From 971aa0b25976ce9ec19d8dc7fd9c39ee2398312a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 14:14:52 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 1/7] net: usb: ax88179_178a: Fix out-of-bounds accesses in RX fixup stable inclusion from stable-5.10.101 commit 758290defe93a865a2880d10c5d5abd288b64b5d category: bugfix issue: I5PUD3 CVE: CVE-2022-2964 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 57bc3d3ae8c14df3ceb4e17d26ddf9eeab304581 upstream. ax88179_rx_fixup() contains several out-of-bounds accesses that can be triggered by a malicious (or defective) USB device, in particular: - The metadata array (hdr_off..hdr_off+2*pkt_cnt) can be out of bounds, causing OOB reads and (on big-endian systems) OOB endianness flips. - A packet can overlap the metadata array, causing a later OOB endianness flip to corrupt data used by a cloned SKB that has already been handed off into the network stack. - A packet SKB can be constructed whose tail is far beyond its end, causing out-of-bounds heap data to be considered part of the SKB's data. I have tested that this can be used by a malicious USB device to send a bogus ICMPv6 Echo Request and receive an ICMPv6 Echo Reply in response that contains random kernel heap data. It's probably also possible to get OOB writes from this on a little-endian system somehow - maybe by triggering skb_cow() via IP options processing -, but I haven't tested that. Fixes: e2ca90c276e1 ("ax88179_178a: ASIX AX88179_178A USB 3.0/2.0 to gigabit ethernet adapter driver") Cc: stable@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c | 68 +++++++++++++++++++--------------- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c index b77b0a33d697..0b0cbcee1920 100644 --- a/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c +++ b/drivers/net/usb/ax88179_178a.c @@ -1467,58 +1467,68 @@ static int ax88179_rx_fixup(struct usbnet *dev, struct sk_buff *skb) u16 hdr_off; u32 *pkt_hdr; - /* This check is no longer done by usbnet */ - if (skb->len < dev->net->hard_header_len) + /* At the end of the SKB, there's a header telling us how many packets + * are bundled into this buffer and where we can find an array of + * per-packet metadata (which contains elements encoded into u16). + */ + if (skb->len < 4) return 0; - skb_trim(skb, skb->len - 4); rx_hdr = get_unaligned_le32(skb_tail_pointer(skb)); - pkt_cnt = (u16)rx_hdr; hdr_off = (u16)(rx_hdr >> 16); + + if (pkt_cnt == 0) + return 0; + + /* Make sure that the bounds of the metadata array are inside the SKB + * (and in front of the counter at the end). + */ + if (pkt_cnt * 2 + hdr_off > skb->len) + return 0; pkt_hdr = (u32 *)(skb->data + hdr_off); - while (pkt_cnt--) { + /* Packets must not overlap the metadata array */ + skb_trim(skb, hdr_off); + + for (; ; pkt_cnt--, pkt_hdr++) { u16 pkt_len; le32_to_cpus(pkt_hdr); pkt_len = (*pkt_hdr >> 16) & 0x1fff; - /* Check CRC or runt packet */ - if ((*pkt_hdr & AX_RXHDR_CRC_ERR) || - (*pkt_hdr & AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR)) { - skb_pull(skb, (pkt_len + 7) & 0xFFF8); - pkt_hdr++; - continue; - } - - if (pkt_cnt == 0) { - skb->len = pkt_len; - /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ - skb_pull(skb, 2); - skb_set_tail_pointer(skb, skb->len); - skb->truesize = pkt_len + sizeof(struct sk_buff); - ax88179_rx_checksum(skb, pkt_hdr); - return 1; - } + if (pkt_len > skb->len) + return 0; - ax_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); - if (ax_skb) { + /* Check CRC or runt packet */ + if (((*pkt_hdr & (AX_RXHDR_CRC_ERR | AX_RXHDR_DROP_ERR)) == 0) && + pkt_len >= 2 + ETH_HLEN) { + bool last = (pkt_cnt == 0); + + if (last) { + ax_skb = skb; + } else { + ax_skb = skb_clone(skb, GFP_ATOMIC); + if (!ax_skb) + return 0; + } ax_skb->len = pkt_len; /* Skip IP alignment pseudo header */ skb_pull(ax_skb, 2); skb_set_tail_pointer(ax_skb, ax_skb->len); ax_skb->truesize = pkt_len + sizeof(struct sk_buff); ax88179_rx_checksum(ax_skb, pkt_hdr); + + if (last) + return 1; + usbnet_skb_return(dev, ax_skb); - } else { - return 0; } - skb_pull(skb, (pkt_len + 7) & 0xFFF8); - pkt_hdr++; + /* Trim this packet away from the SKB */ + if (!skb_pull(skb, (pkt_len + 