From 386b6e6dd1e9de7a8a6575792fdb02c4ed8016a6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Artem Sadovnikov Date: Fri, 7 Mar 2025 16:34:09 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 01/20] jffs2: check that raw node were preallocated before writing summary stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 8ce46dc5b10b0b6f67663202a4921b0e11ad7367 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38194 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- commit ec9e6f22bce433b260ea226de127ec68042849b0 upstream. Syzkaller detected a kernel bug in jffs2_link_node_ref, caused by fault injection in jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs. jffs2_sum_write_sumnode doesn't check return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs and simply lets any error propagate into jffs2_sum_write_data, which eventually calls jffs2_link_node_ref in order to link the summary to an expectedly allocated node. kernel BUG at fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592! invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 31277 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.1.128-syzkaller-00139-ge10f83ca10a1 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:jffs2_link_node_ref+0x570/0x690 fs/jffs2/nodelist.c:592 Call Trace: jffs2_sum_write_data fs/jffs2/summary.c:841 [inline] jffs2_sum_write_sumnode+0xd1a/0x1da0 fs/jffs2/summary.c:874 jffs2_do_reserve_space+0xa18/0xd60 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:388 jffs2_reserve_space+0x55f/0xaa0 fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c:197 jffs2_write_inode_range+0x246/0xb50 fs/jffs2/write.c:362 jffs2_write_end+0x726/0x15d0 fs/jffs2/file.c:301 generic_perform_write+0x314/0x5d0 mm/filemap.c:3856 __generic_file_write_iter+0x2ae/0x4d0 mm/filemap.c:3973 generic_file_write_iter+0xe3/0x350 mm/filemap.c:4005 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2265 [inline] do_iter_readv_writev+0x20f/0x3c0 fs/read_write.c:735 do_iter_write+0x186/0x710 fs/read_write.c:861 vfs_iter_write+0x70/0xa0 fs/read_write.c:902 iter_file_splice_write+0x73b/0xc90 fs/splice.c:685 do_splice_from fs/splice.c:763 [inline] direct_splice_actor+0x10c/0x170 fs/splice.c:950 splice_direct_to_actor+0x337/0xa10 fs/splice.c:896 do_splice_direct+0x1a9/0x280 fs/splice.c:1002 do_sendfile+0xb13/0x12c0 fs/read_write.c:1255 __do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1323 [inline] __se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1309 [inline] __x64_sys_sendfile64+0x1cf/0x210 fs/read_write.c:1309 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8 Fix this issue by checking return value of jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs before calling jffs2_sum_write_data. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 2f785402f39b ("[JFFS2] Reduce visibility of raw_node_ref to upper layers of JFFS2 code.") Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov Reviewed-by: Zhihao Cheng Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/jffs2/summary.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/jffs2/summary.c b/fs/jffs2/summary.c index 4fe64519870f..d83372d3e1a0 100644 --- a/fs/jffs2/summary.c +++ b/fs/jffs2/summary.c @@ -858,7 +858,10 @@ int jffs2_sum_write_sumnode(struct jffs2_sb_info *c) spin_unlock(&c->erase_completion_lock); jeb = c->nextblock; - jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs(c, jeb, 1); + ret = jffs2_prealloc_raw_node_refs(c, jeb, 1); + + if (ret) + goto out; if (!c->summary->sum_num || !c->summary->sum_list_head) { JFFS2_WARNING("Empty summary info!!!\n"); @@ -872,6 +875,8 @@ int jffs2_sum_write_sumnode(struct jffs2_sb_info *c) datasize += padsize; ret = jffs2_sum_write_data(c, jeb, infosize, datasize, padsize); + +out: spin_lock(&c->erase_completion_lock); return ret; } -- Gitee From 2939ed587e80d87fe1d801e58c3fe28d6337f794 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Date: Tue, 15 Apr 2025 11:53:04 -0300 Subject: [PATCH 02/20] ext4: inline: fix len overflow in ext4_prepare_inline_data stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 717414a8c083c376d4a8940a1230fe0c6ed4ee00 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38222 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- commit 227cb4ca5a6502164f850d22aec3104d7888b270 upstream. When running the following code on an ext4 filesystem with inline_data feature enabled, it will lead to the bug below. fd = open("file1", O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0666); ftruncate(fd, 30); pwrite(fd, "a", 1, (1UL << 40) + 5UL); That happens because write_begin will succeed as when ext4_generic_write_inline_data calls ext4_prepare_inline_data, pos + len will be truncated, leading to ext4_prepare_inline_data parameter to be 6 instead of 0x10000000006. Then, later when write_end is called, we hit: BUG_ON(pos + len > EXT4_I(inode)->i_inline_size); at ext4_write_inline_data. Fix it by using a loff_t type for the len parameter in ext4_prepare_inline_data instead of an unsigned int. [ 44.545164] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 44.545530] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/inline.c:240! [ 44.545834] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 44.546172] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 343 Comm: test Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2-00003-g9080916f4863 #45 PREEMPT(full) 112853fcebfdb93254270a7959841d2c6aa2c8bb [ 44.546523] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 44.546523] RIP: 0010:ext4_write_inline_data+0xfe/0x100 [ 44.546523] Code: 3c 0e 48 83 c7 48 48 89 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 e4 fa 43 01 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 49 [ 44.546523] RSP: 0018:ffffb342008b79a8 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 44.546523] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9329c579c000 RCX: 0000010000000006 [ 44.546523] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: ffffb342008b79f0 RDI: ffff9329c158e738 [ 44.546523] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 44.546523] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffffffff9bd0d910 R12: 0000006210000000 [ 44.546523] R13: fffffc7e4015e700 R14: 0000010000000005 R15: ffff9329c158e738 [ 44.546523] FS: 00007f4299934740(0000) GS:ffff932a60179000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 44.546523] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 44.546523] CR2: 00007f4299a1ec90 CR3: 0000000002886002 CR4: 0000000000770eb0 [ 44.546523] PKRU: 55555554 [ 44.546523] Call Trace: [ 44.546523] [ 44.546523] ext4_write_inline_data_end+0x126/0x2d0 [ 44.546523] generic_perform_write+0x17e/0x270 [ 44.546523] ext4_buffered_write_iter+0xc8/0x170 [ 44.546523] vfs_write+0x2be/0x3e0 [ 44.546523] __x64_sys_pwrite64+0x6d/0xc0 [ 44.546523] do_syscall_64+0x6a/0xf0 [ 44.546523] ? __wake_up+0x89/0xb0 [ 44.546523] ? xas_find+0x72/0x1c0 [ 44.546523] ? next_uptodate_folio+0x317/0x330 [ 44.546523] ? set_pte_range+0x1a6/0x270 [ 44.546523] ? filemap_map_pages+0x6ee/0x840 [ 44.546523] ? ext4_setattr+0x2fa/0x750 [ 44.546523] ? do_pte_missing+0x128/0xf70 [ 44.546523] ? security_inode_post_setattr+0x3e/0xd0 [ 44.546523] ? ___pte_offset_map+0x19/0x100 [ 44.546523] ? handle_mm_fault+0x721/0xa10 [ 44.546523] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x197/0x730 [ 44.546523] ? do_syscall_64+0x76/0xf0 [ 44.546523] ? arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x1e/0x60 [ 44.546523] ? irqentry_exit_to_user_mode+0x79/0x90 [ 44.546523] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x55/0x5d [ 44.546523] RIP: 0033:0x7f42999c6687 [ 44.546523] Code: 48 89 fa 4c 89 df e8 58 b3 00 00 8b 93 08 03 00 00 59 5e 48 83 f8 fc 74 1a 5b c3 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 48 8b 44 24 10 0f 05 <5b> c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 83 e2 39 83 fa 08 75 de e8 23 ff ff ff [ 44.546523] RSP: 002b:00007ffeae4a7930 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000012 [ 44.546523] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f4299934740 RCX: 00007f42999c6687 [ 44.546523] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 000055ea6149200f RDI: 0000000000000003 [ 44.546523] RBP: 00007ffeae4a79a0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 44.546523] R10: 0000010000000005 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 0000000000000000 [ 44.546523] R13: 00007ffeae4a7ac8 R14: 00007f4299b86000 R15: 000055ea61493dd8 [ 44.546523] [ 44.546523] Modules linked in: [ 44.568501] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 44.568889] RIP: 0010:ext4_write_inline_data+0xfe/0x100 [ 44.569328] Code: 3c 0e 48 83 c7 48 48 89 de 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 e4 fa 43 01 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 41 57 41 56 41 55 41 54 53 48 83 ec 20 49 [ 44.570931] RSP: 0018:ffffb342008b79a8 EFLAGS: 00010216 [ 44.571356] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff9329c579c000 RCX: 0000010000000006 [ 44.571959] RDX: 000000000000003c RSI: ffffb342008b79f0 RDI: ffff9329c158e738 [ 44.572571] RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 44.573148] R10: 00007ffffffff000 R11: ffffffff9bd0d910 R12: 0000006210000000 [ 44.573748] R13: fffffc7e4015e700 R14: 0000010000000005 R15: ffff9329c158e738 [ 44.574335] FS: 00007f4299934740(0000) GS:ffff932a60179000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 44.575027] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 44.575520] CR2: 00007f4299a1ec90 CR3: 0000000002886002 CR4: 0000000000770eb0 [ 44.576112] PKRU: 55555554 [ 44.576338] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception [ 44.576517] Kernel Offset: 0x1a600000 from 0xffffffff81000000 (relocation range: 0xffffffff80000000-0xffffffffbfffffff) Reported-by: syzbot+fe2a25dae02a207717a0@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=fe2a25dae02a207717a0 Fixes: f19d5870cbf7 ("ext4: add normal write support for inline data") Signed-off-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Jan Kara Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250415-ext4-prepare-inline-overflow-v1-1-f4c13d900967@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ext4/inline.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/inline.c b/fs/ext4/inline.c index 436e09113c9f..3979fc43e095 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/inline.c +++ b/fs/ext4/inline.c @@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ static int ext4_update_inline_data(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, } static int ext4_prepare_inline_data(handle_t *handle, struct inode *inode, - unsigned int len) + loff_t len) { int ret, size, no_expand; struct ext4_inode_info *ei = EXT4_I(inode); -- Gitee From 2be95e15e9f786211df0ff71e51e49c37b24a807 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Namjae Jeon Date: Tue, 1 Apr 2025 13:50:39 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 03/20] exfat: fix double free in delayed_free stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 13d8de1b6568dcc31a95534ced16bc0c9a67bc15 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38206 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 1f3d9724e16d62c7d42c67d6613b8512f2887c22 ] The double free could happen in the following path. exfat_create_upcase_table() exfat_create_upcase_table() : return error exfat_free_upcase_table() : free ->vol_utbl exfat_load_default_upcase_table : return error exfat_kill_sb() delayed_free() exfat_free_upcase_table() <--------- double free This patch set ->vol_util as NULL after freeing it. Reported-by: Jianzhou Zhao Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/exfat/nls.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/fs/exfat/nls.c b/fs/exfat/nls.c index 314d5407a1be..a75d5fb2404c 100644 --- a/fs/exfat/nls.c +++ b/fs/exfat/nls.c @@ -804,4 +804,5 @@ int exfat_create_upcase_table(struct super_block *sb) void exfat_free_upcase_table(struct exfat_sb_info *sbi) { kvfree(sbi->vol_utbl); + sbi->vol_utbl = NULL; } -- Gitee From ada893630f631c4c0ec7101aa2960d8d3718d450 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jaegeuk Kim Date: Sat, 12 Apr 2025 21:09:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH 04/20] f2fs: prevent kernel warning due to negative i_nlink from corrupted image stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 1f6332872374b7f482fc4ad865f9422fedb587fc category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38219 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- commit 42cb74a92adaf88061039601ddf7c874f58b554e upstream. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 9426 at fs/inode.c:417 drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0 home/cc/linux/fs/inode.c:417 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9426 Comm: syz-executor568 Not tainted 6.14.0-12627-g94d471a4f428 #2 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:drop_nlink+0xac/0xd0 home/cc/linux/fs/inode.c:417 Code: 48 8b 5d 28 be 08 00 00 00 48 8d bb 70 07 00 00 e8 f9 67 e6 ff f0 48 ff 83 70 07 00 00 5b 5d e9 9a 12 82 ff e8 95 12 82 ff 90 <0f> 0b 90 c7 45 48 ff ff ff ff 5b 5d e9 83 12 82 ff e8 fe 5f e6 ff RSP: 0018:ffffc900026b7c28 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8239710f RDX: ffff888041345a00 RSI: ffffffff8239717b RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: ffff888054509ad0 R08: 0000000000000005 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffffffff9ab36f08 R12: ffff88804bb40000 R13: ffff8880545091e0 R14: 0000000000008000 R15: ffff8880545091e0 FS: 000055555d0c5880(0000) GS:ffff8880eb3e3000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f915c55b178 CR3: 0000000050d20000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0 Call Trace: f2fs_i_links_write home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h:3194 [inline] f2fs_drop_nlink+0xd1/0x3c0 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/dir.c:845 f2fs_delete_entry+0x542/0x1450 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/dir.c:909 f2fs_unlink+0x45c/0x890 home/cc/linux/fs/f2fs/namei.c:581 vfs_unlink+0x2fb/0x9b0 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4544 do_unlinkat+0x4c5/0x6a0 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4608 __do_sys_unlink home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4654 [inline] __se_sys_unlink home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4652 [inline] __x64_sys_unlink+0xc5/0x110 home/cc/linux/fs/namei.c:4652 do_syscall_x64 home/cc/linux/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xc7/0x250 home/cc/linux/arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7fb3d092324b Code: 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 83 c8 ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa b8 57 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 c0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007ffdc232d938 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000057 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007fb3d092324b RDX: 00007ffdc232d960 RSI: 00007ffdc232d960 RDI: 00007ffdc232d9f0 RBP: 00007ffdc232d9f0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00007ffdc232d7c0 R10: 00000000fffffffd R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00007ffdc232eaf0 R13: 000055555d0cebb0 R14: 00007ffdc232d958 R15: 0000000000000001 Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/namei.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/namei.c b/fs/f2fs/namei.c index 99e4ec48d2a4..43c447c40033 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/namei.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/namei.c @@ -606,6 +606,15 @@ static int f2fs_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) goto fail; } + if (unlikely(inode->i_nlink == 0)) { + f2fs_warn(F2FS_I_SB(inode), "%s: inode (ino=%lx) has zero i_nlink", + __func__, inode->i_ino); + err = -EFSCORRUPTED; + set_sbi_flag(F2FS_I_SB(inode), SBI_NEED_FSCK); + f2fs_put_page(page, 0); + goto fail; + } + f2fs_balance_fs(sbi, true); f2fs_lock_op(sbi); -- Gitee From 809ed67431227e3997bce3cdf2159b0fb6d3bbdd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Chao Yu Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2025 18:55:20 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 05/20] f2fs: fix to do sanity check on sit_bitmap_size stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 82f51bff393e4c12cf4de553120ca831cfa4ef19 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38218 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- commit 5db0d252c64e91ba1929c70112352e85dc5751e7 upstream. w/ below testcase, resize will generate a corrupted image which contains inconsistent metadata, so when mounting such image, it will trigger kernel panic: touch img truncate -s $((512*1024*1024*1024)) img mkfs.f2fs -f img $((256*1024*1024)) resize.f2fs -s -i img -t $((1024*1024*1024)) mount img /mnt/f2fs ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/f2fs/segment.h:863! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 3922 Comm: mount Not tainted 6.15.0-rc1+ #191 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:f2fs_ra_meta_pages+0x47c/0x490 Call Trace: f2fs_build_segment_manager+0x11c3/0x2600 f2fs_fill_super+0xe97/0x2840 mount_bdev+0xf4/0x140 legacy_get_tree+0x2b/0x50 vfs_get_tree+0x29/0xd0 path_mount+0x487/0xaf0 __x64_sys_mount+0x116/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x82/0x190 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fdbfde1bcfe The reaseon is: sit_i->bitmap_size is 192, so size of sit bitmap is 192*8=1536, at maximum there are 1536 sit blocks, however MAIN_SEGS is 261893, so that sit_blk_cnt is 4762, build_sit_entries() -> current_sit_addr() tries to access out-of-boundary in sit_bitmap at offset from [1536, 4762), once sit_bitmap and sit_bitmap_mirror is not the same, it will trigger f2fs_bug_on(). Let's add sanity check in f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt() to avoid panic. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chao Yu Signed-off-by: Jaegeuk Kim Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/f2fs/super.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c index e3c73415c182..6594929e3cd6 100644 --- a/fs/f2fs/super.c +++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c @@ -3014,6 +3014,7 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) block_t user_block_count, valid_user_blocks; block_t avail_node_count, valid_node_count; unsigned int nat_blocks, nat_bits_bytes, nat_bits_blocks; + unsigned int sit_blk_cnt; int i, j; total = le32_to_cpu(raw_super->segment_count); @@ -3115,6 +3116,13 @@ int f2fs_sanity_check_ckpt(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi) return 1; } + sit_blk_cnt = DIV_ROUND_UP(main_segs, SIT_ENTRY_PER_BLOCK); + if (sit_bitmap_size * 8 < sit_blk_cnt) { + f2fs_err(sbi, "Wrong bitmap size: sit: %u, sit_blk_cnt:%u", + sit_bitmap_size, sit_blk_cnt); + return 1; + } + cp_pack_start_sum = __start_sum_addr(sbi); cp_payload = __cp_payload(sbi); if (cp_pack_start_sum < cp_payload + 1 || -- Gitee From 6b8aa15e7409f690cf75f62ce3864d352b5a08ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Terry Junge Date: Wed, 12 Mar 2025 15:23:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 06/20] HID: usbhid: Eliminate recurrent out-of-bounds bug in usbhid_parse() stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 41827a2dbdd7880df9881506dee13bc88d4230bb category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38103 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- commit fe7f7ac8e0c708446ff017453add769ffc15deed upstream. Update struct hid_descriptor to better reflect the mandatory and optional parts of the HID Descriptor as per USB HID 1.11 specification. Note: the kernel currently does not parse any optional HID class descriptors, only the mandatory report descriptor. Update all references to member element desc[0] to rpt_desc. Add test to verify bLength and bNumDescriptors values are valid. Replace the for loop with direct access to the mandatory HID class descriptor member for the report descriptor. This eliminates the possibility of getting an out-of-bounds fault. Add a warning message if the HID descriptor contains any unsupported optional HID class descriptors. Reported-by: syzbot+c52569baf0c843f35495@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c52569baf0c843f35495 Fixes: f043bfc98c19 ("HID: usbhid: fix out-of-bounds bug") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Terry Junge Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley Signed-off-by: Jiri Kosina Signed-off-by: Terry Junge Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c | 5 +++-- drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c | 25 ++++++++++++++----------- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c | 12 ++++++------ include/linux/hid.h | 3 ++- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c b/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c index b7704dd6809d..bf77cfb723d5 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-hyperv.c @@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ static void mousevsc_on_receive_device_info(struct mousevsc_dev *input_device, if (!input_device->hid_desc) goto cleanup; - input_device->report_desc_size = desc->desc[0].wDescriptorLength; + input_device->report_desc_size = le16_to_cpu( + desc->rpt_desc.wDescriptorLength); if (input_device->report_desc_size == 0) { input_device->dev_info_status = -EINVAL; goto cleanup; @@ -217,7 +218,7 @@ static void mousevsc_on_receive_device_info(struct mousevsc_dev *input_device, memcpy(input_device->report_desc, ((unsigned char *)desc) + desc->bLength, - desc->desc[0].wDescriptorLength); + le16_to_cpu(desc->rpt_desc.wDescriptorLength)); /* Send the ack */ memset(&ack, 0, sizeof(struct mousevsc_prt_msg)); diff --git a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c index 009a0469d54f..c3b104c72e49 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/usbhid/hid-core.c @@ -984,12 +984,11 @@ static int usbhid_parse(struct hid_device *hid) struct usb_host_interface *interface = intf->cur_altsetting; struct usb_device *dev = interface_to_usbdev (intf); struct hid_descriptor *hdesc; + struct hid_class_descriptor *hcdesc; u32 quirks = 0; unsigned int rsize = 0; char *rdesc; - int ret, n; - int num_descriptors; - size_t offset = offsetof(struct hid_descriptor, desc); + int ret; quirks = hid_lookup_quirk(hid); @@ -1011,20 +1010,19 @@ static int usbhid_parse(struct hid_device *hid) return -ENODEV; } - if (hdesc->bLength < sizeof(struct hid_descriptor)) { - dbg_hid("hid descriptor is too short\n"); + if (!hdesc->bNumDescriptors || + hdesc->bLength != sizeof(*hdesc) + + (hdesc->bNumDescriptors - 1) * sizeof(*hcdesc)) { + dbg_hid("hid descriptor invalid, bLen=%hhu bNum=%hhu\n", + hdesc->bLength, hdesc->bNumDescriptors); return -EINVAL; } hid->version = le16_to_cpu(hdesc->bcdHID); hid->country = hdesc->bCountryCode; - num_descriptors = min_t(int, hdesc->bNumDescriptors, - (hdesc->bLength - offset) / sizeof(struct hid_class_descriptor)); - - for (n = 0; n < num_descriptors; n++) - if (hdesc->desc[n].bDescriptorType == HID_DT_REPORT) - rsize = le16_to_cpu(hdesc->desc[n].wDescriptorLength); + if (hdesc->rpt_desc.bDescriptorType == HID_DT_REPORT) + rsize = le16_to_cpu(hdesc->rpt_desc.wDescriptorLength); if (!rsize || rsize > HID_MAX_DESCRIPTOR_SIZE) { dbg_hid("weird size of report descriptor (%u)\n", rsize); @@ -1052,6 +1050,11 @@ static int usbhid_parse(struct hid_device *hid) goto err; } + if (hdesc->bNumDescriptors > 1) + hid_warn(intf, + "%u unsupported optional hid class descriptors\n", + (int)(hdesc->bNumDescriptors - 1)); + hid->quirks |= quirks; return 0; diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c index ba018aeb21d8..2f30699f0426 100644 --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c @@ -114,8 +114,8 @@ static struct hid_descriptor hidg_desc = { .bcdHID = cpu_to_le16(0x0101), .bCountryCode = 0x00, .bNumDescriptors = 0x1, - /*.desc[0].bDescriptorType = DYNAMIC */ - /*.desc[0].wDescriptorLenght = DYNAMIC */ + /*.rpt_desc.bDescriptorType = DYNAMIC */ + /*.rpt_desc.wDescriptorLength = DYNAMIC */ }; /* Super-Speed Support */ @@ -724,8 +724,8 @@ static int hidg_setup(struct usb_function *f, struct hid_descriptor hidg_desc_copy = hidg_desc; VDBG(cdev, "USB_REQ_GET_DESCRIPTOR: HID\n"); - hidg_desc_copy.desc[0].bDescriptorType = HID_DT_REPORT; - hidg_desc_copy.desc[0].wDescriptorLength = + hidg_desc_copy.rpt_desc.bDescriptorType = HID_DT_REPORT; + hidg_desc_copy.rpt_desc.wDescriptorLength = cpu_to_le16(hidg->report_desc_length); length = min_t(unsigned short, length, @@ -966,8 +966,8 @@ static int hidg_bind(struct usb_configuration *c, struct usb_function *f) * We can use hidg_desc struct here but we should not relay * that its content won't change after returning from this function. */ - hidg_desc.desc[0].bDescriptorType = HID_DT_REPORT; - hidg_desc.desc[0].wDescriptorLength = + hidg_desc.rpt_desc.bDescriptorType = HID_DT_REPORT; + hidg_desc.rpt_desc.wDescriptorLength = cpu_to_le16(hidg->report_desc_length); hidg_hs_in_ep_desc.bEndpointAddress = diff --git a/include/linux/hid.h b/include/linux/hid.h index 9e306bf9959d..03627c96d814 100644 --- a/include/linux/hid.h +++ b/include/linux/hid.h @@ -674,8 +674,9 @@ struct hid_descriptor { __le16 bcdHID; __u8 bCountryCode; __u8 bNumDescriptors; + struct hid_class_descriptor rpt_desc; - struct hid_class_descriptor desc[1]; + struct hid_class_descriptor opt_descs[]; } __attribute__ ((packed)); #define HID_DEVICE(b, g, ven, prod) \ -- Gitee From 4cae7058b8ad677b3bfca295b4692d30e4bd8519 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kuniyuki Iwashima Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 15:18:56 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 07/20] calipso: Don't call calipso functions for AF_INET sk. stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 0c813dbc851dbf418fdc6dc883fd0592d6c555cd category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38147 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 6e9f2df1c550ead7cecb3e450af1105735020c92 ] syzkaller reported a null-ptr-deref in txopt_get(). [0] The offset 0x70 was of struct ipv6_txoptions in struct ipv6_pinfo, so struct ipv6_pinfo was NULL there. However, this never happens for IPv6 sockets as inet_sk(sk)->pinet6 is always set in inet6_create(), meaning the socket was not IPv6 one. The root cause is missing validation in netlbl_conn_setattr(). netlbl_conn_setattr() switches branches based on struct sockaddr.sa_family, which is passed from userspace. However, netlbl_conn_setattr() does not check if the address family matches the socket. The syzkaller must have called connect() for an IPv6 address on an IPv4 socket. We have a proper validation in tcp_v[46]_connect(), but security_socket_connect() is called in the earlier stage. Let's copy the validation to netlbl_conn_setattr(). [0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000e: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000070-0x0000000000000077] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 12928 Comm: syz.9.1677 Not tainted 6.12.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:txopt_get include/net/ipv6.h:390 [inline] RIP: 0010: Code: 02 00 00 49 8b ac 24 f8 02 00 00 e8 84 69 2a fd e8 ff 00 16 fd 48 8d 7d 70 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 53 02 00 00 48 8b 6d 70 48 85 ed 0f 84 ab 01 00 RSP: 0018:ffff88811b8afc48 EFLAGS: 00010212 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 1ffff11023715f8a RCX: ffffffff841ab00c RDX: 000000000000000e RSI: ffffc90007d9e000 RDI: 0000000000000070 RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffed1023715f9d R09: ffffed1023715f9e R10: ffffed1023715f9d R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff888123075f00 R13: ffff88810245bd80 R14: ffff888113646780 R15: ffff888100578a80 FS: 00007f9019bd7640(0000) GS:ffff8882d2d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f901b927bac CR3: 0000000104788003 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 80000000 Call Trace: calipso_sock_setattr+0x56/0x80 net/netlabel/netlabel_calipso.c:557 netlbl_conn_setattr+0x10c/0x280 net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c:1177 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper+0xd3/0x1b0 security/selinux/netlabel.c:569 selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked security/selinux/netlabel.c:597 [inline] selinux_netlbl_socket_connect+0xb6/0x100 security/selinux/netlabel.c:615 selinux_socket_connect+0x5f/0x80 security/selinux/hooks.c:4931 security_socket_connect+0x50/0xa0 security/security.c:4598 __sys_connect_file+0xa4/0x190 net/socket.c:2067 __sys_connect+0x12c/0x170 net/socket.c:2088 __do_sys_connect net/socket.c:2098 [inline] __se_sys_connect net/socket.c:2095 [inline] __x64_sys_connect+0x73/0xb0 net/socket.c:2095 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xaa/0x1b0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f901b61a12d Code: 02 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f9019bd6fa8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002a RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f901b925fa0 RCX: 00007f901b61a12d RDX: 000000000000001c RSI: 0000200000000140 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f901b701505 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007f901b5b62a0 R15: 00007f9019bb7000 Modules linked in: Fixes: ceba1832b1b2 ("calipso: Set the calipso socket label to match the secattr.") Reported-by: syzkaller Reported-by: John Cheung Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/CAP=Rh=M1LzunrcQB1fSGauMrJrhL6GGps5cPAKzHJXj6GQV+-g@mail.gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima Acked-by: Paul Moore Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250522221858.91240-1-kuniyu@amazon.com Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c index 96059c99b915..2e9344b3c657 100644 --- a/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c +++ b/net/netlabel/netlabel_kapi.c @@ -1140,6 +1140,9 @@ int netlbl_conn_setattr(struct sock *sk, break; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case AF_INET6: + if (sk->sk_family != AF_INET6) + return -EAFNOSUPPORT; + addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr; entry = netlbl_domhsh_getentry_af6(secattr->domain, &addr6->sin6_addr); -- Gitee From a90e0227223e555ab2e4f3501c96bba3beaf67ab Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiayuan Chen Date: Wed, 19 Feb 2025 13:20:14 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 08/20] bpf: fix ktls panic with sockmap mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 54a3ecaeeeae8176da8badbd7d72af1017032c39 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38166 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- [ 2172.936997] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 2172.936999] kernel BUG at lib/iov_iter.c:629! ...... [ 2172.944996] PKRU: 55555554 [ 2172.945155] Call Trace: [ 2172.945299] [ 2172.945428] ? die+0x36/0x90 [ 2172.945601] ? do_trap+0xdd/0x100 [ 2172.945795] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946031] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946267] ? do_error_trap+0x7d/0x110 [ 2172.946499] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.946736] ? exc_invalid_op+0x50/0x70 [ 2172.946961] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.947197] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 [ 2172.947446] ? iov_iter_revert+0x178/0x180 [ 2172.947683] ? iov_iter_revert+0x5c/0x180 [ 2172.947913] tls_sw_sendmsg_locked.isra.0+0x794/0x840 [ 2172.948206] tls_sw_sendmsg+0x52/0x80 [ 2172.948420] ? inet_sendmsg+0x1f/0x70 [ 2172.948634] __sys_sendto+0x1cd/0x200 [ 2172.948848] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 2172.949072] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270 [ 2172.949330] ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x5e/0x170 [ 2172.949595] ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80 [ 2172.949817] ? syscall_trace_enter+0x140/0x270 [ 2172.950211] ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xda/0x190 [ 2172.950632] ? ktime_get_coarse_real_ts64+0xc2/0xd0 [ 2172.951036] __x64_sys_sendto+0x24/0x30 [ 2172.951382] do_syscall_64+0x90/0x170 ...... After calling bpf_exec_tx_verdict(), the size of msg_pl->sg may increase, e.g., when the BPF program executes bpf_msg_push_data(). If the BPF program sets cork_bytes and sg.size is smaller than cork_bytes, it will return -ENOSPC and attempt to roll back to the non-zero copy logic. However, during rollback, msg->msg_iter is reset, but since msg_pl->sg.size has been increased, subsequent executions will exceed the actual size of msg_iter. ''' iov_iter_revert(&msg->msg_iter, msg_pl->sg.size - orig_size); ''' The changes in this commit are based on the following considerations: 1. When cork_bytes is set, rolling back to non-zero copy logic is pointless and can directly go to zero-copy logic. 2. We can not calculate the correct number of bytes to revert msg_iter. Assume the original data is "abcdefgh" (8 bytes), and after 3 pushes by the BPF program, it becomes 11-byte data: "abc?de?fgh?". Then, we set cork_bytes to 6, which means the first 6 bytes have been processed, and the remaining 5 bytes "?fgh?" will be cached until the length meets the cork_bytes requirement. However, some data in "?fgh?" is not within 'sg->msg_iter' (but in msg_pl instead), especially the data "?" we pushed. So it doesn't seem as simple as just reverting through an offset of msg_iter. 3. For non-TLS sockets in tcp_bpf_sendmsg, when a "cork" situation occurs, the user-space send() doesn't return an error, and the returned length is the same as the input length parameter, even if some data is cached. Additionally, I saw that the current non-zero-copy logic for handling corking is written as: ''' line 1177 else if (ret != -EAGAIN) { if (ret == -ENOSPC) ret = 0; goto send_end; ''' So it's ok to just return 'copied' without error when a "cork" situation occurs. Fixes: fcb14cb1bdac ("new iov_iter flavour - ITER_UBUF") Fixes: d3b18ad31f93 ("tls: add bpf support to sk_msg handling") Signed-off-by: Jiayuan Chen Acked-by: John Fastabend Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250219052015.274405-2-jiayuan.chen@linux.dev Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index 21e940b61931..1115269d17f3 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -1027,9 +1027,13 @@ int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) num_async++; else if (ret == -ENOMEM) goto wait_for_memory; - else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC) + else if (ctx->open_rec && ret == -ENOSPC) { + if (msg_pl->cork_bytes) { + ret = 0; + goto send_end; + } goto rollback_iter; - else if (ret != -EAGAIN) + } else if (ret != -EAGAIN) goto send_end; } continue; -- Gitee From ce552e4172932b6823e87c355b2b5c64137e5cd4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2022 20:52:59 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 09/20] bpf: Do mark_chain_precision for ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.0-rc4 commit 2fc31465c5373b5ca4edf2e5238558cb62902311 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2022-49961 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- Precision markers need to be propagated whenever we have an ARG_CONST_* style argument, as the verifier cannot consider imprecise scalars to be equivalent for the purposes of states_equal check when such arguments refine the return value (in this case, set mem_size for PTR_TO_MEM). The resultant mem_size for the R0 is derived from the constant value, and if the verifier incorrectly prunes states considering them equivalent where such arguments exist (by seeing that both registers have reg->precise as false in regsafe), we can end up with invalid programs passing the verifier which can do access beyond what should have been the correct mem_size in that explored state. To show a concrete example of the problem: 0000000000000000 : 0: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80) 1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76) 2: r3 = r1 3: r3 += 4 4: if r3 > r2 goto +18 5: w2 = 0 6: *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r2 7: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) 8: r2 = 1 9: if w1 == 0 goto +1 10: r2 = -1 0000000000000058 : 11: r1 = 0 ll 13: r3 = 0 14: call bpf_ringbuf_reserve 15: if r0 == 0 goto +7 16: r1 = r0 17: r1 += 16777215 18: w2 = 0 19: *(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2 20: r1 = r0 21: r2 = 0 22: call bpf_ringbuf_submit 00000000000000b8 : 23: w0 = 0 24: exit For the first case, the single line execution's exploration will prune the search at insn 14 for the branch insn 9's second leg as it will be verified first using r2 = -1 (UINT_MAX), while as w1 at insn 9 will always be 0 so at runtime we don't get error for being greater than UINT_MAX/4 from bpf_ringbuf_reserve. The verifier during regsafe just sees reg->precise as false for both r2 registers in both states, hence considers them equal for purposes of states_equal. If we propagated precise markers using the backtracking support, we would use the precise marking to then ensure that old r2 (UINT_MAX) was within the new r2 (1) and this would never be true, so the verification would rightfully fail. The end result is that the out of bounds access at instruction 19 would be permitted without this fix. Note that reg->precise is always set to true when user does not have CAP_BPF (or when subprog count is greater than 1 (i.e. use of any static or global functions)), hence this is only a problem when precision marks need to be explicitly propagated (i.e. privileged users with CAP_BPF). A simplified test case has been included in the next patch to prevent future regressions. Fixes: 457f44363a88 ("bpf: Implement BPF ring buffer and verifier support for it") Signed-off-by: Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220823185300.406-2-memxor@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index f063ab2058d2..b9b44397e660 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -4921,6 +4921,9 @@ static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg, return -EACCES; } meta->mem_size = reg->var_off.value; + err = mark_chain_precision(env, regno); + if (err) + return err; } else if (arg_type_is_int_ptr(arg_type)) { int size = int_ptr_type_to_size(arg_type); -- Gitee From f8907e3156c5695c4f1eb5a099106f3fe8d5daaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2025 17:04:46 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 10/20] crypto: lzo - Fix compression buffer overrun mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15-rc1 commit cc47f07234f72cbd8e2c973cdbf2a6730660a463 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38068 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- Unlike the decompression code, the compression code in LZO never checked for output overruns. It instead assumes that the caller always provides enough buffer space, disregarding the buffer length provided by the caller. Add a safe compression interface that checks for the end of buffer before each write. Use the safe interface in crypto/lzo. Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Reviewed-by: David Sterba Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu --- crypto/lzo-rle.c | 2 +- crypto/lzo.c | 2 +- include/linux/lzo.h | 8 +++ lib/lzo/Makefile | 2 +- lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c | 18 ++++++ 6 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) create mode 100644 lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c diff --git a/crypto/lzo-rle.c b/crypto/lzo-rle.c index 0631d975bfac..0abc2d87f042 100644 --- a/crypto/lzo-rle.c +++ b/crypto/lzo-rle.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int __lzorle_compress(const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, size_t tmp_len = *dlen; /* size_t(ulong) <-> uint on 64 bit */ int err; - err = lzorle1x_1_compress(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx); + err = lzorle1x_1_compress_safe(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx); if (err != LZO_E_OK) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/crypto/lzo.c b/crypto/lzo.c index ebda132dd22b..8338851c7406 100644 --- a/crypto/lzo.c +++ b/crypto/lzo.c @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ static int __lzo_compress(const u8 *src, unsigned int slen, size_t tmp_len = *dlen; /* size_t(ulong) <-> uint on 64 bit */ int err; - err = lzo1x_1_compress(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx); + err = lzo1x_1_compress_safe(src, slen, dst, &tmp_len, ctx); if (err != LZO_E_OK) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/include/linux/lzo.h b/include/linux/lzo.h index e95c7d1092b2..4d30e3624acd 100644 --- a/include/linux/lzo.h +++ b/include/linux/lzo.h @@ -24,10 +24,18 @@ int lzo1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len, void *wrkmem); +/* Same as above but does not write more than dst_len to dst. */ +int lzo1x_1_compress_safe(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len, void *wrkmem); + /* This requires 'wrkmem' of size LZO1X_1_MEM_COMPRESS */ int lzorle1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len, void *wrkmem); +/* Same as above but does not write more than dst_len to dst. */ +int lzorle1x_1_compress_safe(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, + unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len, void *wrkmem); + /* safe decompression with overrun testing */ int lzo1x_decompress_safe(const unsigned char *src, size_t src_len, unsigned char *dst, size_t *dst_len); diff --git a/lib/lzo/Makefile b/lib/lzo/Makefile index 2f58fafbbddd..fc7b2b7ef4b2 100644 --- a/lib/lzo/Makefile +++ b/lib/lzo/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only -lzo_compress-objs := lzo1x_compress.o +lzo_compress-objs := lzo1x_compress.o lzo1x_compress_safe.o lzo_decompress-objs := lzo1x_decompress_safe.o obj-$(CONFIG_LZO_COMPRESS) += lzo_compress.o diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c index 8ad5ba2b86e2..469c143f7585 100644 --- a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c +++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress.c @@ -18,11 +18,22 @@ #include #include "lzodefs.h" -static noinline size_t -lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - size_t ti, void *wrkmem, signed char *state_offset, - const unsigned char bitstream_version) +#undef LZO_UNSAFE + +#ifndef LZO_SAFE +#define LZO_UNSAFE 1 +#define LZO_SAFE(name) name +#define HAVE_OP(x) 1 +#endif + +#define NEED_OP(x) if (!HAVE_OP(x)) goto output_overrun + +static noinline int +LZO_SAFE(lzo1x_1_do_compress)(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char **out, unsigned char *op_end, + size_t *tp, void *wrkmem, + signed char *state_offset, + const unsigned char bitstream_version) { const unsigned char *ip; unsigned char *op; @@ -30,8 +41,9 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char * const ip_end = in + in_len - 20; const unsigned char *ii; lzo_dict_t * const dict = (lzo_dict_t *) wrkmem; + size_t ti = *tp; - op = out; + op = *out; ip = in; ii = ip; ip += ti < 4 ? 4 - ti : 0; @@ -118,25 +130,32 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, if (t != 0) { if (t <= 3) { op[*state_offset] |= t; + NEED_OP(4); COPY4(op, ii); op += t; } else if (t <= 16) { + NEED_OP(17); *op++ = (t - 3); COPY8(op, ii); COPY8(op + 8, ii + 8); op += t; } else { if (t <= 18) { + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (t - 3); } else { size_t tt = t - 18; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; while (unlikely(tt > 255)) { tt -= 255; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; } + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = tt; } + NEED_OP(t); do { COPY8(op, ii); COPY8(op + 8, ii + 8); @@ -153,6 +172,7 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, if (unlikely(run_length)) { ip += run_length; run_length -= MIN_ZERO_RUN_LENGTH; + NEED_OP(4); put_unaligned_le32((run_length << 21) | 0xfffc18 | (run_length & 0x7), op); op += 4; @@ -245,10 +265,12 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, ip += m_len; if (m_len <= M2_MAX_LEN && m_off <= M2_MAX_OFFSET) { m_off -= 1; + NEED_OP(2); *op++ = (((m_len - 1) << 5) | ((m_off & 7) << 2)); *op++ = (m_off >> 3); } else if (m_off <= M3_MAX_OFFSET) { m_off -= 1; + NEED_OP(1); if (m_len <= M3_MAX_LEN) *op++ = (M3_MARKER | (m_len - 2)); else { @@ -256,14 +278,18 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, *op++ = M3_MARKER | 0; while (unlikely(m_len > 255)) { m_len -= 255; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; } + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (m_len); } + NEED_OP(2); *op++ = (m_off << 2); *op++ = (m_off >> 6); } else { m_off -= 0x4000; + NEED_OP(1); if (m_len <= M4_MAX_LEN) *op++ = (M4_MARKER | ((m_off >> 11) & 8) | (m_len - 2)); @@ -284,11 +310,14 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, m_len -= M4_MAX_LEN; *op++ = (M4_MARKER | ((m_off >> 11) & 8)); while (unlikely(m_len > 255)) { + NEED_OP(1); m_len -= 255; *op++ = 0; } + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (m_len); } + NEED_OP(2); *op++ = (m_off << 2); *op++ = (m_off >> 6); } @@ -297,14 +326,20 @@ lzo1x_1_do_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, ii = ip; goto next; } - *out_len = op - out; - return in_end - (ii - ti); + *out = op; + *tp = in_end - (ii - ti); + return LZO_E_OK; + +output_overrun: + return LZO_E_OUTPUT_OVERRUN; } -int lzogeneric1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - void *wrkmem, const unsigned char bitstream_version) +static int LZO_SAFE(lzogeneric1x_1_compress)( + const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, + void *wrkmem, const unsigned char bitstream_version) { + unsigned char * const op_end = out + *out_len; const unsigned char *ip = in; unsigned char *op = out; unsigned char *data_start; @@ -328,14 +363,18 @@ int lzogeneric1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, while (l > 20) { size_t ll = l <= (m4_max_offset + 1) ? l : (m4_max_offset + 1); uintptr_t ll_end = (uintptr_t) ip + ll; + int err; + if ((ll_end + ((t + ll) >> 5)) <= ll_end) break; BUILD_BUG_ON(D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t) > LZO1X_1_MEM_COMPRESS); memset(wrkmem, 0, D_SIZE * sizeof(lzo_dict_t)); - t = lzo1x_1_do_compress(ip, ll, op, out_len, t, wrkmem, - &state_offset, bitstream_version); + err = LZO_SAFE(lzo1x_1_do_compress)( + ip, ll, &op, op_end, &t, wrkmem, + &state_offset, bitstream_version); + if (err != LZO_E_OK) + return err; ip += ll; - op += *out_len; l -= ll; } t += l; @@ -344,20 +383,26 @@ int lzogeneric1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, const unsigned char *ii = in + in_len - t; if (op == data_start && t <= 238) { + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (17 + t); } else if (t <= 3) { op[state_offset] |= t; } else if (t <= 18) { + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = (t - 3); } else { size_t tt = t - 18; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; while (tt > 255) { tt -= 255; + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = 0; } + NEED_OP(1); *op++ = tt; } + NEED_OP(t); if (t >= 16) do { COPY8(op, ii); COPY8(op + 8, ii + 8); @@ -370,31 +415,38 @@ int lzogeneric1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, } while (--t > 0); } + NEED_OP(3); *op++ = M4_MARKER | 1; *op++ = 0; *op++ = 0; *out_len = op - out; return LZO_E_OK; + +output_overrun: + return LZO_E_OUTPUT_OVERRUN; } -int lzo1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - void *wrkmem) +int LZO_SAFE(lzo1x_1_compress)(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, + void *wrkmem) { - return lzogeneric1x_1_compress(in, in_len, out, out_len, wrkmem, 0); + return LZO_SAFE(lzogeneric1x_1_compress)( + in, in_len, out, out_len, wrkmem, 0); } -int lzorle1x_1_compress(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, - unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, - void *wrkmem) +int LZO_SAFE(lzorle1x_1_compress)(const unsigned char *in, size_t in_len, + unsigned char *out, size_t *out_len, + void *wrkmem) { - return lzogeneric1x_1_compress(in, in_len, out, out_len, - wrkmem, LZO_VERSION); + return LZO_SAFE(lzogeneric1x_1_compress)( + in, in_len, out, out_len, wrkmem, LZO_VERSION); } -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lzo1x_1_compress); -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(lzorle1x_1_compress); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(LZO_SAFE(lzo1x_1_compress)); +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(LZO_SAFE(lzorle1x_1_compress)); +#ifndef LZO_UNSAFE MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("LZO1X-1 Compressor"); +#endif diff --git a/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..371c9f849492 --- /dev/null +++ b/lib/lzo/lzo1x_compress_safe.c @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/* + * LZO1X Compressor from LZO + * + * Copyright (C) 1996-2012 Markus F.X.J. Oberhumer + * + * The full LZO package can be found at: + * http://www.oberhumer.com/opensource/lzo/ + * + * Changed for Linux kernel use by: + * Nitin Gupta + * Richard Purdie + */ + +#define LZO_SAFE(name) name##_safe +#define HAVE_OP(x) ((size_t)(op_end - op) >= (size_t)(x)) + +#include "lzo1x_compress.c" -- Gitee From cd72a9713d39034a9072f59512681e974812386d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Alexis=20Lothor=C3=A9?