diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
index bfb4f4fada337ac48d7093d76d438896d4edea81..2a273bfebed057feff4c776b8c2d1c14d84feefb 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -507,6 +507,7 @@ What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mds
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/mmio_stale_data
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/retbleed
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spec_store_bypass
 		/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index 84742be223ff895356fbfe990bea705d2538e241..e020d1637e1c4880099eee517fa19fa611794255 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -18,3 +18,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
    gather_data_sampling.rst
    srso
+   reg-file-data-sampling
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..810424b4b7f6d6d1a05df1abe55f7bd816ae880d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+==================================
+Register File Data Sampling (RFDS)
+==================================
+
+Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) is a microarchitectural vulnerability that
+only affects Intel Atom parts(also branded as E-cores). RFDS may allow
+a malicious actor to infer data values previously used in floating point
+registers, vector registers, or integer registers. RFDS does not provide the
+ability to choose which data is inferred. CVE-2023-28746 is assigned to RFDS.
+
+Affected Processors
+===================
+Below is the list of affected Intel processors [#f1]_:
+
+   ===================  ============
+   Common name          Family_Model
+   ===================  ============
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT           06_5CH
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT_D         06_5FH
+   ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS      06_7AH
+   ATOM_TREMONT_D          06_86H
+   ATOM_TREMONT            06_96H
+   ALDERLAKE               06_97H
+   ALDERLAKE_L             06_9AH
+   ATOM_TREMONT_L          06_9CH
+   RAPTORLAKE              06_B7H
+   RAPTORLAKE_P            06_BAH
+   ALDERLAKE_N             06_BEH
+   RAPTORLAKE_S            06_BFH
+   ===================  ============
+
+As an exception to this table, Intel Xeon E family parts ALDERLAKE(06_97H) and
+RAPTORLAKE(06_B7H) codenamed Catlow are not affected. They are reported as
+vulnerable in Linux because they share the same family/model with an affected
+part. Unlike their affected counterparts, they do not enumerate RFDS_CLEAR or
+CPUID.HYBRID. This information could be used to distinguish between the
+affected and unaffected parts, but it is deemed not worth adding complexity as
+the reporting is fixed automatically when these parts enumerate RFDS_NO.
+
+Mitigation
+==========
+Intel released a microcode update that enables software to clear sensitive
+information using the VERW instruction. Like MDS, RFDS deploys the same
+mitigation strategy to force the CPU to clear the affected buffers before an
+attacker can extract the secrets. This is achieved by using the otherwise
+unused and obsolete VERW instruction in combination with a microcode update.
+The microcode clears the affected CPU buffers when the VERW instruction is
+executed.
+
+Mitigation points
+-----------------
+VERW is executed by the kernel before returning to user space, and by KVM
+before VMentry. None of the affected cores support SMT, so VERW is not required
+at C-state transitions.
+
+New bits in IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES
+----------------------------------
+Newer processors and microcode update on existing affected processors added new
+bits to IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. These bits can be used to enumerate
+vulnerability and mitigation capability:
+
+- Bit 27 - RFDS_NO - When set, processor is not affected by RFDS.
+- Bit 28 - RFDS_CLEAR - When set, processor is affected by RFDS, and has the
+  microcode that clears the affected buffers on VERW execution.
+
+Mitigation control on the kernel command line
+---------------------------------------------
+The kernel command line allows to control RFDS mitigation at boot time with the
+parameter "reg_file_data_sampling=". The valid arguments are:
+
+  ==========  =================================================================
+  on          If the CPU is vulnerable, enable mitigation; CPU buffer clearing
+              on exit to userspace and before entering a VM.
+  off         Disables mitigation.
+  ==========  =================================================================
+
+Mitigation default is selected by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS.
+
+Mitigation status information
+-----------------------------
+The Linux kernel provides a sysfs interface to enumerate the current
+vulnerability status of the system: whether the system is vulnerable, and
+which mitigations are active. The relevant sysfs file is:
+
+	/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/reg_file_data_sampling
+
+The possible values in this file are:
+
+  .. list-table::
+
+     * - 'Not affected'
+       - The processor is not vulnerable
+     * - 'Vulnerable'
+       - The processor is vulnerable, but no mitigation enabled
+     * - 'Vulnerable: No microcode'
+       - The processor is vulnerable but microcode is not updated.
+     * - 'Mitigation: Clear Register File'
+       - The processor is vulnerable and the CPU buffer clearing mitigation is
+	 enabled.
+
+References
+----------
+.. [#f1] Affected Processors
+   https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/topic-technology/software-security-guidance/processors-affected-consolidated-product-cpu-model.html
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 95ad009f573ef5fd1000ecd13a0e051c70f0311d..82ae0b5b9a6248bdb21c65c83113a6395dadcd83 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -994,6 +994,26 @@
 			The filter can be disabled or changed to another
 			driver later using sysfs.
 
