diff --git a/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch b/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..ece1a73d3dfd9f81686c88958375029859419c65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1
+--- openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/ssh.1	2011-08-31 13:08:34.880024485 +0200
+@@ -1400,6 +1400,8 @@ manual page for more information.
+ .Nm
+ exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
+ if an error occurred.
++.Sh IPV6
++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
+diff -up openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8
+--- openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8.ipv6man	2011-08-05 22:17:32.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-5.9p0/sshd.8	2011-08-31 13:10:34.129039094 +0200
+@@ -940,6 +940,8 @@ concurrently for different ports, this c
+ started last).
+ The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+ .El
++.Sh IPV6
++IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr scp 1 ,
+ .Xr sftp 1 ,
diff --git a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch b/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ddcb7f15ab4f6114eca22356514d7ada0ea5b47b..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
- 
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
- {
--	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
- 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- };
- 
-@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
- {
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 	size_t n = 0;
--	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
-+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
- 
- 	if (len == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
- 		return (0);
- 
--	while ((len--) > 0) {
-+	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
-+		u_int r,a,b;
-+
- 		if (n == 0) {
--			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
--			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			int outl, i, buflen;
-+
-+			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+
-+			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-+				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+
-+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
-+				ctrbuf, buflen);
- 		}
--		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
--		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+
-+		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
-+		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
-+		r = a ^ b;
-+		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
-+		src += sizeof(a);
-+		dest += sizeof(r);
-+
-+		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
- 	}
-+	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
- 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- 	}
--	if (key != NULL)
--		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
--		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
-+			case 128:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 192:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 256:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
-+		}
-+		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
-+			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
-+	}
- 	if (iv != NULL)
- 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- 	return (1);
-@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
- 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		free(c);
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
index 2aa14bd44e420e4e5a87f56dc6df9da1d935e5cd..529b5089993a57b47f137e1790d238de7a0fbc2d 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
  	ssh-xmss.o \
 @@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
  ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
 +ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
  ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
 @@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
  	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5e06940b64e6f61324f772f3aef1c2ad612064cf..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
---- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
-@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
-+		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+			struct group *gr;
-+
-+			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
-+				/* The only additional bit is read
-+				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
-+				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
-+					return 0;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		}
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
diff --git a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
index f3231f932891964b82096d13ce17d35281653850..eaf4453222b8b3c94bb757e19ae2184fac4eaa68 100644
--- a/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
  	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
 -	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
-+			&& k5login_exists) {
++	if (k5login_exists &&
++	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
  		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
diff --git a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
index 1923ac8c66eec84ff5d3807cd7fc9850ecb64345..1dca99cac57bacd3e56aada85ac0523eb2d96322 100644
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@@ -28,47 +28,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
  	return 0;
  }
  
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
-@@ -3804,7 +3804,7 @@ int
- channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
- {
- 	int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
--	char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
-+	char *host_to_connect = NULL, *listen_host = NULL, *listen_path = NULL;
- 	int port_to_connect, listen_port;
- 
- 	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
-@@ -3832,7 +3832,6 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
- 	success = 1;
- 	if (success) {
- 		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
--		host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
- 		port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
- 		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
- 			host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
-@@ -3853,6 +3852,9 @@ channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct
- 		    host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
- 		    listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
- 	}
-+	free(host_to_connect);
-+	free(listen_host);
-+	free(listen_path);
- 	return idx;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
-		    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
-			error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
-			freerrset(fingerprints);
-+				free(dnskey_digest);
-			return -1;
-		}
-
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
@@ -83,21 +42,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
  			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
  				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
  				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.711967665 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/kexgssc.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -98,8 +98,10 @@ kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	default:
- 		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
- 	}
--	if (r != 0)
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
- 		return r;
-+	}
- 
- 	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
- 
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
@@ -184,17 +128,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
  	return ret;
  }
  
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
-@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
- 	else
- 		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
- 		    strerror(errno));
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
- }
- 
- static unsigned long
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@@ -330,24 +263,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
  		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
  		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
  			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
- 	/* Environment specified by admin */
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
- 		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
-+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
- 		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
- 			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
- 			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
- 		}
- 		*value++ = '\0';
- 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
-+		free(cp);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@@ -360,25 +275,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
  	}
  
  	_exit(1);
-@@ -985,6 +987,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
- 		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
- 			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
- 				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
-+				free(fname);
- 				continue;
- 			}
- 			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
- 		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
- 	}
- 	free(rks);
-+	free(device);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@@ -453,32 +349,3 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
  		} else {
  			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
  				cp += 4;
-@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
- 			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
-+			free(checkpoint);
- 			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
- 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
-@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
- #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+	free(checkpoint);
-+	if (in != stdin)
-+		fclose(in);
- }
- 
- static char *
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
-@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
- 			ssh_digest_free(ctx);
-+			ctx = NULL;
- 			errno = oerrno;
- 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- 			goto out;
diff --git a/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch b/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..363538ca937b04d160a013a45821dc86e5fd1d9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Zseries only: Leave the hardware filedescriptors open.
+
+All filedescriptors above 2 are getting closed when a new
+sshd process to handle a new client connection is
+spawned. As the process also chroot into an empty filesystem
+without any device nodes, there is no chance to reopen the
+files. This patch filters out the reqired fds in the
+closefrom function so these are skipped in the close loop.
+
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
+
+---
+ openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c |   26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+)
+
+--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
++++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
+@@ -82,7 +82,33 @@ closefrom(int lowfd)
+ 	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+ 	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+ 		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
++#ifdef __s390__
++		{
++		    /*
++		     * the filedescriptors used to communicate with
++		     * the device drivers to provide hardware support
++		     * should survive. HF <freude@de.ibm.com>
++		     */
++		    char fpath[PATH_MAX], lpath[PATH_MAX];
++		    len = snprintf(fpath, sizeof(fpath), "%s/%s",
++				   fdpath, dent->d_name);
++		    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len <= sizeof(fpath)) {
++			len = readlink(fpath, lpath, sizeof(lpath));
++			if (len > 0) {
++			    lpath[len] = 0;
++			    if (strstr(lpath, "dev/z90crypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/zcrypt")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/prandom")
++				|| strstr(lpath, "dev/shm/icastats"))
++				fd = -1;
++			}
++		    }
++		    if (fd >= 0)
++			(void) close((int) fd);
++		}
++#else
+ 		(void) close((int) fd);
++#endif
+ 	}
+ 	(void) closedir(dirp);
+ 	return;
+
diff --git a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch b/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
index ad181cb57bef73b71ff1a30c86a05e954d693f9b..2b702d416c44f2ccefdc1784793654ed48b32e41 100644
--- a/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
 @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
  
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
  int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
 -int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
 +int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
@@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
 @@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
  .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
  .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
 +.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
  .Cm X11Forwarding
diff --git a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch b/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
index 4f9e58a99044003969ed299391e20206d395093e..1242aac8d4647dd097be70d150f67bfd8cd2fec5 100644
--- a/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
@@ -9,8 +9,8 @@ index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
 @@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
  AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+ AC_SUBST([CHANNELLIBS])
  
 +# Check whether user wants systemd support
 +SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
diff --git a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
index 7217c6419144681ee08064f1d606708d1087c6b1..90640a02490027f7d3b52da4c33d39ac47718fc9 100644
--- a/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
 +	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
 +#endif
  #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
  #endif
 @@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
  #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
diff --git a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
index 2d3aae95df3c4f8a5d803973960baca3cc177f1c..748c4b608e5808f30d1775976ddf7c988d963351 100644
--- a/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@@ -802,8 +802,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
 +}
 +
  static int
- match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
- {
+ match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
+     struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.681061553 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
@@ -820,15 +820,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.697061676 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
-@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
- 
- char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
- char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-+int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- 
- FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
 @@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_private_by_ty
  int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
  int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
@@ -838,6 +829,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
  
  /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
  const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
+@@ -239,6 +241,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
+     char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
+ int	 auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
+     struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
++int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+ FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ 
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
@@ -910,9 +910,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.743062030 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
 @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "digest.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "audit.h"
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -2006,7 +2006,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
 @@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void	 session_unused(int);
  int	 session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *);
  void	 session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int);
- void	 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *);
+ void	 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
 -void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *));
 +void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *));
  void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
index d1e44b00e6fbf9fcde3f0266d15e8d319fd29959..53515715d1832591153dfd3168aba7a966a6734b 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@@ -368,14 +368,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #endif
  
-@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
 @@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
  			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
@@ -423,10 +415,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
  #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #endif
  
@@ -440,11 +432,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
  
  #ifdef WITH_XMSS
 @@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
- 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- 		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+ 		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
  			continue;
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			switch (kt->type) {
++			switch (impl->type) {
 +			case KEY_ED25519:
 +			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
 +			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
@@ -455,9 +447,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 +			     break;
 +			}
 +		}
- 		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
- 		if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
+ 		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
 @@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
  		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
  	}
@@ -477,40 +469,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 +		break;
 +	}
  	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
- 	ret->type = type;
- 	if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
-@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
-		goto out;
-
-	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
+ 	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
+ 	*ret = *k;
 @@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
- 		break;
- 	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
- 	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ 		*lenp = 0;
+ 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
 +		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		}
 +		/* Fallthrough */
- 	case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
- 	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
- 		r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
 @@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
- 	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
- 	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ 		*detailsp = NULL;
+ 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
 +		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		}
- 		return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
- 		    compat, detailsp);
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
@@ -554,6 +537,26 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
  		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
  			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
  			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ #include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA
+		goto out;
+
+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c	2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
@@ -663,13 +666,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
  	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
  		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 @@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
- 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
  
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
  		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
diff --git a/openssh-7.7p1-anolis.patch b/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
similarity index 76%
rename from openssh-7.7p1-anolis.patch
rename to openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
index bbd0c9ce5ae2bd648187d393681aa2309828ad32..1d77f90ccc65d86a137826d9f136c44899b083e5 100644
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-anolis.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config.anolis openssh/ssh_config
---- openssh/ssh_config.anolis	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
+--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
 @@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
  #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
@@ -12,9 +12,9 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh_config.anolis openssh/ssh_config
 +# included below. For more information, see manual page for
 +#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
 +Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff -up openssh/ssh_config_anolis.anolis openssh/ssh_config_anolis
---- openssh/ssh_config_anolis.anolis	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-+++ openssh/ssh_config_anolis	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
+--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
 +# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
 +# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@ diff -up openssh/ssh_config_anolis.anolis openssh/ssh_config_anolis
 +
 +# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
 +# Host *.local
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.anolis openssh/sshd_config.0
---- openssh/sshd_config.0.anolis	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
 @@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
  
@@ -47,8 +47,8 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.anolis openssh/sshd_config.0
  
       TCPKeepAlive
               Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.anolis openssh/sshd_config.5
---- openssh/sshd_config.5.anolis	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
 @@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
  .It Cm SyslogFacility
@@ -59,8 +59,8 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.anolis openssh/sshd_config.5
  LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
  The default is AUTH.
  .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config.anolis openssh/sshd_config
---- openssh/sshd_config.anolis	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
+--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
 @@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
  # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
@@ -77,17 +77,10 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config.anolis openssh/sshd_config
  #Port 22
  #AddressFamily any
  #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
-diff -up openssh/sshd_config_anolis.anolis openssh/sshd_config_anolis
---- openssh/sshd_config_anolis.anolis	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
-+++ openssh/sshd_config_anolis	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
-+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
-+# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
-+# write it before this block or include it before this file.
-+# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
-+Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-+
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
 +SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
 +
 +ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
@@ -103,4 +96,14 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd_config_anolis.anolis openssh/sshd_config_anolis
 +# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
 +PrintMotd no
 +
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
++# write it before this block or include it before this file.
++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 +
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
index d4549f0ababcd1a8d08637d1eccf0c7b5a140fbc..86c08dba42f5cb25850dc7b5be1c70cd9c9f8ccc 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
---- a/ssh_config.5	2022-07-12 15:05:22.550013071 +0200
-+++ b/ssh_config.5	2022-07-12 15:17:20.016704545 +0200
-@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.284590156 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.623052194 +0200
+@@ -378,17 +378,13 @@
  causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
  This is the default behaviour.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -445,20 +441,25 @@
+@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
  (the default),
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -474,13 +475,6 @@
+@@ -479,13 +480,6 @@
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -874,6 +868,11 @@
+@@ -885,6 +879,11 @@
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -886,10 +885,8 @@
+@@ -897,10 +896,8 @@
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -913,36 +910,25 @@
+@@ -919,36 +916,25 @@
  but may be manually hashed using
  .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -137,7 +137,25 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The
  .Fl Q
-@@ -1219,30 +1216,25 @@
+@@ -1001,6 +987,17 @@
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
++.Pp
++The proposed
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
++.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
++would break the order given by the
++.Pa known_hosts
++file.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlias
+ Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+ real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+@@ -1232,30 +1229,25 @@
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -177,7 +195,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1351,37 +1344,33 @@
+@@ -1365,37 +1357,33 @@
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -224,7 +242,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1553,36 +1542,25 @@
+@@ -1567,39 +1555,31 @@
  The default is
  .Cm no .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -270,7 +288,13 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -2237,7 +2207,9 @@ for those users who do not have a config
++.Pp
++This option affects also
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be
+@@ -2265,7 +2245,9 @@
  This file must be world-readable.
  .El
  .Sh SEE ALSO
@@ -281,10 +305,10 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  .Sh AUTHORS
  .An -nosplit
  OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
-diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
---- a/sshd_config.5	2022-07-12 15:05:22.535012771 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.5	2022-07-12 15:15:33.394809258 +0200
-@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.277590077 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.592051845 +0200
+@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -307,7 +331,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
+@@ -525,20 +521,25 @@
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -337,7 +361,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -490,13 +491,6 @@
+@@ -565,13 +566,6 @@
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -351,7 +375,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -685,53 +679,43 @@
+@@ -766,53 +760,43 @@
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -424,7 +448,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -799,25 +794,14 @@
+@@ -879,25 +863,14 @@
  .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  environment variable.
  .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
@@ -455,7 +479,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -965,20 +947,25 @@
+@@ -1044,20 +1017,25 @@
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -485,7 +509,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
  .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -1010,16 +997,6 @@
+@@ -1089,16 +1067,6 @@
  sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -502,7 +526,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1104,21 +1082,26 @@
+@@ -1184,21 +1152,26 @@
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -533,7 +557,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1161,15 +1144,6 @@
+@@ -1241,15 +1214,6 @@
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -549,7 +573,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1548,36 +1522,25 @@
+@@ -1633,36 +1597,25 @@
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -595,7 +619,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-@@ -2011,7 +1968,9 @@ This file should be writable by root onl
+@@ -2131,7 +2084,9 @@
  .El
  .Sh SEE ALSO
  .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
index d5dfd7ed63e4af5567c8d5ab65415b25fba928fe..0bc509fe301c99426945bf2e17014db168168cb7 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@@ -12,13 +12,22 @@ index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
  