7) & 0xFFF8)) + return 0; } - return 1; } static struct sk_buff * -- Gitee From 340e2a511b90392195e2a8feebb35953cc9c1ec8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lino Sanfilippo Date: Wed, 2 Mar 2022 10:43:53 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 2/7] tpm: fix reference counting for struct tpm_chip stable inclusion from stable-5.10.110 commit 290e05f346d1829e849662c97e42d5ad984f5258 category: bugfix issue: I5PUQL CVE: CVE-2022-2977 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit 7e0438f83dc769465ee663bb5dcf8cc154940712 upstream. The following sequence of operations results in a refcount warning: 1. Open device /dev/tpmrm. 2. Remove module tpm_tis_spi. 3. Write a TPM command to the file descriptor opened at step 1. ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1161 at lib/refcount.c:25 kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4 refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. Modules linked in: tpm_tis_spi tpm_tis_core tpm mdio_bcm_unimac brcmfmac sha256_generic libsha256 sha256_arm hci_uart btbcm bluetooth cfg80211 vc4 brcmutil ecdh_generic ecc snd_soc_core crc32_arm_ce libaes raspberrypi_hwmon ac97_bus snd_pcm_dmaengine bcm2711_thermal snd_pcm snd_timer genet snd phy_generic soundcore [last unloaded: spi_bcm2835] CPU: 3 PID: 1161 Comm: hold_open Not tainted 5.10.0ls-main-dirty #2 Hardware name: BCM2711 [] (unwind_backtrace) from [] (show_stack+0x10/0x14) [] (show_stack) from [] (dump_stack+0xc4/0xd8) [] (dump_stack) from [] (__warn+0x104/0x108) [] (__warn) from [] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x74/0xb8) [] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [] (kobject_get+0xa0/0xa4) [] (kobject_get) from [] (tpm_try_get_ops+0x14/0x54 [tpm]) [] (tpm_try_get_ops [tpm]) from [] (tpm_common_write+0x38/0x60 [tpm]) [] (tpm_common_write [tpm]) from [] (vfs_write+0xc4/0x3c0) [] (vfs_write) from [] (ksys_write+0x58/0xcc) [] (ksys_write) from [] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x4c) Exception stack(0xc226bfa8 to 0xc226bff0) bfa0: 00000000 000105b4 00000003 beafe664 00000014 00000000 bfc0: 00000000 000105b4 000103f8 00000004 00000000 00000000 b6f9c000 beafe684 bfe0: 0000006c beafe648 0001056c b6eb6944 ---[ end trace d4b8409def9b8b1f ]--- The reason for this warning is the attempt to get the chip->dev reference in tpm_common_write() although the reference counter is already zero. Since commit 8979b02aaf1d ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") the extra reference used to prevent a premature zero counter is never taken, because the required TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag is never set. Fix this by moving the TPM 2 character device handling from tpm_chip_alloc() to tpm_add_char_device() which is called at a later point in time when the flag has been set in case of TPM2. Commit fdc915f7f719 ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm") already introduced function tpm_devs_release() to release the extra reference but did not implement the required put on chip->devs that results in the call of this function. Fix this by putting chip->devs in tpm_chip_unregister(). Finally move the new implementation for the TPM 2 handling into a new function to avoid multiple checks for the TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2 flag in the good case and error cases. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: fdc915f7f719 ("tpm: expose spaces via a device link /dev/tpmrm") Fixes: 8979b02aaf1d ("tpm: Fix reference count to main device") Co-developed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe Signed-off-by: Lino Sanfilippo Tested-by: Stefan Berger Reviewed-by: Jason Gunthorpe Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c | 46 +++++-------------------- drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h | 2 ++ drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c index ddaeceb7e109..ed600473ad7e 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-chip.c @@ -274,14 +274,6 @@ static void tpm_dev_release(struct device *dev) kfree(chip); } -static void tpm_devs_release(struct device *dev) -{ - struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, devs); - - /* release