From 289389ab3490d96e9dc5027fd0218113651e1695 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ye Bin Date: Thu, 1 Apr 2021 16:19:03 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 1/9] ext4: always panic when errors=panic is specified mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.13-rc1 commit ac2f7ca51b0929461ea49918f27c11b680f28995 category: bugfix issue: #I94Y11 CVE: CVE-2021-46945 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- Before commit 014c9caa29d3 ("ext4: make ext4_abort() use __ext4_error()"), the following series of commands would trigger a panic: 1. mount /dev/sda -o ro,errors=panic test 2. mount /dev/sda -o remount,abort test After commit 014c9caa29d3, remounting a file system using the test mount option "abort" will no longer trigger a panic. This commit will restore the behaviour immediately before commit 014c9caa29d3. (However, note that the Linux kernel's behavior has not been consistent; some previous kernel versions, including 5.4 and 4.19 similarly did not panic after using the mount option "abort".) This also makes a change to long-standing behaviour; namely, the following series commands will now cause a panic, when previously it did not: 1. mount /dev/sda -o ro,errors=panic test 2. echo test > /sys/fs/ext4/sda/trigger_fs_error However, this makes ext4's behaviour much more consistent, so this is a good thing. Cc: stable@kernel.org Fixes: 014c9caa29d3 ("ext4: make ext4_abort() use __ext4_error()") Signed-off-by: Ye Bin Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210401081903.3421208-1-yebin10@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- fs/ext4/super.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/super.c b/fs/ext4/super.c index 1b9d54d13ea8..a58dded6ce63 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/super.c +++ b/fs/ext4/super.c @@ -661,9 +661,6 @@ static void ext4_handle_error(struct super_block *sb, bool force_ro, int error, ext4_commit_super(sb); } - if (sb_rdonly(sb) || continue_fs) - return; - /* * We force ERRORS_RO behavior when system is rebooting. Otherwise we * could panic during 'reboot -f' as the underlying device got already @@ -673,6 +670,10 @@ static void ext4_handle_error(struct super_block *sb, bool force_ro, int error, panic("EXT4-fs (device %s): panic forced after error\n", sb->s_id); } + + if (sb_rdonly(sb) || continue_fs) + return; + ext4_msg(sb, KERN_CRIT, "Remounting filesystem read-only"); /* * Make sure updated value of ->s_mount_flags will be visible before -- Gitee From 13fff18037fa35e520b3fc121b514a120634e15a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Dumazet Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2023 16:46:21 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 2/9] net: prevent mss overflow in skb_segment() stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit 8f8f185643747fbb448de6aab0efa51c679909a3 category: bugfix issue: #I94PF9 CVE: CVE-2023-52435 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- commit 23d05d563b7e7b0314e65c8e882bc27eac2da8e7 upstream. Once again syzbot is able to crash the kernel in skb_segment() [1] GSO_BY_FRAGS is a forbidden value, but unfortunately the following computation in skb_segment() can reach it quite easily : mss = mss * partial_segs; 65535 = 3 * 5 * 17 * 257, so many initial values of mss can lead to a bad final result. Make sure to limit segmentation so that the new mss value is smaller than GSO_BY_FRAGS. [1] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077] CPU: 1 PID: 5079 Comm: syz-executor993 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc4-syzkaller-00141-g1ae4cd3cbdd0 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/10/2023 RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551 Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc900043473d0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000010046 RCX: ffffffff886b1597 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff886b2520 RDI: 0000000000000070 RBP: ffffc90004347578 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888063202ac0 R13: 0000000000010000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000046 FS: 0000555556e7e380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 0000000027ee2000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: udp6_ufo_fragment+0xa0e/0xd00 net/ipv6/udp_offload.c:109 ipv6_gso_segment+0x534/0x17e0 