diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-1975-1.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-1.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b0ed8816f43fdf5136a212e490bc7990694784de --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-1.patch @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +From bef3d2cca3552100bbe44790c8c1a4f5bef06798 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0pa=C4=8Dek?= +Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 12:10:41 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Remove support for SIG(0) message verification +https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/bef3d2cca3552100bbe44790c8c1a4f5bef06798 + +--- + lib/dns/message.c | 99 +++-------------------------------------------- + lib/ns/client.c | 7 ++++ + 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c +index f8e45ecf92..1d3b6fe2d3 100644 +--- a/lib/dns/message.c ++++ b/lib/dns/message.c +@@ -3292,111 +3292,24 @@ dns_message_dumpsig(dns_message_t *msg, char *txt1) { + + isc_result_t + dns_message_checksig(dns_message_t *msg, dns_view_t *view) { +- isc_buffer_t b, msgb; ++ isc_buffer_t msgb; + + REQUIRE(DNS_MESSAGE_VALID(msg)); + +- if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL && msg->sig0 == NULL) { ++ if (msg->tsigkey == NULL && msg->tsig == NULL) { + return (ISC_R_SUCCESS); + } + + INSIST(msg->saved.base != NULL); + isc_buffer_init(&msgb, msg->saved.base, msg->saved.length); + isc_buffer_add(&msgb, msg->saved.length); +- if (msg->tsigkey != NULL || msg->tsig != NULL) { + #ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG +- dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1"); ++ dns_message_dumpsig(msg, "dns_message_checksig#1"); + #endif /* ifdef SKAN_MSG_DEBUG */ +- if (view != NULL) { +- return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg)); +- } else { +- return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL)); +- } ++ if (view != NULL) { ++ return (dns_view_checksig(view, &msgb, msg)); + } else { +- dns_rdata_t rdata = DNS_RDATA_INIT; +- dns_rdata_sig_t sig; +- dns_rdataset_t keyset; +- isc_result_t result; +- +- result = dns_rdataset_first(msg->sig0); +- INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); +- dns_rdataset_current(msg->sig0, &rdata); +- +- /* +- * This can occur when the message is a dynamic update, since +- * the rdata length checking is relaxed. This should not +- * happen in a well-formed message, since the SIG(0) is only +- * looked for in the additional section, and the dynamic update +- * meta-records are in the prerequisite and update sections. +- */ +- if (rdata.length == 0) { +- return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND); +- } +- +- result = dns_rdata_tostruct(&rdata, &sig, NULL); +- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { +- return (result); +- } +- +- dns_rdataset_init(&keyset); +- if (view == NULL) { +- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; +- goto freesig; +- } +- result = dns_view_simplefind(view, &sig.signer, +- dns_rdatatype_key /* SIG(0) */, 0, +- 0, false, &keyset, NULL); +- +- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { +- /* XXXBEW Should possibly create a fetch here */ +- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; +- goto freesig; +- } else if (keyset.trust < dns_trust_secure) { +- /* XXXBEW Should call a validator here */ +- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; +- goto freesig; +- } +- result = dns_rdataset_first(&keyset); +- INSIST(result == ISC_R_SUCCESS); +- for (; result == ISC_R_SUCCESS; +- result = dns_rdataset_next(&keyset)) +- { +- dst_key_t *key = NULL; +- +- dns_rdata_reset(&rdata); +- dns_rdataset_current(&keyset, &rdata); +- isc_buffer_init(&b, rdata.data, rdata.length); +- isc_buffer_add(&b, rdata.length); +- +- result = dst_key_fromdns(&sig.signer, rdata.rdclass, &b, +- view->mctx, &key); +- if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) { +- continue; +- } +- if (dst_key_alg(key) != sig.algorithm || +- dst_key_id(key) != sig.keyid || +- !(dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_DNSSEC || +- dst_key_proto(key) == DNS_KEYPROTO_ANY)) +- { +- dst_key_free(&key); +- continue; +- } +- result = dns_dnssec_verifymessage(&msgb, msg, key); +- dst_key_free(&key); +- if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) { +- break; +- } +- } +- if (result == ISC_R_NOMORE) { +- result = DNS_R_KEYUNAUTHORIZED; +- } +- +- freesig: +- if (dns_rdataset_isassociated(&keyset)) { +- dns_rdataset_disassociate(&keyset); +- } +- dns_rdata_freestruct(&sig); +- return (result); ++ return (dns_tsig_verify(&msgb, msg, NULL, NULL)); + } + } + +diff --git a/lib/ns/client.c b/lib/ns/client.c +index 590859f020..002185d642 100644 +--- a/lib/ns/client.c ++++ b/lib/ns/client.c +@@ -2167,6 +2167,13 @@ ns__client_request(isc_nmhandle_t *handle, isc_result_t eresult, + ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY, + NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), + "request is signed by a nonauthoritative key"); ++ } else if (result == DNS_R_NOTVERIFIEDYET && ++ client->message->sig0 != NULL) ++ { ++ ns_client_log(client, DNS_LOGCATEGORY_SECURITY, ++ NS_LOGMODULE_CLIENT, ISC_LOG_DEBUG(3), ++ "request has a SIG(0) signature but its support " ++ "was removed (CVE-2024-1975)"); + } else { + char tsigrcode[64]; + isc_buffer_t b; +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-1975-2.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..138206c9773aab2e663e39587ca502204ba7ec24 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +From 33007e302d2e5b4550fa8c9d5cd1bffaaffb6819 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0pa=C4=8Dek?= +Date: Thu, 16 May 2024 12:15:23 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Document SIG(0) verification removal +https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/33007e302d2e5b4550fa8c9d5cd1bffaaffb6819 + +--- + doc/arm/general.rst | 6 ++---- + doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst | 2 +- + doc/arm/reference.rst | 4 ++-- + doc/arm/security.inc.rst | 4 ++-- + doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst | 16 ++-------------- + 5 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/doc/arm/general.rst b/doc/arm/general.rst +index 09bcaa9725..cabf5c8591 100644 +--- a/doc/arm/general.rst ++++ b/doc/arm/general.rst +@@ -391,10 +391,8 @@ Notes + .. [#rfc1035_2] CLASS ANY queries are not supported. This is considered a + feature. + +-.. [#rfc2931] When receiving a query signed with a SIG(0), the server is +- only able to verify the signature if it has the key in its local +- authoritative data; it cannot do recursion or validation to +- retrieve unknown keys. ++.. [#rfc2931] Support for SIG(0) message verification was removed ++ as part of the mitigation of CVE-2024-1975. + + .. [#rfc2874] Compliance is with loading and serving of A6 records only. + A6 records were moved to the experimental category by :rfc:`3363`. +diff --git a/doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst b/doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst +index 87db9701da..996e910a6d 100644 +--- a/doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst ++++ b/doc/arm/intro-security.inc.rst +@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ or ports come preconfigured with local (loopback address) security preconfigured + If ``rndc`` is being invoked from a remote host, further configuration is required. + The ``nsupdate`` tool uses **Dynamic DNS (DDNS)** features and allows users to dynamically + change the contents of the zone file(s). ``nsupdate`` access and security may be controlled +-using ``named.conf`` :ref:`statements or using TSIG or SIG(0) cryptographic methods `. ++using ``named.conf`` :ref:`statements or via the TSIG cryptographic method `. + Clearly, if the remote hosts used for either ``rndc`` or DDNS lie within a network entirely + under the user's control, the security threat may be regarded as non-existent. Any implementation requirements, + therefore, depend on the site's security policy. +diff --git a/doc/arm/reference.rst b/doc/arm/reference.rst +index 2ddc368514..d6dd932948 100644 +--- a/doc/arm/reference.rst ++++ b/doc/arm/reference.rst +@@ -7450,7 +7450,7 @@ the zone's filename, unless :any:`inline-signing` is enabled. + updates are allowed. It specifies a set of rules, in which each rule + either grants or denies permission for one or more names in the zone to + be updated by one or more identities. Identity is determined by the key +- that signed the update request, using either TSIG or SIG(0). In most ++ that signed the update request, using TSIG. In most + cases, :any:`update-policy` rules only apply to key-based identities. There + is no way to specify update permissions based on the client source address. + +@@ -7507,7 +7507,7 @@ the zone's filename, unless :any:`inline-signing` is enabled. + field. Details for each rule type are described below. + + The ``identity`` field must be set to a fully qualified domain name. In +- most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG or SIG(0) key that ++ most cases, this represents the name of the TSIG key that + must be used to sign the update request. If the specified