the master device reference */ - put_device(&chip->dev); -} - /** * tpm_class_shutdown() - prepare the TPM device for loss of power. * @dev: device to which the chip is associated. @@ -344,7 +336,6 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev, chip->dev_num = rc; device_initialize(&chip->dev); - device_initialize(&chip->devs); chip->dev.class = tpm_class; chip->dev.class->shutdown_pre = tpm_class_shutdown; @@ -352,29 +343,12 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev, chip->dev.parent = pdev; chip->dev.groups = chip->groups; - chip->devs.parent = pdev; - chip->devs.class = tpmrm_class; - chip->devs.release = tpm_devs_release; - /* get extra reference on main device to hold on - * behalf of devs. This holds the chip structure - * while cdevs is in use. The corresponding put - * is in the tpm_devs_release (TPM2 only) - */ - if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - get_device(&chip->dev); - if (chip->dev_num == 0) chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MISC_MAJOR, TPM_MINOR); else chip->dev.devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num); - chip->devs.devt = - MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num + TPM_NUM_DEVICES); - rc = dev_set_name(&chip->dev, "tpm%d", chip->dev_num); - if (rc) - goto out; - rc = dev_set_name(&chip->devs, "tpmrm%d", chip->dev_num); if (rc) goto out; @@ -382,9 +356,7 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev, chip->flags |= TPM_CHIP_FLAG_VIRTUAL; cdev_init(&chip->cdev, &tpm_fops); - cdev_init(&chip->cdevs, &tpmrm_fops); chip->cdev.owner = THIS_MODULE; - chip->cdevs.owner = THIS_MODULE; rc = tpm2_init_space(&chip->work_space, TPM2_SPACE_BUFFER_SIZE); if (rc) { @@ -396,7 +368,6 @@ struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_alloc(struct device *pdev, return chip; out: - put_device(&chip->devs); put_device(&chip->dev); return ERR_PTR(rc); } @@ -445,14 +416,9 @@ static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip) } if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) { - rc = cdev_device_add(&chip->cdevs, &chip->devs); - if (rc) { - dev_err(&chip->devs, - "unable to cdev_device_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n", - dev_name(&chip->devs), MAJOR(chip->devs.devt), - MINOR(chip->devs.devt), rc); - return rc; - } + rc = tpm_devs_add(chip); + if (rc) + goto err_del_cdev; } /* Make the chip available. */ @@ -460,6 +426,10 @@ static int tpm_add_char_device(struct tpm_chip *chip) idr_replace(&dev_nums_idr, chip, chip->dev_num); mutex_unlock(&idr_lock); + return 0; + +err_del_cdev: + cdev_device_del(&chip->cdev, &chip->dev); return rc; } @@ -641,7 +611,7 @@ void tpm_chip_unregister(struct tpm_chip *chip) hwrng_unregister(&chip->hwrng); tpm_bios_log_teardown(chip); if (chip->flags & TPM_CHIP_FLAG_TPM2) - cdev_device_del(&chip->cdevs, &chip->devs); + tpm_devs_remove(chip); tpm_del_char_device(chip); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_chip_unregister); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h index 283f78211c3a..2163c6ee0d36 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h @@ -234,6 +234,8 @@ int tpm2_prepare_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, u8 *cmd, size_t cmdsiz); int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, void *buf, size_t *bufsiz); +int tpm_devs_add(struct tpm_chip *chip); +void tpm_devs_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_bios_log_setup(struct tpm_chip *chip); void tpm_bios_log_teardown(struct tpm_chip *chip); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c index 97e916856cf3..265ec72b1d81 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-space.c @@ -574,3 +574,68 @@ int tpm2_commit_space(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_space *space, dev_err(&chip->dev, "%s: error %d\n", __func__, rc); return rc; } + +/* + * Put the reference to the main device. + */ +static void tpm_devs_release(struct device *dev) +{ + struct tpm_chip *chip = container_of(dev, struct tpm_chip, devs); + + /* release the master device reference */ + put_device(&chip->dev); +} + +/* + * Remove the device file for exposed TPM spaces and release the device + * reference. This may also release the reference to the master device. + */ +void tpm_devs_remove(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + cdev_device_del(&chip->cdevs, &chip->devs); + put_device(&chip->devs); +} + +/* + * Add a device file to expose TPM spaces. Also take a reference to the + * main device. + */ +int tpm_devs_add(struct tpm_chip *chip) +{ + int rc; + + device_initialize(&chip->devs); + chip->devs.parent = chip->dev.parent; + chip->devs.class = tpmrm_class; + + /* + * Get extra reference on main device to hold on behalf of devs. + * This holds the chip structure while cdevs is in use. The + * corresponding put is in the tpm_devs_release. + */ + get_device(&chip->dev); + chip->devs.release = tpm_devs_release; + chip->devs.devt = MKDEV(MAJOR(tpm_devt), chip->dev_num + TPM_NUM_DEVICES); + cdev_init(&chip->cdevs, &tpmrm_fops); + chip->cdevs.owner = THIS_MODULE; + + rc = dev_set_name(&chip->devs, "tpmrm%d", chip->dev_num); + if (rc) + goto err_put_devs; + + rc = cdev_device_add(&chip->cdevs, &chip->devs); + if (rc) { + dev_err(&chip->devs, + "unable to cdev_device_add() %s, major %d, minor %d, err=%d\n", + dev_name(&chip->devs), MAJOR(chip->devs.devt), + MINOR(chip->devs.devt), rc); + goto err_put_devs; + } + + return 0; + +err_put_devs: + put_device(&chip->devs); + + return rc; +} -- Gitee From 65c1a4091f7cd444a2ae8e84b9adcb12f978a8c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jiasheng Jiang Date: Fri, 14 Jan 2022 07:28:40 +0100 Subject: [PATCH 3/7] media: vidtv: Check for null return of vzalloc stable inclusion from stable-5.10.110 commit 663e7a72871f89f7a10cc8d7b2f17f27c64e071d category: bugfix issue: I5PUR2 CVE: CVE-2022-3078 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit e6a21a14106d9718aa4f8e115b1e474888eeba44 ] As the possible failure of the vzalloc(), e->encoder_buf might be NULL. Therefore, it should be better to check it in order to guarantee the success of the initialization. If fails, we need to free not only 'e' but also 'e->name'. Also, if the allocation for ctx fails, we need to free 'e->encoder_buf' else. Fixes: f90cf6079bf6 ("media: vidtv: add a bridge driver") Signed-off-by: Jiasheng Jiang Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_s302m.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_s302m.c b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_s302m.c index d79b65854627..4676083cee3b 100644 --- a/drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_s302m.c +++ b/drivers/media/test-drivers/vidtv/vidtv_s302m.c @@ -455,6 +455,9 @@ struct vidtv_encoder e->name = kstrdup(args.name, GFP_KERNEL); e->encoder_buf = vzalloc(VIDTV_S302M_BUF_SZ); + if (!e->encoder_buf) + goto out_kfree_e; + e->encoder_buf_sz = VIDTV_S302M_BUF_SZ; e->encoder_buf_offset = 0; @@ -467,10 +470,8 @@ struct vidtv_encoder e->is_video_encoder = false; ctx = kzalloc(priv_sz, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ctx) { - kfree(e); - return NULL; - } + if (!ctx) + goto out_kfree_buf; e->ctx = ctx; ctx->last_duration = 0; @@ -498,6 +499,14 @@ struct vidtv_encoder e->next = NULL; return e; + +out_kfree_buf: + kfree(e->encoder_buf); + +out_kfree_e: + kfree(e->name); + kfree(e); + return NULL; } void vidtv_s302m_encoder_destroy(struct vidtv_encoder *e) -- Gitee From 26c4ac8b055adbe96b92724ee54595fea98b3fcb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Herbert Xu Date: Thu, 4 Aug 2022 18:03:46 +0800 Subject: [PATCH 4/7] af_key: Do not call xfrm_probe_algs in parallel stable inclusion from stable-5.10.140 commit c5c4d4c9806dadac7bc82f9c29ef4e1b78894775 category: bugfix issue: I5Q1QN CVE: CVE-2022-3028 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- [ Upstream commit ba953a9d89a00c078b85f4b190bc1dde66fe16b5 ] When namespace support was added to xfrm/afkey, it caused the previously single-threaded call to xfrm_probe_algs to become multi-threaded. This is buggy and needs to be fixed with a mutex. Reported-by: Abhishek Shah Fixes: 283bc9f35bbb ("xfrm: Namespacify xfrm state/policy locks") Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Steffen Klassert Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/key/af_key.