diff --git a/backport-0001-misc-Implement-grub_strlcpy.patch b/backport-0001-misc-Implement-grub_strlcpy.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e3968ad4561ca926a26bba2f49d6c83b193709b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0001-misc-Implement-grub_strlcpy.patch @@ -0,0 +1,68 @@ +From ea703528a8581a2ea7e0bad424a70fdf0aec7d8f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sat, 15 Jun 2024 02:33:08 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 01/73] misc: Implement grub_strlcpy() + +grub_strlcpy() acts the same way as strlcpy() does on most *NIX, +returning the length of src and ensuring dest is always NUL +terminated except when size is 0. + +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + include/grub/misc.h | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/include/grub/misc.h b/include/grub/misc.h +index 1578f36c3..14d8f37ac 100644 +--- a/include/grub/misc.h ++++ b/include/grub/misc.h +@@ -64,6 +64,45 @@ grub_stpcpy (char *dest, const char *src) + return d - 1; + } + ++static inline grub_size_t ++grub_strlcpy (char *dest, const char *src, grub_size_t size) ++{ ++ char *d = dest; ++ grub_size_t res = 0; ++ /* ++ * We do not subtract one from size here to avoid dealing with underflowing ++ * the value, which is why to_copy is always checked to be greater than one ++ * throughout this function. ++ */ ++ grub_size_t to_copy = size; ++ ++ /* Copy size - 1 bytes to dest. */ ++ if (to_copy > 1) ++ while ((*d++ = *src++) != '\0' && ++res && --to_copy > 1) ++ ; ++ ++ /* ++ * NUL terminate if size != 0. The previous step may have copied a NUL byte ++ * if it reached the end of the string, but we know dest[size - 1] must always ++ * be a NUL byte. ++ */ ++ if (size != 0) ++ dest[size - 1] = '\0'; ++ ++ /* If there is still space in dest, but are here, we reached the end of src. */ ++ if (to_copy > 1) ++ return res; ++ ++ /* ++ * If we haven't reached the end of the string, iterate through to determine ++ * the strings total length. ++ */ ++ while (*src++ != '\0' && ++res) ++ ; ++ ++ return res; ++} ++ + /* XXX: If grub_memmove is too slow, we must implement grub_memcpy. */ + static inline void * + grub_memcpy (void *dest, const void *src, grub_size_t n) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0002-fs-ufs-Fix-a-heap-OOB-write.patch b/backport-0002-fs-ufs-Fix-a-heap-OOB-write.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5fdf550d22b77a13aefd1bb47af1cb950a610243 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0002-fs-ufs-Fix-a-heap-OOB-write.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From c1a291b01f4f1dcd6a22b61f1c81a45a966d16ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 02:03:33 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 02/73] fs/ufs: Fix a heap OOB write + +grub_strcpy() was used to copy a symlink name from the filesystem +image to a heap allocated buffer. This led to a OOB write to adjacent +heap allocations. Fix by using grub_strlcpy(). + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45781 + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/ufs.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c +index a354c92d9..01235101b 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c +@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ grub_ufs_lookup_symlink (struct grub_ufs_data *data, int ino) + /* Check against zero is paylindromic, no need to swap. */ + if (data->inode.nblocks == 0 + && INODE_SIZE (data) <= sizeof (data->inode.symlink)) +- grub_strcpy (symlink, (char *) data->inode.symlink); ++ grub_strlcpy (symlink, (char *) data->inode.symlink, sz); + else + { + if (grub_ufs_read_file (data, 0, 0, 0, sz, symlink) < 0) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0003-fs-hfs-Fix-stack-OOB-write-with-grub_strcpy.patch b/backport-0003-fs-hfs-Fix-stack-OOB-write-with-grub_strcpy.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fbf42d92f40a7c5c1d9d08f55621b8443c299815 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0003-fs-hfs-Fix-stack-OOB-write-with-grub_strcpy.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 417547c10410b714e43f08f74137c24015f8f4c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 02:48:33 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 03/73] fs/hfs: Fix stack OOB write with grub_strcpy() + +Replaced with grub_strlcpy(). + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45782 +Fixes: CVE-2024-56737 +Fixes: https://savannah.gnu.org/bugs/?66599 + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/hfs.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c +index 91dc0e69c..920112b03 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c +@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ grub_hfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk) + volume name. */ + key.parent_dir = grub_cpu_to_be32_compile_time (1); + key.strlen = data->sblock.volname[0]; +- grub_strcpy ((char *) key.str, (char *) (data->sblock.volname + 1)); ++ grub_strlcpy ((char *) key.str, (char *) (data->sblock.volname + 1), sizeof (key.str)); + + if (grub_hfs_find_node (data, (char *) &key, data->cat_root, + 0, (char *) &dir, sizeof (dir)) == 0) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0004-fs-tar-Initialize-name-in-grub_cpio_find_file.patch b/backport-0004-fs-tar-Initialize-name-in-grub_cpio_find_file.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fe7a920559a6106db9e3af213a4a2d6a4f1adfcd --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0004-fs-tar-Initialize-name-in-grub_cpio_find_file.patch @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +From 2c8ac08c99466c0697f704242363fc687f492a0d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 02:47:54 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 04/73] fs/tar: Initialize name in grub_cpio_find_file() + +It was possible to iterate through grub_cpio_find_file() without +allocating name and not setting mode to GRUB_ARCHELP_ATTR_END, which +would cause the uninitialized value for name to be used as an argument +for canonicalize() in grub_archelp_dir(). + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/tar.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/tar.c b/grub-core/fs/tar.c +index c551ed6b5..646bce5eb 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/tar.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/tar.c +@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + int reread = 0, have_longname = 0, have_longlink = 0; + + data->hofs = data->next_hofs; ++ *name = NULL; + + for (reread = 0; reread < 3; reread++) + { +@@ -202,6 +203,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + } + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } ++ ++ if (*name == NULL) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid tar archive"); ++ + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0005-fs-tar-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch b/backport-0005-fs-tar-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b30433e6e7bf8fa81db30a5df64367b7da70d776 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0005-fs-tar-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +From 0087bc6902182fe5cedce2d034c75a79cf6dd4f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:58 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 05/73] fs/tar: Integer overflow leads to heap OOB write + +Both namesize and linksize are derived from hd.size, a 12-digit octal +number parsed by read_number(). Later direct arithmetic calculation like +"namesize + 1" and "linksize + 1" may exceed the maximum value of +grub_size_t leading to heap OOB write. This patch fixes the issue by +using grub_add() and checking for an overflow. + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45780 + +Reported-by: Nils Langius +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +Reviewed-by: Alec Brown +--- + grub-core/fs/tar.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/tar.c b/grub-core/fs/tar.c +index 646bce5eb..386c09022 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/tar.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/tar.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + { + struct head hd; + int reread = 0, have_longname = 0, have_longlink = 0; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + data->hofs = data->next_hofs; + *name = NULL; +@@ -98,7 +100,11 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + { + grub_err_t err; + grub_size_t namesize = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)); +- *name = grub_malloc (namesize + 1); ++ ++ if (grub_add (namesize, 1, &sz)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("name size overflow")); ++ ++ *name = grub_malloc (sz); + if (*name == NULL) + return grub_errno; + err = grub_disk_read (data->disk, 0, +@@ -118,15 +124,19 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + { + grub_err_t err; + grub_size_t linksize = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)); +- if (data->linkname_alloc < linksize + 1) ++ ++ if (grub_add (linksize, 1, &sz)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("link size overflow")); ++ ++ if (data->linkname_alloc < sz) + { + char *n; +- n = grub_calloc (2, linksize + 1); ++ n = grub_calloc (2, sz); + if (!n) + return grub_errno; + grub_free (data->linkname); + data->linkname = n; +- data->linkname_alloc = 2 * (linksize + 1); ++ data->linkname_alloc = 2 * (sz); + } + + err = grub_disk_read (data->disk, 0, +@@ -149,7 +159,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + while (extra_size < sizeof (hd.prefix) + && hd.prefix[extra_size]) + extra_size++; +- *name = grub_malloc (sizeof (hd.name) + extra_size + 2); ++ ++ if (grub_add (sizeof (hd.name) + 2, extra_size, &sz)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("long name size overflow")); ++ *name = grub_malloc (sz); + if (*name == NULL) + return grub_errno; + if (hd.prefix[0]) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0006-fs-f2fs-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch b/backport-0006-fs-f2fs-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cd64b5d9d494e9eec703871a88a7341221b35cdd --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0006-fs-f2fs-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 563436258cde64da6b974880abff1bf0959f4da3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 06:15:03 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 06/73] fs/f2fs: Set a grub_errno if mount fails + +It was previously possible for grub_errno to not be set when +grub_f2fs_mount() failed if nat_bitmap_ptr() returned NULL. + +This issue is solved by ensuring a grub_errno is set in the fail case. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c +index 855e24618..db8a65f8d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c +@@ -872,6 +872,9 @@ grub_f2fs_mount (grub_disk_t disk) + return data; + + fail: ++ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not a F2FS filesystem"); ++ + grub_free (data); + + return NULL; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0007-fs-hfsplus-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch b/backport-0007-fs-hfsplus-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3eb15cdf5d269b4026177135245b35d0b28c8eba --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0007-fs-hfsplus-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From f7c070a2e28dfab7137db0739fb8db1dc02d8898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 06:22:51 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 07/73] fs/hfsplus: Set a grub_errno if mount fails + +It was possible for mount to fail but not set grub_errno. This led to +a possible double decrement of the module reference count if the NULL +page was mapped. + +Fixing in general as a similar bug was fixed in commit 61b13c187 +(fs/hfsplus: Set grub_errno to prevent NULL pointer access) and there +are likely more variants around. + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45783 + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c +index 295822f69..de71fd486 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c +@@ -405,7 +405,7 @@ grub_hfsplus_mount (grub_disk_t disk) + + fail: + +- if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE) ++ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE || grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE) + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not a HFS+ filesystem"); + + grub_free (data); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0008-fs-iso9660-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch b/backport-0008-fs-iso9660-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4ebf531b3291a041d96e64d198031dcb49cddc9e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0008-fs-iso9660-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 965db5970811d18069b34f28f5f31ddadde90a97 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 06:37:08 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 08/73] fs/iso9660: Set a grub_errno if mount fails + +It was possible for a grub_errno to not be set if mount of an ISO 9660 +filesystem failed when set_rockridge() returned 0. + +This isn't known to be exploitable as the other filesystems due to +filesystem helper checking the requested file type. Though fixing +as a precaution. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/iso9660.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c +index 8c348b59a..8d480e602 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c +@@ -551,6 +551,9 @@ grub_iso9660_mount (grub_disk_t disk) + return data; + + fail: ++ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not a ISO9660 filesystem"); ++ + grub_free (data); + return 0; + } +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0009-fs-iso9660-Fix-invalid-free.patch b/backport-0009-fs-iso9660-Fix-invalid-free.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..83fea62200623a4ec16eece26d0f70b80359e53a --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0009-fs-iso9660-Fix-invalid-free.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 1443833a9535a5873f7de3798cf4d8389f366611 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Chang +Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 15:14:42 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 09/73] fs/iso9660: Fix invalid free + +The ctx->filename can point to either a string literal or a dynamically +allocated string. The ctx->filename_alloc field is used to indicate the +type of allocation. + +An issue has been identified where ctx->filename is reassigned to +a string literal in susp_iterate_dir() but ctx->filename_alloc is not +correctly handled. This oversight causes a memory leak and an invalid +free operation later. + +The fix involves checking ctx->filename_alloc, freeing the allocated +string if necessary and clearing ctx->filename_alloc for string literals. + +Reported-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Michael Chang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/iso9660.c | 14 ++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c +index 8d480e602..8e3c95c4f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c +@@ -628,9 +628,19 @@ susp_iterate_dir (struct grub_iso9660_susp_entry *entry, + filename type is stored. */ + /* FIXME: Fix this slightly improper cast. */ + if (entry->data[0] & GRUB_ISO9660_RR_DOT) +- ctx->filename = (char *) "."; ++ { ++ if (ctx->filename_alloc) ++ grub_free (ctx->filename); ++ ctx->filename_alloc = 0; ++ ctx->filename = (char *) "."; ++ } + else if (entry->data[0] & GRUB_ISO9660_RR_DOTDOT) +- ctx->filename = (char *) ".."; ++ { ++ if (ctx->filename_alloc) ++ grub_free (ctx->filename); ++ ctx->filename_alloc = 0; ++ ctx->filename = (char *) ".."; ++ } + else if (entry->len >= 5) + { + grub_size_t off = 0, csize = 1; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0010-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-in-jfs_getent.patch b/backport-0010-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-in-jfs_getent.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fa4d5948c7a5b9ab11ee4a5049597c59730200eb --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0010-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-in-jfs_getent.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From 66175696f3a385b14bdf1ebcda7755834bd2d5fb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:59 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 10/73] fs/jfs: Fix OOB read in jfs_getent() + +The JFS fuzzing revealed an OOB read in grub_jfs_getent(). The crash +was caused by an invalid leaf nodes count, diro->dirpage->header.count, +which was larger than the maximum number of leaf nodes allowed in an +inode. This fix is to ensure that the leaf nodes count is validated in +grub_jfs_opendir() before calling grub_jfs_getent(). + +On the occasion replace existing raw numbers with newly defined constant. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +Reviewed-by: Alec Brown +--- + grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +index 62e20ef6f..e2fe2850c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +@@ -41,6 +41,12 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + + #define GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF 2 + ++/* ++ * Define max entries stored in-line in an inode. ++ * https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf ++ */ ++#define GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES 8 ++ + struct grub_jfs_sblock + { + /* The magic for JFS. It should contain the string "JFS1". */ +@@ -203,9 +209,9 @@ struct grub_jfs_inode + grub_uint8_t freecnt; + grub_uint8_t freelist; + grub_uint32_t idotdot; +- grub_uint8_t sorted[8]; ++ grub_uint8_t sorted[GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES]; + } header; +- struct grub_jfs_leaf_dirent dirents[8]; ++ struct grub_jfs_leaf_dirent dirents[GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES]; + } GRUB_PACKED dir; + /* Fast symlink. */ + struct +@@ -453,6 +459,13 @@ grub_jfs_opendir (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode) + /* Check if the entire tree is contained within the inode. */ + if (inode->file.tree.flags & GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF) + { ++ if (inode->dir.header.count > GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES) ++ { ++ grub_free (diro); ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("invalid JFS inode")); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + diro->leaf = inode->dir.dirents; + diro->next_leaf = (struct grub_jfs_leaf_next_dirent *) de; + diro->sorted = inode->dir.header.sorted; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0011-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-caused-by-invalid-dir-slot-index.patch b/backport-0011-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-caused-by-invalid-dir-slot-index.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..e5aaf7b60b5cdcaad246c851279275be24dad0ad --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0011-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-caused-by-invalid-dir-slot-index.