+	reg_file_data_sampling=
+			[X86] Controls mitigation for Register File Data
+			Sampling (RFDS) vulnerability. RFDS is a CPU
+			vulnerability which may allow userspace to infer
+			kernel data values previously stored in floating point
+			registers, vector registers, or integer registers.
+			RFDS only affects Intel Atom processors.
+
+			on:	Turns ON the mitigation.
+			off:	Turns OFF the mitigation.
+
+			This parameter overrides the compile time default set
+			by CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS. Mitigation cannot be
+			disabled when other VERW based mitigations (like MDS)
+			are enabled. In order to disable RFDS mitigation all
+			VERW based mitigations need to be disabled.
+
+			For details see:
+			Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst
+
 	driver_async_probe=  [KNL]
 			List of driver names to be probed asynchronously.
 			Format: <driver_name1>,<driver_name2>...
@@ -2920,6 +2940,7 @@
 					       nopti [X86,PPC]
 					       nospectre_v1 [X86,PPC]
 					       nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC,S390,ARM64]
+					       reg_file_data_sampling=off [X86]
 					       retbleed=off [X86]
 					       spec_store_bypass_disable=off [X86,PPC]
 					       spectre_v2_user=off [X86]
diff --git a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
index 5d4330be200f980cf4ea7a8e17b9e89012dcc381..e801df0bb3a81a83c2d7676d72982c3d72c33fca 100644
--- a/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
+++ b/Documentation/x86/mds.rst
@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@ The kernel provides a function to invoke the buffer clearing:
 
     mds_clear_cpu_buffers()
 
+Also macro CLEAR_CPU_BUFFERS can be used in ASM late in exit-to-user path.
+Other than CFLAGS.ZF, this macro doesn't clobber any registers.
+
 The mitigation is invoked on kernel/userspace, hypervisor/guest and C-state
 (idle) transitions.
 
@@ -138,17 +141,30 @@ Mitigation points
 
    When transitioning from kernel to user space the CPU buffers are flushed
    on affected CPUs when the mitigation is not disabled on the kernel
-   command line. The migitation is enabled through the static key
-   mds_user_clear.
-
-   The mitigation is invoked in prepare_exit_to_usermode() which covers
-   all but one of the kernel to user space transitions.  The exception
-   is when we return from a Non Maskable Interrupt (NMI), which is
-   handled directly in do_nmi().
-
-   (The reason that NMI is special is that prepare_exit_to_usermode() can
-    enable IRQs.  In NMI context, NMIs are blocked, and we don't want to
-    enable IRQs with NMIs blocked.)
+   command line. The mitigation is enabled through the feature flag
+   X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF.
+
+   The mitigation is invoked just before transitioning to userspace after
+   user registers are restored. This is done to minimize the window in
+   which kernel data could be accessed after VERW e.g. via an NMI after
+   VERW.
+
+   **Corner case not handled**
+   Interrupts returning to kernel don't clear CPUs buffers since the
+   exit-to-user path is expected to do that anyways. But, there could be
+   a case when an NMI is generated in kernel after the exit-to-user path
+   has cleared the buffers. This case is not handled and NMI returning to
+   kernel don't clear CPU buffers because:
+
+   1. It is rare to get an NMI after VERW, but before returning to userspace.
+   2. For an unprivileged user, there is no known way to make that NMI
+      less rare or target it.
+   3. It would take a large number of these precisely-timed NMIs to mount
+      an actual attack.  There's presumably not enough bandwidth.
+   4. The NMI in question occurs after a VERW, i.e. when user state is
+      restored and most interesting data is already scrubbed. Whats left
+      is only the data that NMI touches, and that may or may not be of
+      any interest.
 
 
 2. C-State transition
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 6dc670e363939ad85fe798094b0c268dfc5255a9..0c4b8c6fb44bb726466143d2fc723e0098e8c9f1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2511,6 +2511,17 @@ config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
 
 	  If in doubt, say N.
 
+config MITIGATION_RFDS
+	bool "RFDS Mitigation"
+	depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+	default y
+	help
+	  Enable mitigation for Register File Data Sampling (RFDS) by default.
+	  RFDS is a hardware vulnerability which affects Intel Atom CPUs. It
+	  allows unprivileged speculative access to stale data previously
+	  stored in floating point, vector and integer registers.
+	  See also <file:Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/reg-file-data-sampling.rst>
+
 endif
 
 config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index cc71ed3fff349896095fb999e96a3a7d26c59a6f..e2940a1ad774e2b63ee08285a833fe9caa4392e3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -453,4 +453,5 @@
 /* BUG word 2 */
 #define X86_BUG_SRSO			X86_BUG(1*32 + 0) /* AMD SRSO bug */
 #define X86_BUG_DIV0			X86_BUG(1*32 + 1) /* AMD DIV0 speculation bug */
+#define X86_BUG_RFDS			X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index 5443851d3aa6089e592ee60b0fb30120c1e1ac4d..264ab414e9f632d3d37f8b336df2aa34762dc5fb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 
 static __always_inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode(void)
 {
-	mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	amd_clear_divider();
 }
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode arch_exit_to_user_mode
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
index 202a52e42a368ff38163664f553075d62e725e47..b86a37c94073199c2fb890e1cc9afe4216e63b4a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h
@@ -166,6 +166,14 @@
 						 * CPU is not vulnerable to Gather
 						 * Data Sampling (GDS).
 						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO		BIT(27)	/*
+						 * Not susceptible to Register
+						 * File Data Sampling.
+						 */
+#define ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR		BIT(28)	/*
+						 * VERW clears CPU Register
+						 * File.
+						 */
 
 #define MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD		0x0000010b
 #define L1D_FLUSH			BIT(0)	/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 7b4782249a9250737c8abc517677fb5e56523844..422f70c7e6209d1c2cd7d4a91ca8e32393f3973f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -355,7 +355,6 @@ DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_to_cond_stibp);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 
 DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mmio_stale_data_clear);
@@ -385,17 +384,6 @@ static __always_inline void mds_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
 	asm volatile("verw %[ds]" : : [ds] "m" (ds) : "cc");
 }
 
