diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 78b9514a3844051916aec16ba69d8a8fe1937417..de39f73e005131e50fc184ef3990cbb90469a82d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1091,6 +1091,7 @@ static void update_mds_branch_idle(void)
 
 #define MDS_MSG_SMT "MDS CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.html for more details.\n"
 #define TAA_MSG_SMT "TAA CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.html for more details.\n"
+#define MMIO_MSG_SMT "MMIO Stale Data CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.html for more details.\n"
 
 void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 {
@@ -1135,6 +1136,16 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	}
 
+	switch (mmio_mitigation) {
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW:
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED:
+		if (sched_smt_active())
+			pr_warn_once(MMIO_MSG_SMT);
+		break;
+	case MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF:
+		break;
+	}
+
 	mutex_unlock(&spec_ctrl_mutex);
 }
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
index bb39f493447cf8c1aa96bd2185e81b0b2f7aab72..2673a34a23924f553b2867113c74e7e5859a22f6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/hyperv.c
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static int synic_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic,
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = synic_to_vcpu(synic);
 	int ret;
 
-	if (!synic->active && !host)
+	if (!synic->active && (!host || data))
 		return 1;
 
 	trace_kvm_hv_synic_set_msr(vcpu->vcpu_id, msr, data, host);
@@ -253,6 +253,9 @@ static int synic_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic,
 	case HV_X64_MSR_EOM: {
 		int i;
 
+		if (!synic->active)
+			break;
+
 		for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(synic->sint); i++)
 			kvm_hv_notify_acked_sint(vcpu, i);
 		break;
@@ -636,7 +639,7 @@ static int stimer_set_config(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 config,
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
 	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = vcpu_to_synic(vcpu);
 
-	if (!synic->active && !host)
+	if (!synic->active && (!host || config))
 		return 1;
 
 	trace_kvm_hv_stimer_set_config(stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
@@ -660,7 +663,7 @@ static int stimer_set_count(struct kvm_vcpu_hv_stimer *stimer, u64 count,
 	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = stimer_to_vcpu(stimer);
 	struct kvm_vcpu_hv_synic *synic = vcpu_to_synic(vcpu);
 
-	if (!synic->active && !host)
+	if (!synic->active && (!host || count))
 		return 1;
 
 	trace_kvm_hv_stimer_set_count(stimer_to_vcpu(stimer)->vcpu_id,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
index 91fbfc8cada801e9e46516d80813b694e60b15ba..7aa86a4409fcff1395cedeea3004558c392eb98b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c
@@ -711,6 +711,18 @@ void inet_unhash(struct sock *sk)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(inet_unhash);
 
+/* RFC 6056 3.3.4.  Algorithm 4: Double-Hash Port Selection Algorithm
+ * Note that we use 32bit integers (vs RFC 'short integers')
+ * because 2^16 is not a multiple of num_ephemeral and this
+ * property might be used by clever attacker.
+ * RFC claims using TABLE_LENGTH=10 buckets gives an improvement, though
+ * attacks were since demonstrated, thus we use 65536 instead to really
+ * give more isolation and privacy, at the expense of 256kB of kernel
+ * memory.
+ */
+#define INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT 16
+static u32 table_perturb[1 << INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT];
+
 int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 		struct sock *sk, u64 port_offset,
 		int (*check_established)(struct inet_timewait_death_row *,
@@ -724,8 +736,8 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 	struct inet_bind_bucket *tb;
 	u32 remaining, offset;
 	int ret, i, low, high;
-	static u32 hint;
 	int l3mdev;
+	u32 index;
 
 	if (port) {
 		head = &hinfo->bhash[inet_bhashfn(net, port,
@@ -752,7 +764,10 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 	if (likely(remaining > 1))
 		remaining &= ~1U;
 
-	offset = hint + port_offset;
+	net_get_random_once(table_perturb, sizeof(table_perturb));
+	index = hash_32(port_offset, INET_TABLE_PERTURB_SHIFT);
+
+	offset = READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + port_offset;
 	offset %= remaining;
 	/* In first pass we try ports of @low parity.
 	 * inet_csk_get_port() does the opposite choice.
@@ -807,7 +822,7 @@ int __inet_hash_connect(struct inet_timewait_death_row *death_row,
 	return -EADDRNOTAVAIL;
 
 ok:
-	hint += i + 2;
+	WRITE_ONCE(table_perturb[index], READ_ONCE(table_perturb[index]) + i + 2);
 
 	/* Head lock still held and bh's disabled */
 	inet_bind_hash(sk, tb, port);