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From ab09fd0531f3523ac0ef833404526c98c08248f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:28:00 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 11/73] fs/jfs: Fix OOB read caused by invalid dir slot index + +While fuzz testing JFS with ASAN enabled an OOB read was detected in +grub_jfs_opendir(). The issue occurred due to an invalid directory slot +index in the first entry of the sorted directory slot array in the inode +directory header. The fix ensures the slot index is validated before +accessing it. Given that an internal or a leaf node in a directory B+ +tree is a 4 KiB in size and each directory slot is always 32 bytes, the +max number of slots in a node is 128. The validation ensures that the +slot index doesn't exceed this limit. + +[1] https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf + + JFS will allocate 4K of disk space for an internal node of the B+ tree. + An internal node looks the same as a leaf node. + - page 10 + + Fixed number of Directory Slots depending on the size of the node. These are + the slots to be used for storing the directory slot array and the directory + entries or router entries. A directory slot is always 32 bytes. + ... + A Directory Slot Array which is a sorted array of indices to the directory + slots that are currently in use. + ... + An internal or a leaf node in the directory B+ tree is a 4K page. + - page 25 + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +Reviewed-by: Alec Brown +--- + grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 9 +++++++++ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +index e2fe2850c..7a68fcbe3 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + * https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf + */ + #define GRUB_JFS_INODE_INLINE_ENTRIES 8 ++#define GRUB_JFS_DIR_MAX_SLOTS 128 + + struct grub_jfs_sblock + { +@@ -481,6 +482,14 @@ grub_jfs_opendir (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode) + return 0; + } + ++ if (inode->dir.header.sorted[0] >= GRUB_JFS_DIR_MAX_SLOTS) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("invalid directory slot index")); ++ grub_free (diro->dirpage); ++ grub_free (diro); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ + blk = grub_le_to_cpu32 (de[inode->dir.header.sorted[0]].ex.blk2); + blk <<= (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS); + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0012-fs-jfs-Use-full-40-bits-offset-and-address-for-a-dat.patch b/backport-0012-fs-jfs-Use-full-40-bits-offset-and-address-for-a-dat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..94c0b84be73eea37256845ee0dcc8724e7f45cdb --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0012-fs-jfs-Use-full-40-bits-offset-and-address-for-a-dat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +From bd999310fe67f35a66de3bfa2836da91589d04ef Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 20:22:39 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 12/73] fs/jfs: Use full 40 bits offset and address for a data + extent + +An extent's logical offset and address are represented as a 40-bit value +split into two parts: the most significant 8 bits and the least +significant 32 bits. Currently the JFS code uses only the least +significant 32 bits value for offsets and addresses assuming the data +size will never exceed the 32-bit range. This approach ignores the most +significant 8 bits potentially leading to incorrect offsets and +addresses for larger values. The patch fixes it by incorporating the +most significant 8 bits into the calculation to get the full 40-bits +value for offsets and addresses. + +https://jfs.sourceforge.net/project/pub/jfslayout.pdf + + "off1,off2 is a 40-bit field, containing the logical offset of the first + block in the extent. + ... + addr1,addr2 is a 40-bit field, containing the address of the extent." + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ + 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +index 7a68fcbe3..3026d5a0b 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +@@ -265,6 +265,20 @@ static grub_dl_t my_mod; + + static grub_err_t grub_jfs_lookup_symlink (struct grub_jfs_data *data, grub_uint32_t ino); + ++/* ++ * An extent's offset, physical and logical, is represented as a 40-bit value. ++ * This 40-bit value is split into two parts: ++ * - offset1: the most signficant 8 bits of the offset, ++ * - offset2: the least significant 32 bits of the offset. ++ * ++ * This function calculates and returns the 64-bit offset of an extent. ++ */ ++static grub_uint64_t ++get_ext_offset (grub_uint8_t offset1, grub_uint32_t offset2) ++{ ++ return (((grub_uint64_t) offset1 << 32) | grub_le_to_cpu32 (offset2)); ++} ++ + static grub_int64_t + getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead, + struct grub_jfs_tree_extent *extents, +@@ -274,22 +288,25 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead, + { + int found = -1; + int i; ++ grub_uint64_t ext_offset, ext_blk; + + for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (treehead->count) - 2 && + i < max_extents; i++) + { ++ ext_offset = get_ext_offset (extents[i].offset1, extents[i].offset2); ++ ext_blk = get_ext_offset (extents[i].extent.blk1, extents[i].extent.blk2); ++ + if (treehead->flags & GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF) + { + /* Read the leafnode. */ +- if (grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].offset2) <= blk ++ if (ext_offset <= blk + && ((grub_le_to_cpu16 (extents[i].extent.length)) + + (extents[i].extent.length2 << 16) +- + grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].offset2)) > blk) +- return (blk - grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].offset2) +- + grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].extent.blk2)); ++ + ext_offset) > blk) ++ return (blk - ext_offset + ext_blk); + } + else +- if (blk >= grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[i].offset2)) ++ if (blk >= ext_offset) + found = i; + } + +@@ -307,10 +324,9 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead, + return -1; + + if (!grub_disk_read (data->disk, +- ((grub_disk_addr_t) grub_le_to_cpu32 (extents[found].extent.blk2)) +- << (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) +- - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS), 0, +- sizeof (*tree), (char *) tree)) ++ (grub_disk_addr_t) ext_blk ++ << (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS), ++ 0, sizeof (*tree), (char *) tree)) + { + if (grub_memcmp (&tree->treehead, treehead, sizeof (struct grub_jfs_treehead)) || + grub_memcmp (&tree->extents, extents, 254 * sizeof (struct grub_jfs_tree_extent))) +@@ -361,7 +377,7 @@ grub_jfs_read_inode (struct grub_jfs_data *data, grub_uint32_t ino, + sizeof (iag_inodes), &iag_inodes)) + return grub_errno; + +- inoblk = grub_le_to_cpu32 (iag_inodes[inoext].blk2); ++ inoblk = get_ext_offset (iag_inodes[inoext].blk1, iag_inodes[inoext].blk2); + inoblk <<= (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) + - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS); + inoblk += inonum; +@@ -490,7 +506,8 @@ grub_jfs_opendir (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode) + return 0; + } + +- blk = grub_le_to_cpu32 (de[inode->dir.header.sorted[0]].ex.blk2); ++ blk = get_ext_offset (de[inode->dir.header.sorted[0]].ex.blk1, ++ de[inode->dir.header.sorted[0]].ex.blk2); + blk <<= (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS); + + /* Read in the nodes until we are on the leaf node level. */ +@@ -508,7 +525,7 @@ grub_jfs_opendir (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode) + + de = (struct grub_jfs_internal_dirent *) diro->dirpage->dirent; + index = diro->dirpage->sorted[diro->dirpage->header.sindex * 32]; +- blk = (grub_le_to_cpu32 (de[index].ex.blk2) ++ blk = (get_ext_offset (de[index].ex.blk1, de[index].ex.blk2) + << (grub_le_to_cpu16 (data->sblock.log2_blksz) + - GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_BITS)); + } while (!(diro->dirpage->header.flags & GRUB_JFS_TREE_LEAF)); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0013-fs-jfs-Inconsistent-signed-unsigned-types-usage-in-r.patch b/backport-0013-fs-jfs-Inconsistent-signed-unsigned-types-usage-in-r.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b90dc353496200035be8cfc5bb9da2bd20a38fbd --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0013-fs-jfs-Inconsistent-signed-unsigned-types-usage-in-r.patch @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From edd995a26ec98654d907a9436a296c2d82bc4b28 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 20:22:40 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 13/73] fs/jfs: Inconsistent signed/unsigned types usage in + return values + +The getblk() returns a value of type grub_int64_t which is assigned to +iagblk and inoblk, both of type grub_uint64_t, in grub_jfs_read_inode() +via grub_jfs_blkno(). This patch fixes the type mismatch in the +functions. Additionally, the getblk() will return 0 instead of -1 on +failure cases. This change is safe because grub_errno is always set in +getblk() to indicate errors and it is later checked in the callers. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 15 +++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +index 3026d5a0b..c06d174c9 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +@@ -279,7 +279,7 @@ get_ext_offset (grub_uint8_t offset1, grub_uint32_t offset2) + return (((grub_uint64_t) offset1 << 32) | grub_le_to_cpu32 (offset2)); + } + +-static grub_int64_t ++static grub_uint64_t + getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead, + struct grub_jfs_tree_extent *extents, + int max_extents, +@@ -290,6 +290,8 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead, + int i; + grub_uint64_t ext_offset, ext_blk; + ++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ + for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (treehead->count) - 2 && + i < max_extents; i++) + { +@@ -312,7 +314,7 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead, + + if (found != -1) + { +- grub_int64_t ret = -1; ++ grub_uint64_t ret = 0; + struct + { + struct grub_jfs_treehead treehead; +@@ -321,7 +323,7 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead, + + tree = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*tree)); + if (!tree) +- return -1; ++ return 0; + + if (!grub_disk_read (data->disk, + (grub_disk_addr_t) ext_blk +@@ -334,19 +336,20 @@ getblk (struct grub_jfs_treehead *treehead, + else + { + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "jfs: infinite recursion detected"); +- ret = -1; ++ ret = 0; + } + } + grub_free (tree); + return ret; + } + +- return -1; ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_READ_ERROR, "jfs: block %" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T " not found", blk); ++ return 0; + } + + /* Get the block number for the block BLK in the node INODE in the + mounted filesystem DATA. */ +-static grub_int64_t ++static grub_uint64_t + grub_jfs_blkno (struct grub_jfs_data *data, struct grub_jfs_inode *inode, + grub_uint64_t blk) + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0014-fs-ext2-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-extents.patch b/backport-0014-fs-ext2-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-extents.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..bddf2f63989b4eff9d13e4190f59f3c9be9bff65 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0014-fs-ext2-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-extents.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From 7e2f750f0a795c4d64ec7dc7591edac8da2e978c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Chang +Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 15:14:23 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 14/73] fs/ext2: Fix out-of-bounds read for inline extents + +When inline extents are used, i.e. the extent tree depth equals zero, +a maximum of four entries can fit into the inode's data block. If the +extent header states a number of entries greater than four the current +ext2 implementation causes an out-of-bounds read. Fix this issue by +capping the number of extents to four when reading inline extents. + +Reported-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Michael Chang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/ext2.c | 10 +++++++++- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c +index e1cc5e62a..3f9f6b208 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c +@@ -481,6 +481,8 @@ grub_ext2_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock) + struct grub_ext4_extent *ext; + int i; + grub_disk_addr_t ret; ++ grub_uint16_t nent; ++ const grub_uint16_t max_inline_ext = sizeof (inode->blocks) / sizeof (*ext) - 1; /* Minus 1 extent header. */ + + leaf = grub_ext4_find_leaf (data, (struct grub_ext4_extent_header *) inode->blocks.dir_blocks, fileblock); + if (! leaf) +@@ -490,7 +492,13 @@ grub_ext2_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock) + } + + ext = (struct grub_ext4_extent *) (leaf + 1); +- for (i = 0; i < grub_le_to_cpu16 (leaf->entries); i++) ++ ++ nent = grub_le_to_cpu16 (leaf->entries); ++ ++ if (leaf->depth == 0) ++ nent = grub_min (nent, max_inline_ext); ++ ++ for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) + { + if (fileblock < grub_le_to_cpu32 (ext[i].block)) + break; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0015-fs-ntfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch b/backport-0015-fs-ntfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c526914604f2d12be91893cad19ec4f361c3f14 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0015-fs-ntfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From aff26318783a135562b904ff09e2359893885732 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Chang +Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2024 12:12:06 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 15/73] fs/ntfs: Fix out-of-bounds read + +When parsing NTFS file records the presence of the 0xFF marker indicates +the end of the attribute list. This value signifies that there are no +more attributes to process. + +However, when the end marker is missing due to corrupted metadata the +loop continues to read beyond the attribute list resulting in out-of-bounds +reads and potentially entering an infinite loop. + +This patch adds a check to provide a stop condition for the loop ensuring +it stops at the end of the attribute list or at the end of the Master File +Table. This guards against out-of-bounds reads and prevents infinite loops. + +Reported-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Michael Chang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index de435aa14..8a5384247 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@ free_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at) + static grub_uint8_t * + find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + { ++ grub_uint8_t *mft_end; ++ + if (at->flags & GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST) + { + retry: +@@ -191,7 +193,8 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + return NULL; + } + at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt; +- while (*at->attr_cur != 0xFF) ++ mft_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); ++ while (at->attr_cur < mft_end && *at->attr_cur != 0xFF) + { + at->attr_nxt += u16at (at->attr_cur, 4); + if (*at->attr_cur == GRUB_NTFS_AT_ATTRIBUTE_LIST) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0016-fs-ntfs-Track-the-end-of-the-MFT-attribute-buffer.patch b/backport-0016-fs-ntfs-Track-the-end-of-the-MFT-attribute-buffer.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..17b33157b7b05fa87d617e32c17823343823e148 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0016-fs-ntfs-Track-the-end-of-the-MFT-attribute-buffer.patch @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +From 237a71184a32d1ef7732f5f49ed6a89c5fe1c99a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Tue, 7 Jan 2025 11:38:34 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 16/73] fs/ntfs: Track the end of the MFT attribute buffer + +The end of the attribute buffer should be stored alongside the rest of +the attribute struct as right now it is not possible to implement bounds +checking when accessing attributes sequentially. + +This is done via: + - updating init_attr() to set at->end and check is is not initially out of bounds, + - implementing checks as init_attr() had its type change in its callers, + - updating the value of at->end when needed. + +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + include/grub/ntfs.h | 1 + + 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index 8a5384247..dbda720e1 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -119,13 +119,20 @@ static grub_err_t read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, + grub_disk_read_hook_t read_hook, + void *read_hook_data); + +-static void ++static grub_err_t + init_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft) + { + at->mft = mft; + at->flags = (mft == &mft->data->mmft) ? GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT : 0; + at->attr_nxt = mft->buf + first_attr_off (mft->buf); ++ at->end = mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); ++ ++ if (at->attr_nxt > at->end) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "attributes start outside the MFT"); ++ + at->attr_end = at->emft_buf = at->edat_buf = at->sbuf = NULL; ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + + static void +@@ -239,6 +246,10 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); + } + at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST; ++ ++ /* From this point on pa_end is the end of the buffer */ ++ at->end = pa_end; ++ + while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end) + { + if ((*at->attr_nxt == attr) || (attr == 0)) +@@ -298,7 +309,9 @@ locate_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, + { + grub_uint8_t *pa; + +- init_attr (at, mft); ++ if (init_attr (at, mft) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return NULL; ++ + pa = find_attr (at, attr); + if (pa == NULL) + return NULL; +@@ -314,7 +327,8 @@ locate_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, + } + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + free_attr (at); +- init_attr (at, mft); ++ if (init_attr (at, mft) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return NULL; + pa = find_attr (at, attr); + } + return pa; +@@ -585,7 +599,7 @@ init_file (struct grub_ntfs_file *mft, grub_uint64_t mftno) + mft->attr.attr_end = 0; /* Don't jump to attribute list */ + } + else +- init_attr (&mft->attr, mft); ++ return init_attr (&mft->attr, mft); + + return 0; + } +@@ -811,7 +825,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + bmp = NULL; + + at = &attr; +- init_attr (at, mft); ++ if (init_attr (at, mft) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return 0; ++ + while (1) + { + cur_pos = find_attr (at, GRUB_NTFS_AT_INDEX_ROOT); +@@ -842,7 +858,9 @@ grub_ntfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + bitmap = NULL; + bitmap_len = 0; + free_attr (at); ++ /* No need to check errors here, as it will already be fine */ + init_attr (at, mft); ++ + while ((cur_pos = find_attr (at, GRUB_NTFS_AT_BITMAP)) != NULL) + { + int ofs; +@@ -1207,6 +1225,7 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label) + struct grub_ntfs_data *data = 0; + struct grub_fshelp_node *mft = 0; + grub_uint8_t *pa; ++ grub_err_t err; + + grub_dl_ref (my_mod); + +@@ -1232,7 +1251,10 @@ grub_ntfs_label (grub_device_t device, char **label) + goto fail; + } + +- init_attr (&mft->attr, mft); ++ err = init_attr (&mft->attr, mft); ++ if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return err; ++ + pa = find_attr (&mft->attr, GRUB_NTFS_AT_VOLUME_NAME); + + if (pa >= mft->buf + (mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR)) +diff --git a/include/grub/ntfs.h b/include/grub/ntfs.h +index d1a6af696..ec1c4db38 100644 +--- a/include/grub/ntfs.h ++++ b/include/grub/ntfs.h +@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ struct grub_ntfs_attr + grub_uint8_t *attr_cur, *attr_nxt, *attr_end; + grub_uint32_t save_pos; + grub_uint8_t *sbuf; ++ grub_uint8_t *end; + struct grub_ntfs_file *mft; + }; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0017-fs-ntfs-Use-a-helper-function-to-access-attributes.patch b/backport-0017-fs-ntfs-Use-a-helper-function-to-access-attributes.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5d8bd9fe746b7aa852a1d7a44b0a233ea6c1dd3e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0017-fs-ntfs-Use-a-helper-function-to-access-attributes.patch @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ +From 048777bc29043403d077d41a81d0183767b8bc71 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 12:39:56 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 17/73] fs/ntfs: Use a helper function to access attributes + +Right now to access the next attribute the code reads the length of the +current attribute and adds that to the current pointer. This is error +prone as bounds checking needs to be performed all over the place. So, +implement a helper and ensure its used across find_attr() and read_attr(). + +This commit does *not* implement full bounds checking. It is just the +preparation work for this to be added into the helper. + +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------- + include/grub/ntfs.h | 2 ++ + 2 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index dbda720e1..1c678f3d0 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -70,6 +70,25 @@ res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr) + return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10); + } + ++/* Return the next attribute if it exists, otherwise return NULL. */ ++static grub_uint8_t * ++next_attribute (grub_uint8_t *curr_attribute, void *end) ++{ ++ grub_uint8_t *next = curr_attribute; ++ ++ /* ++ * Need to verify we aren't exceeding the end of the buffer by reading the ++ * header for the current attribute ++ */ ++ if (curr_attribute + GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE >= (grub_uint8_t *) end) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ next += u16at (curr_attribute, 4); ++ ++ return next; ++} ++ ++ + grub_ntfscomp_func_t grub_ntfscomp_func; + + static grub_err_t +@@ -151,13 +170,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + if (at->flags & GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST) + { + retry: +- while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end) ++ while (at->attr_nxt) + { + at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt; +- at->attr_nxt += u16at (at->attr_cur, 4); ++ at->attr_nxt = next_attribute (at->attr_cur, at->attr_end); + if ((*at->attr_cur == attr) || (attr == 0)) + { +- grub_uint8_t *new_pos; ++ grub_uint8_t *new_pos, *end; + + if (at->flags & GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT) + { +@@ -181,15 +200,36 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + return NULL; + } + ++ /* ++ * Only time emft_bufs is defined is in this function, with this ++ * size. ++ */ ++ grub_size_t emft_buf_size = ++ at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR; ++ ++ /* ++ * Needs to be enough space for the successful case to even ++ * bother. ++ */ ++ if (first_attr_off (at->emft_buf) >= (emft_buf_size - 0x18 - 2)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, ++ "can\'t find 0x%X in attribute list", ++ (unsigned char) *at->attr_cur); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ + new_pos = &at->emft_buf[first_attr_off (at->emft_buf)]; +- while (*new_pos != 0xFF) ++ end = &at->emft_buf[emft_buf_size]; ++ ++ while (new_pos && *new_pos != 0xFF) + { + if ((*new_pos == *at->attr_cur) + && (u16at (new_pos, 0xE) == u16at (at->attr_cur, 0x18))) + { + return new_pos; + } +- new_pos += u16at (new_pos, 4); ++ new_pos = next_attribute (new_pos, end); + } + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, + "can\'t find 0x%X in attribute list", +@@ -203,7 +243,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + mft_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); + while (at->attr_cur < mft_end && *at->attr_cur != 0xFF) + { +- at->attr_nxt += u16at (at->attr_cur, 4); ++ at->attr_nxt = next_attribute (at->attr_cur, at->end); + if (*at->attr_cur == GRUB_NTFS_AT_ATTRIBUTE_LIST) + at->attr_end = at->attr_cur; + if ((*at->attr_cur == attr) || (attr == 0)) +@@ -250,13 +290,14 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + /* From this point on pa_end is the end of the buffer */ + at->end = pa_end; + +- while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end) ++ while (at->attr_nxt) + { + if ((*at->attr_nxt == attr) || (attr == 0)) + break; +- at->attr_nxt += u16at (at->attr_nxt, 4); ++ at->attr_nxt = next_attribute (at->attr_nxt, pa_end); + } +- if (at->attr_nxt >= at->attr_end) ++ ++ if (at->attr_nxt >= at->attr_end || at->attr_nxt == NULL) + return NULL; + + if ((at->flags & GRUB_NTFS_AF_MMFT) && (attr == GRUB_NTFS_AT_DATA)) +@@ -277,7 +318,8 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start + + 1)); + pa = at->attr_nxt + u16at (pa, 4); +- while (pa < at->attr_end) ++ ++ while (pa) + { + if (*pa != attr) + break; +@@ -293,7 +335,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR), + at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR, 0, 0, 0)) + return NULL; +- pa += u16at (pa, 4); ++ pa = next_attribute (pa, pa_end); + } + at->attr_nxt = at->attr_cur; + at->flags &= ~GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS; +@@ -530,14 +572,15 @@ read_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs, + else + vcn = ofs >> (at->mft->data->log_spc + GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); + pa = at->attr_nxt + u16at (at->attr_nxt, 4); +- while (pa < at->attr_end) ++ ++ while (pa) + { + if (*pa != attr) + break; + if (u32at (pa, 8) > vcn) + break; + at->attr_nxt = pa; +- pa += u16at (pa, 4); ++ pa = next_attribute (pa, at->attr_end); + } + } + pp = find_attr (at, attr); +diff --git a/include/grub/ntfs.h b/include/grub/ntfs.h +index ec1c4db38..2c8078403 100644 +--- a/include/grub/ntfs.h ++++ b/include/grub/ntfs.h +@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ enum + #define GRUB_NTFS_COM_SEC (GRUB_NTFS_COM_LEN >> GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) + #define GRUB_NTFS_LOG_COM_SEC (GRUB_NTFS_COM_LOG_LEN - GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) + ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE 16 ++ + enum + { + GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST = 1, +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0018-fs-ntfs-Implement-attribute-verification.patch b/backport-0018-fs-ntfs-Implement-attribute-verification.