From b1224df57ca4cec1911c130e2f6422cb969b5bda Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: wk333 <13474090681@163.com> Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2024 11:39:54 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2024-42472 (cherry picked from commit 07ff066e6df2724cc8fb5fb28074ad3d63e530d0) --- CVE-2024-42472.patch | 219 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ flatpak.spec | 6 +- 2 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 CVE-2024-42472.patch diff --git a/CVE-2024-42472.patch b/CVE-2024-42472.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..43aee74 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2024-42472.patch @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +Origin: +https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/3caeb16c31a3ed62d744e2aaf01d684f7991051a +https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/2cdd1e1e5ae90d7c3a4b60ce2e36e4d609e44e72 +https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/6bd603f6836e9b38b9b937d3b78f3fbf36e7ff75 + +From 6bd603f6836e9b38b9b937d3b78f3fbf36e7ff75 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alexander Larsson +Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 11:31:05 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] persist directories: Pass using new bwrap --bind-fd option + +Instead of passing a /proc/self/fd bind mount we use --bind-fd, which +has two advantages: + * bwrap closes the fd when used, so it doesn't leak into the started app + * bwrap ensures that what was mounted was the passed in fd (same dev/ino), + as there is a small (required) gap between symlink resolve and mount + where the target path could be replaced. + +Please note that this change requires an updated version of bubblewrap. + +Resolves: CVE-2024-42472, GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87 +[smcv: Make whitespace consistent] +Co-authored-by: Simon McVittie +Signed-off-by: Simon McVittie + + +--- + common/flatpak-context.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- + tests/test-run.sh | 41 ++++++++++++++- + 2 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/common/flatpak-context.c b/common/flatpak-context.c +index 2d98d5c..b4b2108 100644 +--- a/common/flatpak-context.c ++++ b/common/flatpak-context.c +@@ -2859,6 +2859,90 @@ flatpak_context_apply_env_appid (FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, + flatpak_bwrap_set_env (bwrap, "HOST_XDG_STATE_HOME", g_getenv ("XDG_STATE_HOME"), TRUE); + } + ++/* This creates zero or more directories unders base_fd+basedir, each ++ * being guaranteed to either exist and be a directory (no symlinks) ++ * or be created as a directory. The last directory is opened ++ * and the fd is returned. ++ */ ++static gboolean ++mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (int base_fd, ++ const char *basedir, ++ int mode, ++ const char *subdir, ++ int *out_fd, ++ GError **error) ++{ ++ glnx_autofd int parent_fd = -1; ++ ++ if (g_path_is_absolute (subdir)) ++ { ++ const char *skipped_prefix = subdir; ++ ++ while (*skipped_prefix == '/') ++ skipped_prefix++; ++ ++ g_warning ("--persist=\"%s\" is deprecated, treating it as --persist=\"%s\"", subdir, skipped_prefix); ++ subdir = skipped_prefix; ++ } ++ ++ g_autofree char *subdir_dirname = g_path_get_dirname (subdir); ++ ++ if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, ".") == 0) ++ { ++ /* It is ok to open basedir with follow=true */ ++ if (!glnx_opendirat (base_fd, basedir, TRUE, &parent_fd, error)) ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ else if (strcmp (subdir_dirname, "..") == 0) ++ { ++ return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths"); ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (base_fd, basedir, mode, ++ subdir_dirname, &parent_fd, error)) ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ g_autofree char *subdir_basename = g_path_get_basename (subdir); ++ ++ if (strcmp (subdir_basename, ".") == 0) ++ { ++ *out_fd = glnx_steal_fd (&parent_fd); ++ return TRUE; ++ } ++ else if (strcmp (subdir_basename, "..") == 0) ++ { ++ return glnx_throw (error, "'..' not supported in --persist paths"); ++ } ++ ++ if (!glnx_shutil_mkdir_p_at (parent_fd, subdir_basename, mode, NULL, error)) ++ return FALSE; ++ ++ int fd = openat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, O_PATH | O_NONBLOCK | O_DIRECTORY | O_CLOEXEC | O_NOCTTY | O_NOFOLLOW); ++ if (fd == -1) ++ { ++ int saved_errno = errno; ++ struct stat stat_buf; ++ ++ /* If it's a symbolic link, that could be a user trying to offload ++ * large data to another filesystem, but it could equally well be ++ * a malicious or compromised app trying to exploit GHSA-7hgv-f2j8-xw87. ++ * Produce a clearer error message in this case. ++ * Unfortunately the errno we get in this case is ENOTDIR, so we have ++ * to ask again to find out whether it's really a symlink. */ ++ if (saved_errno == ENOTDIR && ++ fstatat (parent_fd, subdir_basename, &stat_buf, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == 0 && ++ S_ISLNK (stat_buf.st_mode)) ++ return glnx_throw (error, "Symbolic link \"%s\" not allowed to avoid sandbox escape", subdir_basename); ++ ++ return glnx_throw_errno_prefix (error, "openat(%s)", subdir_basename); ++ } ++ ++ *out_fd = fd; ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ + void + flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext *context, + FlatpakBwrap *bwrap, +@@ -2882,13 +2966,30 @@ flatpak_context_append_bwrap_filesystem (FlatpakContext *context, + while (g_hash_table_iter_next (&iter, &key, NULL)) + { + const char *persist = key; +- g_autofree char *src = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, persist, NULL); ++ g_autofree char *appdir = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), ".var/app", app_id, NULL); + g_autofree char *dest = g_build_filename (g_get_home_dir (), persist, NULL); ++ g_autoptr(GError) local_error = NULL; ++ ++ if (g_mkdir_with_parents (appdir, 0755) != 0) ++ { ++ g_warning ("Unable to create directory %s", appdir); ++ continue; ++ } ++ ++ /* Don't follow symlinks from the persist directory, as it is under user control */ ++ glnx_autofd int src_fd = -1; ++ if (!mkdir_p_open_nofollow_at (AT_FDCWD, appdir, 0755, ++ persist, &src_fd, ++ &local_error)) ++ { ++ g_warning ("Failed to create persist path %s: %s", persist, local_error->message); ++ continue; ++ } + +- if (g_mkdir_with_parents (src, 0755) != 0) +- g_info ("Unable to create directory %s", src); ++ g_autofree char *src_via_proc = g_strdup_printf ("%d", src_fd); + +- flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind", src, dest); ++ flatpak_bwrap_add_fd (bwrap, g_steal_fd (&src_fd)); ++ flatpak_bwrap_add_bind_arg (bwrap, "--bind-fd", src_via_proc, dest); + } + } + +diff --git a/tests/test-run.sh b/tests/test-run.sh +index 7138bc6..244b533 100644 +--- a/tests/test-run.sh ++++ b/tests/test-run.sh +@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ set -euo pipefail + skip_without_bwrap + skip_revokefs_without_fuse + +-echo "1..20" ++echo "1..26" + + # Use stable rather than master as the branch so we can test that the run + # command automatically finds the branch correctly +@@ -543,3 +543,42 @@ ${FLATPAK} ${U} info -m org.test.App > out + assert_file_has_content out "^sdk=org\.test\.Sdk/$(flatpak --default-arch)/stable$" + + ok "--sdk option" ++ ++rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello" ++mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello" ++run --command=sh --persist=.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc' ++sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2 ++assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist" ++ ++ok "--persist=.persist persists a directory" ++ ++rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello" ++mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello" ++# G_DEBUG= to avoid the deprecation warning being fatal ++G_DEBUG= run --command=sh --persist=/.persist org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persist/rc' ++sed -e 's,^,#--persist=/.persist# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" >&2 ++assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persist/rc" "can-persist" ++ ++ok "--persist=/.persist is a deprecated form of --persist=.persist" ++ ++rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello" ++mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello" ++run --command=sh --persist=. org.test.Hello -c 'echo can-persist > .persistrc' ++sed -e 's,^,#--persist=.# ,g' < "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" >&2 ++assert_file_has_content "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/.persistrc" "can-persist" ++ ++ok "--persist=. persists all files" ++ ++mkdir "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible" ++echo FOO > ${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible/secret-file ++rm -fr "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello" ++mkdir -p "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello" ++ln -fns "${TEST_DATA_DIR}/inaccessible" "$HOME/.var/app/org.test.Hello/persist" ++# G_DEBUG= to avoid the warnings being fatal when we reject a --persist option. ++# LC_ALL=C so we get the expected non-localized string. ++LC_ALL=C G_DEBUG= run --command=ls --persist=persist --persist=relative/../escape org.test.Hello -la ~/persist &> hello_out || true ++sed -e 's,^,#--persist=symlink# ,g' < hello_out >&2 ++assert_file_has_content hello_out "not allowed to avoid sandbox escape" ++assert_not_file_has_content hello_out "secret-file" ++ ++ok "--persist doesn't allow sandbox escape via a symlink (CVE-2024-42472)" +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/flatpak.spec b/flatpak.spec index aaa8228..1dfc9e2 100644 --- a/flatpak.spec +++ b/flatpak.spec @@ -1,11 +1,12 @@ Name: flatpak Version: 1.15.6 -Release: 2 +Release: 3 Summary: Application deployment framework for desktop apps License: LGPLv2+ URL: http://flatpak.org/ Source0: https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/releases/download/%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.xz Patch0: CVE-2024-32462.patch +Patch1: CVE-2024-42472.patch BuildRequires: pkgconfig(appstream-glib) pkgconfig(gio-unix-2.0) pkgconfig(gobject-introspection-1.0) >= 1.40.0 pkgconfig(json-glib-1.0) pkgconfig(libarchive) >= 2.8.0 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsoup-2.4) pkgconfig(libxml-2.0) >= 2.4 pkgconfig(ostree-1) >= 2020.8 pkgconfig(polkit-gobject-1) pkgconfig(libseccomp) pkgconfig(xau) @@ -148,6 +149,9 @@ fi %{_mandir}/man5/flatpak-remote.5* %changelog +* Thu Aug 15 2024 wangkai <13474090681@163.com> - 1.15.6-3 +- Fix CVE-2024-42472 + * Fri Apr 19 2024 wangkai <13474090681@163.com> - 1.15.6-2 - Fix CVE-2024-32462 -- Gitee