 @@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
  	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
- 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
  	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
 -	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 +	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
  	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
  	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
  	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+@@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ regress-prep:
+ 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
+ 
+ REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
+-TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
++TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+ 
+ regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
 diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
 --- a/auth.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
 +++ b/auth.c	2021-08-27 12:41:51.262788953 +0200
@@ -151,7 +160,7 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 + * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
 + */
 +static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
++userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
 +{
 +	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
 +	int r, authenticated = 0;
@@ -212,19 +221,20 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
  	else
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
-@@ -326,6 +370,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -326,6 +370,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
  	return 0;
  }
  
 +Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
 +	"gssapi-keyex",
++	NULL,
 +	userauth_gsskeyex,
 +	&options.gss_authentication
 +};
 +
  Authmethod method_gssapi = {
  	"gssapi-with-mic",
-	NULL,
+ 	NULL,
 diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
 index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
 --- a/auth2.c
@@ -378,13 +388,9 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
  /* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
  #define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
  
-@@ -1379,9 +1383,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
- 			break;
- 
- 		/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
--		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
-+		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
-			channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
+@@ -1379,6 +1383,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
+ 		/* Do channel operations. */
+ 		channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +			if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
@@ -393,11 +399,10 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
 +				need_rekeying = 1;
 +			}
 +#endif
-+		}
 +
  		/* Buffer input from the connection.  */
-		if (conn_in_ready)
-			client_process_net_input(ssh);
+ 		if (conn_in_ready)
+ 			client_process_net_input(ssh);
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
 index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
@@ -1254,15 +1259,9 @@ diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
 index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 --- a/kex.c
 +++ b/kex.c
-@@ -57,11 +57,16 @@
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "monitor.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
- 
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@
  #include "digest.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -1360,9 +1359,9 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 +	return 1;
 +}
 +
- /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
- int
- kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ /*
+  * Fill out a proposal array with dynamically allocated values, which may
+  * be modified as required for compatibility reasons.
 @@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
  	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
@@ -1370,8 +1369,8 @@ index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	free(kex->gss_host);
 +#endif /* GSSAPI */
-	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
-	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
+ 	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
  	free(kex->failed_choice);
 diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
 index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
@@ -1414,9 +1413,9 @@ index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
  char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
  int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
 +int	 kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
- 
- int	 kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- 
+ void	 kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+     const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+ void	 kex_proposal_free_entries(char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
 @@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
  int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
@@ -1489,7 +1488,7 @@ new file mode 100644
 index 00000000..f6e1405e
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,599 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,612 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -1590,8 +1589,10 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	default:
 +		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +	}
-+	if (r != 0)
++	if (r != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
 +		return r;
++	}
 +
 +	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
 +
@@ -1654,11 +1655,16 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +			do {
 +				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++					char *tmp = NULL;
++					size_t tmp_len = 0;
++
 +					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
 +					if (server_host_key_blob)
 +						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
++					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
 +						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
++					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
++						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
 +				}
 +			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
 +
@@ -1945,11 +1951,16 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +			do {
 +				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
++					char *tmp = NULL;
++					size_t tmp_len = 0;
++
 +					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
 +					if (server_host_key_blob)
 +						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
++					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
 +						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
++						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
 +				}
 +			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
 +
@@ -2088,13 +2099,14 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
 +	return r;
 +}
++
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
 diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 00000000..60bc02de
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -2161,7 +2173,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 */
 +
 +	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
++	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
 +	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
 +	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
@@ -2201,7 +2213,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +		switch(type) {
 +		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (client_pubkey != NULL)
++			if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
 +				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
 +			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
 +			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
@@ -2232,6 +2244,31 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +				goto out;
 +
 +			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++
++			/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
++			* client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
++			* buffer state->incoming_packet
++			*/
++			hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++			if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
++			    kex->hash_alg,
++			    kex->client_version,
++			    kex->server_version,
++			    kex->peer,
++			    kex->my,
++			    empty,
++			    client_pubkey,
++			    server_pubkey,
++			    shared_secret,
++			    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
++				goto out;
++
++			gssbuf.value = hash;
++			gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++
++			sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++			client_pubkey = NULL;
++
 +			break;
 +		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
 +			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
@@ -2253,7 +2290,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
 +			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
 +
-+		if (client_pubkey == NULL)
++		if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
 +			fatal("No client public key");
 +
 +		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
@@ -2282,23 +2319,6 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    empty,
-+	    client_pubkey,
-+	    server_pubkey,
-+	    shared_secret,
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
@@ -2612,6 +2632,23 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
  	while (!authenticated) {
+@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+ 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+ 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
+ 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+-			if (!partial && !authenticated)
++			if (!partial && !authenticated) {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++				/* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
++				 * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
++				if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
++					monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++#endif
+ 				authctxt->failures++;
++			}
+ 			if (authenticated || partial) {
+ 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
+ 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
 @@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
@@ -3496,7 +3533,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  
  /*
 @@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	char *s, *all_key;
+ 	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3508,9 +3545,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
  	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
 @@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- 	}
- 
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers,
+ 	    options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+ 	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 +		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
@@ -3546,11 +3584,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +		}
 +	}
 +#endif
-+
- 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- 		    options.rekey_interval);
-@@ -224,16 +256,46 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
+ 
+@@ -224,17 +256,47 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
  # endif
@@ -3568,7 +3605,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
-	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
  	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3583,6 +3620,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
  
  	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
+ 	free(myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]);
  	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
  	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3751,8 +3789,8 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  		exit(1);
  	}
 @@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	{
@@ -3885,22 +3923,98 @@ diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
 index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c
 +++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -127,6 +127,75 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
+ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl;
+ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl;
+ #endif
++
++static int ssh_gss_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
++	enum sshkey_serialize_rep)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_deserialize_public(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     enum sshkey_serialize_rep)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_deserialize_private(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_copy_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++	    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int,
++	    struct sshkey_sig_details **)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_gss_funcs = {
++	/* .size = */		NULL,
++	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
++	/* .cleanup = */	NULL,
++	/* .equal = */		ssh_gss_equal,
++	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_gss_serialize_public,
++	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_public,
++	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_gss_serialize_private,
++	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_private,
++	/* .generate = */	NULL,
++	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_gss_copy_public,
++	/* .sign = */		NULL,
++	/* .verify = */		ssh_gss_verify,
++};
++
++/* The struct is intentionally dummy and has no gss calls */
++static const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_gss_kex_impl = {
++	/* .name = */		"null",
++	/* .shortname = */	"null",
++	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
++	/* .type = */		KEY_NULL,
++	/* .nid = */		0,
++	/* .cert = */		0,
++	/* .sigonly = */	0,
++	/* .keybits = */	0, /* FIXME */
++	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_gss_funcs,
++};
+ 
+ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
+ 	&sshkey_ed25519_impl,
 @@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
- #  endif /* ENABLE_SK */
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+	{ "null", "null", NULL, KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
+ 	&sshkey_xmss_impl,
+ 	&sshkey_xmss_cert_impl,
+ #endif
++	&sshkey_gss_kex_impl,
+ 	NULL
  };
  
 @@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
- 	const struct keytype *kt;
  
- 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
--		if (kt->name == NULL)
-+		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+-		if (impl->name == NULL)
++		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
  			continue;
- 		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
 diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
 index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
index b3295a95acafe74fcc508c1f32176d7fb5d1c22e..e21e545c72012bcce90b2d721b116aa03f566d73 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
 +	ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
  	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
  	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
- 	hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
+ 	hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \
 @@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
  	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
  	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
 @@ -677,6 +682,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT
  	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
- 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
  
 +UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\
 +	regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/Makefile.in
 +    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
 +	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \
 +	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS)
 +
  # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
  SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
@@ -1035,7 +1035,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-agent.c
  	int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
  	u_int seconds = 0;
 @@ -869,33 +931,28 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
- 		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+ 		    "providers is disabled", provider);
  		goto send;
  	}
 -	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
@@ -2157,7 +2157,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	int ret = -1;
  	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
  	void *handle = NULL;
-@@ -1517,164 +1702,298 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_
+@@ -1517,162 +1702,296 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
  	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
  	CK_ULONG i;
@@ -2213,10 +2213,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
  		goto fail;
  	}
- 	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
- 		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
+ 	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
 -	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
 -	p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
 -	p->handle = handle;
@@ -3057,3 +3055,4 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +struct	 pkcs11_uri *pkcs11_uri_init();
 +char	*pkcs11_uri_get(struct pkcs11_uri *uri);
 +
+
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ca661ee603a820570f85e521ecdec3aca16eb67f..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
-index 46dfe3a9c2e..478a9403eea 100644
---- a/compat.c
-+++ b/compat.c
-@@ -190,26 +190,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
- char *
- compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
- {
--	char *cp = NULL;
-+	char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
- 
- 	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
- 		return xstrdup(p);
- 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
--		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
-+		if ((cp = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
--		cp = p;
--		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
-+		if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
- 		free(cp);
-+		cp = cp2;
- 	}
--	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
--	if (*p == '\0')
-+	if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
- 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
--	return p;
-+	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp);
-+	return cp;
- }
- 
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1af9b490135551daafd4d154691001a38384b266..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
-@@ -1657,7 +1657,8 @@ sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
- static int
- rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
- {
--	RSA *private = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -1667,20 +1668,42 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
- 	    bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	*rsap = NULL;
--	if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL
-+		|| (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL || !BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
--	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, f4) <= 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
-+	*rsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(res);
-+	if (*rsap) {
-+		ret = 0;
-+	} else {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	*rsap = private;
--	private = NULL;
--	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	RSA_free(private);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
- 	BN_free(f4);
- 	return ret;
- }
-@@ -1820,7 +1820,8 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
- static int
- ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
- {
--	EC_KEY *private;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL)
-@@ -1828,20 +1829,29 @@ ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, i
- 	if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	*ecdsap = NULL;
--	if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(*nid)) <= 0
-+	   || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
-+	*ecdsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(res);
-+	if (*ecdsap) {
-+		EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(*ecdsap, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
-+		ret = 0;
-+	} else {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
--	*ecdsap = private;
--	private = NULL;
--	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	EC_KEY_free(private);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
- 	return ret;
- }
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6908cadfcebce3880a56a0b8625ab90d2238c31f..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -rup a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
---- a/monitor.c	2022-07-11 15:11:28.146863144 +0200
-+++ b/monitor.c	2022-07-11 15:15:35.726655877 +0200
-@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
- 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
- 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
- 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
--			if (!partial && !authenticated)
-+			if (!partial && !authenticated) {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+				/* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
-+				 * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
-+				if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
-+					monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+#endif
- 				authctxt->failures++;
-+			}
- 			if (authenticated || partial) {
- 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
- 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88914bff1c860f1cbb2b88d5c872d5afa72c6a89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c.orig	2022-04-12 15:47:03.815044607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c	2022-04-12 15:48:12.464963511 +0200
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
++#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c9ac80679997649bdfdd348dba99a8360378b18..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -rup a/compat.c b/compat.c
---- a/compat.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/compat.c	2022-07-14 17:39:23.770268440 +0200
-@@ -157,11 +157,12 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
- 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
- }
- 
-+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
- char *
- compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop)
- {
- 	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
--		return cipher_prop;
-+		return xstrdup(cipher_prop);
- 	debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
- 	if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
- 		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
-@@ -171,11 +172,12 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh,
- 	return cipher_prop;
- }
- 
-+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
- char *
- compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
- {
- 	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
--		return pkalg_prop;
-+		return xstrdup(pkalg_prop);
- 	debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
- 	if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
- 		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
-@@ -185,21 +187,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, c
- 	return pkalg_prop;
- }
- 
-+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
- char *
- compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
- {
-+	char *cp = NULL;
-+
- 	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
--		return p;
-+		return xstrdup(p);
- 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
- 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
-+		cp = p;
- 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
-+		free(cp);
- 	}
- 	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
- 	if (*p == '\0')
-diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
---- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 17:38:43.241496549 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 17:39:23.772268479 +0200
-@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- 	char *s, *all_key;
-+	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
- 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-@@ -252,10 +253,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 
- 	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
--	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
-+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
-@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- 	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
- 		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
--		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
- 		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
- 	} else {
- 		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
--		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
- #endif
-+	/* Free only parts of proposal that were dynamically allocated here. */
-+	free(prop_kex);
-+	free(prop_enc);
-+	free(prop_hostkey);
- }
- 
- /*
-diff --color -rup a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
---- a/sshd.c	2022-07-14 17:38:43.242496568 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.c	2022-07-14 17:42:07.616388978 +0200
-@@ -2493,14 +2493,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
- 	struct kex *kex;
-+	char *hostkey_types = NULL;
-+	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
- 	    options.kex_algorithms);
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
--	    options.ciphers);
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
--	    options.ciphers);
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
-+	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- 
-@@ -2513,8 +2514,10 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- 		    options.rekey_interval);
- 
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
--	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
-+	hostkey_types = list_hostkey_types();
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
-+	    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, hostkey_types);
-+	free(hostkey_types);
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	{
-@@ -2606,6 +2609,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "send test");
- #endif
-+	free(prop_kex);
-+	free(prop_enc);
-+	free(prop_hostkey);
- 	debug("KEX done");
- }
- 
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
index ad91fe779c099b20161a903f8e442641bf4f70f4..2ed59a3e099b7db9599382b6875622862541db0c 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
@@ -1,446 +1,24 @@
-diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
-index 36b9d2f5..6b517db4 100644
---- a/auth2-hostbased.c
-+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
-@@ -119,6 +119,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
- 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
-+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
-+		goto done;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
- 		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index 962fd342..5d59febc 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -175,6 +175,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
- 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
-+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
-+		goto done;
-+	}
- 	key_s = format_key(key);
- 	if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
- 		ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
 diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
 index 7f26c680..42be690b 100644
 --- a/readconf.c
 +++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
- 	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
- 	oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
--	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand,
-+	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize,
- 	oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
- } OpCodes;
- 
-@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
  	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
-+	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
+	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
 +	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
  