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..923a2c1d2085244387b21a5ec90cbbe796ff2da9 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0018-fs-ntfs-Implement-attribute-verification.patch @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +From 067b6d225d482280abad03944f04e30abcbdafa1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Tue, 14 May 2024 12:39:56 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 18/73] fs/ntfs: Implement attribute verification + +It was possible to read OOB when an attribute had a size that exceeded +the allocated buffer. This resolves that by making sure all attributes +that get read are fully in the allocated space by implementing +a function to validate them. + +Defining the offsets in include/grub/ntfs.h but they are only used in +the validation function and not across the rest of the NTFS code. + +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/grub/ntfs.h | 22 +++++++ + 2 files changed, 175 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index 9311ba9..f5a247b 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -70,6 +72,149 @@ res_attr_data_len (void *res_attr_ptr) + return u32at (res_attr_ptr, 0x10); + } + ++/* ++ * Check if the attribute is valid and doesn't exceed the allocated region. ++ * This accounts for resident and non-resident data. ++ * ++ * This is based off the documentation from the linux-ntfs project: ++ * https://flatcap.github.io/linux-ntfs/ntfs/concepts/attribute_header.html ++ */ ++static bool ++validate_attribute (grub_uint8_t *attr, void *end) ++{ ++ grub_size_t attr_size = 0; ++ grub_size_t min_size = 0; ++ grub_size_t spare = (grub_uint8_t *) end - attr; ++ /* ++ * Just used as a temporary variable to try and deal with cases where someone ++ * tries to overlap fields. ++ */ ++ grub_size_t curr = 0; ++ ++ /* Need verify we can entirely read the attributes header. */ ++ if (attr + GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE >= (grub_uint8_t *) end) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* ++ * So, the rest of this code uses a 16bit int for the attribute length but ++ * from reading the all the documentation I could find it says this field is ++ * actually 32bit. But let's be consistent with the rest of the code. ++ * ++ * https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.10.7/source/fs/ntfs3/ntfs.h#L370 ++ */ ++ attr_size = u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_LENGTH); ++ ++ if (attr_size > spare) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* Not an error case, just reached the end of the attributes. */ ++ if (attr_size == 0) ++ return false; ++ ++ /* ++ * Extra validation by trying to calculate a minimum possible size for this ++ * attribute. +8 from the size of the resident data struct which is the ++ * minimum that can be added. ++ */ ++ min_size = GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE + 8; ++ ++ if (min_size > attr_size) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* Is the data is resident (0) or not (1). */ ++ if (attr[GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RESIDENT] == 0) ++ { ++ /* Read the offset and size of the attribute. */ ++ curr = u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RES_OFFSET); ++ curr += u32at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RES_LENGTH); ++ if (curr > min_size) ++ min_size = curr; ++ } ++ else ++ { ++ /* ++ * If the data is non-resident, the minimum size is 64 which is where ++ * the data runs start. We already have a minimum size of 24. So, just ++ * adding 40 to get to the real value. ++ */ ++ min_size += 40; ++ if (min_size > attr_size) ++ goto fail; ++ /* If the compression unit size is > 0, +8 bytes*/ ++ if (u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSION_UNIT_SIZE) > 0) ++ min_size += 8; ++ ++ /* ++ * Need to consider the data runs now. Each member of the run has byte ++ * that describes the size of the data length and offset. Each being ++ * 4 bits in the byte. ++ */ ++ curr = u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_DATA_RUNS); ++ ++ if (curr + 1 > min_size) ++ min_size = curr + 1; ++ ++ if (min_size > attr_size) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ /* ++ * Each attribute can store multiple data runs which are stored ++ * continuously in the attribute. They exist as one header byte ++ * with up to 14 bytes following it depending on the lengths. ++ * We stop when we hit a header that is just a NUL byte. ++ * ++ * https://flatcap.github.io/linux-ntfs/ntfs/concepts/data_runs.html ++ */ ++ while (attr[curr] != 0) ++ { ++ /* ++ * We stop when we hit a header that is just a NUL byte. The data ++ * run header is stored as a single byte where the top 4 bits refer ++ * to the number of bytes used to store the total length of the ++ * data run, and the number of bytes used to store the offset. ++ * These directly follow the header byte, so we use them to update ++ * the minimum size. ++ */ ++ min_size += (attr[curr] & 0x7) + ((attr[curr] >> 4) & 0x7); ++ curr += min_size; ++ min_size++; ++ if (min_size > attr_size) ++ goto fail; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ /* Name offset, doing this after data residence checks. */ ++ if (u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_OFFSET) != 0) ++ { ++ curr = u16at (attr, GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_OFFSET); ++ /* ++ * Multiple the name length by 2 as its UTF-16. Can be zero if this in an ++ * unamed attribute. ++ */ ++ curr += attr[GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_LENGTH] * 2; ++ if (curr > min_size) ++ min_size = curr; ++ } ++ ++ /* Padded to 8 bytes. */ ++ if (min_size % 8 != 0) ++ min_size += 8 - (min_size % 8); ++ ++ /* ++ * At this point min_size should be exactly attr_size but being flexible ++ * here to avoid any issues. ++ */ ++ if (min_size > attr_size) ++ goto fail; ++ ++ return true; ++ ++ fail: ++ grub_dprintf ("ntfs", "spare=%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " min_size=%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE " attr_size=%" PRIuGRUB_SIZE "\n", ++ spare, min_size, attr_size); ++ return false; ++} ++ + /* Return the next attribute if it exists, otherwise return NULL. */ + static grub_uint8_t * + next_attribute (grub_uint8_t *curr_attribute, void *end) +@@ -84,6 +229,8 @@ next_attribute (grub_uint8_t *curr_attribute, void *end) + return NULL; + + next += u16at (curr_attribute, 4); ++ if (validate_attribute (next, end) == false) ++ return NULL; + + return next; + } +@@ -290,6 +437,9 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + /* From this point on pa_end is the end of the buffer */ + at->end = pa_end; + ++ if (validate_attribute (at->attr_nxt, pa_end) == false) ++ return NULL; ++ + while (at->attr_nxt) + { + if ((*at->attr_nxt == attr) || (attr == 0)) +@@ -319,6 +469,9 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr) + + 1)); + pa = at->attr_nxt + u16at (pa, 4); + ++ if (validate_attribute (pa, pa_end) == true) ++ pa = NULL; ++ + while (pa) + { + if (*pa != attr) +@@ -572,6 +725,8 @@ read_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs, + else + vcn = ofs >> (at->mft->data->log_spc + GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR); + pa = at->attr_nxt + u16at (at->attr_nxt, 4); ++ if (validate_attribute (pa, at->attr_end) == false) ++ pa = NULL; + + while (pa) + { +diff --git a/include/grub/ntfs.h b/include/grub/ntfs.h +index 2c80784..77b182a 100644 +--- a/include/grub/ntfs.h ++++ b/include/grub/ntfs.h +@@ -91,6 +91,28 @@ enum + + #define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_HEADER_SIZE 16 + ++/* ++ * To make attribute validation clearer the offsets for each value in the ++ * attribute headers are defined as macros. ++ * ++ * These offsets are all from: ++ * https://flatcap.github.io/linux-ntfs/ntfs/concepts/attribute_header.html ++ */ ++ ++/* These offsets are part of the attribute header. */ ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_LENGTH 4 ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RESIDENT 8 ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_LENGTH 9 ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_NAME_OFFSET 10 ++ ++/* Offsets for values needed for resident data. */ ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RES_LENGTH 16 ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_RES_OFFSET 20 ++ ++/* Offsets for values needed for non-resident data. */ ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_DATA_RUNS 32 ++#define GRUB_NTFS_ATTRIBUTE_COMPRESSION_UNIT_SIZE 34 ++ + enum + { + GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST = 1, +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0019-fs-xfs-Fix-issues-found-while-fuzzing-the-XFS-filesy.patch b/backport-0019-fs-xfs-Fix-issues-found-while-fuzzing-the-XFS-filesy.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b5e1c362a3936bf2f181593d6dd42e539b46515c --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0019-fs-xfs-Fix-issues-found-while-fuzzing-the-XFS-filesy.patch @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +From fc5ef088758e9d88f42dfbbbba6549ef0be2f6c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Darren Kenny +Date: Fri, 2 Jun 2023 18:08:44 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] fs/xfs: Fix issues found while fuzzing the XFS filesystem + +While performing fuzz testing with XFS filesystem images with ASAN +enabled, several issues were found where the memory accesses are made +beyond the data that is allocated into the struct grub_xfs_data +structure's data field. + +The existing structure didn't store the size of the memory allocated into +the buffer in the data field and had no way to check it. To resolve these +issues, the data size is stored to enable checks into the data buffer. + +With these checks in place, the fuzzing corpus no longer cause any crashes. + +Signed-off-by: Darren Kenny +Signed-off-by: Robbie Harwood +Signed-off-by: Marta Lewandowska +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper + +--- + grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +index 744f731..4980055 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +@@ -239,6 +239,7 @@ struct grub_fshelp_node + + struct grub_xfs_data + { ++ grub_size_t data_size; + struct grub_xfs_sblock sblock; + grub_disk_t disk; + int pos; +@@ -611,8 +612,20 @@ grub_xfs_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock) + } + else if (node->inode.format == XFS_INODE_FORMAT_EXT) + { ++ grub_addr_t exts_end = 0; ++ grub_addr_t data_end = 0; ++ + nrec = grub_be_to_cpu32 (node->inode.nextents); + exts = (struct grub_xfs_extent *) grub_xfs_inode_data(&node->inode); ++ ++ if (grub_mul (sizeof (struct grub_xfs_extent), nrec, &exts_end) || ++ grub_add ((grub_addr_t) node->data, exts_end, &exts_end) || ++ grub_add ((grub_addr_t) node->data, node->data->data_size, &data_end) || ++ exts_end > data_end) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid number of XFS extents"); ++ return 0; ++ } + } + else + { +@@ -803,6 +816,9 @@ grub_xfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + grub_uint8_t *inopos = grub_xfs_inline_de_inopos(dir->data, de); + grub_uint8_t c; + ++ if ((inopos + (smallino ? 4 : 8)) > (grub_uint8_t *) dir + grub_xfs_fshelp_size (dir->data)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not a correct XFS inode"); ++ + /* inopos might be unaligned. */ + if (smallino) + ino = (((grub_uint32_t) inopos[0]) << 24) +@@ -829,6 +845,10 @@ grub_xfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + de->name[de->len] = c; + + de = grub_xfs_inline_next_de(dir->data, head, de); ++ ++ if ((grub_uint8_t *) de >= (grub_uint8_t *) dir + grub_xfs_fshelp_size (dir->data)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid XFS directory entry"); ++ + } + break; + } +@@ -897,6 +917,9 @@ grub_xfs_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + } + + filename = (char *)(direntry + 1); ++ if (filename + direntry->len - 1 > (char *) tail) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid XFS directory entry"); ++ + /* The byte after the filename is for the filetype, padding, or + tag, which is not used by GRUB. So it can be overwritten. */ + filename[direntry->len] = '\0'; +@@ -941,6 +964,8 @@ grub_xfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk) + if (!data) + return 0; + ++ data->data_size = sizeof (struct grub_xfs_data); ++ + grub_dprintf("xfs", "Reading sb\n"); + /* Read the superblock. */ + if (grub_disk_read (disk, 0, 0, +@@ -962,6 +987,7 @@ grub_xfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk) + if (! data) + goto fail; + ++ data->data_size = sz; + data->diropen.data = data; + data->diropen.ino = grub_be_to_cpu64(data->sblock.rootino); + data->diropen.inode_read = 1; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0020-fs-xfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch b/backport-0020-fs-xfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4d0de1a24714cceb1af7d57bca1d127b25b42713 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0020-fs-xfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From 6ccc77b59d16578b10eaf8a4fe85c20b229f0d8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Chang +Date: Fri, 31 May 2024 15:14:57 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 19/73] fs/xfs: Fix out-of-bounds read + +The number of records in the root key array read from disk was not being +validated against the size of the root node. This could lead to an +out-of-bounds read. + +This patch adds a check to ensure that the number of records in the root +key array does not exceed the expected size of a root node read from +disk. If this check detects an out-of-bounds condition the operation is +aborted to prevent random errors due to metadata corruption. + +Reported-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Michael Chang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 11 +++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +index 8e02ab4a3..82ea33f40 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +@@ -570,6 +570,17 @@ grub_xfs_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock) + do + { + int i; ++ grub_addr_t keys_end, data_end; ++ ++ if (grub_mul (sizeof (grub_uint64_t), nrec, &keys_end) || ++ grub_add ((grub_addr_t) keys, keys_end, &keys_end) || ++ grub_add ((grub_addr_t) node->data, node->data->data_size, &data_end) || ++ keys_end > data_end) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid number of XFS root keys"); ++ grub_free (leaf); ++ return 0; ++ } + + for (i = 0; i < nrec; i++) + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0021-fs-xfs-Ensuring-failing-to-mount-sets-a-grub_errno.patch b/backport-0021-fs-xfs-Ensuring-failing-to-mount-sets-a-grub_errno.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..abe28f3a3de52ea0e21a6f3a882cf618a5ff87bd --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0021-fs-xfs-Ensuring-failing-to-mount-sets-a-grub_errno.patch @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +From d1d6b7ea58aa5a80a4c4d0666b49460056c8ef0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 06:03:58 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 20/73] fs/xfs: Ensuring failing to mount sets a grub_errno + +It was previously possible for grub_xfs_mount() to return NULL without +setting grub_errno if the XFS version was invalid. This resulted in it +being possible for grub_dl_unref() to be called twice allowing the XFS +module to be unloaded while there were still references to it. + +Fixing this problem in general by ensuring a grub_errno is set if the +fail label is reached. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +index 82ea33f40..8c0d60f7d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +@@ -327,6 +327,8 @@ static int grub_xfs_sb_valid(struct grub_xfs_data *data) + } + return 1; + } ++ ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "unsupported XFS filesystem version"); + return 0; + } + +@@ -1068,7 +1070,7 @@ grub_xfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk) + return data; + fail: + +- if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE) ++ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE || grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE) + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "not an XFS filesystem"); + + grub_free (data); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0022-kern-file-Ensure-file-data-is-set.patch b/backport-0022-kern-file-Ensure-file-data-is-set.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7fcf3f2a0202ef71848331a6d8d34afd092b10b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0022-kern-file-Ensure-file-data-is-set.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From a7910687294b29288ac649e71b47493c93294f17 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 03:01:40 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 21/73] kern/file: Ensure file->data is set + +This is to avoid a generic issue were some filesystems would not set +data and also not set a grub_errno. This meant it was possible for many +filesystems to grub_dl_unref() themselves multiple times resulting in +it being possible to unload the filesystems while there were still +references to them, e.g., via a loopback. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/kern/file.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/file.c b/grub-core/kern/file.c +index 750177248..e990507fc 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/file.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/file.c +@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ grub_file_open (const char *name, enum grub_file_type type) + if ((file->fs->fs_open) (file, file_name) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto fail; + ++ if (file->data == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ + file->name = grub_strdup (name); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0023-kern-file-Implement-filesystem-reference-counting.patch b/backport-0023-kern-file-Implement-filesystem-reference-counting.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..201cde3b0d8688c68bda5641cdff3d717bcf7fc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0023-kern-file-Implement-filesystem-reference-counting.patch @@ -0,0 +1,443 @@ +From dc58f3fa76342c15801b25d52055f975f33f9b7d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 10:15:03 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 22/73] kern/file: Implement filesystem reference counting + +The grub_file_open() and grub_file_close() should be the only places +that allow a reference to a filesystem to stay open. So, add grub_dl_t +to grub_fs_t and set this in the GRUB_MOD_INIT() for each filesystem to +avoid issues when filesystems forget to do it themselves or do not track +their own references, e.g. squash4. + +The fs_label(), fs_uuid(), fs_mtime() and fs_read() should all ref and +unref in the same function but it is essentially redundant in GRUB +single threaded model. + +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/affs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/bfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/cbfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/cpio.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/ext2.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/fat.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/hfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/iso9660.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/minix.