= Date: Thu, 29 May 2025 11:07:24 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 11/20] net: stmmac: make sure that ptp_rate is not 0 before configuring EST MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit cbefe2ffa7784525ec5d008ba87c7add19ec631a category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38125 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- If the ptp_rate recorded earlier in the driver happens to be 0, this bogus value will propagate up to EST configuration, where it will trigger a division by 0. Prevent this division by 0 by adding the corresponding check and error code. Suggested-by: Maxime Chevallier Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré Fixes: 8572aec3d0dc ("net: stmmac: Add basic EST support for XGMAC") Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250529-stmmac_tstamp_div-v4-2-d73340a794d5@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c | 5 +++++ drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c | 5 +++++ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c index d1b8b51bf6ad..88334c4706f4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwmac5.c @@ -576,6 +576,11 @@ int dwmac5_est_configure(void __iomem *ioaddr, struct stmmac_est *cfg, int i, ret = 0x0; u32 ctrl; + if (!ptp_rate) { + pr_warn("Invalid PTP rate"); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret |= dwmac5_est_write(ioaddr, BTR_LOW, cfg->btr[0], false); ret |= dwmac5_est_write(ioaddr, BTR_HIGH, cfg->btr[1], false); ret |= dwmac5_est_write(ioaddr, TER, cfg->ter, false); diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c index a5344fcf77e1..4844e6f698b8 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/dwxgmac2_core.c @@ -1466,6 +1466,11 @@ static int dwxgmac3_est_configure(void __iomem *ioaddr, struct stmmac_est *cfg, int i, ret = 0x0; u32 ctrl; + if (!ptp_rate) { + pr_warn("Invalid PTP rate"); + return -EINVAL; + } + ret |= dwxgmac3_est_write(ioaddr, XGMAC_BTR_LOW, cfg->btr[0], false); ret |= dwxgmac3_est_write(ioaddr, XGMAC_BTR_HIGH, cfg->btr[1], false); ret |= dwxgmac3_est_write(ioaddr, XGMAC_TER, cfg->ter, false); -- Gitee From 3b55ced21dedcfc8f7a6c5139830a07c21020b31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: =?UTF-8?q?Alexis=20Lothor=C3=A9?= Date: Thu, 29 May 2025 11:07:23 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 12/20] net: stmmac: make sure that ptp_rate is not 0 before configuring timestamping MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 030ce919e114a111e83b7976ecb3597cefd33f26 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38126 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- The stmmac platform drivers that do not open-code the clk_ptp_rate value after having retrieved the default one from the device-tree can end up with 0 in clk_ptp_rate (as clk_get_rate can return 0). It will eventually propagate up to PTP initialization when bringing up the interface, leading to a divide by 0: Division by zero in kernel. CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.30-00001-g48313bd5768a #22 Hardware name: STM32 (Device Tree Support) Call trace: unwind_backtrace from show_stack+0x18/0x1c show_stack from dump_stack_lvl+0x6c/0x8c dump_stack_lvl from Ldiv0_64+0x8/0x18 Ldiv0_64 from stmmac_init_tstamp_counter+0x190/0x1a4 stmmac_init_tstamp_counter from stmmac_hw_setup+0xc1c/0x111c stmmac_hw_setup from __stmmac_open+0x18c/0x434 __stmmac_open from stmmac_open+0x3c/0xbc stmmac_open from __dev_open+0xf4/0x1ac __dev_open from __dev_change_flags+0x1cc/0x224 __dev_change_flags from dev_change_flags+0x24/0x60 dev_change_flags from ip_auto_config+0x2e8/0x11a0 ip_auto_config from do_one_initcall+0x84/0x33c do_one_initcall from kernel_init_freeable+0x1b8/0x214 kernel_init_freeable from kernel_init+0x24/0x140 kernel_init from ret_from_fork+0x14/0x28 Exception stack(0xe0815fb0 to 0xe0815ff8) Prevent this division by 0 by adding an explicit check and error log about the actual issue. While at it, remove the same check from stmmac_ptp_register, which then becomes duplicate Fixes: 19d857c9038e ("stmmac: Fix calculations for ptp counters when clock input = 50Mhz.") Signed-off-by: Alexis Lothoré Reviewed-by: Yanteng Si Reviewed-by: Maxime Chevallier Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250529-stmmac_tstamp_div-v4-1-d73340a794d5@bootlin.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c index 96ac731fd478..5e5ca3f50fe6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c +++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/stmicro/stmmac/stmmac_main.c @@ -742,6 +742,11 @@ int stmmac_init_tstamp_counter(struct stmmac_priv *priv, u32 systime_flags) if (!(priv->dma_cap.time_stamp || priv->dma_cap.atime_stamp)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (!priv->plat->clk_ptp_rate) { + netdev_err(priv->dev, "Invalid PTP clock rate"); + return -EINVAL; + } + stmmac_config_hw_tstamping(priv, priv->ptpaddr, systime_flags); priv->systime_flags = systime_flags; -- Gitee From 0592b815887bac25c6bc84379c67ae95e3f625b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Luiz Augusto von Dentz Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 15:42:21 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 13/20] Bluetooth: MGMT: Protect mgmt_pending list with its own lock mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc2 commit 6fe26f694c824b8a4dbf50c635bee1302e3f099c category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38117 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- This uses a mutex to protect from concurrent access of mgmt_pending list which can cause crashes like: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in hci_sock_get_channel+0x60/0x68 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:91 Read of size 2 at addr ffff0000c48885b2 by task syz.4.334/7318 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 7318 Comm: syz.4.334 Not tainted 6.15.0-rc7-syzkaller-g187899f4124a #0 PREEMPT Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/12/2025 Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:466 (C) __dump_stack+0x30/0x40 lib/dump_stack.c:94 dump_stack_lvl+0xd8/0x12c lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description+0xa8/0x254 mm/kasan/report.c:408 print_report+0x68/0x84 mm/kasan/report.c:521 kasan_report+0xb0/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:634 __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:379 hci_sock_get_channel+0x60/0x68 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:91 mgmt_pending_find+0x7c/0x140 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:223 pending_find net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:947 [inline] remove_adv_monitor+0x44/0x1a4 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5445 hci_mgmt_cmd+0x780/0xc00 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1712 hci_sock_sendmsg+0x544/0xbb0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1832 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:712 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:727 [inline] sock_write_iter+0x25c/0x378 net/socket.c:1131 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:591 [inline] vfs_write+0x62c/0x97c fs/read_write.c:684 ksys_write+0x120/0x210 fs/read_write.c:736 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:747 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:744 [inline] __arm64_sys_write+0x7c/0x90 fs/read_write.c:744 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x58/0x17c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:767 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 Allocated by task 7037: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x44/0x54 mm/kasan/generic.c:562 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0x9c/0xb4 mm/kasan/common.c:394 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline] __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4327 [inline] __kmalloc_noprof+0x2fc/0x4c8 mm/slub.c:4339 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:909 [inline] sk_prot_alloc+0xc4/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:2198 sk_alloc+0x44/0x3ac net/core/sock.c:2254 bt_sock_alloc+0x4c/0x300 net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:148 hci_sock_create+0xa8/0x194 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:2202 bt_sock_create+0x14c/0x24c net/bluetooth/af_bluetooth.c:132 __sock_create+0x43c/0x91c net/socket.c:1541 sock_create net/socket.c:1599 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1636 [inline] __sys_socket+0xd4/0x1c0 net/socket.c:1683 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1697 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1695 [inline] __arm64_sys_socket+0x7c/0x94 net/socket.c:1695 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x58/0x17c arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:767 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x78/0x108 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:786 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:600 Freed by task 6607: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x40/0x78 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x58/0x70 mm/kasan/generic.c:576 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x68/0x88 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:233 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2380 [inline] slab_free mm/slub.c:4642 [inline] kfree+0x17c/0x474 mm/slub.c:4841 sk_prot_free net/core/sock.c:2237 [inline] __sk_destruct+0x4f4/0x760 net/core/sock.c:2332 sk_destruct net/core/sock.c:2360 [inline] __sk_free+0x320/0x430 net/core/sock.c:2371 sk_free+0x60/0xc8 net/core/sock.c:2382 sock_put include/net/sock.h:1944 [inline] mgmt_pending_free+0x88/0x118 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:290 mgmt_pending_remove+0xec/0x104 net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:298 mgmt_set_powered_complete+0x418/0x5cc net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:1355 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x204/0x33c net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334 process_one_work+0x7e8/0x156c kernel/workqueue.c:3238 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3319 [inline] worker_thread+0x958/0xed8 kernel/workqueue.c:3400 kthread+0x5fc/0x75c kernel/kthread.c:464 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:847 Fixes: a380b6cff1a2 ("Bluetooth: Add generic mgmt helper API") Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=0a7039d5d9986ff4ecec Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=cc0cc52e7f43dc9e6df1 Reported-by: syzbot+0a7039d5d9986ff4ecec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+0a7039d5d9986ff4ecec@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Tested-by: syzbot+cc0cc52e7f43dc9e6df1@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Dmitry Antipov Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz --- include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h | 1 + net/bluetooth/hci_core.c | 1 + net/bluetooth/mgmt.c | 87 +++++++++++++++----------------- net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c | 32 ++++++++++-- net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.h | 4 +- 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 52 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h index 33873266b2bc..dcaf6789aa55 100644 --- a/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h +++ b/include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h @@ -503,6 +503,7 @@ struct hci_dev { struct hci_conn_hash conn_hash; + struct mutex mgmt_pending_lock; struct list_head mgmt_pending; struct list_head reject_list; struct list_head accept_list; diff --git a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c index 8e1dddb78fb2..c2c47a0305eb 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/hci_core.c @@ -3657,6 +3657,7 @@ struct hci_dev *hci_alloc_dev(void) mutex_init(&hdev->lock); mutex_init(&hdev->req_lock); + mutex_init(&hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hdev->mgmt_pending); INIT_LIST_HEAD(&hdev->reject_list); diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c index bd8cfcfca7ae..51236a599144 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt.c @@ -1276,22 +1276,17 @@ static void settings_rsp(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data) send_settings_rsp(cmd->sk, cmd->opcode, match->hdev); - list_del(&cmd->list); - if (match->sk == NULL) { match->sk = cmd->sk; sock_hold(match->sk); } - - mgmt_pending_free(cmd); } static void cmd_status_rsp(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data) { u8 *status = data; - mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, *status); - mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); + mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, *status); } static void cmd_complete_rsp(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data) @@ -1300,8 +1295,6 @@ static void cmd_complete_rsp(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data) u8 *status = data; cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, *status); - mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); - return; } @@ -1310,13 +1303,13 @@ static void cmd_complete_rsp(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data) static int generic_cmd_complete(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status) { - return mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, status, + return mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, status, cmd->param, cmd->param_len); } static