  	{ NULL, oBadOption }
- };
-@@ -2176,6 +2177,10 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
- 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case oRequiredRSASize:
-+		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case oDeprecated:
- 		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
- 		    filename, linenum, keyword);
-@@ -2423,6 +2428,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- 	options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
- 	options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
- 	options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
-+	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -2619,6 +2625,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
- 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
- #endif
-+	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
-+		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
- 
- 	/* Expand KEX name lists */
- 	all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
-@@ -3308,6 +3316,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
- 	dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
- 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
- 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
-+	dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
- 
- 	/* String options */
- 	dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
-diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
-index f647bd42..ffb5ec4f 100644
---- a/readconf.h
-+++ b/readconf.h
-@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 
- 	char   *known_hosts_command;
- 
-+	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
-+
- 	char	*ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
- }       Options;
- 
 diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
 index 29df0463..423772b1 100644
 --- a/servconf.c
 +++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
- 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
- 	options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
-+	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
- }
- 
- /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
-@@ -441,6 +442,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 		options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
- 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
- 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
-+	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
-+		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
- 
- 	assemble_algorithms(options);
- 
-@@ -517,6 +520,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
- 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
- 	sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
-+	sRequiredRSASize,
- 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
- 
-@@ -676,6 +680,8 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -676,6 +680,7 @@ static struct {
  	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
- 
-@@ -2438,6 +2443,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sRequiredRSASize:
-+		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case sDeprecated:
- 	case sIgnore:
- 	case sUnsupported:
-@@ -2610,6 +2619,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
-@@ -2874,6 +2884,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
-+	dump_cfg_int(sRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
- 	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
- 
- 	/* formatted integer arguments */
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 8a04463e..9346155c 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int	expose_userauth_info;
- 	u_int64_t timing_secret;
- 	char   *sk_provider;
-+	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
- }       ServerOptions;
- 
- /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 559bf2af..25be53d5 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -516,14 +516,22 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
- }
- 
- /*
-- * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
-- * fatal()ing for others.
-+ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
-+ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
-  */
- static void
--check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
-+check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
- {
- 	switch (r) {
- 	case 0:
-+		/* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
-+		if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
-+		    (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
-+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+			error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
-+			free(*k);
-+			*k = NULL;
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
- 	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
-@@ -1578,7 +1586,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
- 		fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
- 	check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
--	    p, "pubkey"); \
-+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
- 	if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) \
- 		debug2("hostbased key %d: %s key from \"%s\"", o, \
- 		    sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \
-@@ -1586,7 +1594,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
- 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
- 		fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
--	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
-+	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
-+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
- 	if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) \
- 		debug2("hostbased key %d: %s cert from \"%s\"", o, \
- 		    sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \
-@@ -2265,7 +2274,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
- 		free(cp);
- 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
--		    filename, "pubkey");
-+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
- 		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
- 		    public ? public->type : -1);
- 		free(options.identity_files[i]);
-@@ -2284,7 +2293,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 			continue;
- 		xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
- 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
--		    filename, "pubkey");
-+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
- 		debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
- 		    public ? public->type : -1);
- 		if (public == NULL) {
-@@ -2315,7 +2324,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 		free(cp);
- 
- 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
--		    filename, "certificate");
-+		    &public, filename, "certificate");
- 		debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
- 		    public ? public->type : -1);
- 		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index f9bd19ea..58fe98db 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
- static int
- verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
- {
-+	int r;
-+
-+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey,
-+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
-+		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
- 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
- 	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
- 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
-@@ -1606,6 +1611,13 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id)
- 			private = NULL;
- 			quit = 1;
- 		}
-+		if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private,
-+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+			debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename);
-+			sshkey_free(private);
-+			private = NULL;
-+			quit = 1;
-+		}
- 		if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
- 		    !(id->key && id->isprivate))
- 			maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
-@@ -1752,6 +1764,12 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	/* list of keys supported by the agent */
- 	if ((r = get_agent_identities(ssh, &agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) {
- 		for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
-+			if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j],
-+			    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+				debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key",
-+				    sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j]));
-+				continue;
-+			}
- 			found = 0;
- 			TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
- 				/*
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 17eee9d8..395ef493 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1870,6 +1870,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 				fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"",
- 				    options.host_key_files[i]);
- 		}
-+		if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey,
-+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+			error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
-+			sshkey_free(pubkey);
-+			sshkey_free(key);
-+			continue;
-+		}
- 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
- 		sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
- 
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ed2b5dff..77093235 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -2365,18 +2365,24 @@ cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
--static int
--check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
-+int
-+sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *k, int min_size)
- {
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	int nbits;
- 
--	RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (k == NULL || k->rsa == NULL ||
-+	    (k->type != KEY_RSA && k->type != KEY_RSA_CERT))
-+		return 0;
-+	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
-+	nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
-+	if (nbits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
-+	    (min_size > 0 && nbits < min_size))
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	return 0;
- }
--#endif
- 
- static int
- sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
-@@ -2439,7 +2445,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
--		if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
-+		if ((ret = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
- #ifdef DEBUG_PK
- 		RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
-@@ -3642,7 +3648,7 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
--		if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
-+		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(k, 0)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
- 		if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
-@@ -4644,7 +4650,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
- 			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
--		if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
-+		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(prv, 0)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
- 	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
- 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 094815e0..be254e6b 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
- int	sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
-     int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
- 
-+int sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *, int);
- /* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
- int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
- 
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index b4956aec..e255b9b9 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It RemoteCommand
- .It RemoteForward
- .It RequestTTY
-+.It RequiredRSASize
- .It SendEnv
- .It ServerAliveInterval
- .It ServerAliveCountMax
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 24a46460..d1ede18e 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -1634,6 +1634,17 @@ and
- .Fl T
- flags for
- .Xr ssh 1 .
-+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
-+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
-+.Xr ssh 1
-+will accept.
-+User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored.
-+Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the
-+connection to be terminated.
-+The default is
-+.Cm 1024
-+bits.
-+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
- .It Cm RevokedHostKeys
- Specifies revoked host public keys.
- Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 867a747d..f5a06637 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1596,6 +1596,16 @@ is
- .Cm default none ,
- which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
- of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
-+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
-+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
-+.Xr sshd 8
-+will accept.
-+User and host-based authentication keys smaller than this limit will be
-+refused.
-+The default is
-+.Cm 1024
-+bits.
-+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
- .It Cm RevokedKeys
- Specifies revoked public keys file, or
- .Cm none
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
index 260ddb817beac4daadf63098fc9eb4ffec2ff5b8..ee3637fa37cb1860486800adc670d7fad4abc1ed 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
@@ -1,63 +1,117 @@
-diff --color -rup a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
---- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2022-07-14 11:58:12.172786060 +0200
-@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ r=$?
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+--- openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx	2023-05-29 18:15:56.311236887 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2023-05-29 18:16:07.598503551 +0200
+@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
  
  ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
  
 +PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
 +    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
 +SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
++echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r == 0 ]; then
++echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
++fi
++fi
 +
  trace "load hostkeys"
 -for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
 +for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
-	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
-	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
-		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
-@@ -31,7 +35,7 @@ cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_host
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
+ 		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
+@@ -32,12 +48,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private
  
  unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  
 -for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
 +for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
-	verbose "key type $k"
-	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
---- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 10:10:07.262975710 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 10:10:32.068452067 +0200
-@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	verbose "key type $k"
++	hka=$k
++	if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
++	   hka="rsa-sha2-512"
++	fi
+ 	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
++	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
++	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
+ 	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+@@ -50,15 +70,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ done
+ 
+ SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com'`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
+ 
+ # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ HOSTKEYALGS=""
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
+ 	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
+ done
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
+@@ -70,7 +93,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >>
+ ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
+   cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "cert type $k"
+ 	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx	2023-04-26 17:37:35.100827792 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-04-26 17:50:31.860748877 +0200
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
  {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- 	char *s, *all_key;
-+	char *hostkeyalgs = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
- 	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+-	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
++	char *s, *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
-@@ -264,14 +265,19 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- 	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
- 		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
--		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
--		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
--		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
-+		if ((hostkeyalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo)) == NULL)
-+			fatal_f("order_hostkeyalgs");
-+		pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(hostkeyalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
-+		free(hostkeyalgs);
- 	} else {
--		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
--		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
--		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms */
-+		pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
- 	}
-+	if (pkalg == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("match_filter_allowlist");
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
-+	    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, pkalg);
-+	free(pkalg);
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+@@ -260,9 +260,21 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
+ 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+ 
++	filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
++		               : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
++				 options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
++		if (hkalgs)
++			fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			       hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++		else
++			fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	}
++
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal, s, options.ciphers,
+ 	    options.macs, compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+-	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++	    filtered_algs);
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+@@ -303,6 +315,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
++	free(filtered_algs);
+ 
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7fea8006d9429c8d5d397f7c6872c15dadbf6a2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,402 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.338710923 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.357711165 +0100
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ void
+ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char	*pat;
+ 		int	bugs;
+@@ -145,16 +146,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* process table, return first match */
++	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
+ 	ssh->compat = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.h	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
++#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.279676981 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c	2023-01-20 15:01:07.007821379 +0100
+@@ -660,11 +660,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ 	struct sshkey *key;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+-	char *alg = NULL;
++	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
+ 	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+ 	int r, is_proof = 0;
+ 	u_int keyid, compat;
+ 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
++	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+@@ -719,18 +720,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
+ 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+ 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ 	    auth_sock > 0) {
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
+ 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
++		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
++	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
+ 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh	2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100
+@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+ 
+-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
++#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
++PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+ EXTRA_TYPES=""
+ rsa=""
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
+@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
+ 
+ tests:		prep file-tests t-exec unit
+ 
+-REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
++#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping
++REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
+ 
+ # File based tests
+ file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100
+@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() {
+ 	fi
+ }
+ 
+-SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+-SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
++#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
++SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
++SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
+ 
+ for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ 	# generate user key
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c	2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
+@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype,
+ 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+ 	if (kex != NULL)
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
++	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
++		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+ 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ do_kex(char *kex)
+ {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
+-	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
++	/* do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); */
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c	2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
+@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE(); */
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:10:37.533168013 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c	2023-01-26 12:15:35.637631860 +0100
+@@ -333,13 +333,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE();*/
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+@@ -364,6 +366,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
++	*/
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c	2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
+@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
+ 	u_char *sigblob;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++
+ 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+@@ -101,8 +104,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
++	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0)
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+ 
+ 	free(sigblob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+@@ -119,16 +123,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char *sig;
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
++		expected = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0) {
++		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
++		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
++		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	}
+ 	free(sig);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -514,7 +524,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+ 	    NULL), 0);
+ 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
++	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+ 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:19:23.659513651 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c	2023-01-26 12:20:28.021044803 +0100
+@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ tests(void)
+ 	check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("check DSA signature");
+ 	check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
++	*/
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *
+ 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 		}
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
++			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
++		}
+ 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 15:33:29.140353651 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-01-25 15:59:34.225364883 +0100
+@@ -1461,6 +1464,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_cha
+ 			retried = 1;
+ 			goto retry_pin;
+ 		}
++		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
++			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
++
++			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
++			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
++				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
++		}
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.355711140 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
+@@ -1640,6 +1651,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt;
+ 	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
+ 	sigset_t sigmask;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+@@ -1938,6 +1950,33 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    key = NULL;
+ 		    continue;
+ 		}
++		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA_CERT)) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			verbose_f("sshd: SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
++		    	forbid_ssh_rsa = 1;
++		    }
++		}
++		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT)) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			logit_f("sshd: ssh-dss is disabled, skipping key file %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++			key = NULL;
++			continue;
++		    }
++		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -2275,6 +2306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
+@@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
++		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
++			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
index 5b44d922dc1fccee34eb1f4ff8bdafc6da85de0b..f0d9b0fed4898e8536615edeffe6a122aace88fc 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
  