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/newc.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/odc.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/proc.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/romfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/sfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/squash4.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/tar.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/udf.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/ufs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 1 + + grub-core/kern/file.c | 7 +++++++ + include/grub/fs.h | 4 ++++ + 30 files changed, 39 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/affs.c b/grub-core/fs/affs.c +index ed606b3..9b0afb9 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/affs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/affs.c +@@ -708,6 +708,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_affs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(affs) + { ++ grub_affs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_affs_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/bfs.c b/grub-core/fs/bfs.c +index 07cb3e3..f37b168 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/bfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/bfs.c +@@ -1104,6 +1104,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (bfs) + { + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (1 << LOG_EXTENT_SIZE == + sizeof (struct grub_bfs_extent)); ++ grub_bfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_bfs_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c +index 7e12dce..0dd9a81 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c +@@ -3260,6 +3260,7 @@ subvol_get_env (struct grub_env_var *var __attribute__ ((unused)), + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (btrfs) + { ++ grub_btrfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_btrfs_fs); + cmd_info = grub_register_command("btrfs-info", grub_cmd_btrfs_info, + "DEVICE", +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c b/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c +index 8ab7106..2332745 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c +@@ -390,6 +390,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (cbfs) + #if (defined (__i386__) || defined (__x86_64__)) && !defined (GRUB_UTIL) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_XEN) + init_cbfsdisk (); + #endif ++ grub_cbfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_cbfs_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cpio.c b/grub-core/fs/cpio.c +index dab5f98..1799f7f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/cpio.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/cpio.c +@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ read_number (const grub_uint16_t *arr, grub_size_t size) + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (cpio) + { ++ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c b/grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c +index 8465488..7bed1b8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/cpio_be.c +@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ read_number (const grub_uint16_t *arr, grub_size_t size) + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (cpio_be) + { ++ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c +index 3f9f6b2..c3058f7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c +@@ -1113,6 +1113,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_ext2_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(ext2) + { ++ grub_ext2_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_ext2_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c +index db8a65f..f6d6bea 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c +@@ -1321,6 +1321,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_f2fs_fs = { + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (f2fs) + { ++ grub_f2fs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_f2fs_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/fat.c b/grub-core/fs/fat.c +index c5efed7..6e62b91 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/fat.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/fat.c +@@ -1312,6 +1312,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(fat) + #endif + { + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (sizeof (struct grub_fat_dir_entry) == 32); ++ grub_fat_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_fat_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c +index 920112b..ce7581d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/hfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/hfs.c +@@ -1434,6 +1434,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_hfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(hfs) + { ++ grub_hfs_fs.mod = mod; + if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) + grub_fs_register (&grub_hfs_fs); + my_mod = mod; +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c +index de71fd4..3f203ab 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/hfsplus.c +@@ -1150,6 +1150,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_hfsplus_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(hfsplus) + { ++ grub_hfsplus_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_hfsplus_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c +index 8e3c95c..c73cb9c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/iso9660.c +@@ -1258,6 +1258,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_iso9660_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(iso9660) + { ++ grub_iso9660_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_iso9660_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +index 70a2f49..b0283ac 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_jfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(jfs) + { ++ grub_jfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_jfs_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/minix.c b/grub-core/fs/minix.c +index 5354951..b7679c3 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/minix.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/minix.c +@@ -732,6 +732,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(minix) + #endif + #endif + { ++ grub_minix_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_minix_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/newc.c b/grub-core/fs/newc.c +index 4fb8b2e..43b7f8b 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/newc.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/newc.c +@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ read_number (const char *str, grub_size_t size) + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (newc) + { ++ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c +index fc7374e..4e1e717 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c +@@ -1231,6 +1231,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (nilfs2) + grub_nilfs2_dat_entry)); + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (1 << LOG_INODE_SIZE + == sizeof (struct grub_nilfs2_inode)); ++ grub_nilfs2_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_nilfs2_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index 64f4f22..4e144cc 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -1537,6 +1537,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_ntfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (ntfs) + { ++ grub_ntfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_ntfs_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/odc.c b/grub-core/fs/odc.c +index 7900006..8e4e8ae 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/odc.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/odc.c +@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ read_number (const char *str, grub_size_t size) + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (odc) + { ++ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/proc.c b/grub-core/fs/proc.c +index 5f51650..bcde433 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/proc.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/proc.c +@@ -192,6 +192,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_procfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (procfs) + { ++ grub_procfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_disk_dev_register (&grub_procfs_dev); + grub_fs_register (&grub_procfs_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c +index 36b26ac..c3850e0 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c +@@ -1417,6 +1417,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_reiserfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(reiserfs) + { ++ grub_reiserfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_reiserfs_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/romfs.c b/grub-core/fs/romfs.c +index d97b8fb..a43546d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/romfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/romfs.c +@@ -475,6 +475,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_romfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(romfs) + { ++ grub_romfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_romfs_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c +index 983e880..f0d7cac 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c +@@ -782,6 +782,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_sfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(sfs) + { ++ grub_sfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_sfs_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c +index a30e6eb..6e9d638 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c +@@ -1044,6 +1044,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_squash_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(squash4) + { ++ grub_squash_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_squash_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/tar.c b/grub-core/fs/tar.c +index 386c090..fd2ec1f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/tar.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/tar.c +@@ -363,6 +363,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_cpio_fs = { + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (tar) + { ++ grub_cpio_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_cpio_fs); + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/udf.c b/grub-core/fs/udf.c +index b836e61..8765c63 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/udf.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/udf.c +@@ -1420,6 +1420,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_udf_fs = { + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (udf) + { ++ grub_udf_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_udf_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c +index 0123510..e82d935 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c +@@ -899,6 +899,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(ufs1) + #endif + #endif + { ++ grub_ufs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_ufs_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +index 3c94ed1..f030c5b 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +@@ -1227,6 +1227,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_xfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(xfs) + { ++ grub_xfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_xfs_fs); + my_mod = mod; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index b5453e0..a497b18 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -4396,6 +4396,7 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_zfs_fs = { + GRUB_MOD_INIT (zfs) + { + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (sizeof (zap_leaf_chunk_t) == ZAP_LEAF_CHUNKSIZE); ++ grub_zfs_fs.mod = mod; + grub_fs_register (&grub_zfs_fs); + #ifndef GRUB_UTIL + my_mod = mod; +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/file.c b/grub-core/kern/file.c +index e990507..6e7efe8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/file.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/file.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + void (*EXPORT_VAR (grub_grubnet_fini)) (void); + +@@ -119,6 +120,9 @@ grub_file_open (const char *name, enum grub_file_type type) + if (file->data == NULL) + goto fail; + ++ if (file->fs->mod) ++ grub_dl_ref (file->fs->mod); ++ + file->name = grub_strdup (name); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + +@@ -204,6 +208,9 @@ grub_file_read (grub_file_t file, void *buf, grub_size_t len) + grub_err_t + grub_file_close (grub_file_t file) + { ++ if (file->fs->mod) ++ grub_dl_unref (file->fs->mod); ++ + grub_dprintf ("file", "Closing `%s' ...\n", file->name); + if (file->fs->fs_close) + (file->fs->fs_close) (file); +diff --git a/include/grub/fs.h b/include/grub/fs.h +index 4c380e3..9c82061 100644 +--- a/include/grub/fs.h ++++ b/include/grub/fs.h +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + #include + /* For embedding types. */ +@@ -57,6 +58,9 @@ struct grub_fs + /* My name. */ + const char *name; + ++ /* My module */ ++ grub_dl_t mod; ++ + /* Call HOOK with each file under DIR. */ + grub_err_t (*fs_dir) (grub_device_t device, const char *path, + grub_fs_dir_hook_t hook, void *hook_data); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0024-cryptodisk-Refactor-to-discard-have_it-global.patch b/backport-0024-cryptodisk-Refactor-to-discard-have_it-global.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7bff27086e9df72c042bf78f05830302cf078ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0024-cryptodisk-Refactor-to-discard-have_it-global.patch @@ -0,0 +1,187 @@ +From 450a423b1074d0f0f4909038cb40b54ac95cd241 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 11:14:51 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 01/30] cryptodisk: Refactor to discard have_it global + +The global "have_it" was never used by the crypto-backends, but was used to +determine if a crypto-backend successfully mounted a cryptodisk with a given +UUID. This is not needed however, because grub_device_iterate() will return +1 if and only if grub_cryptodisk_scan_device() returns 1. And +grub_cryptodisk_scan_device() will now only return 1 if a search_uuid has +been specified and a cryptodisk was successfully setup by a crypto-backend or +a cryptodisk of the requested UUID is already open. + +To implement this grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real() is modified to return +a cryptodisk or NULL on failure and having the appropriate grub_errno set to +indicated failure. Note that grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real() will fail now +with a new errno GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE when none of the cryptodisk backend +modules succeed in identifying the source disk. + +With this change grub_device_iterate() will return 1 when a crypto device is +successfully decrypted or when the source device has already been successfully +opened. Prior to this change, trying to mount an already successfully opened +device would trigger an error with the message "no such cryptodisk found", +which is at best misleading. The mount should silently succeed in this case, +which is what happens with this patch. + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index 6883f48..66f5e8c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@ grub_util_cryptodisk_get_uuid (grub_disk_t disk) + + #endif + +-static int check_boot, have_it; ++static int check_boot; + static char *search_uuid; + + static void +@@ -819,7 +819,7 @@ cryptodisk_close (grub_cryptodisk_t dev) + grub_free (dev); + } + +-static grub_err_t ++static grub_cryptodisk_t + grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, grub_disk_t source) + { + grub_err_t err; +@@ -829,13 +829,13 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, grub_disk_t source) + dev = grub_cryptodisk_get_by_source_disk (source); + + if (dev) +- return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ return dev; + + FOR_CRYPTODISK_DEVS (cr) + { + dev = cr->scan (source, search_uuid, check_boot); + if (grub_errno) +- return grub_errno; ++ return NULL; + if (!dev) + continue; + +@@ -843,16 +843,16 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, grub_disk_t source) + if (err) + { + cryptodisk_close (dev); +- return err; ++ return NULL; + } + + grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, name, source); + +- have_it = 1; +- +- return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ return dev; + } +- return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "no cryptodisk module can handle this device"); ++ return NULL; + } + + #ifdef GRUB_UTIL +@@ -906,8 +906,10 @@ static int + grub_cryptodisk_scan_device (const char *name, + void *data __attribute__ ((unused))) + { +- grub_err_t err; ++ int ret = 0; + grub_disk_t source; ++ grub_cryptodisk_t dev; ++ grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + + /* Try to open disk. */ + source = grub_disk_open (name); +@@ -917,13 +919,26 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device (const char *name, + return 0; + } + +- err = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (name, source); ++ dev = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (name, source); ++ if (dev) ++ { ++ ret = (search_uuid != NULL && grub_strcasecmp (search_uuid, dev->uuid) == 0); ++ goto cleanup; ++ } + +- grub_disk_close (source); +- +- if (err) ++ /* ++ * Do not print error when err is GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE to avoid many unhelpful ++ * error messages. ++ */ ++ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE) ++ grub_error_pop (); ++ ++ if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + grub_print_error (); +- return have_it && search_uuid ? 1 : 0; ++ ++ cleanup: ++ grub_disk_close (source); ++ return ret; + } + + static grub_err_t +@@ -934,9 +949,9 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + if (argc < 1 && !state[1].set && !state[2].set) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "device name required"); + +- have_it = 0; + if (state[0].set) + { ++ int found_uuid; + grub_cryptodisk_t dev; + + dev = grub_cryptodisk_get_by_uuid (args[0]); +@@ -949,10 +964,10 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + + check_boot = state[2].set; + search_uuid = args[0]; +- grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, NULL); ++ found_uuid = grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, NULL); + search_uuid = NULL; + +- if (!have_it) ++ if (!found_uuid) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no such cryptodisk found"); + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } +@@ -966,7 +981,6 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + } + else + { +- grub_err_t err; + grub_disk_t disk; + grub_cryptodisk_t dev; + char *diskname; +@@ -1002,13 +1016,13 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +- err = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (diskname, disk); ++ dev = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (diskname, disk); + + grub_disk_close (disk); + if (disklast) + *disklast = ')'; + +- return err; ++ return (dev == NULL) ? grub_errno : GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + } + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0025-cryptodisk-Return-failure-in-cryptomount-when-no-cry.patch b/backport-0025-cryptodisk-Return-failure-in-cryptomount-when-no-cry.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..fd17a4b7d5a25b62b3557b960362a8491b811225 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0025-cryptodisk-Return-failure-in-cryptomount-when-no-cry.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From 542b8e8cb389ab411f8b5044fd3e8bcffc22d2f9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 11:14:52 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 02/30] cryptodisk: Return failure in cryptomount when no + cryptodisk modules are loaded + +This displays an error notifying the user that they'll want to load +a backend module to make cryptomount useful. + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index 66f5e8c..ea68794 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -949,6 +949,9 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + if (argc < 1 && !state[1].set && !state[2].set) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "device name required"); + ++ if (grub_cryptodisk_list == NULL) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "no cryptodisk modules loaded"); ++ + if (state[0].set) + { + int found_uuid; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0026-cryptodisk-Improve-error-messaging-in-cryptomount-in.patch b/backport-0026-cryptodisk-Improve-error-messaging-in-cryptomount-in.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a86d6b2cedd8dbf9418bde7ee392ba8e6ad383db --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0026-cryptodisk-Improve-error-messaging-in-cryptomount-in.