net/ipv6/ip6_offload.c:120 skb_mac_gso_segment+0x290/0x610 net/core/gso.c:53 __skb_gso_segment+0x339/0x710 net/core/gso.c:124 skb_gso_segment include/net/gso.h:83 [inline] validate_xmit_skb+0x36c/0xeb0 net/core/dev.c:3626 __dev_queue_xmit+0x6f3/0x3d60 net/core/dev.c:4338 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3134 [inline] packet_xmit+0x257/0x380 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3087 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x24c6/0x5220 net/packet/af_packet.c:3119 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xd5/0x180 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x255/0x340 net/socket.c:2190 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2202 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2198 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1b0 net/socket.c:2198 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x40/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b RIP: 0033:0x7f8692032aa9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 d1 19 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007fff8d685418 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f8692032aa9 RDX: 0000000000010048 RSI: 00000000200000c0 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00000000000f4240 R08: 0000000020000540 R09: 0000000000000014 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff8d685480 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 00007fff8d685480 R15: 0000000000000003 Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0x181d/0x3f30 net/core/skbuff.c:4551 Code: 83 e3 02 e9 fb ed ff ff e8 90 68 1c f9 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 00 00 48 8d 78 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 08 3c 03 0f 8e 8a 21 00 00 48 8b 84 24 f8 00 RSP: 0018:ffffc900043473d0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000010046 RCX: ffffffff886b1597 RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffffff886b2520 RDI: 0000000000000070 RBP: ffffc90004347578 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 000000000000ffff R10: 000000000000ffff R11: 0000000000000002 R12: ffff888063202ac0 R13: 0000000000010000 R14: 000000000000ffff R15: 0000000000000046 FS: 0000555556e7e380(0000) GS:ffff8880b9900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000020010000 CR3: 0000000027ee2000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Fixes: 3953c46c3ac7 ("sk_buff: allow segmenting based on frag sizes") Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet Cc: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231212164621.4131800-1-edumazet@google.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- net/core/skbuff.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c index e203172b9b9e..d189e3c7a5f5 100644 --- a/net/core/skbuff.c +++ b/net/core/skbuff.c @@ -3873,8 +3873,9 @@ struct sk_buff *skb_segment(struct sk_buff *head_skb, /* GSO partial only requires that we trim off any excess that * doesn't fit into an MSS sized block, so take care of that * now. + * Cap len to not accidentally hit GSO_BY_FRAGS. */ - partial_segs = len / mss; + partial_segs = min(len, GSO_BY_FRAGS - 1U) / mss; if (partial_segs > 1) mss *= partial_segs; else -- Gitee From 3859e57fd5941a137864c9499767635f208b2cbd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Biggers Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 20:44:34 -0800 Subject: [PATCH 3/9] f2fs: explicitly null-terminate the xattr list stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 3e47740091b05ac8d7836a33afd8646b6863ca52 category: bugfix issue: #I94NIQ CVE: CVE-2023-52436 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- commit e26b6d39270f5eab0087453d9b544189a38c8564 upstream. When setting an xattr, explicitly null-terminate the xattr list. This eliminates the fragile assumption that the unused xattr space is always zeroed. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- fs/f2fs/xattr.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c index f44c60114379..dd50b747b671 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/xattr.