  	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
  		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
--		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
-+		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
 			errs = 1;
 		}
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c
  int
  upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
      int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
--    int follow_link_flag)
-+    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
+-    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
  {
  	char *dst_canon;
  	int ret;
@@ -143,9 +143,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h
 @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const
   * times if 'pflag' is set
   */
- int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
--    int, int);
-+    int, int, int);
+ int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    int, int, int, int, int, int);
++    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
  
  /*
   * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
@@ -156,8 +156,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c
  		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
  			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
  			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
  				err = -1;
  		} else {
  			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3ecff1ebd960a6ff5465fc76e688cad844c508bb..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,303 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -rup a/scp.c b/scp.c
---- a/scp.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.560120817 +0200
-+++ b/scp.c	2022-07-26 14:52:37.118213004 +0200
-@@ -1324,11 +1324,11 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
-
-	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
-		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
--		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
-+		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
-			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
-			errs = 1;
-		}
--	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
-+	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
-		error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, targ);
-		errs = 1;
-	}
-@@ -1566,11 +1566,11 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
- 		debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
- 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
- 			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
--			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
-+			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		} else {
- 			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
--			    pflag, 0, 0) == -1)
-+			    pflag, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
- 		free(abs_dst);
-diff --color -rup a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
---- a/sftp.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
-+++ b/sftp.c	2022-07-26 14:52:37.119213023 +0200
-@@ -666,12 +666,12 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- 			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		} else {
- 			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
- 		free(abs_dst);
-@@ -760,12 +760,12 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- 			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		} else {
- 			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
- 	}
-diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
---- a/sftp-client.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-client.c	2022-07-26 15:09:54.825295533 +0200
-@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ progress_meter_path(const char *path)
- int
- do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
-     const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
--    int fsync_flag)
-+    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *msg;
- 	u_char *handle;
-@@ -1498,8 +1498,8 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0)
- 		return -1;
- 
--	local_fd = open(local_path,
--	    O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
-+	local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT |
-+	((resume_flag || inplace_flag) ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
-	if (local_fd == -1) {
-		error("open local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno));
-		goto fail;
-@@ -1661,8 +1661,11 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 	/* Sanity check */
- 	if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
- 		fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
--	/* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
--	if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
-+	/*
-+	 * Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt,
-+	 * or unconditionally if writing in place.
-+	 */
-+	if (inplace_flag || read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
- 		if (reordered && resume_flag) {
- 			error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
- 			    "server reordered requests", local_path);
-@@ -1724,7 +1727,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- static int
- download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
--    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
-+    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	int i, ret = 0;
- 	SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
-@@ -1781,7 +1784,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- 			if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- 			    depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
- 			    print_flag, resume_flag,
--			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
-+			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
- 				ret = -1;
- 		} else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
- 		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
-@@ -1793,7 +1796,8 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- 			if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- 			    S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
- 			    &(dir_entries[i]->a),
--			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
-+			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
-+			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
- 				error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
- 				    new_src, new_dst);
- 				ret = -1;
-@@ -1831,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- int
- download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
--    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
-+    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	char *src_canon;
- 	int ret;
-@@ -1843,26 +1847,25 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
- 
- 	ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
- 	    dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
--	    follow_link_flag);
-+	    follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
- 	free(src_canon);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
- int
- do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
--    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
-+    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume,
-+    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	int r, local_fd;
--	u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
--	u_int id;
--	u_char type;
-+	u_int openmode, id, status = SSH2_FX_OK, reordered = 0;
- 	off_t offset, progress_counter;
--	u_char *handle, *data;
-+	u_char type, *handle, *data;
- 	struct sshbuf *msg;
- 	struct stat sb;
--	Attrib a, *c = NULL;
--	u_int32_t startid;
--	u_int32_t ackid;
-+	Attrib a, t, *c = NULL;
-+	u_int32_t startid, ackid;
-+	u_int64_t highwater = 0;
- 	struct request *ack = NULL;
- 	struct requests acks;
- 	size_t handle_len;
-@@ -1913,10 +1916,15 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	openmode = SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT;
-+	if (resume)
-+		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_APPEND;
-+	else if (!inplace_flag)
-+		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_TRUNC;
-+
- 	/* Send open request */
--	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
--	    (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC),
--	    &a, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
-+	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", openmode, &a,
-+	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
- 		close(local_fd);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -1999,6 +2007,12 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- 			    ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
- 			++ackid;
- 			progress_counter += ack->len;
-+			if (!reordered && ack->offset <= highwater)
-+				highwater = ack->offset + ack->len;
-+			else if (!reordered && ack->offset > highwater) {
-+				debug3_f("server reordered ACKs");
-+				reordered = 1;
-+			}
- 			free(ack);
- 		}
- 		offset += len;
-@@ -2017,6 +2031,14 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- 		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (inplace_flag || (resume && (status != SSH2_FX_OK || interrupted))) {
-+		debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
-+		attrib_clear(&t);
-+		t.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
-+		t.size = highwater;
-+		do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &t);
-+	}
-+
- 	if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
-		error("close local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno));
-		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
-@@ -2041,7 +2063,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- static int
- upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
--    int follow_link_flag)
-+    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	int ret = 0;
- 	DIR *dirp;
-@@ -2119,12 +2141,13 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
- 
- 			if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- 			    depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
--			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
-+			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
- 				ret = -1;
- 		} else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) ||
- 		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) {
- 			if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
--			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) {
-+			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag,
-+			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
-				error("upload \"%s\" to \"%s\" failed",
-				    new_src, new_dst);
-				ret = -1;
-@@ -2144,7 +2167,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
- int
- upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
--    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
-+    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	char *dst_canon;
- 	int ret;
-@@ -2155,7 +2178,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- 	}
- 
- 	ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
--	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag);
-+	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
- 
- 	free(dst_canon);
- 	return ret;
-diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
---- a/sftp-client.h	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-client.h	2022-07-26 14:52:37.120213042 +0200
-@@ -138,28 +138,29 @@ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_c
-  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
--    Attrib *, int, int, int);
-+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
-+    int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
--    Attrib *, int, int, int, int, int);
-+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
-+    int, int, int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
-+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
-+    int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
--    int, int, int);
-+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
-+    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
index 6710304c1dc676ef2e5d13a327fb6fdad52ea93e..161ab2d92842f82809c398d560937d6f4e516358 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
 --- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp	2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1	2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
 @@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
- This is helpful in
- debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+ By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+ .El
  .El
 +.Pp
 +Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8837a7ba5ff83fe0e83d51aa30f53bc226936dce..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
-index 68aac04b..a96e95ad 100644
---- a/scp.1
-+++ b/scp.1
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
- .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
- .Sh SYNOPSIS
- .Nm scp
--.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
-+.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrTv
- .Op Fl c Ar cipher
- .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
- .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
-@@ -79,7 +76,9 @@ The options are as follows:
- Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
- Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
- hosts.
--Note that, when using the original SCP protocol (the default), this option
-+Note that, when using the original SCP protocol (via the
-+.Fl O
-+flag), this option
- selects batch mode for the second host as
- .Nm
- cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
-@@ -146,7 +145,6 @@ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
- wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a
- .Sq ~
- prefix for older SFTP servers.
--This mode is the default.
- .It Fl o Ar ssh_option
- Can be used to pass options to
- .Nm ssh
-@@ -258,8 +258,6 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
- The program must understand
- .Xr ssh 1
- options.
--.It Fl s
--Use the SFTP protocol for transfers rather than the original scp protocol.
- .It Fl T
- Disable strict filename checking.
- By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
-@@ -299,11 +289,23 @@ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
- .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
- .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
-+.Sh CAVEATS
-+The original scp protocol (selected by the
-+.Fl O
-+flag) requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
-+.Xr glob 3
-+pattern matching.
-+This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
-+the remote shell, such as quote characters.
- .Sh HISTORY
- .Nm
- is based on the rcp program in
- .Bx
- source code from the Regents of the University of California.
-+.Pp
-+Since OpenSSH 8.8 (8.7 in R H/Fa builds),
-+.Nm
-+has use the SFTP protocol for transfers by default.
- .Sh AUTHORS
- .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
- .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index e039350c..c7cf7529 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	const char *errstr;
- 	extern char *optarg;
- 	extern int optind;
--	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP;
-+	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP;
- 	char *sftp_direct = NULL;
- 
- 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
-@@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ void
- usage(void)
- {
- 	(void) fprintf(stderr,
--	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
-+	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
- 	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n"
- 	    "           [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
- 	exit(1);
diff --git a/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch b/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
index 04e4c0631da8ef0fa8f220cc5ecc1c928e8df778..c7f6f1e659a00bcba4a91c9e63dc2f5e0e8f2632 100644
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
  .It ControlPersist
  .It DynamicForward
 +.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EnableEscapeCommandline
  .It EscapeChar
  .It ExitOnForwardFailure
- .It FingerprintHash
 @@ -538,6 +540,8 @@
  .It IdentitiesOnly
  .It IdentityAgent
diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fbf5094d883d0113ffa08e3702f3c7252d30763f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1/audit-bsm.c	2022-10-24 14:51:43.685766639 +0200
+@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	/* not implemented */
+ }
+diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/audit.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1/audit.c	2022-10-24 15:20:38.854548226 +0200
+@@ -116,12 +116,22 @@ audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+ void
+ audit_key(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, int *rv, const struct sshkey *key)
+ {
+-	char *fp;
++	char *key_fp = NULL;
++	char *issuer_fp = NULL;
++	struct sshkey_cert *cert = NULL;
+ 
+-	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
+-	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
++	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_HEX);
++	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && key->cert != NULL && key->cert->signature_key != NULL) {
++		cert = key->cert;
++		issuer_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
++										options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
++	}
++	if (audit_keyusage(ssh, host_user, key_fp, cert, issuer_fp, (*rv == 0)) == 0)
+ 		*rv = -SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-	free(fp);
++	if (key_fp)
++		free(key_fp);
++	if (issuer_fp)
++		free(issuer_fp);
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit.h.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit.h
+--- openssh-9.0p1/audit.h.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1/audit.h	2022-10-24 14:58:20.887565518 +0200
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ void	audit_session_close(struct logininf
+ int	audit_run_command(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ void 	audit_end_command(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+ ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+-int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
++int	audit_keyusage(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const struct sshkey_cert *, const char *, int);
+ void	audit_key(struct ssh *, int, int *, const struct sshkey *);
+ void	audit_unsupported(struct ssh *, int);
+ void	audit_kex(struct ssh *, int, char *, char *, char *, char *);
+diff -up openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c.patch	2022-10-24 15:02:16.544858331 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1/audit-linux.c	2022-10-24 15:21:58.165303951 +0200
+@@ -137,10 +137,12 @@ fatal_report:
+ }
+ 
+ int
+-audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, char *fp, int rv)
++audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host_user, const char *key_fp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert, const char *issuer_fp, int rv)
+ {
+ 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
++	const char *rip;
++	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	audit_fd = audit_open();
+ 	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+@@ -150,14 +152,44 @@ audit_keyusage(struct ssh *ssh, int host
+ 		else
+ 			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+ 	}
++	rip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+ 	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_auth grantors=auth-key", host_user ? "pubkey" : "hostbased");
+ 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
+-		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
+ 	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+ 		goto out;
+-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", fp);
++	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=negotiate kind=auth-key fp=%s", key_fp);
+ 	rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER, buf, NULL,
+-		ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), NULL, rv);
++		rip, NULL, rv);
++	if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++		goto out;
++
++	if (cert) {
++		char *pbuf;
++
++		pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("key_id", cert->key_id, 0);
++		if (pbuf == NULL)
++			goto out;
++		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "cert %s cert_serial=%llu cert_issuer_alg=\"%s\" cert_issuer_fp=\"%s\"",
++			pbuf, (unsigned long long)cert->serial, sshkey_type(cert->signature_key), issuer_fp);
++		free(pbuf);
++		rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++			buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++		if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++			goto out;
++
++		for (i = 0; cert->principals != NULL && i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
++			pbuf = audit_encode_nv_string("cert_principal", cert->principals[i], 0);
++			if (pbuf == NULL)
++				goto out;
++			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "principal %s", pbuf);
++			free(pbuf);
++			rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AUTH, NULL,
++				buf, audit_username(), -1, NULL, rip, NULL, rv);
++			if ((rc < 0) && ((rc != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
++				goto out;
++		}
++	}
+ out:
+ 	saved_errno = errno;
+ 	audit_close(audit_fd);
diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d0470d922a89c26e8fcee094700f931da56e4c5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/dh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.730868316 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@
+ int
+ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ {
+-	int pbits;
+-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	int pbits, r = 0;
+ 
+-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ 
+ 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+ 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (need < 256)
+ 		need = 256;
++
++	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ 	 * so double requested need here.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-
+-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	return 0;
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
++		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed key generation");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* reuse context for key generation */
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not create or init context");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not generate keys");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
++	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* transferred */
++	pub_key = NULL;
++	priv_key = NULL;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
++	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ DH *
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.731868327 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -1623,3 +1623,47 @@
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++/* 
++ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
++ * The private key can be omitted.
++ */
++int
++kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
++    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++
++	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (priv != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return r;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.674867692 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:25:28.494533889 +0200
+@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@
+ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ {
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ 	size_t klen = 0;
+-	int kout, r;
++	int kout, r = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
++	/* import key */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* import peer key 
++	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
++	 */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not get key size");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
++	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not derive key");
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
++	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+ 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.h openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:24:28.725868260 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+@@ -283,6 +286,8 @@
+     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
++int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
++    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
+ 
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+ void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0313c6f386d94821605a2680f854b686baa22dfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
+--- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ ./kexecdh.c	2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
+@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
+ #include <signal.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ static int
+ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+ 
++static EC_KEY *
++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
++{
++	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	const char *group_name;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
++		goto out;
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
++	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
++		goto out;
++	}
++out:
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	return client_key;
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
++	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
++	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+-	size_t klen = 0;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
++	size_t klen = 0, publen;
++	const char *group_name;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
++	if ((r = ssh_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
++
++	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
++	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
+ #endif
+-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
++	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	*shared_secretp = buf;
+ 	buf = NULL;
+  out:
+-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
++	freezero(pub, publen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+ }
diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz b/openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz
deleted file mode 100644
index 81cc006f4d2b24e4cd1f521fbf6afc838d6d96b9..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Binary files a/openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz.asc b/openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz.asc
deleted file mode 100644
index 617af2b9b54e8a672f3062f2719e027e7ba149bc..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz.asc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
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diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
similarity index 40%
rename from openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
rename to openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
index ade0bbb2118460071a8b8347c81363cbacd21bb3..98236c5968faf5c53441cfbddc89b778d9ab9188 100644
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
+++ b/openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
@@ -1,23 +1,23 @@
-From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
-
----
- digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
- digest.h         |   6 ++
- ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
- ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
- ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
- sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
- sshkey.h         |   4 +
- 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
-index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
---- a/digest-openssl.c
-+++ b/digest-openssl.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/digest.h openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest.h
+--- openssh-9.3p1/digest.h	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest.h	2023-06-06 15:52:25.602551466 +0200
+@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
+ struct sshbuf;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
++const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
++#endif
++
+ /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
+ int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
+ 
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/digest-openssl.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest-openssl.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/digest-openssl.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/digest-openssl.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.601551454 +0200
+@@ -64,6 +64,22 @@
  	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
  };
  