-/**
- * mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS and TAA vulnerability
- *
- * Clear CPU buffers if the corresponding static key is enabled
- */
-static __always_inline void mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers(void)
-{
-	if (static_branch_likely(&mds_user_clear))
-		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
-}
-
 /**
  * mds_idle_clear_cpu_buffers - Mitigation for MDS vulnerability
  *
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ec3ddb9a456ba2b659eeb5d34938e2b7b75e1a77..008d000a862c041da5b110724eac4f3728718ebf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -109,9 +109,6 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_ibpb);
 /* Control unconditional IBPB in switch_mm() */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_always_ibpb);
 
-/* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before returning to user space */
-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_user_clear);
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_user_clear);
 /* Control MDS CPU buffer clear before idling (halt, mwait) */
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(mds_idle_clear);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(mds_idle_clear);
@@ -249,7 +246,7 @@ static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void)
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MD_CLEAR))
 			mds_mitigation = MDS_MITIGATION_VMWERV;
 
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 
 		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_MSBDS_ONLY) &&
 		    (mds_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt()))
@@ -353,7 +350,7 @@ static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void)
 	 * For guests that can't determine whether the correct microcode is
 	 * present on host, enable the mitigation for UCODE_NEEDED as well.
 	 */
-	static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
 
 	if (taa_nosmt || cpu_mitigations_auto_nosmt())
 		cpu_smt_disable(false);
@@ -421,7 +418,14 @@ static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void)
 	 */
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS) || (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) &&
 					      boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)))
-		static_branch_enable(&mds_user_clear);
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+
+	/*
+	 * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF could be enabled by other VERW based
+	 * mitigations, disable KVM-only mitigation in that case.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
+		static_branch_disable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 	else
 		static_branch_enable(&mmio_stale_data_clear);
 
@@ -473,6 +477,57 @@ static int __init mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 }
 early_param("mmio_stale_data", mmio_stale_data_parse_cmdline);
 
+#undef pr_fmt
+#define pr_fmt(fmt)	"Register File Data Sampling: " fmt
+
+enum rfds_mitigations {
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW,
+	RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED,
+};
+
+/* Default mitigation for Register File Data Sampling */
+static enum rfds_mitigations rfds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+	IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RFDS) ? RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW : RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+
+static const char * const rfds_strings[] = {
+	[RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF]			= "Vulnerable",
+	[RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW]			= "Mitigation: Clear Register File",
+	[RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED]		= "Vulnerable: No microcode",
+};
+
+static void __init rfds_select_mitigation(void)
+{
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS) || cpu_mitigations_off()) {
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
+		return;
+
+	if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF);
+	else
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
+}
+
+static __init int rfds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
+{
+	if (!str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!strcmp(str, "off"))
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
+	else if (!strcmp(str, "on"))
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("reg_file_data_sampling", rfds_parse_cmdline);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)     "" fmt
 
@@ -481,12 +536,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 	if (cpu_mitigations_off())
 		return;
 
-	if (!static_key_enabled(&mds_user_clear))
+	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
 		goto out;
 
 	/*
-	 * mds_user_clear is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
-	 * mitigation, if necessary.
+	 * X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF is now enabled. Update MDS, TAA and MMIO
+	 * Stale Data mitigation, if necessary.
 	 */
 	if (mds_mitigation == MDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
 	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS)) {
@@ -498,11 +553,19 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 		taa_mitigation = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
 		taa_select_mitigation();
 	}
-	if (mmio_mitigation == MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF &&
-	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
+	/*
+	 * MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF is not checked here so that mmio_stale_data_clear
+	 * gets updated correctly as per X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF state.
+	 */
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_STALE_DATA)) {
 		mmio_mitigation = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
 		mmio_select_mitigation();
 	}
+	if (rfds_mitigation == RFDS_MITIGATION_OFF &&
+	    boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS)) {
+		rfds_mitigation = RFDS_MITIGATION_VERW;
+		rfds_select_mitigation();
+	}
 out:
 	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
 		pr_info("MDS: %s\n", mds_strings[mds_mitigation]);
@@ -512,6 +575,8 @@ static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void)
 		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: %s\n", mmio_strings[mmio_mitigation]);
 	else if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MMIO_UNKNOWN))
 		pr_info("MMIO Stale Data: Unknown: No mitigations\n");
+	if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
+		pr_info("Register File Data Sampling: %s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
 }
 
 static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
@@ -519,11 +584,12 @@ static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void)
 	mds_select_mitigation();
 	taa_select_mitigation();
 	mmio_select_mitigation();
+	rfds_select_mitigation();
 
 	/*
-	 * As MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data mitigations are inter-related, update
-	 * and print their mitigation after MDS, TAA and MMIO Stale Data
-	 * mitigation selection is done.
+	 * As these mitigations are inter-related and rely on VERW instruction
+	 * to clear the microarchitural buffers, update and print their status
+	 * after mitigation selection is done for each of these vulnerabilities.
 	 */
 	md_clear_update_mitigation();
 }
@@ -2519,6 +2585,11 @@ static ssize_t mmio_stale_data_show_state(char *buf)
 			  sched_smt_active() ? "vulnerable" : "disabled");
 }
 
+static ssize_t rfds_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", rfds_strings[rfds_mitigation]);
+}
+
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
 	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
@@ -2680,6 +2751,9 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr
 	case X86_BUG_SRSO:
 		return srso_show_state(buf);
 