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From 9f5be9d4e5a7192e498e5b8e9a3ed1f64c065e63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 11:14:53 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 03/30] cryptodisk: Improve error messaging in cryptomount + invocations + +Update such that "cryptomount -u UUID" will not print two error messages +when an invalid passphrase is given and the most relevant error message +will be displayed. + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index ea68794..770f51e 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -933,7 +933,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device (const char *name, + if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE) + grub_error_pop (); + +- if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ if (search_uuid != NULL) ++ /* Push error onto stack to save for cryptomount. */ ++ grub_error_push (); ++ else + grub_print_error (); + + cleanup: +@@ -970,9 +973,19 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + found_uuid = grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, NULL); + search_uuid = NULL; + +- if (!found_uuid) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no such cryptodisk found"); +- return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ if (found_uuid) ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ else if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ { ++ /* ++ * Try to pop the next error on the stack. If there is not one, then ++ * no device matched the given UUID. ++ */ ++ grub_error_pop (); ++ if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no such cryptodisk found"); ++ } ++ return grub_errno; + } + else if (state[1].set || (argc == 0 && state[2].set)) + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0027-cryptodisk-Improve-cryptomount-u-error-message.patch b/backport-0027-cryptodisk-Improve-cryptomount-u-error-message.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..967b12ac951613e41134c1002f0854d946d2b19e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0027-cryptodisk-Improve-cryptomount-u-error-message.patch @@ -0,0 +1,31 @@ +From e499cd344a68a1e3491492f0b0ac17a4e9c21eaf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 11:14:54 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 04/30] cryptodisk: Improve cryptomount -u error message + +When a cryptmount is specified with a UUID, but no cryptodisk backends find +a disk with that UUID, return a more detailed message giving telling the +user that they might not have a needed cryptobackend module loaded. + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index 770f51e..8dd0817 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -983,7 +983,7 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + */ + grub_error_pop (); + if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_NONE) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no such cryptodisk found"); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no such cryptodisk found, perhaps a needed disk or cryptodisk module is not loaded"); + } + return grub_errno; + } +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0028-cryptodisk-Add-infrastructure-to-pass-data-from-cryp.patch b/backport-0028-cryptodisk-Add-infrastructure-to-pass-data-from-cryp.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..acb98334318e2bb10c51abf95aa89ea4ca79332e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0028-cryptodisk-Add-infrastructure-to-pass-data-from-cryp.patch @@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +From 1fc707bb9d86981efbb54d71bc0016a11fa61c42 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 11:14:55 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 05/30] cryptodisk: Add infrastructure to pass data from + cryptomount to cryptodisk modules + +Previously, the cryptomount arguments were passed by global variable and +function call argument, neither of which are ideal. This change passes data +via a grub_cryptomount_args struct, which can be added to over time as +opposed to continually adding arguments to the cryptodisk scan and +recover_key. + +As an example, passing a password as a cryptomount argument is implemented. +However, the backends are not implemented, so testing this will return a not +implemented error. + +Also, add comments to cryptomount argument parsing to make it more obvious +which argument states are being handled. + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++---------- + grub-core/disk/geli.c | 6 +++++- + grub-core/disk/luks.c | 7 ++++++- + include/grub/cryptodisk.h | 9 ++++++++- + 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index 8dd0817..f01b027 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static const struct grub_arg_option options[] = + /* TRANSLATORS: It's still restricted to cryptodisks only. */ + {"all", 'a', 0, N_("Mount all."), 0, 0}, + {"boot", 'b', 0, N_("Mount all volumes with `boot' flag set."), 0, 0}, ++ {"password", 'p', 0, N_("Password to open volumes."), 0, ARG_TYPE_STRING}, + {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} + }; + +@@ -820,7 +821,9 @@ cryptodisk_close (grub_cryptodisk_t dev) + } + + static grub_cryptodisk_t +-grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, grub_disk_t source) ++grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, ++ grub_disk_t source, ++ grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs) + { + grub_err_t err; + grub_cryptodisk_t dev; +@@ -839,7 +842,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, grub_disk_t source) + if (!dev) + continue; + +- err = cr->recover_key (source, dev); ++ err = cr->recover_key (source, dev, cargs); + if (err) + { + cryptodisk_close (dev); +@@ -904,11 +907,12 @@ grub_cryptodisk_cheat_mount (const char *sourcedev, const char *cheat) + + static int + grub_cryptodisk_scan_device (const char *name, +- void *data __attribute__ ((unused))) ++ void *data) + { + int ret = 0; + grub_disk_t source; + grub_cryptodisk_t dev; ++ grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs = data; + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + + /* Try to open disk. */ +@@ -919,7 +923,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device (const char *name, + return 0; + } + +- dev = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (name, source); ++ dev = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (name, source, cargs); + if (dev) + { + ret = (search_uuid != NULL && grub_strcasecmp (search_uuid, dev->uuid) == 0); +@@ -948,6 +952,7 @@ static grub_err_t + grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + { + struct grub_arg_list *state = ctxt->state; ++ struct grub_cryptomount_args cargs = {0}; + + if (argc < 1 && !state[1].set && !state[2].set) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "device name required"); +@@ -955,7 +960,13 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + if (grub_cryptodisk_list == NULL) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "no cryptodisk modules loaded"); + +- if (state[0].set) ++ if (state[3].set) /* password */ ++ { ++ cargs.key_data = (grub_uint8_t *) state[3].arg; ++ cargs.key_len = grub_strlen (state[3].arg); ++ } ++ ++ if (state[0].set) /* uuid */ + { + int found_uuid; + grub_cryptodisk_t dev; +@@ -970,7 +981,7 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + + check_boot = state[2].set; + search_uuid = args[0]; +- found_uuid = grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, NULL); ++ found_uuid = grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, &cargs); + search_uuid = NULL; + + if (found_uuid) +@@ -987,11 +998,11 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + } + return grub_errno; + } +- else if (state[1].set || (argc == 0 && state[2].set)) ++ else if (state[1].set || (argc == 0 && state[2].set)) /* -a|-b */ + { + search_uuid = NULL; + check_boot = state[2].set; +- grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, NULL); ++ grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, &cargs); + search_uuid = NULL; + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } +@@ -1032,7 +1043,7 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +- dev = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (diskname, disk); ++ dev = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (diskname, disk, &cargs); + + grub_disk_close (disk); + if (disklast) +@@ -1171,7 +1182,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (cryptodisk) + { + grub_disk_dev_register (&grub_cryptodisk_dev); + cmd = grub_register_extcmd ("cryptomount", grub_cmd_cryptomount, 0, +- N_("SOURCE|-u UUID|-a|-b"), ++ N_("[-p password] "), + N_("Mount a crypto device."), options); + grub_procfs_register ("luks_script", &luks_script); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/geli.c b/grub-core/disk/geli.c +index e9d2329..48d9be9 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/geli.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/geli.c +@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, + } + + static grub_err_t +-recover_key (grub_disk_t source, grub_cryptodisk_t dev) ++recover_key (grub_disk_t source, grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs) + { + grub_size_t keysize; + grub_uint8_t digest[GRUB_CRYPTO_MAX_MDLEN]; +@@ -414,6 +414,10 @@ recover_key (grub_disk_t source, grub_cryptodisk_t dev) + grub_disk_addr_t sector; + grub_err_t err; + ++ /* Keyfiles are not implemented yet */ ++ if (cargs->key_data != NULL || cargs->key_len) ++ return GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET; ++ + if (dev->cipher->cipher->blocksize > GRUB_CRYPTO_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "cipher block is too long"); + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/luks.c b/grub-core/disk/luks.c +index 18b3a8b..86bf951 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/luks.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/luks.c +@@ -309,7 +309,8 @@ configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, + + static grub_err_t + luks_recover_key (grub_disk_t source, +- grub_cryptodisk_t dev) ++ grub_cryptodisk_t dev, ++ grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs) + { + struct grub_luks_phdr header; + grub_size_t keysize; +@@ -322,6 +323,10 @@ luks_recover_key (grub_disk_t source, + grub_size_t max_stripes = 1; + char *tmp; + ++ /* Keyfiles are not implemented yet */ ++ if (cargs->key_data != NULL || cargs->key_len) ++ return GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET; ++ + err = grub_disk_read (source, 0, 0, sizeof (header), &header); + if (err) + return err; +diff --git a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h +index 32f564a..a41b426 100644 +--- a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h ++++ b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h +@@ -60,6 +60,13 @@ typedef gcry_err_code_t + (*grub_cryptodisk_rekey_func_t) (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev, + grub_uint64_t zoneno); + ++struct grub_cryptomount_args ++{ ++ grub_uint8_t *key_data; ++ grub_size_t key_len; ++}; ++typedef struct grub_cryptomount_args *grub_cryptomount_args_t; ++ + struct grub_cryptodisk + { + struct grub_cryptodisk *next; +@@ -108,7 +115,7 @@ struct grub_cryptodisk_dev + + grub_cryptodisk_t (*scan) (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, + int boot_only); +- grub_err_t (*recover_key) (grub_disk_t disk, grub_cryptodisk_t dev); ++ grub_err_t (*recover_key) (grub_disk_t disk, grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs); + }; + typedef struct grub_cryptodisk_dev *grub_cryptodisk_dev_t; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0029-cryptodisk-Refactor-password-input-out-of-crypto-dev.patch b/backport-0029-cryptodisk-Refactor-password-input-out-of-crypto-dev.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..60ba6eca40ae26651fa09598abe5a9bb55afefe8 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0029-cryptodisk-Refactor-password-input-out-of-crypto-dev.patch @@ -0,0 +1,270 @@ +From 964793a17bfecdb4bfa1e766e6880337c02dcd2c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 11:14:56 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 06/30] cryptodisk: Refactor password input out of crypto dev + modules into cryptodisk + +The crypto device modules should only be setting up the crypto devices and +not getting user input. This has the added benefit of simplifying the code +such that three essentially duplicate pieces of code are merged into one. + +Add documentation of passphrase option for cryptomount as it is now usable. + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + docs/grub.texi | 8 ++++-- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------- + grub-core/disk/geli.c | 26 ++++------------- + grub-core/disk/luks.c | 27 +++--------------- + include/grub/cryptodisk.h | 1 + + 5 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 58 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi +index 2b12b2c..44fd6dc 100644 +--- a/docs/grub.texi ++++ b/docs/grub.texi +@@ -4253,9 +4253,11 @@ Alias for @code{hashsum --hash crc32 arg @dots{}}. See command @command{hashsum} + @node cryptomount + @subsection cryptomount + +-@deffn Command cryptomount device|@option{-u} uuid|@option{-a}|@option{-b} +-Setup access to encrypted device. If necessary, passphrase +-is requested interactively. Option @var{device} configures specific grub device ++@deffn Command cryptomount [@option{-p} password] device|@option{-u} uuid|@option{-a}|@option{-b} ++Setup access to encrypted device. If @option{-p} is not given, a passphrase ++is requested interactively. Otherwise, the given @var{password} will be used and ++no passphrase will be requested interactively. ++Option @var{device} configures specific grub device + (@pxref{Naming convention}); option @option{-u} @var{uuid} configures device + with specified @var{uuid}; option @option{-a} configures all detected encrypted + devices; option @option{-b} configures all geli containers that have boot flag set. +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index f01b027..3b2ded1 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -825,9 +825,11 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, + grub_disk_t source, + grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs) + { +- grub_err_t err; ++ grub_err_t ret = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + grub_cryptodisk_t dev; + grub_cryptodisk_dev_t cr; ++ int askpass = 0; ++ char *part = NULL; + + dev = grub_cryptodisk_get_by_source_disk (source); + +@@ -841,21 +843,53 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, + return NULL; + if (!dev) + continue; +- +- err = cr->recover_key (source, dev, cargs); +- if (err) +- { +- cryptodisk_close (dev); +- return NULL; +- } ++ ++ if (!cargs->key_len) ++ { ++ /* Get the passphrase from the user, if no key data. */ ++ askpass = 1; ++ if (source->partition != NULL) ++ part = grub_partition_get_name (source->partition); ++ grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s (%s): "), source->name, ++ source->partition != NULL ? "," : "", ++ part != NULL ? part : "", ++ dev->uuid); ++ grub_free (part); ++ ++ cargs->key_data = grub_malloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE); ++ if (cargs->key_data == NULL) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ if (!grub_password_get ((char *) cargs->key_data, GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "passphrase not supplied"); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ cargs->key_len = grub_strlen ((char *) cargs->key_data); ++ } ++ ++ ret = cr->recover_key (source, dev, cargs); ++ if (ret != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ goto error; + + grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, name, source); + +- return dev; ++ goto cleanup; + } +- + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "no cryptodisk module can handle this device"); +- return NULL; ++ goto cleanup; ++ ++ error: ++ cryptodisk_close (dev); ++ dev = NULL; ++ ++ cleanup: ++ if (askpass) ++ { ++ cargs->key_len = 0; ++ grub_free (cargs->key_data); ++ } ++ return dev; + } + + #ifdef GRUB_UTIL +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/geli.c b/grub-core/disk/geli.c +index 48d9be9..248c42a 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/geli.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/geli.c +@@ -135,8 +135,6 @@ const char *algorithms[] = { + [0x16] = "aes" + }; + +-#define MAX_PASSPHRASE 256 +- + static gcry_err_code_t + geli_rekey (struct grub_cryptodisk *dev, grub_uint64_t zoneno) + { +@@ -406,17 +404,14 @@ recover_key (grub_disk_t source, grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_cryptomount_args_t + grub_uint8_t verify_key[GRUB_CRYPTO_MAX_MDLEN]; + grub_uint8_t zero[GRUB_CRYPTO_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE]; + grub_uint8_t geli_cipher_key[64]; +- char passphrase[MAX_PASSPHRASE] = ""; + unsigned i; + gcry_err_code_t gcry_err; + struct grub_geli_phdr header; +- char *tmp; + grub_disk_addr_t sector; + grub_err_t err; + +- /* Keyfiles are not implemented yet */ +- if (cargs->key_data != NULL || cargs->key_len) +- return GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET; ++ if (cargs->key_data == NULL || cargs->key_len == 0) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no key data"); + + if (dev->cipher->cipher->blocksize > GRUB_CRYPTO_MAX_CIPHER_BLOCKSIZE) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "cipher block is too long"); +@@ -438,23 +433,12 @@ recover_key (grub_disk_t source, grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_cryptomount_args_t + + grub_puts_ (N_("Attempting to decrypt master key...")); + +- /* Get the passphrase from the user. */ +- tmp = NULL; +- if (source->partition) +- tmp = grub_partition_get_name (source->partition); +- grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s (%s): "), source->name, +- source->partition ? "," : "", tmp ? : "", +- dev->uuid); +- grub_free (tmp); +- if (!grub_password_get (passphrase, MAX_PASSPHRASE)) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "Passphrase not supplied"); +- + /* Calculate the PBKDF2 of the user supplied passphrase. */ + if (grub_le_to_cpu32 (header.niter) != 0) + { + grub_uint8_t pbkdf_key[64]; +- gcry_err = grub_crypto_pbkdf2 (dev->hash, (grub_uint8_t *) passphrase, +- grub_strlen (passphrase), ++ gcry_err = grub_crypto_pbkdf2 (dev->hash, cargs->key_data, ++ cargs->key_len, + header.salt, + sizeof (header.salt), + grub_le_to_cpu32 (header.niter), +@@ -477,7 +461,7 @@ recover_key (grub_disk_t source, grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_cryptomount_args_t + return grub_crypto_gcry_error (GPG_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY); + + grub_crypto_hmac_write (hnd, header.salt, sizeof (header.salt)); +- grub_crypto_hmac_write (hnd, passphrase, grub_strlen (passphrase)); ++ grub_crypto_hmac_write (hnd, cargs->key_data, cargs->key_len); + + gcry_err = grub_crypto_hmac_fini (hnd, geomkey); + if (gcry_err) +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/luks.c b/grub-core/disk/luks.c +index 86bf951..8b39f52 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/luks.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/luks.c +@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@ + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +-#define MAX_PASSPHRASE 256 +- + #define LUKS_KEY_ENABLED 0x00AC71F3 + + /* On disk LUKS header */ +@@ -315,17 +313,14 @@ luks_recover_key (grub_disk_t source, + struct grub_luks_phdr header; + grub_size_t keysize; + grub_uint8_t *split_key = NULL; +- char passphrase[MAX_PASSPHRASE] = ""; + grub_uint8_t candidate_digest[sizeof (header.mkDigest)]; + unsigned i; + grub_size_t length; + grub_err_t err; + grub_size_t max_stripes = 1; +- char *tmp; + +- /* Keyfiles are not implemented yet */ +- if (cargs->key_data != NULL || cargs->key_len) +- return GRUB_ERR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED_YET; ++ if (cargs->key_data == NULL || cargs->key_len == 0) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "no key data"); + + err = grub_disk_read (source, 0, 0, sizeof (header), &header); + if (err) +@@ -345,20 +340,6 @@ luks_recover_key (grub_disk_t source, + if (!split_key) + return grub_errno; + +- /* Get the passphrase from the user. */ +- tmp = NULL; +- if (source->partition) +- tmp = grub_partition_get_name (source->partition); +- grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s (%s): "), source->name, +- source->partition ? "," : "", tmp ? : "", +- dev->uuid); +- grub_free (tmp); +- if (!grub_password_get (passphrase, MAX_PASSPHRASE)) +- { +- grub_free (split_key); +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "Passphrase not supplied"); +- } +- + /* Try to recover master key from each active keyslot. */ + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE (header.keyblock); i++) + { +@@ -373,8 +354,8 @@ luks_recover_key (grub_disk_t source, + grub_dprintf ("luks", "Trying keyslot %d\n", i); + + /* Calculate the PBKDF2 of the user supplied passphrase. */ +- gcry_err = grub_crypto_pbkdf2 (dev->hash, (grub_uint8_t *) passphrase, +- grub_strlen (passphrase), ++ gcry_err = grub_crypto_pbkdf2 (dev->hash, cargs->key_data, ++ cargs->key_len, + header.keyblock[i].passwordSalt, + sizeof (header.keyblock[i].passwordSalt), + grub_be_to_cpu32 (header.keyblock[i]. +diff --git a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h +index a41b426..55d5c26 100644 +--- a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h ++++ b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h +@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@ typedef enum + #define GRUB_CRYPTODISK_GF_LOG_BYTES (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_GF_LOG_SIZE - 3) + #define GRUB_CRYPTODISK_GF_BYTES (1U << GRUB_CRYPTODISK_GF_LOG_BYTES) + #define GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_KEYLEN 128 ++#define GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE 256 + + struct grub_cryptodisk; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0030-cryptodisk-Move-global-variables-into-grub_cryptomou.patch b/backport-0030-cryptodisk-Move-global-variables-into-grub_cryptomou.