name is a + wildcard, it is subject to DNS wildcard expansion, and the rule may + apply to multiple identities. When a TKEY exchange has been used to +diff --git a/doc/arm/security.inc.rst b/doc/arm/security.inc.rst +index 878fa379fe..8fc65d3820 100644 +--- a/doc/arm/security.inc.rst ++++ b/doc/arm/security.inc.rst +@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ Limiting access to the server by outside parties can help prevent + spoofing and denial of service (DoS) attacks against the server. + + ACLs match clients on the basis of up to three characteristics: 1) The +-client's IP address; 2) the TSIG or SIG(0) key that was used to sign the ++client's IP address; 2) the TSIG key that was used to sign the + request, if any; and 3) an address prefix encoded in an EDNS + Client-Subnet option, if any. + +@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ and no queries at all from the networks specified in ``bogusnets``. + + In addition to network addresses and prefixes, which are matched against + the source address of the DNS request, ACLs may include ``key`` +-elements, which specify the name of a TSIG or SIG(0) key. ++elements, which specify the name of a TSIG key. + + When BIND 9 is built with GeoIP support, ACLs can also be used for + geographic access restrictions. This is done by specifying an ACL +diff --git a/doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst b/doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst +index 048dbeae7c..6e6fc3219e 100644 +--- a/doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst ++++ b/doc/arm/sig0.inc.rst +@@ -12,17 +12,5 @@ + SIG(0) + ------ + +-BIND partially supports DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures as +-specified in :rfc:`2535` and :rfc:`2931`. SIG(0) uses public/private keys to +-authenticate messages. Access control is performed in the same manner as with +-TSIG keys; privileges can be granted or denied in ACL directives based +-on the key name. +- +-When a SIG(0) signed message is received, it is only verified if +-the key is known and trusted by the server. The server does not attempt +-to recursively fetch or validate the key. +- +-SIG(0) signing of multiple-message TCP streams is not supported. +- +-The only tool shipped with BIND 9 that generates SIG(0) signed messages +-is :iscman:`nsupdate`. ++Support for DNSSEC SIG(0) transaction signatures has been removed. ++This is a countermeasure for CVE-2024-1975. +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-1975-3.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d2f188f6fd2140aa547569fe2c9e4362dca4eb38 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +From 02dffb63a84662b19da4e0efda26e061676f85a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0pa=C4=8Dek?= +Date: Fri, 17 May 2024 12:23:05 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Adapt the tsiggss test to the SIG(0) removal +https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/02dffb63a84662b19da4e0efda26e061676f85a8 + +Test that SIG(0) signer is NOT sent to the external socket for +authorization. It MUST NOT be considered a valid signature by +any chance. + +Also check that the signer's name does not appear in authsock.pl +output. +--- + bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl | 1 + + bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh | 12 +++++++----- + 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl +index 103d3b0be2..972252aa99 100644 +--- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl ++++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/authsock.pl +@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ if ($timeout != 0) { + } + + while (my $client = $server->accept()) { ++ printf("accept()\n"); + $client->recv(my $buf, 8, 0); + my ($version, $req_len) = unpack('N N', $buf); + +diff --git a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh +index c37f32ed39..004ad83f94 100644 +--- a/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh ++++ b/bin/tests/system/tsiggss/tests.sh +@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ status=$((status + ret)) + + echo_i "testing external update policy (CNAME) with auth sock ($n)" + ret=0 +-$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >/dev/null 2>&1 & ++$PERL ./authsock.pl --type=CNAME --path=ns1/auth.sock --pidfile=authsock.pid --timeout=120 >authsock.log 2>&1 & + sleep 1 + test_update $n testcname.example.nil. CNAME "86400 CNAME testdenied.example.nil" "testdenied" || ret=1 + n=$((n + 1)) +@@ -131,17 +131,19 @@ n=$((n + 1)) + if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi + status=$((status + ret)) + +-echo_i "testing external policy with SIG(0) key ($n)" ++echo_i "testing external policy with unsupported SIG(0) key ($n)" + ret=0 +-$NSUPDATE -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private </dev/null 2>&1 || ret=1 ++$NSUPDATE -d -k ns1/Kkey.example.nil.