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/key/af_key.c b/net/key/af_key.c index b95684b8903e..65b5ad394aa1 100644 --- a/net/key/af_key.c +++ b/net/key/af_key.c @@ -1701,9 +1701,12 @@ static int pfkey_register(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sad pfk->registered |= (1<sadb_msg_satype); } + mutex_lock(&pfkey_mutex); xfrm_probe_algs(); supp_skb = compose_sadb_supported(hdr, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO); + mutex_unlock(&pfkey_mutex); + if (!supp_skb) { if (hdr->sadb_msg_satype != SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC) pfk->registered &= ~(1<sadb_msg_satype); -- Gitee From 3d0173d17d6a3717d9001997825e20ee730b7826 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Borkmann Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 23:26:47 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 5/7] bpf: Don't use tnum_range on array range checking for poke descriptors stable inclusion from stable-5.10.140 commit e8979807178434db8ceaa84dfcd44363e71e50bb category: bugfix issue: I5PULT CVE: CVE-2022-2905 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit a657182a5c5150cdfacb6640aad1d2712571a409 upstream. Hsin-Wei reported a KASAN splat triggered by their BPF runtime fuzzer which is based on a customized syzkaller: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888004e90b58 by task syz-executor.0/1489 CPU: 1 PID: 1489 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 5.19.0 #1 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xc9 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x1f/0x1f0 ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 kasan_report.cold+0xeb/0x197 ? kvmalloc_node+0x170/0x200 ? bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 bpf_int_jit_compile+0x1257/0x13f0 ? arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher+0xd0/0xd0 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x43/0x70 bpf_prog_select_runtime+0x3e8/0x640 ? bpf_obj_name_cpy+0x149/0x1b0 bpf_prog_load+0x102f/0x2220 ? __bpf_prog_put.constprop.0+0x220/0x220 ? find_held_lock+0x2c/0x110 ? __might_fault+0xd6/0x180 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? lock_is_held_type+0xa6/0x120 ? __might_fault+0x147/0x180 __sys_bpf+0x137b/0x6070 ? bpf_perf_link_attach+0x530/0x530 ? new_sync_read+0x600/0x600 ? __fget_files+0x255/0x450 ? lock_downgrade+0x6e0/0x6e0 ? fput+0x30/0x1a0 ? ksys_write+0x1a8/0x260 __x64_sys_bpf+0x7a/0xc0 ? syscall_enter_from_user_mode+0x21/0x70 do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd RIP: 0033:0x7f917c4e2c2d The problem here is that a range of tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1) has limited ability to represent the concrete tight range with the tnum as the set of resulting states from value + mask can result in a superset of the actual intended range, and as such a tnum_in(range, reg->var_off) check may yield true when it shouldn't, for example tnum_range(0, 2) would result in 00XX -> v = 0000, m = 0011 such that the intended set of {0, 1, 2} is here represented by a less precise superset of {0, 1, 2, 3}. As the register is known const scalar, really just use the concrete reg->var_off.value for the upper index check. Fixes: d2e4c1e6c294 ("bpf: Constant map key tracking for prog array pokes") Reported-by: Hsin-Wei Hung Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Cc: Shung-Hsi Yu Acked-by: John Fastabend Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/984b37f9fdf7ac36831d2137415a4a915744c1b6.1661462653.git.daniel@iogearbox.net Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 10 ++++------ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 8de76974537f..72f3c42ac94a 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -5333,8 +5333,7 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx]; struct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env), *reg; struct bpf_map *map = meta->map_ptr; - struct tnum range; - u64 val; + u64 val, max; int err; if (func_id != BPF_FUNC_tail_call) @@ -5344,10 +5343,11 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, return -EINVAL; } - range = tnum_range(0, map->max_entries - 1); reg = ®s[BPF_REG_3]; + val = reg->var_off.value; + max = map->max_entries; - if (!register_is_const(reg) || !tnum_in(range, reg->var_off)) { + if (!(register_is_const(reg) && val < max)) { bpf_map_key_store(aux, BPF_MAP_KEY_POISON); return 0; } @@ -5355,8 +5355,6 @@ record_func_key(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, err = mark_chain_precision(env, BPF_REG_3); if (err) return err; - - val = reg->var_off.value; if (bpf_map_key_unseen(aux)) bpf_map_key_store(aux, val); else if (!bpf_map_key_poisoned(aux) && -- Gitee From ddea496428c2827e422cd8ca9309b6de24011336 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jann Horn Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2022 21:13:48 +0200 Subject: [PATCH 6/7] mm: Force TLB flush for PFNMAP mappings before unlink_file_vma() stable inclusion from stable-5.10.141 commit 895428ee124ad70b9763259308354877b725c31d category: bugfix issue: I5PULH CVE: CVE-2022-39188 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- commit b67fbebd4cf980aecbcc750e1462128bffe8ae15 upstream. Some drivers rely on having all VMAs through which a PFN might be accessible listed in the rmap for correctness. However, on X86, it was possible for a VMA with stale TLB entries to not be listed in the rmap. This was fixed in mainline with commit b67fbebd4cf9 ("mmu_gather: Force tlb-flush VM_PFNMAP vmas"), but that commit relies on preceding refactoring in commit 18ba064e42df3 ("mmu_gather: Let there be one tlb_{start,end}_vma() implementation") and commit 1e9fdf21a4339 ("mmu_gather: Remove per arch tlb_{start,end}_vma()"). This patch provides equivalent protection without needing that refactoring, by forcing a TLB flush between removing PTEs in unmap_vmas() and the call to unlink_file_vma() in free_pgtables(). [This is a stable-specific rewrite of the upstream commit!] Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- mm/mmap.c | 12 ++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+) diff --git a/mm/mmap.c b/mm/mmap.c index d6c6a639ce3d..787116f8d481 100644 --- a/mm/mmap.c +++ b/mm/mmap.c @@ -2699,6 +2699,18 @@ static void unmap_region(struct mm_struct *mm, tlb_gather_mmu(&tlb, mm, start, end); update_hiwater_rss(mm); unmap_vmas(&tlb, vma, start, end); + + /* + * Ensure we have no stale TLB entries by the time this mapping is + * removed from the rmap. + * Note that we don't have to worry about nested flushes here because + * we're holding the mm semaphore for removing the mapping - so any + * concurrent flush in this region has to be coming through the rmap, + * and we synchronize against that using the rmap lock. + */ + if ((vma->vm_flags & (VM_PFNMAP|VM_MIXEDMAP)) != 0) + tlb_flush_mmu(&tlb); + free_pgtables(&tlb, vma, prev ? prev->vm_end : FIRST_USER_ADDRESS, next ? next->vm_start : USER_PGTABLES_CEILING); tlb_finish_mmu(&tlb, start, end); -- Gitee From 50a26c99effb928f36acca48d80431a1cb415f7e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Hyunwoo Kim Date: Mon, 20 Jun 2022 07:17:46 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 7/7] video: fbdev: pxa3xx-gcu: Fix integer overflow in pxa3xx_gcu_write mainline inclusion from mainline-5.19-rc4 commit a09d2d00af53b43c6f11e6ab3cb58443c2cac8a7 category: bugfix issue: I5Q1QX CVE: CVE-2022-39842 Signed-off-by: gaochao --------------------------------------- In pxa3xx_gcu_write, a count parameter of type size_t is passed to words of type int. Then, copy_from_user() may cause a heap overflow because it is used as the third argument of copy_from_user(). Signed-off-by: Hyunwoo Kim Signed-off-by: Helge Deller --- drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c b/drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c index 4279e13a3b58..3f2306419947 100644 --- a/drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c +++ b/drivers/video/fbdev/pxa3xx-gcu.c @@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ pxa3xx_gcu_write(struct file *file, const char *buff, struct pxa3xx_gcu_batch *buffer; struct pxa3xx_gcu_priv *priv = to_pxa3xx_gcu_priv(file); - int words = count / 4; + size_t words = count / 4; /* Does not need to be atomic. There's a lock in user space, * but anyhow, this is just for statistics. */ -- Gitee