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4c59cfaaf256e8d53f7c812a6587b645d43f6bb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0030-cryptodisk-Move-global-variables-into-grub_cryptomou.patch @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +From 4fcf56249bd68eeb0ba2ad722dcfded0045de688 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 11:14:57 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 07/30] cryptodisk: Move global variables into + grub_cryptomount_args struct + +Note that cargs.search_uuid does not need to be initialized in various parts +of the cryptomount argument parsing, just once when cargs is declared with +a struct initializer. The previous code used a global variable which would +retain the value across cryptomount invocations. + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 24 +++++++++--------------- + grub-core/disk/geli.c | 9 ++++----- + grub-core/disk/luks.c | 9 ++++----- + include/grub/cryptodisk.h | 9 +++++++-- + 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index d12368a..7ca8804 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -984,9 +984,6 @@ grub_util_cryptodisk_get_uuid (grub_disk_t disk) + + #endif + +-static int check_boot; +-static char *search_uuid; +- + static void + cryptodisk_close (grub_cryptodisk_t dev) + { +@@ -1014,7 +1011,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, + + FOR_CRYPTODISK_DEVS (cr) + { +- dev = cr->scan (source, search_uuid, check_boot); ++ dev = cr->scan (source, cargs); + if (grub_errno) + return NULL; + if (!dev) +@@ -1077,6 +1074,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_cheat_mount (const char *sourcedev, const char *cheat) + grub_cryptodisk_t dev; + grub_cryptodisk_dev_t cr; + grub_disk_t source; ++ struct grub_cryptomount_args cargs = {0}; + + /* Try to open disk. */ + source = grub_disk_open (sourcedev); +@@ -1093,7 +1091,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_cheat_mount (const char *sourcedev, const char *cheat) + + FOR_CRYPTODISK_DEVS (cr) + { +- dev = cr->scan (source, search_uuid, check_boot); ++ dev = cr->scan (source, &cargs); + if (grub_errno) + return grub_errno; + if (!dev) +@@ -1136,7 +1134,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device (const char *name, + dev = grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (name, source, cargs); + if (dev) + { +- ret = (search_uuid != NULL && grub_strcasecmp (search_uuid, dev->uuid) == 0); ++ ret = (cargs->search_uuid != NULL && grub_strcasecmp (cargs->search_uuid, dev->uuid) == 0); + goto cleanup; + } + +@@ -1147,7 +1145,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device (const char *name, + if (grub_errno == GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE) + grub_error_pop (); + +- if (search_uuid != NULL) ++ if (cargs->search_uuid != NULL) + /* Push error onto stack to save for cryptomount. */ + grub_error_push (); + else +@@ -1189,10 +1187,9 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +- check_boot = state[2].set; +- search_uuid = args[0]; ++ cargs.check_boot = state[2].set; ++ cargs.search_uuid = args[0]; + found_uuid = grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, &cargs); +- search_uuid = NULL; + + if (found_uuid) + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; +@@ -1210,10 +1207,8 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + } + else if (state[1].set || (argc == 0 && state[2].set)) /* -a|-b */ + { +- search_uuid = NULL; +- check_boot = state[2].set; ++ cargs.check_boot = state[2].set; + grub_device_iterate (&grub_cryptodisk_scan_device, &cargs); +- search_uuid = NULL; + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + else +@@ -1224,8 +1219,7 @@ grub_cmd_cryptomount (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + char *disklast = NULL; + grub_size_t len; + +- search_uuid = NULL; +- check_boot = state[2].set; ++ cargs.check_boot = state[2].set; + diskname = args[0]; + len = grub_strlen (diskname); + if (len && diskname[0] == '(' && diskname[len - 1] == ')') +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/geli.c b/grub-core/disk/geli.c +index 7299a47..23789c4 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/geli.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/geli.c +@@ -240,8 +240,7 @@ grub_util_get_geli_uuid (const char *dev) + #endif + + static grub_cryptodisk_t +-configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, +- int boot_only) ++configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs) + { + grub_cryptodisk_t newdev; + struct grub_geli_phdr header; +@@ -289,7 +288,7 @@ configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, + return NULL; + } + +- if (boot_only && !(grub_le_to_cpu32 (header.flags) & GRUB_GELI_FLAGS_BOOT)) ++ if (cargs->check_boot && !(grub_le_to_cpu32 (header.flags) & GRUB_GELI_FLAGS_BOOT)) + { + grub_dprintf ("geli", "not a boot volume\n"); + return NULL; +@@ -302,9 +301,9 @@ configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, + return NULL; + } + +- if (check_uuid && grub_strcasecmp (check_uuid, uuid) != 0) ++ if (cargs->search_uuid != NULL && grub_strcasecmp (cargs->search_uuid, uuid) != 0) + { +- grub_dprintf ("geli", "%s != %s\n", uuid, check_uuid); ++ grub_dprintf ("geli", "%s != %s\n", uuid, cargs->search_uuid); + return NULL; + } + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/luks.c b/grub-core/disk/luks.c +index 39a7af6..f0feb38 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/luks.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/luks.c +@@ -63,8 +63,7 @@ gcry_err_code_t AF_merge (const gcry_md_spec_t * hash, grub_uint8_t * src, + grub_size_t blocknumbers); + + static grub_cryptodisk_t +-configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, +- int check_boot) ++configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs) + { + grub_cryptodisk_t newdev; + const char *iptr; +@@ -76,7 +75,7 @@ configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, + char hashspec[sizeof (header.hashSpec) + 1]; + grub_err_t err; + +- if (check_boot) ++ if (cargs->check_boot) + return NULL; + + /* Read the LUKS header. */ +@@ -103,9 +102,9 @@ configure_ciphers (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, + } + *optr = 0; + +- if (check_uuid && grub_strcasecmp (check_uuid, uuid) != 0) ++ if (cargs->search_uuid != NULL && grub_strcasecmp (cargs->search_uuid, uuid) != 0) + { +- grub_dprintf ("luks", "%s != %s\n", uuid, check_uuid); ++ grub_dprintf ("luks", "%s != %s\n", uuid, cargs->search_uuid); + return NULL; + } + +diff --git a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h +index 5bd9706..c6524c9 100644 +--- a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h ++++ b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h +@@ -69,7 +69,13 @@ typedef gcry_err_code_t + + struct grub_cryptomount_args + { ++ /* scan: Flag to indicate that only bootable volumes should be decrypted */ ++ grub_uint32_t check_boot : 1; ++ /* scan: Only volumes matching this UUID should be decrpyted */ ++ char *search_uuid; ++ /* recover_key: Key data used to decrypt voume */ + grub_uint8_t *key_data; ++ /* recover_key: Length of key_data */ + grub_size_t key_len; + }; + typedef struct grub_cryptomount_args *grub_cryptomount_args_t; +@@ -125,8 +131,7 @@ struct grub_cryptodisk_dev + struct grub_cryptodisk_dev *next; + struct grub_cryptodisk_dev **prev; + +- grub_cryptodisk_t (*scan) (grub_disk_t disk, const char *check_uuid, +- int boot_only); ++ grub_cryptodisk_t (*scan) (grub_disk_t disk, grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs); + grub_err_t (*recover_key) (grub_disk_t disk, grub_cryptodisk_t dev, grub_cryptomount_args_t cargs); + }; + typedef struct grub_cryptodisk_dev *grub_cryptodisk_dev_t; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0031-cryptodisk-Improve-handling-of-partition-name-in-cry.patch b/backport-0031-cryptodisk-Improve-handling-of-partition-name-in-cry.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0a99535cbec4fc8e1323f917a35d88b4f8bae800 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0031-cryptodisk-Improve-handling-of-partition-name-in-cry.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From ea9aa4d566591710b3eae8f0ce286b1040424e5f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Thu, 9 Dec 2021 11:14:58 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 08/30] cryptodisk: Improve handling of partition name in + cryptomount password prompt + +Call grub_partition_get_name() unconditionally to initialize the part +variable. Then part will only be NULL when grub_partition_get_name() errors. +Note that when source->partition is NULL, then grub_partition_get_name() +returns an allocated empty string. So no comma or partition will be printed, +as desired. + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 5 ++--- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index 6613b27..9a69e24 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -845,11 +845,10 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, + { + /* Get the passphrase from the user, if no key data. */ + askpass = 1; +- if (source->partition != NULL) +- part = grub_partition_get_name (source->partition); ++ part = grub_partition_get_name (source->partition); + grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s (%s): "), source->name, + source->partition != NULL ? "," : "", +- part != NULL ? part : "", ++ part != NULL ? part : N_("UNKNOWN"), + dev->uuid); + grub_free (part); + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0032-cryptodisk-Fix-Coverity-use-after-free-bug.patch b/backport-0032-cryptodisk-Fix-Coverity-use-after-free-bug.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..428440013a6c48d7871fc586a776f5deccd975f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0032-cryptodisk-Fix-Coverity-use-after-free-bug.patch @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +From 155b53904177961d3d44032c87c0eb4b288d2271 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Glenn Washburn +Date: Sat, 1 Jan 2022 15:48:25 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH 09/30] cryptodisk: Fix Coverity use after free bug + +The Coverity output is: + + *** CID 366905: Memory - illegal accesses (USE_AFTER_FREE) + /grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c: 1064 in grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real() + 1058 cleanup: + 1059 if (askpass) + 1060 { + 1061 cargs->key_len = 0; + 1062 grub_free (cargs->key_data); + 1063 } + >>> CID 366905: Memory - illegal accesses (USE_AFTER_FREE) + >>> Using freed pointer "dev". + 1064 return dev; + 1065 } + 1066 + 1067 #ifdef GRUB_UTIL + 1068 #include + 1069 grub_err_t + +Here the "dev" variable can point to a freed cryptodisk device if the +function grub_cryptodisk_insert() fails. This can happen only on a OOM +condition, but when this happens grub_cryptodisk_insert() calls grub_free on +the passed device. Since grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real() assumes that +grub_cryptodisk_insert() is always successful, it will return the device, +though the device was freed. + +Change grub_cryptodisk_insert() to not free the passed device on failure. +Then on grub_cryptodisk_insert() failure, free the device pointer. This is +done by going to the label "error", which will call cryptodisk_close() to +free the device and set the device pointer to NULL, so that a pointer to +freed memory is not returned. + +Fixes: CID 366905 + +Signed-off-by: Glenn Washburn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 9 ++++----- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index 9a69e24..b8a43a8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -713,10 +713,7 @@ grub_cryptodisk_insert (grub_cryptodisk_t newdev, const char *name, + { + newdev->source = grub_strdup (name); + if (!newdev->source) +- { +- grub_free (newdev); +- return grub_errno; +- } ++ return grub_errno; + + newdev->id = last_cryptodisk_id++; + newdev->source_id = source->id; +@@ -868,7 +865,9 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, + if (ret != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; + +- grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, name, source); ++ ret = grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, name, source); ++ if (ret != GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ goto error; + + goto cleanup; + } +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0033-disk-cryptodisk-Require-authentication-after-TPM-unl.patch b/backport-0033-disk-cryptodisk-Require-authentication-after-TPM-unl.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..96b6280a7208532a7aa1e114956b36dfae7a6dd2 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0033-disk-cryptodisk-Require-authentication-after-TPM-unl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +From d88f6f068ba813ebb3c62bdc7f3a8367ec13a1a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Chang +Date: Thu, 29 Aug 2024 13:27:30 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 23/73] disk/cryptodisk: Require authentication after TPM unlock for + CLI access + +The GRUB may use TPM to verify the integrity of boot components and the +result can determine whether a previously sealed key can be released. If +everything checks out, showing nothing has been tampered with, the key +is released and GRUB unlocks the encrypted root partition for the next +stage of booting. + +However, the liberal Command Line Interface (CLI) can be misused by +anyone in this case to access files in the encrypted partition one way +or another. Despite efforts to keep the CLI secure by preventing utility +command output from leaking file content, many techniques in the wild +could still be used to exploit the CLI, enabling attacks or learning +methods to attack. It's nearly impossible to account for all scenarios +where a hack could be applied. + +Therefore, to mitigate potential misuse of the CLI after the root device +has been successfully unlocked via TPM, the user should be required to +authenticate using the LUKS password. This added layer of security +ensures that only authorized users can access the CLI reducing the risk +of exploitation or unauthorized access to the encrypted partition. + +Fixes: CVE-2024-49504 + +Signed-off-by: Michael Chang +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + docs/grub.texi | 29 ++++++++++++ + grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c | 87 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + grub-core/kern/main.c | 13 ++++++ + grub-core/normal/auth.c | 30 ++++++++++++ + grub-core/normal/main.c | 4 ++ + grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c | 4 ++ + include/grub/auth.h | 1 + + include/grub/cryptodisk.h | 4 ++ + include/grub/misc.h | 10 ++++ + 9 files changed, 181 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/docs/grub.texi b/docs/grub.texi +index f5de76e..ed77eb8 100644 +--- a/docs/grub.texi ++++ b/docs/grub.texi +@@ -6296,6 +6296,35 @@ sign-file SHA256 grub.key certificate.der core.elf.unsigned core.elf.signed + As with UEFI secure boot, it is necessary to build in the required modules, + or sign them separately. + ++@subsection Command line and menuentry editor protection ++ ++The TPM key protector provides full disk encryption support on servers or ++virtual machine images, meanwhile keeping the boot process unattended. This ++prevents service disruptions by eliminating the need for manual password input ++during startup, improving system uptime and continuity. It is achieved by TPM, ++which verifies the integrity of boot components by checking cryptographic ++hashes against securely stored values, to confirm the disks are unlocked in a ++trusted state. ++ ++However, for users to access the system interactively, some form of ++authentication is still required, as the disks are not unlocked by an ++authorized user. This raised concerns about using an unprotected ++@samp{command-line interface} (@pxref{Command-line interface}), as anyone could ++execute commands to access decrypted data. To address this issue, the LUKS ++password is used to ensure that only authorized users are granted access to the ++interface. Additionally, the @samp{menu entry editor} (@pxref{Menu entry ++editor}) is also safeguarded by the LUKS password, as modifying a boot entry is ++effectively the same as altering the @file{grub.cfg} file read from encrypted ++files. ++ ++It is worth mentioning that the built-in password support, as described in ++@samp{Authentication and Authorization in GRUB} (@pxref{Authentication and ++authorisation}), can also be used to protect the command-line interface from ++unauthorized access. However, it is not recommended to rely on this approach as ++it is an optional step. Setting it up requires additional manual intervention, ++which increases the risk of password leakage during the process. Moreover, the ++superuser list must be well maintained, and the password used cannot be ++synchronized with LUKS key rotation. + + @node Platform limitations + @chapter Platform limitations +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +index e7c4795..493ee90 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/cryptodisk.c +@@ -1044,7 +1044,9 @@ grub_cryptodisk_scan_device_real (const char *name, + ret = grub_cryptodisk_insert (dev, name, source); + if (ret != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + goto error; +- ++#ifndef GRUB_UTIL ++ grub_cli_set_auth_needed (); ++#endif + goto cleanup; + } + grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "no cryptodisk module can handle this device"); +@@ -1372,6 +1374,89 @@ luks_script_get (grub_size_t *sz) + return ret; + } + ++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI ++grub_err_t ++grub_cryptodisk_challenge_password (void) ++{ ++ grub_cryptodisk_t cr_dev; ++ ++ for (cr_dev = cryptodisk_list; cr_dev != NULL; cr_dev = cr_dev->next) ++ { ++ grub_cryptodisk_dev_t cr; ++ grub_disk_t source = NULL; ++ grub_err_t ret = GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ grub_cryptodisk_t dev = NULL; ++ char *part = NULL; ++ struct grub_cryptomount_args cargs = {0}; ++ ++ cargs.check_boot = 0; ++ cargs.search_uuid = cr_dev->uuid; ++ ++ source = grub_disk_open (cr_dev->source); ++ ++ if (source == NULL) ++ { ++ ret = grub_errno; ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ ++ FOR_CRYPTODISK_DEVS (cr) ++ { ++ dev = cr->scan (source, &cargs); ++ if (grub_errno) ++ { ++ ret = grub_errno; ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ if (dev == NULL) ++ continue; ++ break; ++ } ++ ++ if (dev == NULL) ++ { ++ ret = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_MODULE, "no cryptodisk module can handle this device"); ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ ++ part = grub_partition_get_name (source->partition); ++ grub_printf_ (N_("Enter passphrase for %s%s%s (%s): "), source->name, ++ source->partition != NULL ? "," : "", ++ part != NULL ? part : N_("UNKNOWN"), cr_dev->uuid); ++ grub_free (part); ++ ++ cargs.key_data = grub_malloc (GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE); ++ if (cargs.key_data == NULL) ++ { ++ ret = grub_errno; ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ ++ if (!grub_password_get ((char *) cargs.key_data, GRUB_CRYPTODISK_MAX_PASSPHRASE)) ++ { ++ ret = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, "passphrase not supplied"); ++ goto error_out; ++ } ++ cargs.key_len = grub_strlen ((char *) cargs.key_data); ++ ret = cr->recover_key (source, dev, &cargs); ++ ++ error_out: ++ grub_disk_close (source); ++ if (dev != NULL) ++ cryptodisk_close (dev); ++ if (cargs.key_data) ++ { ++ grub_memset (cargs.key_data, 0, cargs.key_len); ++ grub_free (cargs.key_data); ++ } ++ ++ return ret; ++ } ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++} ++#endif /* GRUB_MACHINE_EFI */ ++ + struct grub_procfs_entry luks_script = + { + .name = "luks_script", +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/main.c b/grub-core/kern/main.c +index 3fc3401..92d144c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/main.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/main.c +@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@ + #include + #endif + ++static bool cli_need_auth = false; ++ + grub_addr_t + grub_modules_get_end (void) + { +@@ -284,6 +286,17 @@ grub_load_normal_mode (void) + grub_command_execute ("normal", 0, 0); + } + ++bool ++grub_is_cli_need_auth (void) ++{ ++ return cli_need_auth; ++} ++ ++void grub_cli_set_auth_needed (void) ++{ ++ cli_need_auth = true; ++} ++ + static void + reclaim_module_space (void) + { +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/auth.c b/grub-core/normal/auth.c +index 6be678c..7d83d41 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/auth.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/auth.c +@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@ + #include + #include + ++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI ++#include ++#endif ++ + struct grub_auth_user + { + struct grub_auth_user *next; +@@ -200,6 +204,32 @@ grub_username_get (char buf[], unsigned buf_size) + return (key != GRUB_TERM_ESC); + } + ++grub_err_t ++grub_auth_check_cli_access (void) ++{ ++ if (grub_is_cli_need_auth () == true) ++ { ++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI ++ static bool authenticated = false; ++ ++ if (authenticated == false) ++ { ++ grub_err_t ret; ++ ++ ret = grub_cryptodisk_challenge_password (); ++ if (ret == GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ authenticated = true; ++ return ret; ++ } ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++#else ++ return GRUB_ACCESS_DENIED; ++#endif ++ } ++ ++ return GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++} ++ + grub_err_t + grub_auth_check_authentication (const char *userlist) + { +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/main.c b/grub-core/normal/main.c +index d7a6b79..e768ee7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/main.