*.private <nsupdate.out${n} 2>&1 || true ++debug + server 10.53.0.1 ${PORT} + zone example.nil + update add fred.example.nil 120 cname foo.bar. + send + END + output=$($DIG $DIGOPTS +short cname fred.example.nil.) +-[ -n "$output" ] || ret=1 +-[ $ret -eq 0 ] || echo_i "failed" ++# update must have failed - SIG(0) signer is not supported ++[ -n "$output" ] && ret=1 ++grep -F "signer=key.example.nil" authsock.log >/dev/null && ret=1 + n=$((n + 1)) + if [ "$ret" -ne 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi + status=$((status + ret)) +-- +2.20.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-1975-4.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fac0e04a4603295eb73fb73cfa44c03b2e8e6a2b --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 227f9aa0646cdf521e0db0d472f8bcc1e2bd6154 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Aram Sargsyan +Date: Tue, 21 May 2024 09:29:35 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Adapt the upforwd test to the SIG(0) removal +https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/227f9aa0646cdf521e0db0d472f8bcc1e2bd6154 + +Change the check so that update with SIG(0) is expected to fail. +--- + bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh | 9 ++++++--- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh +index 518eac6..d231d0f 100644 +--- a/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh ++++ b/bin/tests/system/upforwd/tests.sh +@@ -229,10 +229,12 @@ fi + n=$((n + 1)) + + if test -f keyname; then +- echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 ($n)" ++ echo_i "checking update forwarding to with sig0 (expected to fail) ($n)" + ret=0 + keyname=$(cat keyname) +- $NSUPDATE -k $keyname.private -- - <nsupdate.out.$n 2>&1 && ret=1 + $DIG -p ${PORT} unsigned.example2 A @10.53.0.1 >dig.out.ns1.test$n +- grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null || ret=1 ++ grep "status: NOERROR" dig.out.ns1.test$n >/dev/null && ret=1 + if [ $ret != 0 ]; then echo_i "failed"; fi + status=$((status + ret)) + n=$((n + 1)) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-1975-5.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-5.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7b30a555c4911d3d852a8120094b9d4d9d8f9dad --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-1975-5.patch @@ -0,0 +1,24 @@ +From 8acd71b9cc3d46618319f8c2195d857a8f79744b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: =?UTF-8?q?Petr=20=C5=A0pa=C4=8Dek?= +Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2024 17:43:20 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Add CHANGES note for [GL #4480] +https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9/commit/8acd71b9cc3d46618319f8c2195d857a8f79744b + +--- + CHANGES | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES +index 913aad0..c01b186 100644 +--- a/CHANGES ++++ b/CHANGES +@@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ + --- 9.18.21 released --- ++6298. [security] Remove SIG(0) support from named as a countermeasure ++ for CVE-2024-1975. [GL #4480] + + 6297. [bug] Improve LRU cleaning behaviour. [GL #4448] + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/bind.spec b/bind.spec index aec8d67097b6cd2ebbd00ff152f4c35cf6f77848..9f9e24a55a573b33025f3c737fb250a398c877b7 100644 --- a/bind.spec +++ b/bind.spec @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ Summary: The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) DNS (Domain Name System) serv Name: bind License: MPLv2.0 Version: 9.18.21 -Release: 2 +Release: 3 Epoch: 32 Url: https://www.isc.org/downloads/bind/ # @@ -64,6 +64,13 @@ Patch6000:backport-CVE-2023-4408.patch Patch6001:backport-CVE-2023-5517.patch Patch6002:backport-CVE-2023-5679.patch Patch6003:backport-CVE-2023-50387-CVE-2023-50868.patch + +# fix CVE-2024-1975 +patch9000:backport-CVE-2024-1975-1.patch +patch9001:backport-CVE-2024-1975-2.patch +patch9002:backport-CVE-2024-1975-3.patch +patch9003:backport-CVE-2024-1975-4.patch +patch9004:backport-CVE-2024-1975-5.patch # Common patches %{?systemd_ordering} @@ -903,6 +910,12 @@ fi; %endif %changelog +* Thu Jul 25 2024 zhangxianting - 32:9.18.21-3 +- Type:CVE +- CVE:CVE-2024-1975 +- SUG:NA +- DESC:fix CVE-2024-1975 + * Tue Mar 19 2024 chengyechun - 32:9.18.21-2 - Type:CVE - CVE:CVE-2023-4408 CVE-2023-5517 CVE-2023-5679 CVE-2023-50387 CVE-2023-50868