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/xattr.c @@ -741,6 +741,12 @@ static int __f2fs_setxattr(struct inode *inode, int index, memcpy(pval, value, size); last->e_value_size = cpu_to_le16(size); new_hsize += newsize; + /* + * Explicitly add the null terminator. The unused xattr space + * is supposed to always be zeroed, which would make this + * unnecessary, but don't depend on that. + */ + *(u32 *)((u8 *)last + newsize) = 0; } error = write_all_xattrs(inode, new_hsize, base_addr, ipage); -- Gitee From aaf68b5eff90559307a69f4946f367d8743a45a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Llamas Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 17:21:31 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 4/9] binder: fix use-after-free in shinker's callback stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit c8c1158ffb007197f31f9d9170cf13e4f34cbb5c category: bugfix issue: #I94NJB CVE: CVE-2023-52438 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- commit 3f489c2067c5824528212b0fc18b28d51332d906 upstream. The mmap read lock is used during the shrinker's callback, which means that using alloc->vma pointer isn't safe as it can race with munmap(). As of commit dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap") the mmap lock is downgraded after the vma has been isolated. I was able to reproduce this issue by manually adding some delays and triggering page reclaiming through the shrinker's debug sysfs. The following KASAN report confirms the UAF: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in zap_page_range_single+0x470/0x4b8 Read of size 8 at addr ffff356ed50e50f0 by task bash/478 CPU: 1 PID: 478 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-00055-g1c8b86a3799f-dirty #70 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: zap_page_range_single+0x470/0x4b8 binder_alloc_free_page+0x608/0xadc __list_lru_walk_one+0x130/0x3b0 list_lru_walk_node+0xc4/0x22c binder_shrink_scan+0x108/0x1dc shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x2b4/0x500 full_proxy_write+0xd4/0x140 vfs_write+0x1ac/0x758 ksys_write+0xf0/0x1dc __arm64_sys_write+0x6c/0x9c Allocated by task 492: kmem_cache_alloc+0x130/0x368 vm_area_alloc+0x2c/0x190 mmap_region+0x258/0x18bc do_mmap+0x694/0xa60 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x170/0x29c ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x290/0x3a0 __arm64_sys_mmap+0xcc/0x144 Freed by task 491: kmem_cache_free+0x17c/0x3c8 vm_area_free_rcu_cb+0x74/0x98 rcu_core+0xa38/0x26d4 rcu_core_si+0x10/0x1c __do_softirq+0x2fc/0xd24 Last potentially related work creation: __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x6c/0xba0 call_rcu+0x10/0x1c vm_area_free+0x18/0x24 remove_vma+0xe4/0x118 do_vmi_align_munmap.isra.0+0x718/0xb5c do_vmi_munmap+0xdc/0x1fc __vm_munmap+0x10c/0x278 __arm64_sys_munmap+0x58/0x7c Fix this issue by performing instead a vma_lookup() which will fail to find the vma that was isolated before the mmap lock downgrade. Note that this option has better performance than upgrading to a mmap write lock which would increase contention. Plus, mmap_write_trylock() has been recently removed anyway. Fixes: dd2283f2605e ("mm: mmap: zap pages with read mmap_sem in munmap") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Liam Howlett Cc: Minchan Kim Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231201172212.1813387-3-cmllamas@google.com [cmllamas: use find_vma() instead of vma_lookup() as commit ce6d42f2e4a2 is missing in v5.10. This only works because we check the vma against our cached alloc->vma pointer.] Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- drivers/android/binder_alloc.c | 6 +++++- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c index a77ed66425f2..3c93e6c05c4d 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder_alloc.c @@ -1002,7 +1002,9 @@ enum lru_status binder_alloc_free_page(struct list_head *item, goto err_mmget; if (!mmap_read_trylock(mm)) goto err_mmap_read_lock_failed; - vma = binder_alloc_get_vma(alloc); + vma = find_vma(mm, page_addr); + if (vma && vma != binder_alloc_get_vma(alloc)) + goto err_invalid_vma; list_lru_isolate(lru, item); spin_unlock(lock); @@ -1028,6 +1030,8 @@ enum lru_status binder_alloc_free_page(struct list_head *item, mutex_unlock(&alloc->mutex); return LRU_REMOVED_RETRY; +err_invalid_vma: + mmap_read_unlock(mm); err_mmap_read_lock_failed: mmput_async(mm); err_mmget: -- Gitee From cba559b8d7f4dbd138eb21b5aacff6e85d512f74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Fedor Pchelkin Date: Thu, 28 Dec 2023 19:07:43 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 5/9] apparmor: avoid crash when parsed profile name is empty stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 5ff00408e5029d3550ee77f62dc15f1e15c47f87 category: bugfix issue: #I94PIM CVE: CVE-2023-52443 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 55a8210c9e7d21ff2644809699765796d4bfb200 ] When processing a packed profile in unpack_profile() described like "profile :ns::samba-dcerpcd /usr/lib*/samba/{,samba/}samba-dcerpcd {...