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/main.c +@@ -552,9 +552,13 @@ grub_cmdline_run (int nested, int force_auth) + } + while (err && force_auth); + ++ if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ err = grub_auth_check_cli_access (); ++ + if (err) + { + grub_print_error (); ++ grub_wait_after_message (); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + return; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c b/grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c +index 50eef91..150a800 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/menu_entry.c +@@ -1255,9 +1255,13 @@ grub_menu_entry_run (grub_menu_entry_t entry) + + err = grub_auth_check_authentication (NULL); + ++ if (err == GRUB_ERR_NONE) ++ err = grub_auth_check_cli_access (); ++ + if (err) + { + grub_print_error (); ++ grub_wait_after_message (); + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + return; + } +diff --git a/include/grub/auth.h b/include/grub/auth.h +index 7473344..21d5190 100644 +--- a/include/grub/auth.h ++++ b/include/grub/auth.h +@@ -33,5 +33,6 @@ grub_err_t grub_auth_unregister_authentication (const char *user); + grub_err_t grub_auth_authenticate (const char *user); + grub_err_t grub_auth_deauthenticate (const char *user); + grub_err_t grub_auth_check_authentication (const char *userlist); ++grub_err_t grub_auth_check_cli_access (void); + + #endif /* ! GRUB_AUTH_HEADER */ +diff --git a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h +index c6524c9..9dc2def 100644 +--- a/include/grub/cryptodisk.h ++++ b/include/grub/cryptodisk.h +@@ -183,4 +183,8 @@ grub_util_get_geli_uuid (const char *dev); + grub_cryptodisk_t grub_cryptodisk_get_by_uuid (const char *uuid); + grub_cryptodisk_t grub_cryptodisk_get_by_source_disk (grub_disk_t disk); + ++#ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI ++grub_err_t grub_cryptodisk_challenge_password (void); ++#endif ++ + #endif +diff --git a/include/grub/misc.h b/include/grub/misc.h +index 237c8c0..8c092b6 100644 +--- a/include/grub/misc.h ++++ b/include/grub/misc.h +@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@ + #include + #include + ++ ++#ifndef __cplusplus ++#ifndef GRUB_POSIX_BOOL_DEFINED ++typedef enum { false = 0, true = 1 } bool; ++#define GRUB_POSIX_BOOL_DEFINED 1 ++#endif ++#endif ++ + #define ALIGN_UP(addr, align) \ + (((addr) + (typeof (addr)) (align) - 1) & ~((typeof (addr)) (align) - 1)) + #define ALIGN_UP_OVERHEAD(addr, align) ((-(addr)) & ((typeof (addr)) (align) - 1)) +@@ -408,6 +415,8 @@ void EXPORT_FUNC(grub_exit) (int rc) __attribute__ ((noreturn)); + grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_divmod64) (grub_uint64_t n, + grub_uint64_t d, + grub_uint64_t *r); ++extern bool EXPORT_FUNC(grub_is_cli_need_auth) (void); ++extern void EXPORT_FUNC(grub_cli_set_auth_needed) (void); + + /* Must match softdiv group in gentpl.py. */ + #if !defined(GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__ia64__) || \ +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0034-disk-loopback-Reference-tracking-for-the-loopback.patch b/backport-0034-disk-loopback-Reference-tracking-for-the-loopback.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..5f30900c544dcdaf821ed237cb3fe762108410c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0034-disk-loopback-Reference-tracking-for-the-loopback.patch @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +From abff01c61155a33c22d259c224ce2d7f9fae54f7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 03:26:19 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 24/73] disk/loopback: Reference tracking for the loopback + +It was possible to delete a loopback while there were still references +to it. This led to an exploitable use-after-free. + +Fixed by implementing a reference counting in the grub_loopback struct. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/loopback.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++ + include/grub/err.h | 3 ++- + include/grub/loopback.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/loopback.c b/grub-core/disk/loopback.c +index 99f4792..93026c5 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/loopback.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/loopback.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -56,6 +57,8 @@ delete_loopback (const char *name) + if (! dev) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_DEVICE, "device not found"); + ++ if (dev->refcnt > 0) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED, "device still referenced"); + /* Remove the device from the list. */ + *prev = dev->next; + +@@ -109,6 +112,7 @@ grub_cmd_loopback (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + + newdev->file = file; + newdev->id = last_id++; ++ newdev->refcnt = 0; + + /* Add the new entry to the list. */ + newdev->next = loopback_list; +@@ -150,6 +154,9 @@ grub_loopback_open (const char *name, grub_disk_t disk) + if (! dev) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_UNKNOWN_DEVICE, "can't open device"); + ++ if (grub_add (dev->refcnt, 1, &dev->refcnt)) ++ grub_fatal ("Reference count overflow"); ++ + /* Use the filesize for the disk size, round up to a complete sector. */ + if (dev->file->size != GRUB_FILE_SIZE_UNKNOWN) + disk->total_sectors = ((dev->file->size + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - 1) +@@ -167,6 +174,15 @@ grub_loopback_open (const char *name, grub_disk_t disk) + return 0; + } + ++static void ++grub_loopback_close (grub_disk_t disk) ++{ ++ struct grub_loopback *dev = disk->data; ++ ++ if (grub_sub (dev->refcnt, 1, &dev->refcnt)) ++ grub_fatal ("Reference count underflow"); ++} ++ + static grub_err_t + grub_loopback_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, + grub_size_t size, char *buf) +@@ -209,6 +225,7 @@ static struct grub_disk_dev grub_loopback_dev = + .id = GRUB_DISK_DEVICE_LOOPBACK_ID, + .disk_iterate = grub_loopback_iterate, + .disk_open = grub_loopback_open, ++ .disk_close = grub_loopback_close, + .disk_read = grub_loopback_read, + .disk_write = grub_loopback_write, + .next = 0 +diff --git a/include/grub/err.h b/include/grub/err.h +index c0f90ef..4b903df 100644 +--- a/include/grub/err.h ++++ b/include/grub/err.h +@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ typedef enum + GRUB_ERR_NET_PACKET_TOO_BIG, + GRUB_ERR_NET_NO_DOMAIN, + GRUB_ERR_EOF, +- GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE ++ GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, ++ GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED + } + grub_err_t; + +diff --git a/include/grub/loopback.h b/include/grub/loopback.h +index 3b9a9e3..915ef65 100644 +--- a/include/grub/loopback.h ++++ b/include/grub/loopback.h +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct grub_loopback + grub_file_t file; + struct grub_loopback *next; + unsigned long id; ++ grub_uint64_t refcnt; + }; + + #endif /* ! GRUB_LOOPBACK_HEADER */ +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0035-kern-disk-Limit-recursion-depth.patch b/backport-0035-kern-disk-Limit-recursion-depth.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..087f85c49f7009bb3c3d8b4f43b5b8878daf19fb --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0035-kern-disk-Limit-recursion-depth.patch @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +From f0bf8bd744b17135bc5a65193706f6d7832aa306 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 04:09:24 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 25/73] kern/disk: Limit recursion depth + +The grub_disk_read() may trigger other disk reads, e.g. via loopbacks. +This may lead to very deep recursion which can corrupt the heap. So, fix +the issue by limiting reads depth. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/kern/disk.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++------- + include/grub/err.h | 3 ++- + 2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/disk.c b/grub-core/kern/disk.c +index 3ca8528..3e0d212 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/disk.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/disk.c +@@ -28,6 +28,10 @@ + + #define GRUB_CACHE_TIMEOUT 2 + ++/* Disk reads may trigger other disk reads. So, limit recursion depth. */ ++#define MAX_READ_RECURSION_DEPTH 16 ++static unsigned int read_recursion_depth = 0; ++ + /* The last time the disk was used. */ + static grub_uint64_t grub_last_time = 0; + +@@ -421,6 +425,8 @@ grub_err_t + grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, + grub_off_t offset, grub_size_t size, void *buf) + { ++ grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE; ++ + /* First of all, check if the region is within the disk. */ + if (grub_disk_adjust_range (disk, §or, &offset, size) != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + { +@@ -431,12 +437,17 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, + return grub_errno; + } + ++ if (++read_recursion_depth >= MAX_READ_RECURSION_DEPTH) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH, "grub_disk_read(): Maximum recursion depth exceeded"); ++ goto error; ++ } ++ + /* First read until first cache boundary. */ + if (offset || (sector & (GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE - 1))) + { + grub_disk_addr_t start_sector; + grub_size_t pos; +- grub_err_t err; + grub_size_t len; + + start_sector = sector & ~((grub_disk_addr_t) GRUB_DISK_CACHE_SIZE - 1); +@@ -448,7 +459,7 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, + err = grub_disk_read_small (disk, start_sector, + offset + pos, len, buf); + if (err) +- return err; ++ goto error; + buf = (char *) buf + len; + size -= len; + offset += len; +@@ -461,7 +472,6 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, + { + char *data = NULL; + grub_disk_addr_t agglomerate; +- grub_err_t err; + + /* agglomerate read until we find a first cached entry. */ + for (agglomerate = 0; agglomerate +@@ -497,7 +507,7 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, + - disk->log_sector_size), + buf); + if (err) +- return err; ++ goto error; + + for (i = 0; i < agglomerate; i ++) + grub_disk_cache_store (disk->dev->id, disk->id, +@@ -531,13 +541,16 @@ grub_disk_read (grub_disk_t disk, grub_disk_addr_t sector, + /* And now read the last part. */ + if (size) + { +- grub_err_t err; + err = grub_disk_read_small (disk, sector, 0, size, buf); + if (err) +- return err; ++ goto error; + } + +- return grub_errno; ++ err = grub_errno; ++ ++ error: ++ read_recursion_depth--; ++ return err; + } + + grub_uint64_t +diff --git a/include/grub/err.h b/include/grub/err.h +index 4b903df..905a6df 100644 +--- a/include/grub/err.h ++++ b/include/grub/err.h +@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ typedef enum + GRUB_ERR_NET_NO_DOMAIN, + GRUB_ERR_EOF, + GRUB_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE, +- GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED ++ GRUB_ERR_STILL_REFERENCED, ++ GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH + } + grub_err_t; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0036-kern-partition-Limit-recursion-in-part_iterate.patch b/backport-0036-kern-partition-Limit-recursion-in-part_iterate.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a5b84a0e7c7d9c80cfa22ac642618a1b164b5677 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0036-kern-partition-Limit-recursion-in-part_iterate.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 8a7103fddfd6664f41081f3bb88eebbf2871da2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2024 21:24:19 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 26/73] kern/partition: Limit recursion in part_iterate() + +The part_iterate() is used by grub_partition_iterate() as a callback in +the partition iterate functions. However, part_iterate() may also call +the partition iterate functions which may lead to recursion. Fix potential +issue by limiting the recursion depth. + +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/kern/partition.c | 10 +++++++++- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/partition.c b/grub-core/kern/partition.c +index edad9f9e4..704512a20 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/partition.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/partition.c +@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ + + grub_partition_map_t grub_partition_map_list; + ++#define MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH 32 ++static unsigned int recursion_depth = 0; ++ + /* + * Checks that disk->partition contains part. This function assumes that the + * start of part is relative to the start of disk->partition. Returns 1 if +@@ -208,7 +211,12 @@ part_iterate (grub_disk_t dsk, const grub_partition_t partition, void *data) + FOR_PARTITION_MAPS(partmap) + { + grub_err_t err; +- err = partmap->iterate (dsk, part_iterate, ctx); ++ recursion_depth++; ++ if (recursion_depth <= MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) ++ err = partmap->iterate (dsk, part_iterate, ctx); ++ else ++ err = grub_error (GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH, "maximum recursion depth exceeded"); ++ recursion_depth--; + if (err) + grub_errno = GRUB_ERR_NONE; + if (ctx->ret) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0037-script-execute-Limit-the-recursion-depth.patch b/backport-0037-script-execute-Limit-the-recursion-depth.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..88f91aa8e4f7d3a6906188e3d5d944b61832bc5e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0037-script-execute-Limit-the-recursion-depth.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From d8a937ccae5c6d86dc4375698afca5cefdcd01e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 19:04:13 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 27/73] script/execute: Limit the recursion depth + +If unbounded recursion is allowed it becomes possible to collide the +stack with the heap. As UEFI firmware often lacks guard pages this +becomes an exploitable issue as it is possible in some cases to do +a controlled overwrite of a section of this heap region with +arbitrary data. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/script/execute.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c +index 14ff09094..e1450f45d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c ++++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c +@@ -33,10 +33,18 @@ + is sizeof (int) * 3, and one extra for a possible -ve sign. */ + #define ERRNO_DIGITS_MAX (sizeof (int) * 3 + 1) + ++/* ++ * A limit on recursion, to avoid colliding with the heap. UEFI defines a baseline ++ * stack size of 128 KiB. So, assuming at most 1-2 KiB per iteration this should ++ * keep us safe. ++ */ ++#define MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH 64 ++ + static unsigned long is_continue; + static unsigned long active_loops; + static unsigned long active_breaks; + static unsigned long function_return; ++static unsigned long recursion_depth; + + #define GRUB_SCRIPT_SCOPE_MALLOCED 1 + #define GRUB_SCRIPT_SCOPE_ARGS_MALLOCED 2 +@@ -816,7 +824,13 @@ grub_script_execute_cmd (struct grub_script_cmd *cmd) + if (cmd == 0) + return 0; + ++ recursion_depth++; ++ ++ if (recursion_depth >= MAX_RECURSION_DEPTH) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_RECURSION_DEPTH, N_("maximum recursion depth exceeded")); ++ + ret = cmd->exec (cmd); ++ recursion_depth--; + + grub_snprintf (errnobuf, sizeof (errnobuf), "%d", ret); + grub_env_set ("?", errnobuf); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0038-net-Unregister-net_default_ip-and-net_default_mac-va.patch b/backport-0038-net-Unregister-net_default_ip-and-net_default_mac-va.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..62defdd236af4a6d7c4d4deb8b24841c5bd00223 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0038-net-Unregister-net_default_ip-and-net_default_mac-va.patch @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +From d271e744753f8aa863153a822ce673055be68b03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 04:05:04 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 28/73] net: Unregister net_default_ip and net_default_mac variables + hooks on unload + +The net module is a dependency of normal. So, it shouldn't be possible +to unload the net. Though unregister variables hooks as a precaution. +It also gets in line with unregistering the other net module hooks. + +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/net.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c +index 58d0488..6f02cea 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/net.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c +@@ -2143,6 +2143,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(net) + + grub_register_variable_hook ("net_default_server", 0, 0); + grub_register_variable_hook ("pxe_default_server", 0, 0); ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("net_default_ip", 0, 0); ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("net_default_mac", 0, 0); + + grub_bootp_fini (); + grub_dns_fini (); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0039-net-Remove-variables-hooks-when-interface-is-unregis.patch b/backport-0039-net-Remove-variables-hooks-when-interface-is-unregis.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..67dcca6dc53dac74c36490586af87413b2f25b2c --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0039-net-Remove-variables-hooks-when-interface-is-unregis.patch @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +From aa8b4d7facef7b75a2703274b1b9d4e0e734c401 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 23:49:48 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 29/73] net: Remove variables hooks when interface is + unregisted + +The grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister(), previously +implemented in a header, did not remove the variables hooks that +were registered in grub_net_network_level_interface_register(). +Fix this by implementing the same logic used to register the +variables and move the function into the grub-core/net/net.c. + +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/net.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + include/grub/net.h | 11 +---------- + 2 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c +index 13b001d..fcc11a2 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/net.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c +@@ -979,6 +979,39 @@ grub_net_network_level_interface_register (struct grub_net_network_level_interfa + grub_net_network_level_interfaces = inter; + } + ++void ++grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister (struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inter) ++{ ++ char *name; ++ ++ { ++ char buf[GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN]; ++ ++ grub_net_hwaddr_to_str (&inter->hwaddress, buf); ++ name = grub_xasprintf ("net_%s_mac", inter->name); ++ if (name != NULL) ++ grub_register_variable_hook (name, NULL, NULL); ++ grub_free (name); ++ } ++ ++ { ++ char buf[GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_ADDR_LEN]; ++ ++ grub_net_addr_to_str (&inter->address, buf); ++ name = grub_xasprintf ("net_%s_ip", inter->name); ++ if (name != NULL) ++ grub_register_variable_hook (name, NULL, NULL); ++ grub_free (name); ++ } ++ ++ inter->card->num_ifaces--; ++ *inter->prev = inter->next; ++ if (inter->next) ++ inter->next->prev = inter->prev; ++ inter->next = 0; ++ inter->prev = 0; ++} ++ + int + grub_ipv6_get_masksize (grub_uint16_t be_mask[8]) + { +diff --git a/include/grub/net.h b/include/grub/net.h +index 9e4898c..43eba92 100644 +--- a/include/grub/net.h ++++ b/include/grub/net.h +@@ -618,16 +618,7 @@ void grub_bootp_fini (void); + void grub_dns_init (void); + void grub_dns_fini (void); + +-static inline void +-grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister (struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inter) +-{ +- inter->card->num_ifaces--; +- *inter->prev = inter->next; +- if (inter->next) +- inter->next->prev = inter->prev; +- inter->next = 0; +- inter->prev = 0; +-} ++void grub_net_network_level_interface_unregister (struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inter); + + void + grub_net_tcp_retransmit (void); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0040-net-Fix-OOB-write-in-grub_net_search_config_file.patch b/backport-0040-net-Fix-OOB-write-in-grub_net_search_config_file.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c63488c76be00afb97ebe4bd86a2b3815a0fb650 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0040-net-Fix-OOB-write-in-grub_net_search_config_file.patch @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +From 387807749137edcb83f2e328959098aedceb29d1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2024 13:12:09 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 30/73] net: Fix OOB write in grub_net_search_config_file() + +The function included a call to grub_strcpy() which copied data from an +environment variable to a buffer allocated in grub_cmd_normal(). The +grub_cmd_normal() didn't consider the length of the environment variable. +So, the copy operation could exceed the allocation and lead to an OOB +write. Fix the issue by replacing grub_strcpy() with grub_strlcpy() and +pass the underlying buffers size to the grub_net_search_config_file(). + +Fixes: CVE-2025-0624 + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/net.c | 7 ++++--- + grub-core/normal/main.c | 2 +- + include/grub/net.h | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c +index fcc11a2..0cf37f4 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/net.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c +@@ -1972,14 +1972,15 @@ grub_config_search_through (char *config, char *suffix, + } + + grub_err_t +-grub_net_search_config_file (char *config) ++grub_net_search_config_file (char *config, grub_size_t config_buf_len) + { +- grub_size_t config_len; ++ grub_size_t config_len, suffix_len; + char *suffix; + + config_len = grub_strlen (config); + config[config_len] = '-'; + suffix = config + config_len + 1; ++ suffix_len = config_buf_len - (config_len + 1); + + struct grub_net_network_level_interface *inf; + FOR_NET_NETWORK_LEVEL_INTERFACES (inf) +@@ -2005,7 +2006,7 @@ grub_net_search_config_file (char *config) + + if (client_uuid) + { +- grub_strcpy (suffix, client_uuid); ++ grub_strlcpy (suffix, client_uuid, suffix_len); + if (grub_config_search_through (config, suffix, 1, 0) == 0) + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/main.c b/grub-core/normal/main.c +index a2b59e6..385250c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/main.