From aac5d69daa1f53ce29f8bb791e5f93cd1536d569 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: sunchendong Date: Fri, 25 Aug 2023 15:01:27 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] permit requests with invalid Host headers --- ...t-requests-with-invalid-Host-headers.patch | 104 ++++++++++++++++++ golang.spec | 6 +- 2 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 0048-Backport-net-http-permit-requests-with-invalid-Host-headers.patch diff --git a/0048-Backport-net-http-permit-requests-with-invalid-Host-headers.patch b/0048-Backport-net-http-permit-requests-with-invalid-Host-headers.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c9ccf3d --- /dev/null +++ b/0048-Backport-net-http-permit-requests-with-invalid-Host-headers.patch @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +From b9153f6ef338baee5fe02a867c8fbc83a8b29dd1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Damien Neil +Date: Wed, 19 Jul 2023 10:30:46 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] net/http: permit requests with invalid Host headers + +Historically, the Transport has silently truncated invalid +Host headers at the first '/' or ' ' character. CL 506996 changed +this behavior to reject invalid Host headers entirely. +Unfortunately, Docker appears to rely on the previous behavior. + +When sending a HTTP/1 request with an invalid Host, send an empty +Host header. This is safer than truncation: If you care about the +Host, then you should get the one you set; if you don't care, +then an empty Host should be fine. + +Continue to fully validate Host headers sent to a proxy, +since proxies generally can't productively forward requests +without a Host. + +For #60374 +Fixes #61431 + +Change-Id: If170c7dd860aa20eb58fe32990fc93af832742b6 +Reviewed-on: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/511155 +TryBot-Result: Gopher Robot +Reviewed-by: Roland Shoemaker +Run-TryBot: Damien Neil +--- + src/net/http/request.go | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++- + src/net/http/request_test.go | 17 ++++++++++++----- + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/net/http/request.go b/src/net/http/request.go +index a2e8373dd5..d1fbd5df90 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/request.go ++++ b/src/net/http/request.go +@@ -591,8 +591,29 @@ func (r *Request) write(w io.Writer, usingProxy bool, extraHeaders Header, waitF + if err != nil { + return err + } ++ // Validate that the Host header is a valid header in general, ++ // but don't validate the host itself. This is sufficient to avoid ++ // header or request smuggling via the Host field. ++ // The server can (and will, if it's a net/http server) reject ++ // the request if it doesn't consider the host valid. + if !httpguts.ValidHostHeader(host) { +- return errors.New("http: invalid Host header") ++ // Historically, we would truncate the Host header after '/' or ' '. ++ // Some users have relied on this truncation to convert a network ++ // address such as Unix domain socket path into a valid, ignored ++ // Host header (see https://go.dev/issue/61431). ++ // ++ // We don't preserve the truncation, because sending an altered ++ // header field opens a smuggling vector. Instead, zero out the ++ // Host header entirely if it isn't valid. (An empty Host is valid; ++ // see RFC 9112 Section 3.2.) ++ // ++ // Return an error if we're sending to a proxy, since the proxy ++ // probably can't do anything useful with an empty Host header. ++ if !usingProxy { ++ host = "" ++ } else { ++ return errors.New("http: invalid Host header") ++ } + } + + // According to RFC 6874, an HTTP client, proxy, or other +diff --git a/src/net/http/request_test.go b/src/net/http/request_test.go +index 0892bc255f..a32b583c11 100644 +--- a/src/net/http/request_test.go ++++ b/src/net/http/request_test.go +@@ -767,16 +767,23 @@ func TestRequestWriteBufferedWriter(t *testing.T) { + } + } + +-func TestRequestBadHost(t *testing.T) { ++func TestRequestBadHostHeader(t *testing.T) { + got := []string{} + req, err := NewRequest("GET", "http://foo/after", nil) + if err != nil { + t.Fatal(err) + } +- req.Host = "foo.com with spaces" +- req.URL.Host = "foo.com with spaces" +- if err := req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}); err == nil { +- t.Errorf("Writing request with invalid Host: succeded, want error") ++ req.Host = "foo.com\nnewline" ++ req.URL.Host = "foo.com\nnewline" ++ req.Write(logWrites{t, &got}) ++ want := []string{ ++ "GET /after HTTP/1.1\r\n", ++ "Host: \r\n", ++ "User-Agent: " + DefaultUserAgent + "\r\n", ++ "\r\n", ++ } ++ if !reflect.DeepEqual(got, want) { ++ t.Errorf("Writes = %q\n Want = %q", got, want) + } + } + +-- +2.33.0 + + diff --git a/golang.spec b/golang.spec index 123995c..b625327 100644 --- a/golang.spec +++ b/golang.spec @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ Name: golang Version: 1.17.3 -Release: 20 +Release: 21 Summary: The Go Programming Language License: BSD and Public Domain URL: https://golang.org/ @@ -197,6 +197,7 @@ Patch6044: 0044-Backport-cmd-go-disallow-package-directories-contain.patch Patch6045: 0045-Backport-cmd-go-enforce-flags-with-non-optional-argu.patch Patch6046: 0046-Backport-cmd-go-cmd-cgo-in-_cgo_flags-use-one-line-p.patch Patch6047: 0047-Backport-net-http-validate-Host-header-before-sendin.patch +Patch6048: 0048-Backport-net-http-permit-requests-with-invalid-Host-headers.patch ExclusiveArch: %{golang_arches} @@ -435,6 +436,9 @@ fi %files devel -f go-tests.list -f go-misc.list -f go-src.list %changelog +* Fri Aug 25 2023 sunchendong - 1.17.3-21 +- permit invalid host header for docker + * Fri Jul 21 2023 hanchao - 1.17.3-20 - Type:CVE - CVE:CVE-2023-29406 -- Gitee