+	case X86_BUG_RFDS:
+		return rfds_show_state(buf);
+
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
@@ -2754,4 +2828,9 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev, struct device_attribut
 {
 	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_SRSO);
 }
+
+ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return cpu_show_common(dev, attr, buf, X86_BUG_RFDS);
+}
 #endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index 4ecc6072e9a48d18860e0eba9993423f337ad0cb..23b38ef21ce1baa61c646dd743066f86f1ccb832 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -1134,6 +1134,8 @@ static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_whitelist[] = {
 #define SRSO		BIT(5)
 /* CPU is affected by GDS */
 #define GDS		BIT(6)
+/* CPU is affected by Register File Data Sampling */
+#define RFDS		BIT(7)
 
 static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		SRBDS),
@@ -1161,9 +1163,18 @@ static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		GDS),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO),
-	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_P,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE_S,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_N,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_TREMONT_L,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_D,	X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
+	VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ATOM_GOLDMONT_PLUS, X86_STEPPING_ANY,		RFDS),
 
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x15, RETBLEED),
 	VULNBL_AMD(0x16, RETBLEED),
@@ -1197,6 +1208,24 @@ static bool arch_cap_mmio_immune(u64 ia32_cap)
 		ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO);
 }
 
+static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap)
+{
+	/* The "immunity" bit trumps everything else: */
+	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO)
+		return false;
+
+	/*
+	 * VMMs set ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR for processors not in the blacklist to
+	 * indicate that mitigation is needed because guest is running on a
+	 * vulnerable hardware or may migrate to such hardware:
+	 */
+	if (ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
+		return true;
+
+	/* Only consult the blacklist when there is no enumeration: */
+	return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
+}
+
 static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 {
 	u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ -1302,6 +1331,9 @@ static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 			setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SRSO);
 	}
 
+	if (vulnerable_to_rfds(ia32_cap))
+		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS);
+
 	if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
 		return;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
index 2ef961cf4cfc54b5e77162735fc0cea48dfb57d9..f2e53b20df7e3b0f01e351a619b1714e5398323f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/nmi.c
@@ -519,9 +519,6 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_nmi)
 		write_cr2(this_cpu_read(nmi_cr2));
 	if (this_cpu_dec_return(nmi_state))
 		goto nmi_restart;
-
-	if (user_mode(regs))
-		mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers();
 }
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86_64) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 2445c61038954d7f622e583a3cce93be138b66e4..1030c5904122c3aed40026b0e614ca1b68a99c1f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6795,7 +6795,7 @@ static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 	/* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
 	if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
 		vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
-	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
+	else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF))
 		mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
 	else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mmio_stale_data_clear) &&
 		 kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 9d3015863e5817b8aa12ac4ef9a62e0f102bb121..e92d723ec18ff6f4b8c39059855d62db74000e0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -1389,7 +1389,8 @@ static unsigned int num_msr_based_features;
 	 ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH | ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO | \
 	 ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \
 	 ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \
-	 ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO)
+	 ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO | \
+	 ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
 
 static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 {
@@ -1426,6 +1427,8 @@ static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
 		data |= ARCH_CAP_SSB_NO;
 	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_MDS))
 		data |= ARCH_CAP_MDS_NO;
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RFDS))
+		data |= ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO;
 
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
 		/*
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c b/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
index 59781e765e0e2dfe039c5030219f9f088f3a3564..3deeabb2739406e3d93995faf03270ed33eaa387 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/processor_idle.c
@@ -1427,6 +1427,8 @@ int acpi_processor_power_exit(struct acpi_processor *pr)
 		acpi_processor_registered--;
 		if (acpi_processor_registered == 0)
 			cpuidle_unregister_driver(&acpi_idle_driver);
+
+		kfree(dev);
 	}
 
 	pr->flags.power_setup_done = 0;
diff --git a/drivers/base/cpu.c b/drivers/base/cpu.c
index 9aeb01c7406aa076d4a6f7ebc83c5a22080aaf47..2faa12bc818394ee78c3226ccd0c3417992a5b8e 100644
--- a/drivers/base/cpu.c
+++ b/drivers/base/cpu.c
@@ -629,6 +629,12 @@ ssize_t __weak cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev,
 	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
 }
 
+ssize_t __weak cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev,
+					       struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return sysfs_emit(buf, "Not affected\n");
+}
+
 static DEVICE_ATTR(meltdown, 0444, cpu_show_meltdown, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v1, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v1, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spectre_v2, 0444, cpu_show_spectre_v2, NULL);
@@ -642,6 +648,7 @@ static DEVICE_ATTR(mmio_stale_data, 0444, cpu_show_mmio_stale_data, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(retbleed, 0444, cpu_show_retbleed, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(gather_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_gds, NULL);
 static DEVICE_ATTR(spec_rstack_overflow, 0444, cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow, NULL);
+static DEVICE_ATTR(reg_file_data_sampling, 0444, cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling, NULL);
 