@@ -40,30 +40,21 @@ index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
  static const struct ssh_digest *
  ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
  {
-diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
-index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
---- a/digest.h
-+++ b/digest.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
-+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
-+#endif
-+
- /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
- int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-dss.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-dss.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-dss.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-dss.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.624551743 +0200
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
  
-diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
-index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
---- a/ssh-dss.c
-+++ b/ssh-dss.c
-@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
- ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -261,11 +263,15 @@
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
  {
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
  	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
@@ -79,7 +70,7 @@ index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
  	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
  
  	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+@@ -276,17 +282,23 @@
  	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
  	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -88,9 +79,8 @@ index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
  
 -	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
++    		return ret;
 +	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
 +	    data, datalen);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -109,7 +99,7 @@ index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
  
  	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
  	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
-@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+@@ -319,7 +331,7 @@
  		*lenp = len;
  	ret = 0;
   out:
@@ -118,15 +108,15 @@ index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
  	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
  	sshbuf_free(b);
  	return ret;
-@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+@@ -331,20 +343,20 @@
+     const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+     struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
  {
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	DSA_SIG *dsig = NULL;
  	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
--	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+-	size_t len, hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
 +	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
 +	size_t len, slen;
  	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -136,25 +126,25 @@ index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
  
  	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
  	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
+-	if (hlen == 0)
 -		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  
  	/* fetch signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
-@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+@@ -386,25 +398,28 @@
  	}
  	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
  
 -	/* sha1 the data */
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, dlen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
++	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(dsig, NULL)) == 0) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
  		goto out;
 -
--	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
+-	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, dsig, key->dsa)) {
 -	case 1:
 -		ret = 0;
 -		break;
@@ -167,70 +157,197 @@ index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
 -	default:
 +	}
 +	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
++	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(dsig, &psig)) == 0) {
  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
  		goto out;
  	}
  
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
 +		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, dlen,
 +	    sigb, slen);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +
   out:
 -	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 +	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ 	DSA_SIG_free(dsig);
  	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
  	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
-diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
---- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
- ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+@@ -415,6 +430,65 @@
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
++int
++ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub = NULL, *priv = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++
++  	if (k == NULL)
++  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
++  	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	  	goto out;
++  	}
++
++  	DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
++  	DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub, &priv);
++
++  	if (p != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (q != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (g != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (pub != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	        pub) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (priv != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	        priv) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	return ret;
++}
++
+ static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_dss_funcs = {
+ 	/* .size = */		ssh_dss_size,
+ 	/* .alloc = */		ssh_dss_alloc,
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
+@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
++#endif
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ 
+@@ -126,19 +128,29 @@
+ static int
+ ssh_ecdsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+ {
+-	EC_KEY *private;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+-	if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL)
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
+-		EC_KEY_free(private);
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(k->ecdsa_nid)) <= 0
++	   || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++		EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+ 		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 	}
+-	EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+-	k->ecdsa = private;
+-	return 0;
++	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
++	k->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(res);
++	if (k->ecdsa)
++		EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(k->ecdsa, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
++
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
++ 	return (k->ecdsa) ? 0 : SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -228,11 +240,13 @@
+     const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
+     const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
  {
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL;
 +	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
 +	const unsigned char *psig;
  	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
  	int hash_alg;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t len, dlen;
+-	size_t len, hlen;
 +	int len;
  	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
  	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  
-@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+@@ -245,18 +259,33 @@
  	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
  
 -	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+-	    (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
 +	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
  		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
 +
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++	if (is_ecdsa_pkcs11(key->ecdsa)) {
++		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++		    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
++			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	} else {
++#endif
++		if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
++			return ret;
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++	}
++#endif
 +	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
++	    dlen);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
  		goto out;
 +	}
  
--	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
+-	if ((esig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, hlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
 +	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
++	if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&esig, &psig, len) == NULL) {
  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
  		goto out;
  	}
@@ -238,7 +355,7 @@ index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
  	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
  		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
  		goto out;
-@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+@@ -280,7 +309,7 @@
  		*lenp = len;
  	ret = 0;
   out:
@@ -246,17 +363,17 @@ index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
 +	free(sigb);
  	sshbuf_free(b);
  	sshbuf_free(bb);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(esig);
+@@ -293,22 +322,21 @@
+     const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+     struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
  {
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ 	ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL;
  	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
 -	int hash_alg;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t dlen;
+-	size_t hlen;
 +	int hash_alg, len;
  	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
@@ -265,79 +382,489 @@ index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
  
  	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
  	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
  
 -	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+-	    (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
 +	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
  		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  
  	/* fetch signature */
-@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -344,28 +372,33 @@
  	}
  	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
  
 -	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
 +	/* Figure out the length */
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
++	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(esig, NULL)) == 0) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
  		goto out;
  	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
+-		goto out;
+-
+-	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, esig, key->ecdsa)) {
 -	case 1:
 -		ret = 0;
 -		break;
 -	case 0:
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
++	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
  		goto out;
 -	default:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +	}
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
-+		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	psig = sigb;
++	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(esig, &psig)) == 0) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
  		goto out;
  	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
  
++	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++  	if (ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, dlen, sigb, len);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++
   out:
 -	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 +	free(sigb);
  	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
  	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
+ 	ECDSA_SIG_free(esig);
+@@ -375,6 +408,79 @@
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
++int
++ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
++  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL; 
++  	const char *group_name;
++  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (k == NULL)
++    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
++     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
++                group_name,
++                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++	}
++  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
++    		const EC_GROUP *group;
++    		size_t len;
++
++		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
++		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
++		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
++		    pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len,
++		    bn_ctx);
++		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len) != 1) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++			goto out;
++		}
++	}
++  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
++  	free(pub_ser);
++  	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* NB. not static; used by ECDSA-SK */
+ const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_funcs = {
+ 	/* .size = */		ssh_ecdsa_size,
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.c	2023-06-06 15:53:36.608444190 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.625551756 +0200
+@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -575,6 +577,86 @@
+ }
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++int
++sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
++    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
++{
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	u_char *sig = NULL;
++	int ret, slen;
++	size_t len;
++
++	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++
++	slen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
++	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++
++	len = slen;
++	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto error;
++	}
++	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
++	        NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto error;
++	}
++
++	*sigp = sig;
++	*lenp = len;
++	/* Now owned by the caller */
++	sig = NULL;
++	ret = 0;
++
++error:
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++	free(sig);
++	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
++    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
++{
++	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int ret;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++	if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
++	    NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto done;
++	}
++	ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
++	switch (ret) {
++	case 1:
++		ret = 0;
++		break;
++	case 0:
++		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		break;
++	default:
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		break;
++	}
++
++done:
++	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return ret;
++}
++
+ /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
+ int
+ sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
+@@ -3763,3 +3845,27 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_XMSS */
++
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++EVP_PKEY *
++sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
++{
++  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
++  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
++  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	return ret;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.h openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.h
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshkey.h	2023-06-06 15:53:36.608444190 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshkey.h	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
+@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #  include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+@@ -268,6 +271,10 @@
+ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
+ int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
+ char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
++int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
++    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
++int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
++    size_t, u_char *, int);
+ 
+ int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
+ int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
+@@ -324,6 +331,13 @@
+ 
+ void	 sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++EVP_PKEY  *sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *, EVP_PKEY_CTX *);
++int   ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
++int   ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
++int   ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *, int, EVP_PKEY **);
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++
+ #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ int	sshkey_sk_fields_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b);
+ void	sshkey_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k);
+@@ -338,6 +352,10 @@
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++int pkcs11_get_ecdsa_idx(void);
++#endif
++
+ #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ # undef RSA
+ # undef DSA
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2023-06-06 15:53:36.592443989 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
+@@ -777,8 +777,24 @@
+ 
+ 	return (0);
+ }
++
++int
++is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
++{
++	if (EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx) != NULL)
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ 
++int
++is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
++{
++	if (RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx) != NULL)
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* remove trailing spaces */
+ static void
+ rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2023-06-06 15:53:36.591443976 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
+@@ -225,8 +225,36 @@
+ static RSA_METHOD	*helper_rsa;
+ #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+ static EC_KEY_METHOD	*helper_ecdsa;
++
++int
++is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
++{
++	const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth;
++	ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
++		const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey) = NULL;
++
++	meth = EC_KEY_get_method(ecdsa);
++	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(meth, NULL, NULL, &sign_sig);
++	if (sign_sig == ecdsa_do_sign)
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ 
++int
++is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
++{
++	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
++	int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++        	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) = NULL;
++
++	meth = RSA_get_method(rsa);
++	priv_enc = RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(meth);
++	if (priv_enc == rsa_encrypt)
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
+ static void
+ wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2023-06-06 15:53:36.592443989 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h	2023-06-06 15:52:25.626551768 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@
+ 	    u_int32_t *);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++int is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa);
++#endif
++int is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa);
++
+ #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
+ #undef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #endif
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c	2023-06-06 15:52:25.627551781 +0200
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -36,10 +36,13 @@
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "log.h"
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
++#endif
  
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  
 -static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
 +static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
  
- static const char *
- rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
-@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
+ static u_int
+ ssh_rsa_size(const struct sshkey *key)
+@@ -131,27 +133,50 @@
+ static int
+ ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+ {
+-	RSA *private = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+ 	    bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+-	if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL
++		|| (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL || !BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+-	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, f4) <= 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
++	k->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(res);
++	if (k->rsa) {
++		ret = 0;
++	} else {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	k->rsa = private;
+-	private = NULL;
+-	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	RSA_free(private);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+ 	BN_free(f4);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+@@ -317,21 +342,6 @@
  	return -1;
  }
  
@@ -359,14 +886,14 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
  int
  ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
  {
-@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
- ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
+@@ -393,11 +403,10 @@
+     const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
  {
 -	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
 -	size_t slen = 0;
--	u_int dlen, len;
+-	u_int hlen, len;
 -	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 +	u_char *sig = NULL;
@@ -375,10 +902,10 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
  	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
  
  	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+@@ -409,33 +418,33 @@
  		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
  	else
- 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
+ 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg);
 +
  	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
  	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
@@ -392,7 +919,7 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
 -
 -	/* hash the data */
 -	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+-	if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
 -		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 -	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
@@ -402,24 +929,33 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
  
 -	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++	if (is_rsa_pkcs11(key->rsa)) {
++		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++		    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
++			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	} else {
++#endif
++		if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
++			return ret;
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ 	}
+-
+-	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, hlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++#endif
 +	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
 +	    datalen);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
  		goto out;
  	}
- 
--	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto out;
--	}
++
  	if (len < slen) {
  		size_t diff = slen - len;
  		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+@@ -444,6 +453,7 @@
  		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
  		goto out;
  	}
@@ -427,7 +963,7 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
  	/* encode signature */
  	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
  		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+@@ -464,7 +474,6 @@
  		*lenp = len;
  	ret = 0;
   out:
@@ -435,20 +971,20 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
  	freezero(sig, slen);
  	sshbuf_free(b);
  	return ret;
-@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg)
+@@ -476,10 +485,10 @@
+     const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+     struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
  {
 -	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
  	char *sigtype = NULL;
  	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
+-	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, hlen;
 +	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
  	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
  	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
  
-@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -487,8 +496,7 @@
  	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
  	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -458,30 +994,29 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
  		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
  
  	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -540,16 +548,13 @@
  		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
  		len = modlen;
  	}
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
+-	if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
+-	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
 +
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
  		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
  
--	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
+-	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, hlen, sigblob, len,
 -	    key->rsa);
++	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, dlen, sigblob, len, pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++
   out:
  	freezero(sigblob, len);
  	free(sigtype);
-@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+@@ -558,125 +563,110 @@
  	return ret;
  }
  