}" a string ":samba-dcerpcd" is unpacked as a fully-qualified name and then passed to aa_splitn_fqname(). aa_splitn_fqname() treats ":samba-dcerpcd" as only containing a namespace. Thus it returns NULL for tmpname, meanwhile tmpns is non-NULL. Later aa_alloc_profile() crashes as the new profile name is NULL now. general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 6 PID: 1657 Comm: apparmor_parser Not tainted 6.7.0-rc2-dirty #16 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 Call Trace: ? strlen+0x1e/0xa0 aa_policy_init+0x1bb/0x230 aa_alloc_profile+0xb1/0x480 unpack_profile+0x3bc/0x4960 aa_unpack+0x309/0x15e0 aa_replace_profiles+0x213/0x33c0 policy_update+0x261/0x370 profile_replace+0x20e/0x2a0 vfs_write+0x2af/0xe00 ksys_write+0x126/0x250 do_syscall_64+0x46/0xf0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x76 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- RIP: 0010:strlen+0x1e/0xa0 It seems such behaviour of aa_splitn_fqname() is expected and checked in other places where it is called (e.g. aa_remove_profiles). Well, there is an explicit comment "a ns name without a following profile is allowed" inside. AFAICS, nothing can prevent unpacked "name" to be in form like ":samba-dcerpcd" - it is passed from userspace. Deny the whole profile set replacement in such case and inform user with EPROTO and an explaining message. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org). Fixes: 04dc715e24d0 ("apparmor: audit policy ns specified in policy load") Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin Signed-off-by: John Johansen Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index 519656e68582..3d886d409210 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -696,6 +696,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len); if (tmpns) { + if (!tmpname) { + info = "empty profile name"; + goto fail; + } *ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!*ns_name) { info = "out of memory"; -- Gitee From 3178e7b65db626dffb385a03fc9fe62905c492ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2023 17:25:16 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 6/9] f2fs: fix to avoid dirent corruption stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit 6f866885e147d33efc497f1095f35b2ee5ec7310 category: bugfix issue: #I94PIU CVE: CVE-2023-52444 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 53edb549565f55ccd0bdf43be3d66ce4c2d48b28 ] As Al reported in link[1]: f2fs_rename() ... if (old_dir != new_dir && !whiteout) f2fs_set_link(old_inode, old_dir_entry, old_dir_page, new_dir); else f2fs_put_page(old_dir_page, 0); You want correct inumber in the ".." link. And cross-directory rename does move the source to new parent, even if you'd been asked to leave a whiteout in the old place. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20231017055040.GN800259@ZenIV/ With below testcase, it may cause dirent corruption, due to it missed to call f2fs_set_link() to update ".." link to new directory. - mkdir -p dir/foo - renameat2 -w dir/foo bar [ASSERT] (__chk_dots_dentries:1421) --> Bad inode number[0x4] for '..', parent parent ino is [0x3] [FSCK] other corrupted bugs [Fail] Fixes: 7e01e7ad746b ("f2fs: support RENAME_WHITEOUT") Cc: Jan Kara Reported-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- fs/f2fs/namei.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c index 98263180c0ea..b460347a69b9 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c @@ -1074,7 +1074,7 @@ static int f2fs_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry, } if (old_dir_entry) { - if (old_dir != new_dir && !whiteout) + if (old_dir != new_dir) f2fs_set_link(old_inode, old_dir_entry, old_dir_page, new_dir); else -- Gitee From bffce76633bf4a0a41d3a33de514c8ee8709ad3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Maurizio Lombardi Date: Fri, 22 Dec 2023 16:17:48 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 7/9] nvmet-tcp: Fix a kernel panic when host sends an invalid H2C PDU length stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.209 commit f775f2621c2ac5cc3a0b3a64665dad4fb146e510 category: bugfix issue: #I94PNN CVE: CVE-2023-52454 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit efa56305908ba20de2104f1b8508c6a7401833be ] If the host sends an H2CData command with an invalid DATAL, the kernel may crash in nvmet_tcp_build_pdu_iovec(). Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000 lr : nvmet_tcp_io_work+0x6ac/0x718 [nvmet_tcp] Call trace: process_one_work+0x174/0x3c8 worker_thread+0x2d0/0x3e8 kthread+0x104/0x110 Fix the bug by raising a fatal error if DATAL isn't coherent with the packet size. Also, the PDU length should never exceed the MAXH2CDATA parameter which has been communicated to the host in nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq(). Fixes: 872d26a391da ("nvmet-tcp: add NVMe over TCP target driver") Signed-off-by: Maurizio Lombardi Reviewed-by: Sagi Grimberg Signed-off-by: Keith Busch Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c index 7ce22d173fc7..153150e8beb9 100644 --- a/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c +++ b/drivers/nvme/target/tcp.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include "nvmet.h" #define NVMET_TCP_DEF_INLINE_DATA_SIZE (4 * PAGE_SIZE) +#define NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA 0x400000 /* 16M arbitrary limit */ /* Define the socket priority to use for connections were it is desirable * that the NIC consider performing optimized packet processing or filtering. @@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_handle_icreq(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue) icresp->hdr.pdo = 0; icresp->hdr.plen = cpu_to_le32(icresp->hdr.hlen); icresp->pfv = cpu_to_le16(NVME_TCP_PFV_1_0); - icresp->maxdata = cpu_to_le32(0x400000); /* 16M arbitrary limit */ + icresp->maxdata = cpu_to_le32(NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA); icresp->cpda = 0; if (queue->hdr_digest) icresp->digest |= NVME_TCP_HDR_DIGEST_ENABLE; @@ -918,6 +919,7 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue) { struct nvme_tcp_data_pdu *data = &queue->pdu.data; struct nvmet_tcp_cmd *cmd; + unsigned int plen; if (likely(queue->nr_cmds)) { if (unlikely(data->ttag >= queue->nr_cmds)) { @@ -941,7 +943,16 @@ static int nvmet_tcp_handle_h2c_data_pdu(struct nvmet_tcp_queue *queue) return -EPROTO; } + plen = le32_to_cpu(data->hdr.plen); cmd->pdu_len = le32_to_cpu(data->data_length); + if (unlikely(cmd->pdu_len != (plen - sizeof(*data)) || + cmd->pdu_len == 0 || + cmd->pdu_len > NVMET_TCP_MAXH2CDATA)) { + pr_err("H2CData PDU len %u is invalid\n", cmd->pdu_len); + /* FIXME: use proper transport errors */ + nvmet_tcp_fatal_error(queue); + return -EPROTO; + } cmd->pdu_recv = 0; nvmet_tcp_map_pdu_iovec(cmd); queue->cmd = cmd; -- Gitee From 252e197b353458936c61d25a0d1388031f963f92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hao Sun Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2024 09:20:27 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 8/9] bpf: Reject variable offset alu on PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.8-rc1 commit 22c7fa171a02d310e3a3f6ed46a698ca8a0060ed category: bugfix issue: #I94PX1 CVE: CVE-2024-26589 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- For PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS, check_flow_keys_access() only uses fixed off for validation. However, variable offset ptr alu is not prohibited for this ptr kind. So the variable offset is not checked. The following prog is accepted: func#0 @0 0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0 0: (bf) r6 = r1 ; R1=ctx() R6_w=ctx() 1: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r6 +144) ; R6_w=ctx() R7_w=flow_keys() 2: (b7) r8 = 1024 ; R8_w=1024 3: (37) r8 /= 1 ; R8_w=scalar() 4: (57) r8 &= 1024 ; R8_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0, smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,var_off=(0x0; 0x400)) 5: (0f) r7 += r8 mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 4: (57) r8 &= 1024 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 3: (37) r8 /= 1 mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 2: (b7) r8 = 1024 6: R7_w=flow_keys(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,var_off =(0x0; 0x400)) R8_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024, var_off=(0x0; 0x400)) 6: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) ; R0_w=scalar() 7: (95) exit This prog loads flow_keys to r7, and adds the variable offset r8 to r7, and finally causes out-of-bounds access: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90014c80038 [...] Call Trace: bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1231 [inline] __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:651 [inline] bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:658 [inline] bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu include/linux/filter.h:675 [inline] bpf_flow_dissect+0x15f/0x350 net/core/flow_dissector.c:991 bpf_prog_test_run_flow_dissector+0x39d/0x620 net/bpf/test_run.c:1359 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4107 [inline] __sys_bpf+0xf8f/0x4560 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5475 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5561 [inline] __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5559 [inline] __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5559 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Fix this by rejecting ptr alu with variable offset on flow_keys. Applying the patch rejects the program with "R7 pointer arithmetic on flow_keys prohibited". Fixes: d58e468b1112 ("flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF hook") Signed-off-by: Hao Sun Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Yonghong Song Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20240115082028.9992-1-sunhao.th@gmail.com Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 2f60dffeeb36..f1deefc9bdcd 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -6162,6 +6162,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, } switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) { + case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS: + if (known) + break; + fallthrough; case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP: /* smin_val represents the known value */ if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD) -- Gitee From 391d2de71d191597f95a5cf4ec73618de9e10905 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Carlos Llamas Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2024 21:53:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 9/9] binder: signal epoll threads of self-work MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.210 commit a423042052ec2bdbf1e552e621e6a768922363cc category: bugfix issue: #I94Q0R CVE: CVE-2024-26606 Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --------------------------------------- commit 97830f3c3088638ff90b20dfba2eb4d487bf14d7 upstream. In (e)poll mode, threads often depend on I/O events to determine when data is ready for consumption. Within binder, a thread may initiate a command via BINDER_WRITE_READ without a read buffer and then make use of epoll_wait() or similar to consume any responses afterwards. It is then crucial that epoll threads are signaled via wakeup when they queue their own work. Otherwise, they risk waiting indefinitely for an event leaving their work unhandled. What is worse, subsequent commands won't trigger a wakeup either as the thread has pending work. Fixes: 457b9a6f09f0 ("Staging: android: add binder driver") Cc: Arve Hjønnevåg Cc: Martijn Coenen Cc: Alice Ryhl Cc: Steven Moreland Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.19+ Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240131215347.1808751-1-cmllamas@google.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: wanxiaoqing --- drivers/android/binder.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/android/binder.c b/drivers/android/binder.c index a4a0950b2a7c..a38959e912ae 100644 --- a/drivers/android/binder.c +++ b/drivers/android/binder.c @@ -877,6 +877,16 @@ binder_enqueue_thread_work_ilocked(struct binder_thread *thread, { WARN_ON(!list_empty(&thread->waiting_thread_node)); binder_enqueue_work_ilocked(work, &thread->todo); + + /* (e)poll-based threads require an explicit wakeup signal when + * queuing their own work; they rely on these events to consume + * messages without I/O block. Without it, threads risk waiting + * indefinitely without handling the work. + */ + if (thread->looper & BINDER_LOOPER_STATE_POLL && + thread->pid == current->pid && !thread->process_todo) + wake_up_interruptible_sync(&thread->wait); + thread->process_todo = true; } -- Gitee