int addr_cmd_complete(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status) { - return mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, status, + return mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, status, cmd->param, sizeof(struct mgmt_addr_info)); } @@ -1354,7 +1347,7 @@ void mgmt_set_discoverable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status) if (status) { u8 mgmt_err = mgmt_status(status); - mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, mgmt_err); + mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_err); hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_LIMITED_DISCOVERABLE); goto remove_cmd; } @@ -1519,7 +1512,7 @@ void mgmt_set_connectable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status) if (status) { u8 mgmt_err = mgmt_status(status); - mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, mgmt_err); + mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_err); goto remove_cmd; } @@ -1882,12 +1875,12 @@ static void le_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, u16 opcode) if (status) { u8 mgmt_err = mgmt_status(status); - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_LE, hdev, cmd_status_rsp, + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_LE, hdev, true, cmd_status_rsp, &mgmt_err); goto unlock; } - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_LE, hdev, settings_rsp, &match); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_LE, hdev, true, settings_rsp, &match); new_settings(hdev, match.sk); @@ -2079,7 +2072,7 @@ static void mgmt_class_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u16 mgmt_op, u8 status) if (!cmd) goto unlock; - mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, + mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_status(status), hdev->dev_class, 3); mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); @@ -2833,7 +2826,7 @@ static int pairing_complete(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status) bacpy(&rp.addr.bdaddr, &conn->dst); rp.addr.type = link_to_bdaddr(conn->type, conn->dst_type); - err = mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, MGMT_OP_PAIR_DEVICE, + err = mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, MGMT_OP_PAIR_DEVICE, status, &rp, sizeof(rp)); /* So we don't get further callbacks for this connection */ @@ -4752,7 +4745,7 @@ static int start_limited_discovery(struct sock *sk, struct hci_dev *hdev, static int service_discovery_cmd_complete(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status) { - return mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, status, + return mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, status, cmd->param, 1); } @@ -5091,7 +5084,7 @@ static void set_advertising_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, if (status) { u8 mgmt_err = mgmt_status(status); - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING, hdev, + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING, hdev, true, cmd_status_rsp, &mgmt_err); goto unlock; } @@ -5101,7 +5094,7 @@ static void set_advertising_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, else hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_ADVERTISING); - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING, hdev, settings_rsp, + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_ADVERTISING, hdev, true, settings_rsp, &match); new_settings(hdev, match.sk); @@ -5490,7 +5483,7 @@ static void set_bredr_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, u16 opcode) */ hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_BREDR_ENABLED); - mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, mgmt_err); + mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_err); } else { send_settings_rsp(cmd->sk, MGMT_OP_SET_BREDR, hdev); new_settings(hdev, cmd->sk); @@ -5628,7 +5621,7 @@ static void sc_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, u16 opcode) goto unlock; if (status) { - mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, + mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_status(status)); goto remove; } @@ -6081,7 +6074,7 @@ static int conn_info_cmd_complete(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status) rp.max_tx_power = HCI_TX_POWER_INVALID; } - err = mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO, + err = mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, MGMT_OP_GET_CONN_INFO, status, &rp, sizeof(rp)); hci_conn_drop(conn); @@ -6278,7 +6271,7 @@ static int clock_info_cmd_complete(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status) if (status) goto complete; - hdev = hci_dev_get(cmd->index); + hdev = hci_dev_get(cmd->hdev->id); if (hdev) { rp.local_clock = cpu_to_le32(hdev->clock); hci_dev_put(hdev); @@ -6290,7 +6283,7 @@ static int clock_info_cmd_complete(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, u8 status) } complete: - err = mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, status, &rp, + err = mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, status, &rp, sizeof(rp)); if (conn) { @@ -7436,10 +7429,10 @@ static void add_advertising_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, rp.instance = cp->instance; if (status) - mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, + mgmt_cmd_status(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_status(status)); else - mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, + mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, mgmt_status(status), &rp, sizeof(rp)); mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); @@ -7623,7 +7616,7 @@ static void remove_advertising_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status, cp = cmd->param; rp.instance = cp->instance; - mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->index, cmd->opcode, MGMT_STATUS_SUCCESS, + mgmt_cmd_complete(cmd->sk, cmd->hdev->id, cmd->opcode, MGMT_STATUS_SUCCESS, &rp, sizeof(rp)); mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); @@ -7919,7 +7912,7 @@ void mgmt_index_removed(struct hci_dev *hdev) switch (hdev->dev_type) { case HCI_PRIMARY: - mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, cmd_complete_rsp, &status); + mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, true, cmd_complete_rsp, &status); if (hci_dev_test_flag(hdev, HCI_UNCONFIGURED)) { mgmt_index_event(MGMT_EV_UNCONF_INDEX_REMOVED, hdev, @@ -7982,7 +7975,8 @@ void mgmt_power_on(struct hci_dev *hdev, int err) hci_update_background_scan(hdev); } - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED, hdev, settings_rsp, &match); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED, hdev, true, settings_rsp, + &match); new_settings(hdev, match.sk); @@ -7997,7 +7991,8 @@ void __mgmt_power_off(struct hci_dev *hdev) struct cmd_lookup match = { NULL, hdev }; u8 status, zero_cod[] = { 0, 0, 0 }; - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED, hdev, settings_rsp, &match); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_POWERED, hdev, true, settings_rsp, + &match); /* If the power off is because of hdev unregistration let * use the appropriate INVALID_INDEX status. Otherwise use @@ -8011,7 +8006,7 @@ void __mgmt_power_off(struct hci_dev *hdev) else status = MGMT_STATUS_NOT_POWERED; - mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, cmd_complete_rsp, &status); + mgmt_pending_foreach(0, hdev, true, cmd_complete_rsp, &status); if (memcmp(hdev->dev_class, zero_cod, sizeof(zero_cod)) != 0) { mgmt_limited_event(MGMT_EV_CLASS_OF_DEV_CHANGED, hdev, @@ -8248,7 +8243,6 @@ static void unpair_device_rsp(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data) device_unpaired(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, cp->addr.type, cmd->sk); cmd->cmd_complete(cmd, 0); - mgmt_pending_remove(cmd); } bool mgmt_powering_down(struct hci_dev *hdev) @@ -8288,7 +8282,7 @@ void mgmt_device_disconnected(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, if (link_type != ACL_LINK && link_type != LE_LINK) return; - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT, hdev, disconnect_rsp, &sk); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT, hdev, true, disconnect_rsp, &sk); bacpy(&ev.addr.bdaddr, bdaddr); ev.addr.type = link_to_bdaddr(link_type, addr_type); @@ -8303,7 +8297,7 @@ void mgmt_device_disconnected(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, if (sk) sock_put(sk); - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_UNPAIR_DEVICE, hdev, unpair_device_rsp, + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_UNPAIR_DEVICE, hdev, true, unpair_device_rsp, hdev); } @@ -8314,8 +8308,8 @@ void mgmt_disconnect_failed(struct hci_dev *hdev, bdaddr_t *bdaddr, struct mgmt_cp_disconnect *cp; struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd; - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_UNPAIR_DEVICE, hdev, unpair_device_rsp, - hdev); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_UNPAIR_DEVICE, hdev, true, + unpair_device_rsp, hdev); cmd = pending_find(MGMT_OP_DISCONNECT, hdev); if (!cmd) @@ -8511,7 +8505,7 @@ void mgmt_auth_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status) if (status) { u8 mgmt_err = mgmt_status(status); - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_LINK_SECURITY, hdev, + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_LINK_SECURITY, hdev, true, cmd_status_rsp, &mgmt_err); return; } @@ -8521,8 +8515,8 @@ void mgmt_auth_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 status) else changed = hci_dev_test_and_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_LINK_SECURITY); - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_LINK_SECURITY, hdev, settings_rsp, - &match); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_LINK_SECURITY, hdev, true, + settings_rsp, &match); if (changed) new_settings(hdev, match.sk); @@ -8561,8 +8555,8 @@ void mgmt_ssp_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 enable, u8 status) new_settings(hdev, NULL); } - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_SSP, hdev, cmd_status_rsp, - &mgmt_err); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_SSP, hdev, true, + cmd_status_rsp, &mgmt_err); return; } @@ -8577,7 +8571,7 @@ void mgmt_ssp_enable_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 enable, u8 status) hci_dev_clear_flag(hdev, HCI_HS_ENABLED); } - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_SSP, hdev, settings_rsp, &match); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_SSP, hdev, true, settings_rsp, &match); if (changed) new_settings(hdev, match.sk); @@ -8614,9 +8608,12 @@ void mgmt_set_class_of_dev_complete(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 *dev_class, { struct cmd_lookup match = { NULL, hdev, mgmt_status(status) }; - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_DEV_CLASS, hdev, sk_lookup, &match); - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_ADD_UUID, hdev, sk_lookup, &match); - mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_REMOVE_UUID, hdev, sk_lookup, &match); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_SET_DEV_CLASS, hdev, false, sk_lookup, + &match); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_ADD_UUID, hdev, false, sk_lookup, + &match); + mgmt_pending_foreach(MGMT_OP_REMOVE_UUID, hdev, false, sk_lookup, + &match); if (!status) { mgmt_limited_event(MGMT_EV_CLASS_OF_DEV_CHANGED, hdev, dev_class, diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c b/net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c index 0d0a6d77b9e8..cab19de2a2c4 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c @@ -184,15 +184,22 @@ int mgmt_cmd_complete(struct sock *sk, u16 index, u16 cmd, u8 status, struct mgmt_pending_cmd *mgmt_pending_find(unsigned short channel, u16 opcode, struct hci_dev *hdev) { - struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd; + struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, *tmp; - list_for_each_entry(cmd, &hdev->mgmt_pending, list) { + mutex_lock(&hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); + + list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, tmp, &hdev->mgmt_pending, list) { if (hci_sock_get_channel(cmd->sk) != channel) continue; - if (cmd->opcode == opcode) + + if (cmd->opcode == opcode) { + mutex_unlock(&hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); return cmd; + } } + mutex_unlock(&hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); + return NULL; } @@ -213,18 +220,28 @@ struct mgmt_pending_cmd *mgmt_pending_find_data(unsigned short channel, return NULL; } -void mgmt_pending_foreach(u16 opcode, struct hci_dev *hdev, +void