 static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_meltdown.attr,
@@ -657,6 +664,7 @@ static struct attribute *cpu_root_vulnerabilities_attrs[] = {
 	&dev_attr_retbleed.attr,
 	&dev_attr_gather_data_sampling.attr,
 	&dev_attr_spec_rstack_overflow.attr,
+	&dev_attr_reg_file_data_sampling.attr,
 	NULL
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/dma/ti/edma.c b/drivers/dma/ti/edma.c
index 35d81bd857f118200c575ccc2bf8143b3410a2e6..ddeba9a7c1cfee64febf1af94dfd8daaa8392066 100644
--- a/drivers/dma/ti/edma.c
+++ b/drivers/dma/ti/edma.c
@@ -2462,6 +2462,11 @@ static int edma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (irq >= 0) {
 		irq_name = devm_kasprintf(dev, GFP_KERNEL, "%s_ccint",
 					  dev_name(dev));
+		if (!irq_name) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_disable_pm;
+		}
+
 		ret = devm_request_irq(dev, irq, dma_irq_handler, 0, irq_name,
 				       ecc);
 		if (ret) {
@@ -2478,6 +2483,11 @@ static int edma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	if (irq >= 0) {
 		irq_name = devm_kasprintf(dev, GFP_KERNEL, "%s_ccerrint",
 					  dev_name(dev));
+		if (!irq_name) {
+			ret = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_disable_pm;
+		}
+
 		ret = devm_request_irq(dev, irq, dma_ccerr_handler, 0, irq_name,
 				       ecc);
 		if (ret) {
diff --git a/drivers/md/md.c b/drivers/md/md.c
index fdfc3b742a2e3a56274a110ddb2c2dcd0d328263..9b12b7c23de520941ba4828e516914677afb03cc 100644
--- a/drivers/md/md.c
+++ b/drivers/md/md.c
@@ -2486,6 +2486,7 @@ static int bind_rdev_to_array(struct md_rdev *rdev, struct mddev *mddev)
  fail:
 	pr_warn("md: failed to register dev-%s for %s\n",
 		b, mdname(mddev));
+	mddev_destroy_serial_pool(mddev, rdev, false);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c
index 2ff8a1b776fb4a1b741c81a70a92cd2fc90631ea..467be48b9004c0f5b2a04cf92d7d948467ddc750 100644
--- a/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c
+++ b/drivers/media/dvb-core/dvbdev.c
@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 		dvbdevfops = kmemdup(template->fops, sizeof(*dvbdevfops), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!dvbdevfops) {
 			kfree(dvbdev);
+			*pdvbdev = NULL;
 			mutex_unlock(&dvbdev_register_lock);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
@@ -510,6 +511,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 		if (!new_node) {
 			kfree(dvbdevfops);
 			kfree(dvbdev);
+			*pdvbdev = NULL;
 			mutex_unlock(&dvbdev_register_lock);
 			return -ENOMEM;
 		}
@@ -543,6 +545,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 		}
 		list_del (&dvbdev->list_head);
 		kfree(dvbdev);
+		*pdvbdev = NULL;
 		up_write(&minor_rwsem);
 		mutex_unlock(&dvbdev_register_lock);
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -565,6 +568,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 		dvb_media_device_free(dvbdev);
 		list_del (&dvbdev->list_head);
 		kfree(dvbdev);
+		*pdvbdev = NULL;
 		mutex_unlock(&dvbdev_register_lock);
 		return ret;
 	}
@@ -583,6 +587,7 @@ int dvb_register_device(struct dvb_adapter *adap, struct dvb_device **pdvbdev,
 		dvb_media_device_free(dvbdev);
 		list_del (&dvbdev->list_head);
 		kfree(dvbdev);
+		*pdvbdev = NULL;
 		mutex_unlock(&dvbdev_register_lock);
 		return PTR_ERR(clsdev);
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c
index ad14d521410675fb7889883c11b7fd61afc26f6a..56d320b1a1ca77e257ef1ae334158f0ce6dcec2e 100644
--- a/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c
+++ b/drivers/media/v4l2-core/v4l2-mem2mem.c
@@ -1053,11 +1053,17 @@ static int v4l2_m2m_register_entity(struct media_device *mdev,
 	entity->function = function;
 
 	ret = media_entity_pads_init(entity, num_pads, pads);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(entity->name);
+		entity->name = NULL;
 		return ret;
+	}
 	ret = media_device_register_entity(mdev, entity);
-	if (ret)
+	if (ret) {
+		kfree(entity->name);
+		entity->name = NULL;
 		return ret;
+	}
 
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index 191bf0df146619332f3a2d403fc0451ab0c5a47f..d4c92b11e022e70f829d81569f08fa709ae11975 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -2140,14 +2140,16 @@ static ssize_t tun_put_user(struct tun_struct *tun,
 					    tun_is_little_endian(tun), true,
 					    vlan_hlen)) {
 			struct skb_shared_info *sinfo = skb_shinfo(skb);
-			pr_err("unexpected GSO type: "
-			       "0x%x, gso_size %d, hdr_len %d\n",
-			       sinfo->gso_type, tun16_to_cpu(tun, gso.gso_size),
-			       tun16_to_cpu(tun, gso.hdr_len));
-			print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "tun: ",
-				       DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
-				       16, 1, skb->head,
-				       min((int)tun16_to_cpu(tun, gso.hdr_len), 64), true);
+
+			if (net_ratelimit()) {
+				netdev_err(tun->dev, "unexpected GSO type: 0x%x, gso_size %d, hdr_len %d\n",
+					   sinfo->gso_type, tun16_to_cpu(tun, gso.gso_size),
+					   tun16_to_cpu(tun, gso.hdr_len));
+				print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "tun: ",
+					       DUMP_PREFIX_NONE,
+					       16, 1, skb->head,
+					       min((int)tun16_to_cpu(tun, gso.hdr_len), 64), true);
+			}
 			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
 			return -EINVAL;
 		}
diff --git a/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c b/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
index a2ca38e25e0c33ab6a2c7aace36573068e3d9e36..19da72fe892d150b5ec14c5f315fb8a224e2dd7d 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/sysfs.c
@@ -1190,14 +1190,24 @@ static ssize_t interface_authorized_store(struct device *dev,
 {
 	struct usb_interface *intf = to_usb_interface(dev);
 	bool val;
+	struct kernfs_node *kn;
 
 	if (strtobool(buf, &val) != 0)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	if (val)
+	if (val) {
 		usb_authorize_interface(intf);
-	else
-		usb_deauthorize_interface(intf);
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Prevent deadlock if another process is concurrently
+		 * trying to unregister intf.
+		 */
+		kn = sysfs_break_active_protection(&dev->kobj, &attr->attr);
+		if (kn) {
+			usb_deauthorize_interface(intf);
+			sysfs_unbreak_active_protection(kn);
+		}
+	}
 
 	return count;
 }
diff --git a/fs/aio.c b/fs/aio.c
index b2396cd4a7755cc33292639368295fa0c87b8940..00641a1ad0b3ff0b1d4df7f1c47e25a09a245068 100644
--- a/fs/aio.c
+++ b/fs/aio.c
@@ -565,13 +565,24 @@ static int aio_setup_ring(struct kioctx *ctx, unsigned int nr_events)
 
 void kiocb_set_cancel_fn(struct kiocb *iocb, kiocb_cancel_fn *cancel)
 {
-	struct aio_kiocb *req = container_of(iocb, struct aio_kiocb, rw);
-	struct kioctx *ctx = req->ki_ctx;
+	struct aio_kiocb *req;
+	struct kioctx *ctx;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	/*
+	 * kiocb didn't come from aio or is neither a read nor a write, hence
+	 * ignore it.
+	 */
+	if (!(iocb->ki_flags & IOCB_AIO_RW))
+		return;
+
+	req = container_of(iocb, struct aio_kiocb, rw);
+
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&req->ki_list)))
 		return;
 
+	ctx = req->ki_ctx;
+
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&ctx->ctx_lock, flags);
 	list_add_tail(&req->ki_list, &ctx->active_reqs);
 	req->ki_cancel = cancel;
@@ -1454,7 +1465,7 @@ static int aio_prep_rw(struct kiocb *req, const struct iocb *iocb)
 	req->ki_complete = aio_complete_rw;
 	req->private = NULL;
 	req->ki_pos = iocb->aio_offset;
-	req->ki_flags = iocb_flags(req->ki_filp);
+	req->ki_flags = iocb_flags(req->ki_filp) | IOCB_AIO_RW;
 	if (iocb->aio_flags & IOCB_FLAG_RESFD)
 		req->ki_flags |= IOCB_EVENTFD;
 	req->ki_hint = ki_hint_validate(file_write_hint(req->ki_filp));
diff --git a/fs/fat/nfs.c b/fs/fat/nfs.c
index af191371c3529beb3e84fb30484632b255de629a..bab63eeaf9cbc7cdb4f4cc5ebcb11ac1909824f3 100644
--- a/fs/fat/nfs.c
+++ b/fs/fat/nfs.c
@@ -130,6 +130,12 @@ fat_encode_fh_nostale(struct inode *inode, __u32 *fh, int *lenp,
 		fid->parent_i_gen = parent->i_generation;
 		type = FILEID_FAT_WITH_PARENT;
 		*lenp = FAT_FID_SIZE_WITH_PARENT;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * We need to initialize this field because the fh is actually
+		 * 12 bytes long
+		 */
+		fid->parent_i_pos_hi = 0;
 	}
 
 	return type;
diff --git a/fs/nfs/direct.c b/fs/nfs/direct.c
index 5d86ffa72ceab2c2a82a686319021b8c44fd6351..499519f0f6ecd9f9469ad8d222936f58a375bb98 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/direct.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/direct.c
@@ -678,10 +678,17 @@ static void nfs_direct_commit_schedule(struct nfs_direct_req *dreq)
 	LIST_HEAD(mds_list);
 
 	nfs_init_cinfo_from_dreq(&cinfo, dreq);
+	nfs_commit_begin(cinfo.mds);
 	nfs_scan_commit(dreq->inode, &mds_list, &cinfo);
 	res = nfs_generic_commit_list(dreq->inode, &mds_list, 0, &cinfo);
-	if (res < 0) /* res == -ENOMEM */
-		nfs_direct_write_reschedule(dreq);
+	if (res < 0) { /* res == -ENOMEM */
+		spin_lock(&dreq->lock);
+		if (dreq->flags == 0)
+			dreq->flags = NFS_ODIRECT_RESCHED_WRITES;
+		spin_unlock(&dreq->lock);
+	}
+	if (nfs_commit_end(cinfo.mds))
+		nfs_direct_write_complete(dreq);
 }
 
 static void nfs_direct_write_clear_reqs(struct nfs_direct_req *dreq)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/write.c b/fs/nfs/write.c
index d3cd099ffb6e17702dd35a21cc317a2c70243e45..4cf0606919794f13bfa6e793b63c34544aeeadeb 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/write.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/write.c
@@ -1637,7 +1637,7 @@ static int wait_on_commit(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo)
 				       !atomic_read(&cinfo->rpcs_out));
 }
 
-static void nfs_commit_begin(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo)
+void nfs_commit_begin(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo)
 {
 	atomic_inc(&cinfo->rpcs_out);
 }
diff --git a/fs/pstore/inode.c b/fs/pstore/inode.c
index bbf241a431f27c36d416ef1d259254fe395903db..e83f9df43e64c1af2d5cd3eedee3c1188d7b11cf 100644
--- a/fs/pstore/inode.c
+++ b/fs/pstore/inode.c
@@ -312,7 +312,6 @@ int pstore_put_backend_records(struct pstore_info *psi)
 {
 	struct pstore_private *pos, *tmp;
 	struct dentry *root;
-	int rc = 0;
 
 	root = psinfo_lock_root();
 	if (!root)
@@ -322,11 +321,8 @@ int pstore_put_backend_records(struct pstore_info *psi)
 	list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, &records_list, list) {
 		if (pos->record->psi == psi) {
 			list_del_init(&pos->list);
-			rc = simple_unlink(d_inode(root), pos->dentry);
-			if (WARN_ON(rc))
-				break;
-			d_drop(pos->dentry);
-			dput(pos->dentry);
+			d_invalidate(pos->dentry);
+			simple_unlink(d_inode(root), pos->dentry);
 			pos->dentry = NULL;
 		}
 	}
@@ -334,7 +330,7 @@ int pstore_put_backend_records(struct pstore_info *psi)
 
 	inode_unlock(d_inode(root));
 
-	return rc;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/fs/squashfs/inode.c b/fs/squashfs/inode.c
index 24463145b35135aeaa400eb51abb8aefed848453..9fb8e9fd4c001761c8c4e3369da17634b1db2b25 100644
--- a/fs/squashfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/inode.c
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ static int squashfs_new_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode,
 	gid_t i_gid;
 	int err;
 
+	inode->i_ino = le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->inode_number);
+	if (inode->i_ino == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
 	err = squashfs_get_id(sb, le16_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->uid), &i_uid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
@@ -58,7 +62,6 @@ static int squashfs_new_inode(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode,
 
 	i_uid_write(inode, i_uid);
 	i_gid_write(inode, i_gid);
-	inode->i_ino = le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->inode_number);
 	inode->i_mtime.tv_sec = le32_to_cpu(sqsh_ino->mtime);
 	inode->i_atime.tv_sec = inode->i_mtime.tv_sec;
 	inode->i_ctime.tv_sec = inode->i_mtime.tv_sec;
diff --git a/fs/sysfs/file.c b/fs/sysfs/file.c
index 96d0da65e0887ce8192a7c4719aadfb9cd76d7c5..f51b2396830f4a87660a3c759afd28ed4e543395 100644
--- a/fs/sysfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/sysfs/file.c
@@ -429,6 +429,8 @@ struct kernfs_node *sysfs_break_active_protection(struct kobject *kobj,
 	kn = kernfs_find_and_get(kobj->sd, attr->name);
 	if (kn)
 		kernfs_break_active_protection(kn);
+	else
+		kobject_put(kobj);
 	return kn;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sysfs_break_active_protection);
diff --git a/fs/ubifs/dir.c b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
index ab54732c9c933add03cfb45db2117c947acaab55..6ccc465aa4265d3e021c3a1546a5b05a82ad46a9 100644
--- a/fs/ubifs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/dir.c
@@ -1127,6 +1127,8 @@ static int ubifs_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	dir_ui->ui_size = dir->i_size;
 	mutex_unlock(&dir_ui->ui_mutex);
 out_inode:
+	/* Free inode->i_link before inode is marked as bad. */
+	fscrypt_free_inode(inode);
 	make_bad_inode(inode);
 	iput(inode);
 out_fname:
diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h
index 6d7ab016127c9e7b8bcaa35bc6e902bcb26a26ff..2099226d8623816fe30d6fc02049cca615ece63a 100644
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@ extern ssize_t cpu_show_spec_rstack_overflow(struct device *dev,
 					     struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 extern ssize_t cpu_show_gds(struct device *dev,
 			    struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
+extern ssize_t cpu_show_reg_file_data_sampling(struct device *dev,
+					       struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf);
 
 extern __printf(4, 5)
 struct device *cpu_device_create(struct device *parent, void *drvdata,
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 3a1b74b1c79cf290cf6eb1f62087e92d3762fd8c..a0c79a5de2a8246d301fd406d8878cb53a9e3b6a 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -317,6 +317,8 @@ enum rw_hint {
 /* iocb->ki_waitq is valid */
 #define IOCB_WAITQ		(1 << 19)
 #define IOCB_NOIO		(1 << 20)
+/* kiocb is a read or write operation submitted by fs/aio.c. */
+#define IOCB_AIO_RW		(1 << 23)
 
 struct kiocb {
 	struct file		*ki_filp;
diff --git a/include/linux/nfs_fs.h b/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
index e39342945a80ba88360de774cf28e9208cb77721..7488864589a7abf0a58d418741ea594da0f8e21e 100644
--- a/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/nfs_fs.h
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ extern int nfs_wb_page_cancel(struct inode *inode, struct page* page);
 extern int  nfs_commit_inode(struct inode *, int);
 extern struct nfs_commit_data *nfs_commitdata_alloc(void);
 extern void nfs_commit_free(struct nfs_commit_data *data);
+void nfs_commit_begin(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo);
 bool nfs_commit_end(struct nfs_mds_commit_info *cinfo);
 
 static inline int
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index c8934546e764c351822eb8ddc82cd9cb983fa8f7..124d586f2cd9cdabd83704f5af0e73ffeffa9fc2 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -630,6 +630,8 @@ static void __init setup_command_line(char *command_line)
 	if (!saved_command_line)
 		panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes\n", __func__, len + ilen);
 
+	len = xlen + strlen(command_line) + 1;
+
 	static_command_line = memblock_alloc(len, SMP_CACHE_BYTES);
 	if (!static_command_line)
 		panic("%s: Failed to allocate %zu bytes\n", __func__, len);
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
index c61a23b564aa5b5e04b3a822abaa8992ec3d3d0f..2dcc04b2f330ebe44a56d5db15fca7906599d511 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ static int cpu_map_bpf_prog_run_xdp(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu,
 				    void **frames, int n,
 				    struct xdp_cpumap_stats *stats)
 {
-	struct xdp_rxq_info rxq;
+	struct xdp_rxq_info rxq = {};
 	struct xdp_buff xdp;
 	int i, nframes = 0;
 
diff --git a/mm/swapfile.c b/mm/swapfile.c
index d9c798405eb031aaa2902097df0c2b55ae4145d0..0a067a083116ad3a00d74dd397d1ff8e784bd526 100644
--- a/mm/swapfile.c
+++ b/mm/swapfile.c
@@ -1272,6 +1272,11 @@ static unsigned char __swap_entry_free_locked(struct swap_info_struct *p,
 }
 