@@ -558,7 +1093,6 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
 -	return 0;
 -}
 +	size_t rsasize = 0;
-+	const RSA *rsa;
 +	int ret;
  
 -static int
@@ -578,8 +1112,8 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -		goto done;
 -	}
-+	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
- 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
+-	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
++	rsasize = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
  	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
  	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
  		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -613,108 +1147,90 @@ index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
 -	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
  	return ret;
  }
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
- }
  
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +int
-+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
-+    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
++ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
 +{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int ret, slen, len;
-+
-+	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++  	const BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
 +
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if (k == NULL)
++  	  	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
++  	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++  	  	ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	  	goto out;
++  	}
 +
-+	len = slen;
-+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
++  	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
++  	RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, &q);
++  	RSA_get0_crt_params(k->rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
 +
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
++  	if (n != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n) != 1) {
++  	  	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (e != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e) != 1) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	*sigp = sig;
-+	*lenp = len;
-+	/* Now owned by the caller */
-+	sig = NULL;
-+	ret = 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	free(sig);
-+	return ret;
-+}
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (d != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
 +
-+int
-+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
-+    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int ret;
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
 +
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
++  	/* setting this to param_build makes the creation process fail */
++  	if (p != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, p) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'p' param");
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto done;
-+	}
-+	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	switch (ret) {
-+	case 1:
-+		ret = 0;
-+		break;
-+	case 0:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		break;
-+	default:
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (q != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, q) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'q' param");
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		break;
-+	}
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (dmp1 != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
++  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, dmp1) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'dmp1' param");
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (dmq1 != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
++  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, dmq1) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'dmq1' param");
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (iqmp != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
++  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, iqmp) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'iqmp' param");
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
 +
-+done:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return ret;
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	return ret;
 +}
 +
- /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
- int
- sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
- const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
- int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
- char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
-+int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
-+    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
-+int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
-+    size_t, u_char *, int);
- 
- int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
-
+ static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_rsa_funcs = {
+ 	/* .size = */		ssh_rsa_size,
+ 	/* .alloc = */		ssh_rsa_alloc,
diff --git a/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cf512ef9ae8c5da648f40e1806bb1b6c89821ff4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+--- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200
+@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
+ 
+ /*
+  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+- * within a patch series.
++ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match.
++ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1
++ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series.
++ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html
+  */
+ 
+ int
+@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@
+ 	if (headerver == libver)
+ 		return 1;
+ 
+-	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
+-	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
+-		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
++	/*
++	 * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match.
++	 */
++	if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) {
++		mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */
+ 		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+-	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
++	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and
++	 * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+ 	 */
+ 	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+ 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
diff --git a/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch b/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 03688862c0bde28a0077d0eba536f0b8d4b22abd..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
-index 618bb198..8ea831f4 100644
-diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c.cve	2023-07-21 15:38:13.237276580 +0200
-+++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-agent.c	2023-07-21 15:41:30.269943569 +0200
-@@ -169,6 +169,12 @@ char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
- /* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
- static char *allowed_providers;
- 
-+/*
-+ * Allows PKCS11 providers or SK keys that use non-internal providers to
-+ * be added over a remote connection (identified by session-bind@openssh.com).
-+ */
-+static int remote_add_provider;
-+
- /* locking */
- #define LOCK_SIZE	32
- #define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
-@@ -1228,6 +1234,12 @@ process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
- 		if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
- 			debug_f("internal provider");
- 		} else {
-+			if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
-+				verbose("failed add of SK provider \"%.100s\": "
-+				    "remote addition of providers is disabled",
-+				    sk_provider);
-+				goto out;
-+			}
- 			if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
- 				verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
- 				    "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
-@@ -1368,7 +1380,7 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- static char *
--sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
-+sanitize_pkcs11_provider(SocketEntry *e, const char *provider)
- {
- 	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = NULL;
- 	char *sane_uri, *module_path = NULL; /* default path */
-@@ -1399,6 +1411,11 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
- 		module_path = strdup(provider); /* simple path */
- 
- 	if (module_path != NULL) { /* do not validate default NULL path in URI */
-+		if (e->nsession_ids != 0 && !remote_add_provider) {
-+			verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": remote addition of "
-+			    "providers is disabled", provider);
-+			return NULL;
-+		}
- 		if (realpath(module_path, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
- 			verbose("failed PKCS#11 provider \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
- 			    module_path, strerror(errno));
-@@ -1455,7 +1472,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
- 		goto send;
- 	}
- 
--	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
-+	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider);
- 	if (sane_uri == NULL)
- 		goto send;
- 
-@@ -1516,7 +1533,7 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
- 	}
- 	free(pin);
- 
--	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
-+	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(e, provider);
- 	if (sane_uri == NULL)
- 		goto send;
- 
-@@ -2108,7 +2125,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			break;
- 		case 'O':
- 			if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
--				restrict_websafe  = 0;
-+				restrict_websafe = 0;
-+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "allow-remote-pkcs11") == 0)
-+				remote_add_provider = 1;
- 			else
- 				fatal("Unknown -O option");
- 			break;
-diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
-index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
---- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
-+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
-@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
- 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
--		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
--		goto fail;
--	}
-+	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
-+		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- 
- 	p->module->handle = handle;
- 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
diff --git a/openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz b/openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a670bd8ef9841e04c51b55d924630261ee007880
Binary files /dev/null and b/openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz differ
diff --git a/openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz.asc b/openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4c69906cd5d1f6092d81e0b9c5d1fb0cf31698cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh-9.3p2.tar.gz.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEcWi5g4FaXu9ZpK39Kj9BTnNgYLoFAmS3g5wACgkQKj9BTnNg
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+kN5khCHIg6bUc3JzFZM7Ib0tshNP5AY0pyduSEF7SPOB5Zz2E+EwkDmkrnw9FoMh
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+jx/172HqCzRDgUogtZ/BTwiLDEzTHG7YS5RDIUYkqEGkkjjj6gg=
+=yVD2
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch b/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8a422054f4e82e1f3f39dce1c7facc11500d35a2..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-From 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2023 14:47:44 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ban user/hostnames with most shell metacharacters
-
-This makes ssh(1) refuse user or host names provided on the
-commandline that contain most shell metacharacters.
-
-Some programs that invoke ssh(1) using untrusted data do not filter
-metacharacters in arguments they supply. This could create
-interactions with user-specified ProxyCommand and other directives
-that allow shell injection attacks to occur.
-
-It's a mistake to invoke ssh(1) with arbitrary untrusted arguments,
-but getting this stuff right can be tricky, so this should prevent
-most obvious ways of creating risky situations. It however is not
-and cannot be perfect: ssh(1) has no practical way of interpreting
-what shell quoting rules are in use and how they interact with the
-user's specified ProxyCommand.
-
-To allow configurations that use strange user or hostnames to
-continue to work, this strictness is applied only to names coming
-from the commandline. Names specified using User or Hostname
-directives in ssh_config(5) are not affected.
-
-feedback/ok millert@ markus@ dtucker@ deraadt@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b487348b5964f3e77b6b4d3da4c3b439e94b2d9
----
- ssh.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 35c48e62d18..48d93ddf2a9 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 	free(cinfo);
- }
-
-+static int
-+valid_hostname(const char *s)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	if (*s == '-')
-+		return 0;
-+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
-+		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
-+		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+valid_ruser(const char *s)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	if (*s == '-')
-+		return 0;
-+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
-+		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
-+			return 0;
-+		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
-+		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
-+			return 0;
-+		/* Disallow \ in last position */
-+		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Main program for the ssh client.
-  */
-@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (!host)
- 		usage();
-
-+	if (!valid_hostname(host))
-+		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
-+	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
-+		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
- 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
-
- 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
diff --git a/openssh.spec b/openssh.spec
index 8073763a2799054153589dd734f18d8339a90099..33736003c5b7d2aa1b6fc58f68b2394c7f15717d 100644
--- a/openssh.spec
+++ b/openssh.spec
@@ -1,117 +1,307 @@
-%define anolis_release 11
+%define anolis_release 1
+
+%global WITH_SELINUX 1
+
 %global _hardened_build 1
-%global sysconfig_anaconda /etc/sysconfig/sshd-permitrootlogin
 
-%bcond_without libfido2
-%bcond_without libedit
-%bcond_without pam
+# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%global no_gnome_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
+%global static_libcrypto 0
+
+# Use GTK3 instead of GTK2 in gnome-ssh-askpass
+%global gtk3 1
+
+# Build position-independent executables (requires toolchain support)?
+%global pie 1
+
+# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
+%global kerberos5 1
+
+# Do we want libedit support
+%global libedit 1
+
+# Whether to build pam_ssh_agent_auth
+%global pam_ssh_agent 0
+
+# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
+%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1}
+
+# Options for static OpenSSL link:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
+%{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
+
+# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
+%global openssh_ver 9.3p2
+%global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
+%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 9
 
-Name:    openssh
-Version: 9.0p1
-Release: %{anolis_release}%{?dist}
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
-License: BSD
-URL:     http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+Name: openssh
+Version: %{openssh_ver}
+Release: %{anolis_release}%{?dist}
+URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+#URL1: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/
 Source0: http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
-Source1: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/archive/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz
+Source1: http://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc
 Source2: sshd.pam
-Source3: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
-Source4: ssh-keycat.pam
-Source5: sshd.sysconfig
-Source6: sshd@.service
-Source7: sshd.socket
-Source8: sshd.service
-Source9: sshd-keygen@.service
-Source10: sshd-keygen
-Source11: sshd-keygen.target
-Source12: ssh-agent.service
-Source13: ssh-agent.socket
-Source14: openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
-
-# --- patches for pam_ssh-agent ---
-Patch100: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
-Patch101: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
-Patch102: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
-Patch103: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
-Patch104: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
-Patch105: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
-Patch106: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch
-
-Patch300: openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
-Patch301: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
-Patch302: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
-Patch303: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
-Patch304: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
-Patch305: openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
-Patch306: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
-Patch307: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
-Patch308: openssh-7.7p1-anolis.patch
-Patch309: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
-Patch310: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
-Patch311: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
-Patch312: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
-Patch313: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
-Patch314: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
-Patch315: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
-Patch316: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
-Patch317: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
-Patch318: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
-Patch319: openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
-Patch320: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
-Patch321: openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
-Patch322: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
-Patch323: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
-Patch324: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
-Patch325: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
-Patch326: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
-Patch327: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
-Patch328: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
-Patch329: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
-Patch330: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
-Patch331: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
-Patch332: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
-Patch333: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
-Patch334: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
-Patch335: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
-Patch336: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
-Patch337: openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
-Patch338: openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
-Patch339: openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch
-Patch340: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
-Patch341: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
-Patch342: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
-Patch343: openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch
-Patch344: openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
-Patch345: openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch
-Patch346: openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch
-Patch347: openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
-Patch348: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
-Patch349: add-loongarch64-support-for-openssh.patch
-Patch350: openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch
-Patch351: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
-Patch352: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
-
-BuildRequires: autoconf automake make gcc
-BuildRequires: perl-interpreter perl-generators perl-podlators
-BuildRequires: zlib-devel libX11-devel gtk3-devel pam-devel p11-kit-devel krb5-devel
-BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5 openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j
-BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 2.3-5 audit-libs >= 1.0.8
-BuildRequires: util-linux groff xauth
-BuildRequires: systemd-devel systemd-rpm-macros
-%if %{with libfido2}
-BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
+Source3: gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
+Source4: https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/archive/pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}.tar.gz
+Source5: pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
+Source6: ssh-keycat.pam
+Source7: sshd.sysconfig
+Source9: sshd@.service
+Source10: sshd.socket
+Source11: sshd.service
+Source12: sshd-keygen@.service
+Source13: sshd-keygen
+Source15: sshd-keygen.target
+Source16: ssh-agent.service
+Source17: ssh-agent.socket
+Source19: openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
+Source20: ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+Source21: ssh-host-keys-migration.service
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
+Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1402
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1171248
+# record pfs= field in CRYPTO_SESSION audit event
+Patch200: openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+# Audit race condition in forked child (#1310684)
+Patch201: openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2049947
+Patch202: openssh-9.0p1-audit-log.patch
+
+# --- pam_ssh-agent ---
+# make it build reusing the openssh sources
+Patch300: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
+# check return value of seteuid()
+# https://sourceforge.net/p/pamsshagentauth/bugs/23/
+Patch301: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
+# explicitly make pam callbacks visible
+Patch302: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
+# update to current version of agent structure
+Patch305: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
+# remove prefixes to be able to build against current openssh library
+Patch306: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
+# Fix NULL dereference from getpwuid() return value
+# https://sourceforge.net/p/pamsshagentauth/bugs/22/
+Patch307: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2070113
+Patch308: pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch
+Patch309: pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1641 (WONTFIX)
+Patch400: openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=781634
+Patch404: openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+#?
+Patch502: openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1644
+Patch601: openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+#(drop?) https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1925
+Patch606: openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+#?
+Patch607: openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1789
+Patch609: openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+
+#?
+Patch700: openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+#?
+Patch702: openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=198332
+Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1635 (WONTFIX)
+Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+# warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545)
+Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+
+# GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
+# from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
+# and
+# Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures
+# upstream MR:
+# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21
+Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+#http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
+Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
+# CVE-2014-9278
+Patch802: openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+# Improve ccache handling in openssh (#991186, #1199363, #1566494)
+# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2775
+Patch804: openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+# Respect k5login_directory option in krk5.conf (#1328243)
+Patch805: openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+
+
+#https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1780
+Patch901: openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+# Use tty allocation for a remote scp (#985650)
+Patch906: openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+# privsep_preauth: use SELinux context from selinux-policy (#1008580)
+Patch916: openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+# log via monitor in chroots without /dev/log (#2681)
+Patch918: openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+# scp file into non-existing directory (#1142223)
+Patch919: openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+# apply upstream patch and make sshd -T more consistent (#1187521)
+Patch922: openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+# Add sftp option to force mode of created files (#1191055)
+Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+# make s390 use /dev/ crypto devices -- ignore closefrom
+Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
+Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+# Help systemd to track the running service
+Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+# Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level
+Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+# Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit
+Patch950: openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+# PKCS#11 URIs (upstream #2817, 2nd iteration)
+# https://github.com/Jakuje/openssh-portable/commits/jjelen-pkcs11
+# git show > ~/devel/fedora/openssh/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+# Unbreak scp between two IPv6 hosts (#1620333)
+Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+# Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
+# clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config
+Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
+# TODO fix the comment above ^
+Patch963: openssh-9.3p1-merged-openssl-evp.patch
+# Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761)
+Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+# sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work
+Patch965: openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+# Do not break X11 without IPv6
+Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+# ssh-keygen printing fingerprint issue with Windows keys (#1901518)
+Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+# sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
+Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+
+# Implement kill switch for SCP protocol
+Patch977: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+
+# Workaround for lack of sftp_realpath in older versions of RHEL
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038854
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/299
+# downstream only
+Patch981: openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+# https://github.com/djmdjm/openssh-wip/pull/13
+Patch982: openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+# downstream only, IBMCA tentative fix
+# From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976202#c14
+Patch984: openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+
+# Add missing options from ssh_config into ssh manpage
+# upstream bug:
+# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3455
+Patch1002: openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+
+# Don't propose disallowed algorithms during hostkey negotiation
+# upstream MR:
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323
+Patch1006: openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+
+Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-dh.patch
+Patch1013: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-ecdh.patch
+Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+# upstream b7afd8a4ecaca8afd3179b55e9db79c0ff210237
+Patch1016: openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
+# for loongarch
+Patch1017: add-loongarch64-support-for-openssh.patch
+
+License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant
+Requires: /sbin/nologin
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+BuildRequires: libX11-devel
+%if %{gtk3}
+BuildRequires: gtk3-devel
+%else
+BuildRequires: gtk3-devel
 %endif
-%if %{with libedit}
-BuildRequires: libedit-devel ncurses-devel
 %endif
 
+BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, perl-interpreter, perl-generators, zlib-devel
+BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 2.0.5
+BuildRequires: util-linux, groff
+BuildRequires: pam-devel
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 0.9.8j
+BuildRequires: perl-podlators
+BuildRequires: systemd-devel
+BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
+BuildRequires: gcc make
+BuildRequires: p11-kit-devel
+BuildRequires: libfido2-devel
 Recommends: p11-kit
-
-Requires: /sbin/nologin
-Requires: libselinux >= 2.3-5 audit-libs >= 1.0.8
 Obsoletes: openssh-ldap < 8.3p1-4
 Obsoletes: openssh-cavs < 8.4p1-5
 
+%if %{kerberos5}
+BuildRequires: krb5-devel
+%endif
+
+%if %{libedit}
+BuildRequires: libedit-devel ncurses-devel
+%endif
+
+%if %{WITH_SELINUX}
+Requires: libselinux >= 2.3-5
+BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 2.3-5
+Requires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8
+BuildRequires: audit-libs >= 1.0.8
+%endif
+
+BuildRequires: xauth
+# for tarball signature verification
+BuildRequires: gnupg2
+
+%package clients
+Summary: An open source SSH client applications
+Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
+Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
+
+%package server
+Summary: An open source SSH server daemon
+Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
+Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/useradd
+Requires: pam >= 1.0.1-3
+Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
+%{?systemd_requires}
+
+%package keycat
+Summary: A mls keycat backend for openssh
+Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
+
+%package askpass
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X
+Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
+
+%package doc
+Summary:        Documentation files for %{name}
+Requires:       openssh = %{EVR}
+BuildArch:      noarch
+
+%package sk-dummy
+Summary: OpenSSH SK driver for test purposes
+Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
+
+%package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
+Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
+Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
+Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{anolis_release}%{?dist}
+License: BSD-3-Clause AND BSD-2-Clause AND ISC AND SSH-OpenSSH AND ssh-keyscan AND sprintf AND LicenseRef-Fedora-Public-Domain AND X11-distribute-modifications-variant AND OpenSSL
+
 %description
 SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
 commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
@@ -126,59 +316,31 @@ This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
 client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
 install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
 
-%package clients
-Summary: An open source SSH client applications
-Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
-Requires: crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
-
 %description clients
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
 the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
 
-%package server
-Summary: An open source SSH server daemon
-Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
-Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/useradd
-Requires: pam >= 1.0.1-3 crypto-policies >= 20220824-1
-%{?systemd_requires}
-
 %description server
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
 the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to
 securely connect to your SSH server.
 
-%package keycat
-Summary: A mls keycat backend for openssh
-Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
-
 %description keycat
 OpenSSH mls keycat is backend for using the authorized keys in the
 openssh in the mls mode.
 
-%package askpass
-Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X
-Requires: openssh = %{EVR}
-
 %description askpass
 OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
 into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
 an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
 
-%package doc
-Summary:        Documentation files for %{name}
-Requires:       openssh = %{EVR}
-BuildArch:      noarch
-
 %description    doc
 The %{name}-doc package contains documentation files for %{name}.
 
-%package -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
-Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
-Version: 0.10.4
-Release: 7.%{anolis_release}%{?dist}
-License: BSD
+%description sk-dummy
+This package contains a test SK driver used for OpenSSH test purposes
 
 %description -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
 This package contains a PAM module which can be used to authenticate
@@ -189,19 +351,93 @@ remote ssh-agent instance.
 The module is most useful for su and sudo service stacks.
 
 %prep
-%setup -q -a 1
-
-%if %{with pam}
-pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4
-%autopatch -M 200 -p2
-rm -f $(cat %{SOURCE3})
+gpgv2 --quiet --keyring %{SOURCE3} %{SOURCE1} %{SOURCE0}
+%setup -q -a 4
+
+%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
+pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
+%patch -P 300 -p2 -b .psaa-build
+%patch -P 301 -p2 -b .psaa-seteuid
+%patch -P 302 -p2 -b .psaa-visibility
+%patch -P 306 -p2 -b .psaa-compat
+%patch -P 305 -p2 -b .psaa-agent
+%patch -P 307 -p2 -b .psaa-deref
+%patch -P 308 -p2 -b .rsasha2
+%patch -P 309 -p1 -b .psaa-configure-c99
+# Remove duplicate headers and library files
+rm -f $(cat %{SOURCE5})
 popd
 %endif
 
-%autopatch -m 200 -p1
+%patch -P 400 -p1 -b .role-mls
+%patch -P 404 -p1 -b .privsep-selinux
+
+%patch -P 502 -p1 -b .keycat
+
+%patch -P 601 -p1 -b .ip-opts
+%patch -P 606 -p1 -b .ipv6man
+%patch -P 607 -p1 -b .sigpipe
+%patch -P 609 -p1 -b .x11
+%patch -P 702 -p1 -b .progress
+%patch -P 703 -p1 -b .grab-info
+%patch -P 707 -p1 -b .redhat
+%patch -P 711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
+# 
+%patch -P 800 -p1 -b .gsskex
+%patch -P 801 -p1 -b .force_krb
+%patch -P 804 -p1 -b .ccache_name
+%patch -P 805 -p1 -b .k5login
+# 
+%patch -P 901 -p1 -b .kuserok
+%patch -P 906 -p1 -b .fromto-remote
+%patch -P 916 -p1 -b .contexts
+%patch -P 918 -p1 -b .log-in-chroot
+%patch -P 919 -p1 -b .scp
+%patch -P 802 -p1 -b .GSSAPIEnablek5users
+%patch -P 922 -p1 -b .sshdt
+%patch -P 926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
+%patch -P 939 -p1 -b .s390-dev
+%patch -P 944 -p1 -b .x11max
+%patch -P 948 -p1 -b .systemd
+%patch -P 949 -p1 -b .refactor
+%patch -P 950 -p1 -b .sandbox
+%patch -P 951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
+%patch -P 953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
+%patch -P 962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
+%patch -P 963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
+%patch -P 964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
+%patch -P 965 -p1 -b .visibility
+%patch -P 966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
+%patch -P 974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
+%patch -P 975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
+
+%patch -P 977 -p1 -b .kill-scp
+
+%patch -P 981 -p1 -b .scp-sftpdirs
+%patch -P 982 -p1 -b .minrsabits
+%patch -P 984 -p1 -b .ibmca
+
+%patch -P 200 -p1 -b .audit
+%patch -P 201 -p1 -b .audit-race
+%patch -P 202 -p1 -b .audit-log
+%patch -P 700 -p1 -b .fips
+
+%patch -P 1002 -p1 -b .ssh-manpage
+
+%patch -P 1006 -p1 -b .negotiate-supported-algs
+
+%patch -P 1012 -p1 -b .evp-fips-dh
+%patch -P 1013 -p1 -b .evp-fips-ecdh
+%patch -P 1014 -p1 -b .nosha1hostproof
+%patch -P 1016 -p1 -b .ossl-version
+
+%patch -P 100 -p1 -b .coverity
+
+#patch for loongarch
+%patch -P 1017 -p1
 
 autoreconf
-pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4
+pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
 autoreconf
 popd
 
@@ -209,10 +445,17 @@ popd
 %set_build_flags
 # the -fvisibility=hidden is needed for clean build of the pam_ssh_agent_auth
 # it is needed for lib(open)ssh build too since it is linked to the pam module too
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fvisibility=hidden -fpic"; export CFLAGS
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fvisibility=hidden"; export CFLAGS
+%if %{pie}
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fpic"
 SAVE_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
-LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -pie -z relro -z now"; export LDFLAGS
+LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -pie -z relro -z now"
+
+export CFLAGS
+export LDFLAGS
 
+%endif
+%if %{kerberos5}
 if test -r /etc/profile.d/krb5-devel.sh ; then
 	source /etc/profile.d/krb5-devel.sh
 fi
@@ -226,6 +469,7 @@ else
 	CPPFLAGS="-I%{_includedir}/gssapi"; export CPPFLAGS
 	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -I%{_includedir}/gssapi"
 fi
+%endif
 
 %configure \
 	--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
@@ -239,105 +483,157 @@ fi
 	--with-ssl-engine \
 	--with-ipaddr-display \
 	--with-pie=no \
-	--without-hardening  \
+	--without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \
 	--with-systemd \
 	--with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \
-%if %{with libfido2}
-        --enable-security-key \
-%else
-        --disable-security-key \
-%endif
 	--with-security-key-builtin=yes \
 	--with-pam \
+%if %{WITH_SELINUX}
 	--with-selinux --with-audit=linux \
 	--with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
+%endif
+%if %{kerberos5}
 	--with-kerberos5${krb5_prefix:+=${krb5_prefix}} \
-%if %{with libedit}
+%else
+	--without-kerberos5 \
+%endif
+%if %{libedit}
 	--with-libedit
 %else
 	--without-libedit
 %endif
 
+%if %{static_libcrypto}
+perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
+%endif
 
 %make_build
+make regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
 
+# Define a variable to toggle gtk2/gtk3 building.  This is necessary
+# because RPM doesn't handle nested %%if statements.
+%if %{gtk3}
+        gtk3=yes
+%else
+        gtk3=no
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
 pushd contrib
-CFLAGS="$CFLAGS %{?__global_ldflags}" make gnome-ssh-askpass3
-mv gnome-ssh-askpass3 gnome-ssh-askpass
+if [ $gtk3 = yes ] ; then
+        CFLAGS="$CFLAGS %{?__global_ldflags}" \
+            make gnome-ssh-askpass3
+        mv gnome-ssh-askpass3 gnome-ssh-askpass
+else
+        CFLAGS="$CFLAGS %{?__global_ldflags}" \
+            make gnome-ssh-askpass2
+        mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
+fi
 popd
+%endif
 
-%if %{with pam}
-pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4
+%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
+pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
 LDFLAGS="$SAVE_LDFLAGS"
 %configure --with-selinux \
 	--libexecdir=/%{_libdir}/security \
 	--with-mantype=man \
-	--without-openssl-header-check
+	--without-openssl-header-check `# The check is broken`
 %make_build
 popd
 %endif
 
 %check
+#to run tests use "--with check"
 %if %{?_with_check:1}%{!?_with_check:0}
 make tests
 %endif
 
 %install
-mkdir -p -m755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
-mkdir -p -m755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d
-mkdir -p -m755 %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d
-mkdir -p -m755 %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
 %make_install
 