mgmt_pending_foreach(u16 opcode, struct hci_dev *hdev, bool remove, void (*cb)(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data), void *data) { struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, *tmp; + mutex_lock(&hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); + list_for_each_entry_safe(cmd, tmp, &hdev->mgmt_pending, list) { if (opcode > 0 && cmd->opcode != opcode) continue; + if (remove) + list_del(&cmd->list); + cb(cmd, data); + + if (remove) + mgmt_pending_free(cmd); } + + mutex_unlock(&hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); } struct mgmt_pending_cmd *mgmt_pending_add(struct sock *sk, u16 opcode, @@ -238,7 +255,7 @@ struct mgmt_pending_cmd *mgmt_pending_add(struct sock *sk, u16 opcode, return NULL; cmd->opcode = opcode; - cmd->index = hdev->id; + cmd->hdev = hdev; cmd->param = kmemdup(data, len, GFP_KERNEL); if (!cmd->param) { @@ -251,7 +268,9 @@ struct mgmt_pending_cmd *mgmt_pending_add(struct sock *sk, u16 opcode, cmd->sk = sk; sock_hold(sk); + mutex_lock(&hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); list_add(&cmd->list, &hdev->mgmt_pending); + mutex_unlock(&hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); return cmd; } @@ -265,6 +284,9 @@ void mgmt_pending_free(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd) void mgmt_pending_remove(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd) { + mutex_lock(&cmd->hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); list_del(&cmd->list); + mutex_unlock(&cmd->hdev->mgmt_pending_lock); + mgmt_pending_free(cmd); } diff --git a/net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.h b/net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.h index 6559f189213c..811aa7c810a0 100644 --- a/net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.h +++ b/net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.h @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ struct mgmt_pending_cmd { struct list_head list; u16 opcode; - int index; + struct hci_dev *hdev; void *param; size_t param_len; struct sock *sk; @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ struct mgmt_pending_cmd *mgmt_pending_find_data(unsigned short channel, u16 opcode, struct hci_dev *hdev, const void *data); -void mgmt_pending_foreach(u16 opcode, struct hci_dev *hdev, +void mgmt_pending_foreach(u16 opcode, struct hci_dev *hdev, bool remove, void (*cb)(struct mgmt_pending_cmd *cmd, void *data), void *data); struct mgmt_pending_cmd *mgmt_pending_add(struct sock *sk, u16 opcode, -- Gitee From c6b2067cf2e9e63f2be64ecf9a7e74d360e6c723 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Sabrina Dubroca Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2025 15:59:57 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 14/20] espintcp: remove encap socket caching to avoid reference leak mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.15 commit 028363685bd0b7a19b4a820f82dd905b1dc83999 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38097 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- The current scheme for caching the encap socket can lead to reference leaks when we try to delete the netns. The reference chain is: xfrm_state -> enacp_sk -> netns Since the encap socket is a userspace socket, it holds a reference on the netns. If we delete the espintcp state (through flush or individual delete) before removing the netns, the reference on the socket is dropped and the netns is correctly deleted. Otherwise, the netns may not be reachable anymore (if all processes within the ns have terminated), so we cannot delete the xfrm state to drop its reference on the socket. This patch results in a small (~2% in my tests) performance regression. A GC-type mechanism could be added for the socket cache, to clear references if the state hasn't been used "recently", but it's a lot more complex than just not caching the socket. Fixes: e27cca96cd68 ("xfrm: add espintcp (RFC 8229)") Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca Reviewed-by: Simon Horman Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert --- include/net/xfrm.h | 1 - net/ipv4/esp4.c | 49 ++++--------------------------------------- net/ipv6/esp6.c | 49 ++++--------------------------------------- net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 3 --- 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 94 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/xfrm.h b/include/net/xfrm.h index 7865db2f827e..31d2afcf79b1 100644 --- a/include/net/xfrm.h +++ b/include/net/xfrm.h @@ -200,7 +200,6 @@ struct xfrm_state { /* Data for encapsulator */ struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap; - struct sock __rcu *encap_sk; /* Data for care-of address */ xfrm_address_t *coaddr; diff --git a/net/ipv4/esp4.c b/net/ipv4/esp4.c index 5e716ee4db83..30dfe2424af4 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/esp4.c +++ b/net/ipv4/esp4.c @@ -120,46 +120,15 @@ static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp) } #ifdef CONFIG_INET_ESPINTCP -struct esp_tcp_sk { - struct sock *sk; - struct rcu_head rcu; -}; - -static void esp_free_tcp_sk(struct rcu_head *head) -{ - struct esp_tcp_sk *esk = container_of(head, struct esp_tcp_sk, rcu); - - sock_put(esk->sk); - kfree(esk); -} - static struct sock *esp_find_tcp_sk(struct xfrm_state *x) { struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap; - struct esp_tcp_sk *esk; __be16 sport, dport; - struct sock *nsk; struct sock *sk; - sk = rcu_dereference(x->encap_sk); - if (sk && sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) - return sk; - spin_lock_bh(&x->lock); sport = encap->encap_sport; dport = encap->encap_dport; - nsk = rcu_dereference_protected(x->encap_sk, - lockdep_is_held(&x->lock)); - if (sk && sk == nsk) { - esk = kmalloc(sizeof(*esk), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!esk) { - spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - RCU_INIT_POINTER(x->encap_sk, NULL); - esk->sk = sk; - call_rcu(&esk->rcu, esp_free_tcp_sk); - } spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); sk = inet_lookup_established(xs_net(x), &tcp_hashinfo, x->id.daddr.a4, @@ -172,20 +141,6 @@ static struct sock *esp_find_tcp_sk(struct xfrm_state *x) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } - spin_lock_bh(&x->lock); - nsk = rcu_dereference_protected(x->encap_sk, - lockdep_is_held(&x->lock)); - if (encap->encap_sport != sport || - encap->encap_dport != dport) { - sock_put(sk); - sk = nsk ?: ERR_PTR(-EREMCHG); - } else if (sk == nsk) { - sock_put(sk); - } else { - rcu_assign_pointer(x->encap_sk, sk); - } - spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); - return sk; } @@ -210,6 +165,8 @@ static int esp_output_tcp_finish(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) err = espintcp_push_skb(sk, skb); bh_unlock_sock(sk); + sock_put(sk); + out: rcu_read_unlock(); return err; @@ -395,6 +352,8 @@ static struct ip_esp_hdr *esp_output_tcp_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, if (IS_ERR(sk)) return ERR_CAST(sk); + sock_put(sk); + *lenp = htons(len); esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(lenp + 1); diff --git a/net/ipv6/esp6.c b/net/ipv6/esp6.c index 5382beac4e3c..11680203c785 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/esp6.c +++ b/net/ipv6/esp6.c @@ -136,46 +136,15 @@ static void esp_ssg_unref(struct xfrm_state *x, void *tmp) } #ifdef CONFIG_INET6_ESPINTCP -struct esp_tcp_sk { - struct sock *sk; - struct rcu_head rcu; -}; - -static void esp_free_tcp_sk(struct rcu_head *head) -{ - struct esp_tcp_sk *esk = container_of(head, struct esp_tcp_sk, rcu); - - sock_put(esk->sk); - kfree(esk); -} - static struct sock *esp6_find_tcp_sk(struct xfrm_state *x) { struct xfrm_encap_tmpl *encap = x->encap; - struct esp_tcp_sk *esk; __be16 sport, dport; - struct sock *nsk; struct sock *sk; - sk = rcu_dereference(x->encap_sk); - if (sk && sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) - return sk; - spin_lock_bh(&x->lock); sport = encap->encap_sport; dport = encap->encap_dport; - nsk = rcu_dereference_protected(x->encap_sk, - lockdep_is_held(&x->lock)); - if (sk && sk == nsk) { - esk = kmalloc(sizeof(*esk), GFP_ATOMIC); - if (!esk) { - spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - RCU_INIT_POINTER(x->encap_sk, NULL); - esk->sk = sk; - call_rcu(&esk->rcu, esp_free_tcp_sk); - } spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); sk = __inet6_lookup_established(xs_net(x), &tcp_hashinfo, &x->id.daddr.in6, @@ -188,20 +157,6 @@ static struct sock *esp6_find_tcp_sk(struct xfrm_state *x) return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); } - spin_lock_bh(&x->lock); - nsk = rcu_dereference_protected(x->encap_sk, - lockdep_is_held(&x->lock)); - if (encap->encap_sport != sport || - encap->encap_dport != dport) { - sock_put(sk); - sk = nsk ?: ERR_PTR(-EREMCHG); - } else if (sk == nsk) { - sock_put(sk); - } else { - rcu_assign_pointer(x->encap_sk, sk); - } - spin_unlock_bh(&x->lock); - return sk; } @@ -226,6 +181,8 @@ static int esp_output_tcp_finish(struct xfrm_state *x, struct sk_buff *skb) err = espintcp_push_skb(sk, skb); bh_unlock_sock(sk); + sock_put(sk); + out: rcu_read_unlock(); return err; @@ -430,6 +387,8 @@ static struct ip_esp_hdr *esp6_output_tcp_encap(struct xfrm_state *x, if (IS_ERR(sk)) return ERR_CAST(sk); + sock_put(sk); + *lenp = htons(len); esph = (struct ip_esp_hdr *)(lenp + 1); diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c index ba73014805a4..c4d424db2d64 100644 --- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c @@ -669,9 +669,6 @@ int __xfrm_state_delete(struct xfrm_state *x) net->xfrm.state_num--; spin_unlock(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock); - if (x->encap_sk) - sock_put(rcu_dereference_raw(x->encap_sk)); - xfrm_dev_state_delete(x); /* All xfrm_state objects are created by xfrm_state_alloc. -- Gitee From d77f05368501e41e87b1d6ad3908c379bab8afd3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Andrew Lunn Date: Mon, 9 Jan 2023 16:30:44 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 15/20] net: mdio: C22 is now optional, EOPNOTSUPP if not provided stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 72e9c8aa595b3ec65488099ed0c541c7cae4bfd9 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38111 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit b063b1924fd9bf0bc157cf644764dc2151d04ccc ] When performing a C22 operation, check that the bus driver actually provides the methods, and return -EOPNOTSUPP if not. C45 only busses do exist, and in future their C22 methods will be NULL. Signed-off-by: Andrew Lunn Signed-off-by: Michael Walle Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Stable-dep-of: 0e629694126c ("net/mdiobus: Fix potential out-of-bounds read/write access") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c index e9303be48655..743a63eca784 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c @@ -754,7 +754,10 @@ int __mdiobus_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr, u32 regnum) WARN_ON_ONCE(!mutex_is_locked(&bus->mdio_lock)); - retval = bus->read(bus, addr, regnum); + if (bus->read) + retval = bus->read(bus, addr, regnum); + else + retval = -EOPNOTSUPP; trace_mdio_access(bus, 1, addr, regnum, retval, retval); mdiobus_stats_acct(&bus->stats[addr], true, retval); @@ -780,7 +783,10 @@ int __mdiobus_write(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr, u32 regnum, u16 val) WARN_ON_ONCE(!mutex_is_locked(&bus->mdio_lock)); - err = bus->write(bus, addr, regnum, val); + if (bus->write) + err = bus->write(bus, addr, regnum, val); + else + err = -EOPNOTSUPP; trace_mdio_access(bus, 0, addr, regnum, val, err); mdiobus_stats_acct(&bus->stats[addr], false, err); -- Gitee From 0851a9ff8706a5d0d56e6cc51b2bbcb49946bee8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jakub Raczynski Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2025 17:31:46 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 16/20] net/mdiobus: Fix potential out-of-bounds read/write access stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit 19c5875e26c4ed5686d82a7d8f7051385461b9eb category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38111 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit 0e629694126ca388916f059453a1c36adde219c4 ] When using publicly available tools like 'mdio-tools' to read/write data from/to network interface and its PHY via mdiobus, there is no verification of parameters passed to the ioctl and it accepts any mdio address. Currently there is support for 32 addresses in kernel via PHY_MAX_ADDR define, but it is possible to pass higher value than that via ioctl. While read/write operation should generally fail in this case, mdiobus provides stats array, where wrong address may allow out-of-bounds read/write. Fix that by adding address verification before read/write operation. While this excludes this access from any statistics, it improves security of read/write operation. Fixes: 080bb352fad00 ("net: phy: Maintain MDIO device and bus statistics") Signed-off-by: Jakub Raczynski Reported-by: Wenjing Shan Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c index 743a63eca784..d15deb3281ed 100644 --- a/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c +++ b/drivers/net/phy/mdio_bus.c @@ -754,6 +754,9 @@ int __mdiobus_read(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr, u32 regnum) WARN_ON_ONCE(!mutex_is_locked(&bus->mdio_lock)); + if (addr >= PHY_MAX_ADDR) + return -ENXIO; + if (bus->read) retval = bus->read(bus, addr, regnum); else @@ -783,6 +786,9 @@ int __mdiobus_write(struct mii_bus *bus, int addr, u32 regnum, u16 val) WARN_ON_ONCE(!mutex_is_locked(&bus->mdio_lock)); + if (addr >= PHY_MAX_ADDR) + return -ENXIO; + if (bus->write) err = bus->write(bus, addr, regnum, val); else -- Gitee From 02a155b161c1b256a51439b562c2540be57c8bf6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Willem de Bruijn Date: Tue, 1 Oct 2024 13:17:46 -0400 Subject: [PATCH 17/20] gso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after pull from frag_list mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.12-rc2 commit a1e40ac5b5e9077fe1f7ae0eb88034db0f9ae1ab category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2024-49978 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- Detect gso fraglist skbs with corrupted geometry (see below) and pass these to skb_segment instead of skb_segment_list, as the first can segment them correctly. Valid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs - consist of two or more segments - the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size - one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment - all but the last must be gso_size Optional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can modify these skbs, breaking these invariants. In extreme cases they pull all data into skb linear. For UDP, this causes a NULL ptr deref in __udpv4_gso_segment_list_csum at udp_hdr(seg->next)->dest. Detect invalid geometry due to pull, by checking head_skb size. Don't just drop, as this may blackhole a destination. Convert to be able to pass to regular skb_segment. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240428142913.18666-1-shiming.cheng@mediatek.com/ Fixes: 9fd1ff5d2ac7 ("udp: Support UDP fraglist GRO/GSO.") Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241001171752.107580-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski Signed-off-by: May27May Conflicts: net/ipv4/udp_offload.c --- net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c index 99b22e708343..f06136404a43 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include static struct sk_buff *__skb_udp_tunnel_segment(struct sk_buff *skb, netdev_features_t features, @@ -269,8 +270,26 @@ struct sk_buff *__udp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *gso_skb, __sum16 check; __be16 newlen; - if (skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) - return __udp_gso_segment_list(gso_skb, features, is_ipv6); + if (skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) { + /* Detect modified geometry and pass those to skb_segment. */ + if (skb_pagelen(gso_skb) - sizeof(*uh) == skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_size) + return __udp_gso_segment_list(gso_skb, features, is_ipv6); + + /* Setup csum, as fraglist skips this in udp4_gro_receive. */ + gso_skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(gso_skb) - gso_skb->head; + gso_skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check); + gso_skb->ip_summed = CHECKSUM_PARTIAL; + + uh = udp_hdr(gso_skb); + if (is_ipv6) + uh->check = ~udp_v6_check(gso_skb->len, + &ipv6_hdr(gso_skb)->saddr, + &ipv6_hdr(gso_skb)->daddr, 0); + else + uh->check = ~udp_v4_check(gso_skb->len, + ip_hdr(gso_skb)->saddr, + ip_hdr(gso_skb)->daddr, 0); + } mss = skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_size; if (gso_skb->len <= sizeof(*uh) + mss) -- Gitee From 01df355b8fdc42a70afb43db66e8ca9b2ca80b5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Shiming Cheng Date: Fri, 30 May 2025 09:26:08 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 18/20] net: fix udp gso skb_segment after pull from frag_list mainline inclusion from mainline-v6.16-rc1 commit 3382a1ed7f778db841063f5d7e317ac55f9e7f72 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38124 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- Commit a1e40ac5b5e9 ("net: gso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after pull from frag_list") detected invalid geometry in frag_list skbs and redirects them from skb_segment_list to more robust skb_segment. But some packets with modified geometry can also hit bugs in that code. We don't know how many such cases exist. Addressing each one by one also requires touching the complex skb_segment code, which risks introducing bugs for other types of skbs. Instead, linearize all these packets that fail the basic invariants on gso fraglist skbs. That is more robust. If only part of the fraglist payload is pulled into head_skb, it will always cause exception when splitting skbs by skb_segment. For detailed call stack information, see below. Valid SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST skbs - consist of two or more segments - the head_skb holds the protocol headers plus first gso_size - one or more frag_list skbs hold exactly one segment - all but the last must be gso_size Optional datapath hooks such as NAT and BPF (bpf_skb_pull_data) can modify fraglist skbs, breaking these invariants. In extreme cases they pull one part of data into skb linear. For UDP, this causes three payloads with lengths of (11,11,10) bytes were pulled tail to become (12,10,10) bytes. The skbs no longer meets the above SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST conditions because payload was pulled into head_skb, it needs to be linearized before pass to regular skb_segment. skb_segment+0xcd0/0xd14 __udp_gso_segment+0x334/0x5f4 udp4_ufo_fragment+0x118/0x15c inet_gso_segment+0x164/0x338 skb_mac_gso_segment+0xc4/0x13c __skb_gso_segment+0xc4/0x124 validate_xmit_skb+0x9c/0x2c0 validate_xmit_skb_list+0x4c/0x80 sch_direct_xmit+0x70/0x404 __dev_queue_xmit+0x64c/0xe5c neigh_resolve_output+0x178/0x1c4 ip_finish_output2+0x37c/0x47c __ip_finish_output+0x194/0x240 ip_finish_output+0x20/0xf4 ip_output+0x100/0x1a0 NF_HOOK+0xc4/0x16c ip_forward+0x314/0x32c ip_rcv+0x90/0x118 __netif_receive_skb+0x74/0x124 process_backlog+0xe8/0x1a4 __napi_poll+0x5c/0x1f8 net_rx_action+0x154/0x314 handle_softirqs+0x154/0x4b8 [118.376811] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:bug&]kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:4278! [118.376829] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:traps&]Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP [118.470774] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]Kernel Offset: 0x178cc00000 from 0xffffffc008000000 [118.470810] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]PHYS_OFFSET: 0x40000000 [118.470827] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO) [118.470848] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]pc : [0xffffffd79598aefc] skb_segment+0xcd0/0xd14 [118.470900] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]lr : [0xffffffd79598a5e8] skb_segment+0x3bc/0xd14 [118.470928] [C201134] rxq0_pus: [name:mrdump&]sp : ffffffc008013770 Fixes: a1e40ac5b5e9 ("gso: fix udp gso fraglist segmentation after pull from frag_list") Signed-off-by: Shiming Cheng Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn Signed-off-by: David S. Miller --- net/ipv4/udp_offload.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c index f06136404a43..7832967d93ea 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c +++ b/net/ipv4/udp_offload.c @@ -269,12 +269,17 @@ struct sk_buff *__udp_gso_segment(struct sk_buff *gso_skb, bool copy_dtor; __sum16 check; __be16 newlen; + int ret = 0; if (skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_FRAGLIST) { /* Detect modified geometry and pass those to skb_segment. */ if (skb_pagelen(gso_skb) - sizeof(*uh) == skb_shinfo(gso_skb)->gso_size) return __udp_gso_segment_list(gso_skb, features, is_ipv6); + ret = __skb_linearize(gso_skb); + if (ret) + return ERR_PTR(ret); + /* Setup csum, as fraglist skips this in udp4_gro_receive. */ gso_skb->csum_start = skb_transport_header(gso_skb) - gso_skb->head; gso_skb->csum_offset = offsetof(struct udphdr, check); -- Gitee From 23f96d8a58051581e48f546c5cbd6d679d17f3ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jeongjun Park Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2025 23:33:22 +0900 Subject: [PATCH 19/20] ipc: fix to protect IPCS lookups using RCU stable inclusion from stable-v5.10.239 commit b968ba8bfd9f90914957bbbd815413bf6a98eca7 category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2025-38212 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- commit d66adabe91803ef34a8b90613c81267b5ded1472 upstream. syzbot reported that it discovered a use-after-free vulnerability, [0] [0]: https://lore.kernel.org/all/67af13f8.050a0220.21dd3.0038.GAE@google.com/ idr_for_each() is protected by rwsem, but this is not enough. If it is not protected by RCU read-critical region, when idr_for_each() calls radix_tree_node_free() through call_rcu() to free the radix_tree_node structure, the node will be freed immediately, and when reading the next node in radix_tree_for_each_slot(), the already freed memory may be read. Therefore, we need to add code to make sure that idr_for_each() is protected within the RCU read-critical region when we call it in shm_destroy_orphaned(). Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250424143322.18830-1-aha310510@gmail.com Fixes: b34a6b1da371 ("ipc: introduce shm_rmid_forced sysctl") Signed-off-by: Jeongjun Park Reported-by: syzbot+a2b84e569d06ca3a949c@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Cc: Jeongjun Park Cc: Liam Howlett Cc: Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) Cc: Vasiliy Kulikov Cc: Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- ipc/shm.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/ipc/shm.c b/ipc/shm.c index b418731d66e8..323a5810a947 100644 --- a/ipc/shm.c +++ b/ipc/shm.c @@ -417,8 +417,11 @@ static int shm_try_destroy_orphaned(int id, void *p, void *data) void shm_destroy_orphaned(struct ipc_namespace *ns) { down_write(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem); - if (shm_ids(ns).in_use) + if (shm_ids(ns).in_use) { + rcu_read_lock(); idr_for_each(&shm_ids(ns).ipcs_idr, &shm_try_destroy_orphaned, ns); + rcu_read_unlock(); + } up_write(&shm_ids(ns).rwsem); } -- Gitee From 3d12b9f82613653680995db24b9182f5b0fd5eb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Alexey Dobriyan Date: Wed, 4 May 2022 12:54:20 +0300 Subject: [PATCH 20/20] module: fix [e_shstrndx].sh_size=0 OOB access mainline inclusion from mainline-v5.19-rc1 commit 391e982bfa632b8315235d8be9c0a81374c6a19c category: bugfix issue: #ICLVPR CVE: CVE-2022-49444 Signed-off-by: Tengda Wu --------------------------------------- It is trivial to craft a module to trigger OOB access in this line: if (info->secstrings[strhdr->sh_size - 1] != '\0') { BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000aa0fff PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 100066067 PMD 10436f067 PTE 0 Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 7 PID: 1215 Comm: insmod Not tainted 5.18.0-rc5-00007-g9bf578647087-dirty #10 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-4.fc34 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:load_module+0x19b/0x2391 Fixes: ec2a29593c83 ("module: harden ELF info handling") Signed-off-by: Alexey Dobriyan [rebased patch onto modules-next] Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain --- kernel/module.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index 0dac54adf7e8..f4fd4906bdeb 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -3048,6 +3048,10 @@ static int elf_validity_check(struct load_info *info) * strings in the section safe. */ info->secstrings = (void *)info->hdr + strhdr->sh_offset; + if (strhdr->sh_size == 0) { + pr_err("empty section name table\n"); + return -ENOEXEC; + } if (info->secstrings[strhdr->sh_size - 1] != '\0') return -ENOEXEC; -- Gitee