 /*
+ * Note that when only holding the PTL, swapoff might succeed immediately
+ * after freeing a swap entry. Therefore, immediately after
+ * __swap_entry_free(), the swap info might become stale and should not
+ * be touched without a prior get_swap_device().
+ *
  * Check whether swap entry is valid in the swap device.  If so,
  * return pointer to swap_info_struct, and keep the swap entry valid
  * via preventing the swap device from being swapoff, until
@@ -1798,13 +1803,19 @@ int free_swap_and_cache(swp_entry_t entry)
 	if (non_swap_entry(entry))
 		return 1;
 
-	p = _swap_info_get(entry);
+	p = get_swap_device(entry);
 	if (p) {
+		if (WARN_ON(data_race(!p->swap_map[swp_offset(entry)]))) {
+			put_swap_device(p);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
 		count = __swap_entry_free(p, entry);
 		if (count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE &&
 		    !swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(p, entry))
 			__try_to_reclaim_swap(p, swp_offset(entry),
 					      TTRS_UNMAPPED | TTRS_FULL);
+		put_swap_device(p);
 	}
 	return p != NULL;
 }
diff --git a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
index 9e8ebac9b7e7ec5b66b7d12ce8f06facf741f7ed..f5019f698105b940e4d5b923a1a5ae04d207fc96 100644
--- a/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
+++ b/net/batman-adv/translation-table.c
@@ -4188,7 +4188,7 @@ void batadv_tt_local_resize_to_mtu(struct net_device *soft_iface)
 
 	spin_lock_bh(&bat_priv->tt.commit_lock);
 
-	while (true) {
+	while (timeout) {
 		table_size = batadv_tt_local_table_transmit_size(bat_priv);
 		if (packet_size_max >= table_size)
 			break;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
index 99f70b990eb138f7aaa43049ae48f1438ab9f8d9..0953d805cbbeef0c584d85ef7a4608d3cb61e6cb 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/ip_tunnel.c
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ int ip_tunnel_rcv(struct ip_tunnel *tunnel, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		  bool log_ecn_error)
 {
 	const struct iphdr *iph = ip_hdr(skb);
-	int err;
+	int nh, err;
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NET_IPGRE_BROADCAST
 	if (ipv4_is_multicast(iph->daddr)) {
@@ -390,8 +390,21 @@ int ip_tunnel_rcv(struct ip_tunnel *tunnel, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		tunnel->i_seqno = ntohl(tpi->seq) + 1;
 	}
 
+	/* Save offset of outer header relative to skb->head,
+	 * because we are going to reset the network header to the inner header
+	 * and might change skb->head.
+	 */
+	nh = skb_network_header(skb) - skb->head;
+
 	skb_set_network_header(skb, (tunnel->dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER) ? ETH_HLEN : 0);
 
+	if (!pskb_inet_may_pull(skb)) {
+		DEV_STATS_INC(tunnel->dev, rx_length_errors);
+		DEV_STATS_INC(tunnel->dev, rx_errors);
+		goto drop;
+	}
+	iph = (struct iphdr *)(skb->head + nh);
+
 	err = IP_ECN_decapsulate(iph, skb);
 	if (unlikely(err)) {
 		if (log_ecn_error)
@@ -540,6 +553,20 @@ static int tnl_update_pmtu(struct net_device *dev, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void ip_tunnel_adj_headroom(struct net_device *dev, unsigned int headroom)
+{
+	/* we must cap headroom to some upperlimit, else pskb_expand_head
+	 * will overflow header offsets in skb_headers_offset_update().
+	 */
+	static const unsigned int max_allowed = 512;
+
+	if (headroom > max_allowed)
+		headroom = max_allowed;
+
+	if (headroom > READ_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom))
+		WRITE_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom, headroom);
+}
+
 void ip_md_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 		       u8 proto, int tunnel_hlen)
 {
@@ -613,13 +640,13 @@ void ip_md_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 	}
 
 	headroom += LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev) + rt->dst.header_len;
-	if (headroom > READ_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom))
-		WRITE_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom, headroom);
-
-	if (skb_cow_head(skb, READ_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom))) {
+	if (skb_cow_head(skb, headroom)) {
 		ip_rt_put(rt);
 		goto tx_dropped;
 	}
+
+	ip_tunnel_adj_headroom(dev, headroom);
+
 	iptunnel_xmit(NULL, rt, skb, fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr, proto, tos, ttl,
 		      df, !net_eq(tunnel->net, dev_net(dev)));
 	return;
@@ -797,16 +824,16 @@ void ip_tunnel_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev,
 
 	max_headroom = LL_RESERVED_SPACE(rt->dst.dev) + sizeof(struct iphdr)
 			+ rt->dst.header_len + ip_encap_hlen(&tunnel->encap);
-	if (max_headroom > READ_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom))
-		WRITE_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom, max_headroom);
 
-	if (skb_cow_head(skb, READ_ONCE(dev->needed_headroom))) {
+	if (skb_cow_head(skb, max_headroom)) {
 		ip_rt_put(rt);
 		dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
 		kfree_skb(skb);
 		return;
 	}
 
+	ip_tunnel_adj_headroom(dev, max_headroom);
+
 	iptunnel_xmit(NULL, rt, skb, fl4.saddr, fl4.daddr, protocol, tos, ttl,
 		      df, !net_eq(tunnel->net, dev_net(dev)));
 	return;