-install -d %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/
-install -d %{buildroot}/etc/sysconfig/
-install -d %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/openssh
-install -m644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/sshd
-install -m644 %{SOURCE4} %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat
-install -m644 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-install -m644 ssh_config_anolis %{buildroot}/etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/50-anolis.conf
-install -m644 sshd_config_anolis %{buildroot}/etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-anolis.conf
-install -d -m755 %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}
-install -m644 %{SOURCE6} %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}/sshd@.service
-install -m644 %{SOURCE7} %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
-install -m644 %{SOURCE8} %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
-install -m644 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service
-install -m644 %{SOURCE11} %{buildroot}/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target
-install -d -m755 %{buildroot}/%{_userunitdir}
-install -m644 %{SOURCE12} %{buildroot}/%{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
-install -m644 %{SOURCE13} %{buildroot}/%{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.socket
-install -m744 %{SOURCE10} %{buildroot}/%{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
-install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/
-install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+install -m644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+install -m644 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat
+install -m644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/sysconfig/sshd
+install -m644 ssh_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf
+install -m644 sshd_config_redhat_cp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/40-redhat-crypto-policies.conf
+install -m644 sshd_config_redhat $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf
+install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}
+install -m644 %{SOURCE9} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd@.service
+install -m644 %{SOURCE10} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
+install -m644 %{SOURCE11} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd.service
+install -m644 %{SOURCE12} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service
+install -m644 %{SOURCE15} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target
+install -d -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir}
+install -m644 %{SOURCE16} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
+install -m644 %{SOURCE17} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.socket
+install -m744 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
+install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/
+install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/
 install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd
-install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE14} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/openssh-server.conf
+install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE19} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/openssh-server.conf
+# Migration service/script for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+install -m744 %{SOURCE20} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+# Pulled-in via a `Wants=` in `sshd.service` & `sshd@.service`
+install -m644 %{SOURCE21} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_unitdir}/ssh-host-keys-migration.service
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_localstatedir}/lib
+touch $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_localstatedir}/lib/.ssh-host-keys-migration
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
 
-install -m755 contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+ln -s gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+%endif
 
-ln -s gnome-ssh-askpass %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
-install -m 755 -d %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
-install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
-install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+%if %{no_gnome_askpass}
+rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
+%endif
 
-perl -pi -e "s|%{buildroot}||g" %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man*/*
+perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
 
-%if %{with pam}
-pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4
+%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
+pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
 %make_install
 popd
 %endif
 
+install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest/
+install -m 755 regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest
+
 %generate_compatibility_deps
 
 %pre server
-%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE14}
-# We want to remove group ownership for standard host keys if they exist
-test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key     && /usr/bin/chmod g-r /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key     || :
-test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key   && /usr/bin/chmod g-r /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key   || :
-test -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key && /usr/bin/chmod g-r /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key || :
+%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE19}
 
 %post server
+if [ $1 -gt 1 ]; then
+    # In the case of an upgrade (never true on OSTree systems) run the migration
+    # script for Fedora 38 to remove group ownership for host keys.
+    %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+    # Prevent the systemd unit that performs the same service (useful for
+    # OSTree systems) from running.
+    touch /var/lib/.ssh-host-keys-migration
+fi
 %systemd_post sshd.service sshd.socket
+# Migration scriptlet for Fedora 31 and 32 installations to sshd_config
+# drop-in directory (in F32+).
+# Do this only if the file generated by anaconda exists, contains our config
+# directive and sshd_config contains include directive as shipped in our package
+%global sysconfig_anaconda /etc/sysconfig/sshd-permitrootlogin
 test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
   test ! -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/01-permitrootlogin.conf && \
   grep -q '^PERMITROOTLOGIN="-oPermitRootLogin=yes"' %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
@@ -360,23 +656,24 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %systemd_user_preun ssh-agent.socket
 
 %files
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
+%license LICENCE
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
 %attr(4555,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
-
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
-%license LICENCE
 
 %files clients
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d/50-anolis.conf
-%dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d/
-
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
+%dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d/
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config.d/50-redhat.conf
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
@@ -384,68 +681,74 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-copy-id
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-sk-helper
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.socket
-
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-copy-id.1*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.service
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_userunitdir}/ssh-agent.socket
 
 %files server
-%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
-%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-anolis.conf
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
-%attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/sysconfig/sshd
-%dir %attr(0700,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/openssh-server.conf
-
+%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
-
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+%dir %attr(0700,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/40-redhat-crypto-policies.conf
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config.d/50-redhat.conf
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0640,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/sysconfig/sshd
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd@.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target
-%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
-
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
-%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/openssh-server.conf
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/ssh-host-keys-migration.service
+%attr(0744,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+%ghost %attr(0644,root,root) %{_localstatedir}/lib/.ssh-host-keys-migration
 
 %files keycat
-%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keycat
 %doc HOWTO.ssh-keycat
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keycat
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/ssh-keycat
 
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
 %files askpass
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%endif
 
-%if %{with pam}
+%files doc
+%doc README*
+%doc CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW PROTOCOL*  TODO
+
+%files sk-dummy
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/sshtest/sk-dummy.so
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{abidir}/sk-dummy.dump
+
+%if %{pam_ssh_agent}
 %files -n pam_ssh_agent_auth
-%license pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/OPENSSH_LICENSE
+%license pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}/OPENSSH_LICENSE
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/security/pam_ssh_agent_auth.so
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/pam_ssh_agent_auth.8*
 %dir %{abidir}
 %attr(0644,root,rooti) %{abidir}/pam_ssh_agent_auth.dump
 %endif
 
-%files doc
-%doc README*
-%doc CREDITS ChangeLog OVERVIEW PROTOCOL*  TODO
-
 %changelog
+* Fri Mar 22 2024 mgb01105731 <mgb01105731@alibaba-inc.com> - 9.3p2-1
+- update to 9.3p2
+
 * Thu Dec 28 2023 Caspar Zhang <caspar@linux.alibaba.com> - 9.0p1-11
 - Fix CVE-2023-51385
 
diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch b/pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bc40434968e8cce4d22acfd0735039bc9b06f782
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pam_ssh_agent-configure-c99.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
+configure.ac: Improve C99 compatibility
+
+Future compilers will not support implicit declarations and implicit
+ints by default.  This means that configure probes which rely on them
+will fail unconditionally, without actually testing anything.
+
+The changes mostly mirror what has been implemented in the openssh
+repository, but had to be adapted somewhat because of drift between
+the two versions of configure.ac.
+
+Sam James has submitted similar fixes upstream:
+
+  <https://github.com/jbeverly/pam_ssh_agent_auth/pull/41>
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 6496679..d927b62 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -500,10 +500,10 @@ int main(void) { exit(0); }
+ 	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_BUNDLE, 1, [Define if your system uses bundles instead of ELF shared objects])
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if we have working getaddrinfo)
+ 	AC_TRY_RUN([#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+-main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+-		exit(0);
++int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
++		return 0;
+ 	else
+-		exit(1);
++		return 1;
+ }], [AC_MSG_RESULT(working)],
+ 	[AC_MSG_RESULT(buggy)
+ 	AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO, 1, [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])],
+@@ -917,8 +917,8 @@ AC_SUBST(LDFLAGS_SHARED)
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING(compiler and flags for sanity)
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([
+-#include <stdio.h>
+-int main(){exit(0);}
++#include <stdlib.h>
++int main(void){exit(0);}
+ 	])],
+ 	[	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes) ],
+ 	[
+@@ -951,9 +951,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+     strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
+     s = dirname(buf);
+     if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
+-	exit(1);
++	return 1;
+     } else {
+-	exit(0);
++	return 0;
+     }
+ }
+ 				]])],
+@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <dirent.h>
+-int main(void){struct dirent d;exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));}
++int main(void){struct dirent d;return sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char);}
+ 	]])],
+ 	[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ 	[
+@@ -1327,8 +1327,10 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresuid, [
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresuid seems to work)
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ int main(){errno=0; setresuid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0);}
+ 		]])],
+ 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+@@ -1344,8 +1346,10 @@ AC_CHECK_FUNCS(setresgid, [
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if setresgid seems to work)
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
+ int main(){errno=0; setresgid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0);}
+ 		]])],
+ 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+@@ -1384,7 +1388,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
+-int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");exit(b[4]!='\0');}
++int main(void){char b[5];snprintf(b,5,"123456789");return b[4]!='\0';}
+ 		]])],
+ 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ 		[
+@@ -1418,7 +1422,7 @@ int x_snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...)
+ int main(void)
+ {
+ 	char x[1];
+-	exit(x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1);
++	return x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1;
+ } ]])],
+ 		[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+ 		[
+@@ -1467,7 +1471,8 @@ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+-main() { char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
++#include <unistd.h>
++int main(void) { char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
+ if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
+ 	exit(1);
+ unlink(template); exit(0);
+@@ -1492,10 +1497,14 @@ if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
+ 	AC_MSG_CHECKING(if openpty correctly handles controlling tty)
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <sys/fcntl.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/wait.h>
++#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
++#include <pty.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ int
+ main()
+@@ -1543,6 +1552,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+ 	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+ #include <netdb.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+@@ -1748,6 +1758,7 @@ AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC(RAND_add, AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL, 1,
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
++#include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+@@ -1794,12 +1805,12 @@ int main(void) {
+ 
+ 	fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+ 	if(fd == NULL)
+-		exit(1);
++		return 1;
+ 
+ 	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0)
+-		exit(1);
++		return 1;
+ 
+-	exit(0);
++	return 0;
+ }
+ 	]])],
+ 	[
+@@ -1829,7 +1840,7 @@ AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+ 	[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+-int main(void) { exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); }
++int main(void) { return SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1; }
+ 	]])],
+ 	[
+ 		AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)
+@@ -2598,7 +2609,7 @@ dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+-main()
++int main(void)
+ {
+ 	char buf[50];
+ 	char expected_out[50];
+@@ -2611,11 +2622,11 @@ main()
+ 	strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
+ 	snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
+ 	if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
+-		exit(1);
+-	exit(0);
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
+ }
+ #else
+-main() { exit(0); }
++int main(void) { return 0; }
+ #endif
+ 		]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) ],
+ 		AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
+@@ -2746,11 +2757,11 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
+ int main() {
+ #ifdef msg_accrights
+ #error "msg_accrights is a macro"
+-exit(1);
++return 1;
+ #endif
+ struct msghdr m;
+ m.msg_accrights = 0;
+-exit(0);
++return 0;
+ }
+ 		])],
+ 		[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
+@@ -2773,11 +2784,11 @@ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
+ int main() {
+ #ifdef msg_control
+ #error "msg_control is a macro"
+-exit(1);
++return 1;
+ #endif
+ struct msghdr m;
+ m.msg_control = 0;
+-exit(0);
++return 0;
+ }
+ 		])],
+ 		[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
+@@ -2791,7 +2802,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+ fi
+ 
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
+-	AC_TRY_LINK([],
++	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
+ 		[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]
+@@ -2871,7 +2882,7 @@ if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
+ fi
+ 
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
+-	AC_TRY_LINK([],
++	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
+ 		[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]
+@@ -2884,7 +2895,7 @@ fi
+ 
+ 
+ AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
+-	AC_TRY_LINK([],
++	AC_TRY_LINK([#include <stdio.h>],
+ 		[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
+ 		[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]
diff --git a/ssh-agent.service b/ssh-agent.service
index 311f91dd758864d859fb92f470ade2dae1e8a15f..812303cb4769098af2217fe55946079aeba6e8bf 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.service
+++ b/ssh-agent.service
@@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ Requires=ssh-agent.socket
 [Service]
 Environment=SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%t/ssh-agent.socket
 ExecStartPre=/usr/bin/rm -f $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -D -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
 PassEnvironment=SSH_AGENT_PID
 SuccessExitStatus=2
-Type=forking
+Type=simple
 
 [Install]
 Also=ssh-agent.socket
diff --git a/ssh-host-keys-migration.service b/ssh-host-keys-migration.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..41e2c6becfdd5072f79bddde5ba54b06eeaf4c9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-host-keys-migration.service
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=Update OpenSSH host key permissions
+Documentation=https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Before=sshd.service
+After=ssh-keygen.target
+ConditionPathExists=!/var/lib/.ssh-host-keys-migration
+
+[Service]
+Type=oneshot
+ExecStart=-/usr/libexec/openssh/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
+ExecStart=touch /var/lib/.ssh-host-keys-migration
+RemainAfterExit=yes
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=sshd.service
diff --git a/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh b/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..083326efbb646d7b18d11c583c3504c33ee0646c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-host-keys-migration.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/usr/bin/bash 
+set -eu -o pipefail
+# Detect existing non-conforming host keys and perform the permissions migration
+# https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+# 
+# Example output looks like:
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# @         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @
+# @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
+# Permissions 0640 for '/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key' are too open.
+# It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.
+# This private key will be ignored.
+# sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.
+#
+output="$(sshd -T 2>&1 || true)" # expected to fail
+while read line; do
+    if [[ $line =~ ^Permissions\ [0-9]+\ for\ \'(.*)\'\ are\ too\ open. ]]; then
+        keyfile=${BASH_REMATCH[1]}
+        echo $line
+        echo -e "\t-> changing permissions on $keyfile"
+        chmod --verbose g-r $keyfile
+        chown --verbose root:root $keyfile
+    fi
+done <<< "$output"
diff --git a/sshd.service b/sshd.service
index e8afb869854ca11c713832b710733d19f7fc65ff..0cb2a263051e27f62e80b9dcae1e2323c12f72cf 100644
--- a/sshd.service
+++ b/sshd.service
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ Description=OpenSSH server daemon
 Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
 After=network.target sshd-keygen.target
 Wants=sshd-keygen.target
+# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
 Type=notify
diff --git a/sshd@.service b/sshd@.service
index 196c555ae54f339b718c3f65858b1caa4adf6365..be6d3b90c20a2180aca5ad32705b4a6f7b5659ba 100644
--- a/sshd@.service
+++ b/sshd@.service
@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon
 Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
 Wants=sshd-keygen.target
 After=sshd-keygen.target
+# Migration for Fedora 38 change to remove group ownership for standard host keys
+# See https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/SSHKeySignSuidBit
+Wants=ssh-host-keys-migration.service
 
 [Service]
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd