From c459c66a48d75ec5c51163d4a5bb44e5d7ef7040 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: hanchao Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 19:08:12 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] cvefix: fix CVE-2023-29406 reference:https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/507358 score:6.5 --- ...p-validate-Host-header-before-sendin.patch | 211 ++++++++++++++++++ golang.spec | 9 +- 2 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 0047-Backport-net-http-validate-Host-header-before-sendin.patch diff --git a/0047-Backport-net-http-validate-Host-header-before-sendin.patch b/0047-Backport-net-http-validate-Host-header-before-sendin.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..947365f --- /dev/null +++ b/0047-Backport-net-http-validate-Host-header-before-sendin.patch @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +From 874209f9b9a0d5cd1d572e64101316a34d0b258d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Damien Neil +Date: Thu, 29 Jun 2023 04:20:08 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH] [Backport] net/http: validate Host header before sending + +Offering: Cloud Core Network +CVE: CVE-2023-29406 +Reference: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/507358 + +Verify that the Host header we send is valid. +Avoids surprising behavior such as a Host of "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:oops" +adding an X-Evil header to HTTP/1 requests. + +Add a test, skip the test for HTTP/2. HTTP/2 is not vulnerable to +header injection in the way HTTP/1 is, but x/net/http2 doesn't validate +the header and will go into a retry loop when the server rejects it. +CL 506995 adds the necessary validation to x/net/http2. + +Updates #60374 +Fixes #61075 +For CVE-2023-29406 + +Change-Id: I05cb6866a9bead043101954dfded199258c6dd04 +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/506996 +Reviewed-by: Tatiana Bradley +TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot +Run-TryBot: Damien Neil +(cherry picked from commit 499458f7ca04087958987a33c2703c3ef03e27e2) +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/507358 +Run-TryBot: Tatiana Bradley +Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker +Signed-off-by: Ma Chang Wang machangwang@huawei.com +--- + src/net/http/http_test.go | 29 ---------------------- + src/net/http/request.go | 45 ++++++++-------------------------- + src/net/http/request_test.go | 11 ++------- + src/net/http/transport_test.go | 18 ++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 73 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/net/http/http_test.go b/src/net/http/http_test.go +index 0d92fe5f96..f03272ab91 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/http_test.go ++++ b/src/net/http/http_test.go +@@ -48,35 +48,6 @@ func TestForeachHeaderElement(t *testing.T) { + } + } + +-func TestCleanHost(t *testing.T) { +- tests := []struct { +- in, want string +- }{ +- {"www.google.com", "www.google.com"}, +- {"www.google.com foo", "www.google.com"}, +- {"www.google.com/foo", "www.google.com"}, +- {" first character is a space", ""}, +- {"[1::6]:8080", "[1::6]:8080"}, +- +- // Punycode: +- {"гофер.рф/foo", "xn--c1ae0ajs.xn--p1ai"}, +- {"bücher.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"}, +- {"bücher.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"}, +- // Verify we convert to lowercase before punycode: +- {"BÜCHER.de", "xn--bcher-kva.de"}, +- {"BÜCHER.de:8080", "xn--bcher-kva.de:8080"}, +- // Verify we normalize to NFC before punycode: +- {"gophér.nfc", "xn--gophr-esa.nfc"}, // NFC input; no work needed +- {"goph\u0065\u0301r.nfd", "xn--gophr-esa.nfd"}, // NFD input +- } +- for _, tt := range tests { +- got := cleanHost(tt.in) +- if tt.want != got { +- t.Errorf("cleanHost(%q) = %q, want %q", tt.in, got, tt.want) +- } +- } +-} +- + // Test that cmd/go doesn't link in the HTTP server. + // + // This catches accidental dependencies between the HTTP transport and +diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go +index 09cb0c7f56..2f4e74077b 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/request.go ++++ b/src/net/http/request.go +@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@ import ( + "io" + "mime" + "mime/multipart" +- "net" + "net/http/httptrace" + "net/http/internal/ascii" + "net/textproto" +@@ -27,6 +26,7 @@ import ( + "strings" + "sync" + ++ "golang.org/x/net/http/httpguts" + "golang.org/x/net/idna" + ) + +@@ -568,12 +568,19 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF + // is not given, use the host from the request URL. + // + // Clean the host, in case it arrives with unexpected stuff in it. +- host := cleanHost(r.Host) ++ host := r.Host + if host == "" { + if r.URL == nil { + return errMissingHost + } +- host = cleanHost(r.URL.Host) ++ host = r.URL.Host ++ } ++ host, err = httpguts.PunycodeHostPort(host) ++ if err != nil { ++ return err ++ } ++ if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) { ++ return errors.New("http: invalid Host header") + } + + // According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other +@@ -730,38 +737,6 @@ func idnaASCII(v string) (string, error) { + return idna.Lookup.ToASCII(v) + } + +-// cleanHost cleans up the host sent in request's Host header. +-// +-// It both strips anything after '/' or ' ', and puts the value +-// into Punycode form, if necessary. +-// +-// Ideally we'd clean the Host header according to the spec: +-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-5.4 (Host = uri-host [ ":" port ]") +-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7230#section-2.7 (uri-host -> rfc3986's host) +-// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986#section-3.2.2 (definition of host) +-// But practically, what we are trying to avoid is the situation in +-// issue 11206, where a malformed Host header used in the proxy context +-// would create a bad request. So it is enough to just truncate at the +-// first offending character. +-func cleanHost(in string) string { +- if i := strings.IndexAny(in, " /"); i != -1 { +- in = in[:i] +- } +- host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(in) +- if err != nil { // input was just a host +- a, err := idnaASCII(in) +- if err != nil { +- return in // garbage in, garbage out +- } +- return a +- } +- a, err := idnaASCII(host) +- if err != nil { +- return in // garbage in, garbage out +- } +- return net.JoinHostPort(a, port) +-} +- + // removeZone removes IPv6 zone identifier from host. + // E.g., "[fe80::1%en0]:8080" to "[fe80::1]:8080" + func removeZone(host string) string { +diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go +index fac12b7ee6..368e87a0b1 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go ++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go +@@ -776,15 +776,8 @@ func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) { + } + req.Host = "foo.com with spaces" + req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces" +- req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}) +- want := []string{ +- "GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n", +- "Host: foo.com\r\n", +- "User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n", +- "\r\n", +- } +- if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) { +- t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n Want = %q", got, want) ++ if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil { ++ t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error") + } + } + +diff --git a/src/net/http/transport_test.go b/src/net/http/transport_test.go +index eeaa492644..58f12afd53 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/transport_test.go ++++ b/src/net/http/transport_test.go +@@ -6512,3 +6512,21 @@ func TestCancelRequestWhenSharingConnection(t *testing.T) { + close(r2c) + wg.Wait() + } ++ ++func TestRequestSanitization(t *testing.T) { ++ setParallel(t) ++ defer afterTest(t) ++ ++ ts := newClientServerTest(t, h1Mode, HandlerFunc(func(rw ResponseWriter, req *Request) { ++ if h, ok := req.Header["X-Evil"]; ok { ++ t.Errorf("request has X-Evil header: %q", h) ++ } ++ })).ts ++ defer ts.Close() ++ req, _ := NewRequest("GET", ts.URL, nil) ++ req.Host = "go.dev\r\nX-Evil:evil" ++ resp, _ := ts.Client().Do(req) ++ if resp != nil { ++ resp.Body.Close() ++ } ++} +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/golang.spec b/golang.spec index 83a1a18..92c4411 100644 --- a/golang.spec +++ b/golang.spec @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ Name: golang Version: 1.17.3 -Release: 19 +Release: 20 Summary: The Go Programming Language License: BSD and Public Domain URL: https://golang.org/ @@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ Patch6043: 0043-Backport-runtime-implement-SUID-SGID-protections.patch Patch6044: 0044-Backport-cmd-go-disallow-package-directories-contain.patch Patch6045: 0045-Backport-cmd-go-enforce-flags-with-non-optional-argu.patch Patch6046: 0046-Backport-cmd-go-cmd-cgo-in-_cgo_flags-use-one-line-p.patch +Patch6047: 0047-Backport-net-http-validate-Host-header-before-sendin.patch ExclusiveArch: %{golang_arches} @@ -449,6 +450,12 @@ fi %files devel -f go-tests.list -f go-misc.list -f go-src.list %changelog +* Fri Jul 21 2023 hanchao - 1.17.3-20 +- Type:CVE +- CVE:CVE-2023-29406 +- SUG:NA +- DESC:fix CVE-2023-29406 + * Wed Jun 21 2023 hanchao - 1.17.3-19 - Type:CVE - CVE:CVE-2023-29402,CVE-2023-29403,CVE-2023-29404,CVE-2023-29405 -- Gitee