From 0a4a5d9496a7aa7da7056908946ca229b445f09b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: xcy Date: Tue, 20 Aug 2024 14:12:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] =?UTF-8?q?[CVE-2024-23170]=20[CVE-2024-23775]=E6=BC=8F?= =?UTF-8?q?=E6=B4=9E=E4=BF=AE=E5=A4=8D?= MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Signed-off-by: xcy --- library/rsa.c | 93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- library/x509_create.c | 4 +- 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-) diff --git a/library/rsa.c b/library/rsa.c index 183cf6307..4da054be2 100644 --- a/library/rsa.c +++ b/library/rsa.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" +#include "bignum_core.h" #include "rsa_alt_helpers.h" #include "mbedtls/oid.h" #include "mbedtls/platform_util.h" @@ -832,6 +833,45 @@ cleanup: return ret; } +/* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ +static int rsa_unblind(mbedtls_mpi *T, mbedtls_mpi *Vf, const mbedtls_mpi *N) +{ + int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED; + const mbedtls_mpi_uint mm = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_init(N->p); + const size_t nlimbs = N->n; + const size_t tlimbs = mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul_working_limbs(nlimbs); + mbedtls_mpi RR, M_T; + + mbedtls_mpi_init(&RR); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&M_T); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_core_get_mont_r2_unsafe(&RR, N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(&M_T, tlimbs)); + + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(T, nlimbs)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_grow(Vf, nlimbs)); + + /* T = T * Vf mod N + * Reminder: montmul(A, B, N) = A * B * R^-1 mod N + * Usually both operands are multiplied by R mod N beforehand (by calling + * `to_mont_rep()` on them), yielding a result that's also * R mod N (aka + * "in the Montgomery domain"). Here we only multiply one operand by R mod + * N, so the result is directly what we want - no need to call + * `from_mont_rep()` on it. */ + mbedtls_mpi_core_to_mont_rep(T->p, T->p, N->p, nlimbs, mm, RR.p, M_T.p); + mbedtls_mpi_core_montmul(T->p, T->p, Vf->p, nlimbs, N->p, nlimbs, mm, M_T.p); + +cleanup: + + mbedtls_mpi_free(&RR); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&M_T); + + return ret; +} + /* * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, @@ -879,23 +919,14 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, /* Temporaries holding the blinded exponents for * the mod p resp. mod q computation (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; - - /* Pointers to actual exponents to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded ones, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP; - mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ; #else /* Temporary holding the blinded exponent (if used). */ mbedtls_mpi D_blind; - - /* Pointer to actual exponent to be used - either the unblinded - * or the blinded one, depending on the presence of a PRNG. */ - mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ /* Temporaries holding the initial input and the double * checked result; should be the same in the end. */ - mbedtls_mpi I, C; + mbedtls_mpi input_blinded, check_result_blinded; if (f_rng == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA; @@ -930,8 +961,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, mbedtls_mpi_init(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_init(&TQ); #endif - mbedtls_mpi_init(&I); - mbedtls_mpi_init(&C); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&input_blinded); + mbedtls_mpi_init(&check_result_blinded); /* End of MPI initialization */ @@ -941,8 +972,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, goto cleanup; } - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&I, &T)); - /* * Blinding * T = T * Vi mod N @@ -950,6 +979,7 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_prepare_blinding(ctx, f_rng, p_rng)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vi)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_copy(&input_blinded, &T)); /* * Exponent blinding @@ -966,8 +996,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &P1, &Q1)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &R)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D)); - - D = &D_blind; #else /* * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP @@ -978,8 +1006,6 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DP_blind, &DP_blind, &ctx->DP)); - DP = &DP_blind; - /* * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ */ @@ -988,12 +1014,10 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&DQ_blind, &Q1, &R)); MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, &ctx->DQ)); - - DQ = &DQ_blind; #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, D, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&T, &T, &D_blind, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); #else /* * Faster decryption using the CRT @@ -1002,8 +1026,8 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, * TQ = input ^ dQ mod Q */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, DP, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TP, &T, &DP_blind, &ctx->P, &ctx->RP)); + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&TQ, &T, &DQ_blind, &ctx->Q, &ctx->RQ)); /* * T = (TP - TQ) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P @@ -1019,21 +1043,20 @@ int mbedtls_rsa_private(mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi(&T, &TQ, &TP)); #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ - /* - * Unblind - * T = T * Vf mod N - */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->Vf)); - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi(&T, &T, &ctx->N)); - - /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ - MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&C, &T, &ctx->E, + /* Verify the result to prevent glitching attacks. */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod(&check_result_blinded, &T, &ctx->E, &ctx->N, &ctx->RN)); - if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&C, &I) != 0) { + if (mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi(&check_result_blinded, &input_blinded) != 0) { ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; goto cleanup; } + /* + * Unblind + * T = T * Vf mod N + */ + MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(rsa_unblind(&T, &ctx->Vf, &ctx->N)); + olen = ctx->len; MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_write_binary(&T, output, olen)); @@ -1061,8 +1084,8 @@ cleanup: mbedtls_mpi_free(&TP); mbedtls_mpi_free(&TQ); #endif - mbedtls_mpi_free(&C); - mbedtls_mpi_free(&I); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&check_result_blinded); + mbedtls_mpi_free(&input_blinded); if (ret != 0 && ret >= -0x007f) { return MBEDTLS_ERROR_ADD(MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED, ret); diff --git a/library/x509_create.c b/library/x509_create.c index 50db95688..9663daab2 100644 --- a/library/x509_create.c +++ b/library/x509_create.c @@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ int mbedtls_x509_set_extension(mbedtls_asn1_named_data **head, const char *oid, int critical, const unsigned char *val, size_t val_len) { mbedtls_asn1_named_data *cur; - + if (val_len > (SIZE_MAX - 1)) { + return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_BAD_INPUT_DATA; + } if ((cur = mbedtls_asn1_store_named_data(head, oid, oid_len, NULL, val_len + 1)) == NULL) { return MBEDTLS_ERR_X509_ALLOC_FAILED; -- Gitee