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/main.c +@@ -360,7 +360,7 @@ grub_try_normal_prefix (const char *prefix) + return err; + + grub_snprintf (config, config_len, "%s/grub.cfg", prefix); +- err = grub_net_search_config_file (config); ++ err = grub_net_search_config_file (config, config_len); + } + + if (err != GRUB_ERR_NONE) +diff --git a/include/grub/net.h b/include/grub/net.h +index 43eba92..1101b03 100644 +--- a/include/grub/net.h ++++ b/include/grub/net.h +@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ void + grub_net_remove_dns_server (const struct grub_net_network_level_address *s); + + grub_err_t +-grub_net_search_config_file (char *config); ++grub_net_search_config_file (char *config, grub_size_t config_buf_len); + + extern char *grub_net_default_server; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0041-net-tftp-Fix-stack-buffer-overflow-in-tftp_open.patch b/backport-0041-net-tftp-Fix-stack-buffer-overflow-in-tftp_open.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..678cd464b11a69b2afac5532b9cd9f8a5ceab353 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0041-net-tftp-Fix-stack-buffer-overflow-in-tftp_open.patch @@ -0,0 +1,118 @@ +From 0707accab1b9be5d3645d4700dde3f99209f9367 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 17:32:34 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 31/73] net/tftp: Fix stack buffer overflow in tftp_open() + +An overly long filename can be passed to tftp_open() which would cause +grub_normalize_filename() to write out of bounds. + +Fixed by adding an extra argument to grub_normalize_filename() for the +space available, making it act closer to a strlcpy(). As several fixed +strings are strcpy()'d after into the same buffer, their total length is +checked to see if they exceed the remaining space in the buffer. If so, +return an error. + +On the occasion simplify code a bit by removing unneeded rrqlen zeroing. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/tftp.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- + 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/tftp.c b/grub-core/net/tftp.c +index 409b1d09b..336b78691 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/tftp.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/tftp.c +@@ -266,17 +266,19 @@ tftp_receive (grub_net_udp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)), + * forward slashes to a single forward slash. + */ + static void +-grub_normalize_filename (char *normalized, const char *filename) ++grub_normalize_filename (char *normalized, const char *filename, int c) + { + char *dest = normalized; + const char *src = filename; + +- while (*src != '\0') ++ while (*src != '\0' && c > 0) + { + if (src[0] == '/' && src[1] == '/') + src++; +- else ++ else { ++ c--; + *dest++ = *src++; ++ } + } + *dest = '\0'; + } +@@ -287,7 +289,7 @@ tftp_open (struct grub_file *file, const char *filename) + struct tftphdr *tftph; + char *rrq; + int i; +- int rrqlen; ++ int rrqlen, rrqsize; + int hdrlen; + grub_uint8_t open_data[1500]; + struct grub_net_buff nb; +@@ -315,37 +317,45 @@ tftp_open (struct grub_file *file, const char *filename) + + tftph = (struct tftphdr *) nb.data; + +- rrq = (char *) tftph->u.rrq; +- rrqlen = 0; +- + tftph->opcode = grub_cpu_to_be16_compile_time (TFTP_RRQ); + ++ rrq = (char *) tftph->u.rrq; ++ rrqsize = sizeof (tftph->u.rrq); ++ + /* + * Copy and normalize the filename to work-around issues on some TFTP + * servers when file names are being matched for remapping. + */ +- grub_normalize_filename (rrq, filename); +- rrqlen += grub_strlen (rrq) + 1; ++ grub_normalize_filename (rrq, filename, rrqsize); ++ ++ rrqlen = grub_strlen (rrq) + 1; + rrq += grub_strlen (rrq) + 1; + +- grub_strcpy (rrq, "octet"); ++ /* Verify there is enough space for the remaining components. */ + rrqlen += grub_strlen ("octet") + 1; ++ rrqlen += grub_strlen ("blksize") + 1; ++ rrqlen += grub_strlen ("1024") + 1; ++ rrqlen += grub_strlen ("tsize") + 1; ++ rrqlen += grub_strlen ("0") + 1; ++ ++ if (rrqlen >= rrqsize) { ++ grub_free (data); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILENAME, N_("filename too long")); ++ } ++ ++ grub_strcpy (rrq, "octet"); + rrq += grub_strlen ("octet") + 1; + + grub_strcpy (rrq, "blksize"); +- rrqlen += grub_strlen ("blksize") + 1; + rrq += grub_strlen ("blksize") + 1; + + grub_strcpy (rrq, "1024"); +- rrqlen += grub_strlen ("1024") + 1; + rrq += grub_strlen ("1024") + 1; + + grub_strcpy (rrq, "tsize"); +- rrqlen += grub_strlen ("tsize") + 1; + rrq += grub_strlen ("tsize") + 1; + + grub_strcpy (rrq, "0"); +- rrqlen += grub_strlen ("0") + 1; + rrq += grub_strlen ("0") + 1; + hdrlen = sizeof (tftph->opcode) + rrqlen; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0042-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-permit-duplicate-SOF0-mark.patch b/backport-0042-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-permit-duplicate-SOF0-mark.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..09574c341c0373a8bb113a779eae4de40d2cfa08 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0042-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-permit-duplicate-SOF0-mark.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From 2c34af908ebf4856051ed29e46d88abd2b20387f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2024 22:47:20 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 32/73] video/readers/jpeg: Do not permit duplicate SOF0 + markers in JPEG + +Otherwise a subsequent header could change the height and width +allowing future OOB writes. + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45774 + +Reported-by: Nils Langius +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +index ae634fd41..631a89356 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c +@@ -339,6 +339,10 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_sof (struct grub_jpeg_data *data) + if (grub_errno != GRUB_ERR_NONE) + return grub_errno; + ++ if (data->image_height != 0 || data->image_width != 0) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, ++ "jpeg: cannot have duplicate SOF0 markers"); ++ + if (grub_jpeg_get_byte (data) != 8) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, + "jpeg: only 8-bit precision is supported"); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0043-kern-dl-Fix-for-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_dl_ref.patch b/backport-0043-kern-dl-Fix-for-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_dl_ref.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..17886c09f29977d58ab13c916d8665a44bef4c27 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0043-kern-dl-Fix-for-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_dl_ref.patch @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +From 832604bba80220879b54c2ebc99489cb1bc2e03d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 15:59:26 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 33/73] kern/dl: Fix for an integer overflow in grub_dl_ref() + +It was possible to overflow the value of mod->ref_count, a signed +integer, by repeatedly invoking insmod on an already loaded module. +This led to a use-after-free. As once ref_count was overflowed it became +possible to unload the module while there was still references to it. + +This resolves the issue by using grub_add() to check if the ref_count +will overflow and then stops further increments. Further changes were +also made to grub_dl_unref() to check for the underflow condition and +the reference count was changed to an unsigned 64-bit integer. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/commands/minicmd.c | 2 +- + grub-core/kern/dl.c | 17 ++++++++++++----- + include/grub/dl.h | 8 ++++---- + util/misc.c | 4 ++-- + 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c +index 0898923..9efb771 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c +@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ grub_mini_cmd_lsmod (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + { + grub_dl_dep_t dep; + +- grub_printf ("%s\t%d\t\t", mod->name, mod->ref_count); ++ grub_printf ("%s\t%" PRIuGRUB_UINT64_T "\t\t", mod->name, mod->ref_count); + for (dep = mod->dep; dep; dep = dep->next) + { + if (dep != mod->dep) +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c +index a06523f..b4fddab 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c +@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + /* Platforms where modules are in a readonly area of memory. */ + #if defined(GRUB_MACHINE_QEMU) +@@ -597,7 +598,7 @@ grub_dl_resolve_dependencies (grub_dl_t mod, Elf_Ehdr *e) + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + } + +-int ++grub_uint64_t + grub_dl_ref (grub_dl_t mod) + { + grub_dl_dep_t dep; +@@ -608,10 +609,13 @@ grub_dl_ref (grub_dl_t mod) + for (dep = mod->dep; dep; dep = dep->next) + grub_dl_ref (dep->mod); + +- return ++mod->ref_count; ++ if (grub_add (mod->ref_count, 1, &mod->ref_count)) ++ grub_fatal ("Module reference count overflow"); ++ ++ return mod->ref_count; + } + +-int ++grub_uint64_t + grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod) + { + grub_dl_dep_t dep; +@@ -622,10 +626,13 @@ grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod) + for (dep = mod->dep; dep; dep = dep->next) + grub_dl_unref (dep->mod); + +- return --mod->ref_count; ++ if (grub_sub (mod->ref_count, 1, &mod->ref_count)) ++ grub_fatal ("Module reference count underflow"); ++ ++ return mod->ref_count; + } + +-int ++grub_uint64_t + grub_dl_ref_count (grub_dl_t mod) + { + if (mod == NULL) +diff --git a/include/grub/dl.h b/include/grub/dl.h +index 20d870f..0233383 100644 +--- a/include/grub/dl.h ++++ b/include/grub/dl.h +@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ typedef struct grub_dl_dep *grub_dl_dep_t; + struct grub_dl + { + char *name; +- int ref_count; ++ grub_uint64_t ref_count; + int persistent; + grub_dl_dep_t dep; + grub_dl_segment_t segment; +@@ -206,9 +206,9 @@ grub_dl_t grub_dl_load_core (void *addr, grub_size_t size); + grub_dl_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_load_core_noinit) (void *addr, grub_size_t size); + int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unload) (grub_dl_t mod); + extern void grub_dl_unload_unneeded (void); +-extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod); +-extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod); +-extern int EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref_count) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_unref) (grub_dl_t mod); ++extern grub_uint64_t EXPORT_FUNC(grub_dl_ref_count) (grub_dl_t mod); + + extern grub_dl_t EXPORT_VAR(grub_dl_head); + +diff --git a/util/misc.c b/util/misc.c +index d545212..0f928e5 100644 +--- a/util/misc.c ++++ b/util/misc.c +@@ -190,14 +190,14 @@ grub_xputs_real (const char *str) + + void (*grub_xputs) (const char *str) = grub_xputs_real; + +-int ++grub_uint64_t + grub_dl_ref (grub_dl_t mod) + { + (void) mod; + return 0; + } + +-int ++grub_uint64_t + grub_dl_unref (grub_dl_t mod) + { + (void) mod; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0044-fs-ext2-Rework-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-and-external.patch b/backport-0044-fs-ext2-Rework-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-and-external.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..28681119aedec60ae391a2432c46f05024c97545 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0044-fs-ext2-Rework-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-and-external.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From d72208423dcabf9eb4a3bcb17b6b31888396bd49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Michael Chang +Date: Fri, 21 Feb 2025 09:06:12 +0800 +Subject: [PATCH 34/73] fs/ext2: Rework out-of-bounds read for inline and external + exten + +Previously, the number of extent entries was not properly capped based +on the actual available space. This could lead to insufficient reads for +external extents, since the computation was based solely on the inline +extent layout. + +In this patch, when processing the extent header, we determine whether +the header is stored inline (i.e., at inode->blocks.dir_blocks) or in an +external extent block. We then clamp the number of entries accordingly +(using max_inline_ext for inline extents and max_external_ext for +external extent blocks). + +This change ensures that only the valid number of extent entries is +processed, preventing out-of-bound reads and potential filesystem +corruption. + +Fixes: 7e2f750f0a (fs/ext2: Fix out-of-bounds read for inline extents) + +Signed-off-by: Michael Chang +--- + grub-core/fs/ext2.c | 15 ++++++++++++++- + 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c +index 0ee22e6..ecf4dc0 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ext2.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ext2.c +@@ -482,7 +482,10 @@ grub_ext2_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock) + int i; + grub_disk_addr_t ret; + grub_uint16_t nent; ++ /* maximum number of extent entries in the inode's inline extent area */ + const grub_uint16_t max_inline_ext = sizeof (inode->blocks) / sizeof (*ext) - 1; /* Minus 1 extent header. */ ++ /* maximum number of extent entries in the external extent block */ ++ const grub_uint16_t max_external_ext = EXT2_BLOCK_SIZE(data) / sizeof (*ext) - 1; /* Minus 1 extent header. */ + + leaf = grub_ext4_find_leaf (data, (struct grub_ext4_extent_header *) inode->blocks.dir_blocks, fileblock); + if (! leaf) +@@ -495,8 +498,18 @@ grub_ext2_read_block (grub_fshelp_node_t node, grub_disk_addr_t fileblock) + + nent = grub_le_to_cpu16 (leaf->entries); + +- if (leaf->depth == 0) ++ /* ++ * Determine the effective number of extent entries (nent) to process: ++ * If the extent header (leaf) is stored inline in the inode’s block ++ * area (i.e. at inode->blocks.dir_blocks), then only max_inline_ext ++ * entries can fit. ++ * Otherwise, if the header was read from an external extent block, use ++ * the larger limit, max_external_ext, based on the full block size. ++ */ ++ if (leaf == (struct grub_ext4_extent_header *) inode->blocks.dir_blocks) + nent = grub_min (nent, max_inline_ext); ++ else ++ nent = grub_min (nent, max_external_ext); + + for (i = 0; i < nent; i++) + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0045-kern-dl-Check-for-the-SHF_INFO_LINK-flag-in-grub_dl_.patch b/backport-0045-kern-dl-Check-for-the-SHF_INFO_LINK-flag-in-grub_dl_.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b885452c78d53500faf409a8a146c67c27259b0f --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0045-kern-dl-Check-for-the-SHF_INFO_LINK-flag-in-grub_dl_.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 98ad84328dcabfa603dcf5bd217570aa6b4bdd99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2024 06:00:36 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 35/73] kern/dl: Check for the SHF_INFO_LINK flag in + grub_dl_relocate_symbols() + +The grub_dl_relocate_symbols() iterates through the sections in +an ELF looking for relocation sections. According to the spec [1] +the SHF_INFO_LINK flag should be set if the sh_info field is meant +to be a section index. + +[1] https://refspecs.linuxbase.org/elf/gabi4+/ch4.sheader.html + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/kern/dl.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/dl.c b/grub-core/kern/dl.c +index acc6ccad6..de8c3aa8d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/dl.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/dl.c +@@ -623,6 +623,9 @@ grub_dl_relocate_symbols (grub_dl_t mod, void *ehdr) + grub_dl_segment_t seg; + grub_err_t err; + ++ if (!(s->sh_flags & SHF_INFO_LINK)) ++ continue; ++ + /* Find the target segment. */ + for (seg = mod->segment; seg; seg = seg->next) + if (seg->section == s->sh_info) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0046-commands-extcmd-Missing-check-for-failed-allocation.patch b/backport-0046-commands-extcmd-Missing-check-for-failed-allocation.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..74a61abcbe46a954a2973eb2421a7b2f678337f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0046-commands-extcmd-Missing-check-for-failed-allocation.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 05be856a8c3aae41f5df90cab7796ab7ee34b872 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:55 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 36/73] commands/extcmd: Missing check for failed allocation + +The grub_extcmd_dispatcher() calls grub_arg_list_alloc() to allocate +a grub_arg_list struct but it does not verify the allocation was successful. +In case of failed allocation the NULL state pointer can be accessed in +parse_option() through grub_arg_parse() which may lead to a security issue. + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45775 + +Reported-by: Nils Langius +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +Reviewed-by: Alec Brown +--- + grub-core/commands/extcmd.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c b/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c +index 90a5ca24a..c236be13a 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/extcmd.c +@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ grub_extcmd_dispatcher (struct grub_command *cmd, int argc, char **args, + } + + state = grub_arg_list_alloc (ext, argc, args); ++ if (state == NULL) ++ return grub_errno; ++ + if (grub_arg_parse (ext, argc, args, state, &new_args, &new_argc)) + { + context.state = state; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0047-commands-ls-Fix-NULL-dereference.patch b/backport-0047-commands-ls-Fix-NULL-dereference.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1134dfb5b99799e745d59ebd488e6ae5b24e7df5 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0047-commands-ls-Fix-NULL-dereference.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 0bf56bce47489c059e50e61a3db7f682d8c44b56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Sun, 12 May 2024 11:08:23 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 37/73] commands/ls: Fix NULL dereference + +The grub_strrchr() may return NULL when the dirname do not contain "/". +This can happen on broken filesystems. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/commands/ls.c | 6 +++++- + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/ls.c b/grub-core/commands/ls.c +index 8e98c73..3addd06 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/ls.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/ls.c +@@ -241,7 +241,11 @@ grub_ls_list_files (char *dirname, int longlist, int all, int human) + + grub_file_close (file); + +- p = grub_strrchr (dirname, '/') + 1; ++ p = grub_strrchr (dirname, '/'); ++ if (p == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ ++p; ++ + dirname = grub_strndup (dirname, p - dirname); + if (! dirname) + goto fail; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0048-commands-pgp-Unregister-the-check_signatures-hooks-o.patch b/backport-0048-commands-pgp-Unregister-the-check_signatures-hooks-o.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b7a041f890ec0b440989a5fe88be2723b1b97036 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0048-commands-pgp-Unregister-the-check_signatures-hooks-o.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From 2123c5bca7e21fbeb0263df4597ddd7054700726 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 19:24:29 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 38/73] commands/pgp: Unregister the "check_signatures" hooks + on module unload + +If the hooks are not removed they can be called after the module has +been unloaded leading to an use-after-free. + +Fixes: CVE-2025-0622 + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/commands/pgp.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/pgp.c b/grub-core/commands/pgp.c +index c6766f044..5fadc33c4 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/pgp.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/pgp.c +@@ -1010,6 +1010,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(pgp) + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(pgp) + { ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("check_signatures", NULL, NULL); ++ grub_env_unset ("check_signatures"); + grub_verifier_unregister (&grub_pubkey_verifier); + grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd); + grub_unregister_extcmd (cmd_trust); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0049-normal-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch b/backport-0049-normal-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3685468d713e724ac6849be1677a00d3fbeef377 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0049-normal-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 9c16197734ada8d0838407eebe081117799bfe67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 23:46:55 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 39/73] normal: Remove variables hooks on module unload + +The normal module does not entirely cleanup after itself in +its GRUB_MOD_FINI() leaving a few variables hooks in place. +It is not possible to unload normal module now but fix the +issues for completeness. + +On the occasion replace 0s with NULLs for "pager" variable +hooks unregister. + +Fixes: CVE-2025-0622 + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/normal/main.c | 4 +++- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/main.c b/grub-core/normal/main.c +index 838f57fa5..04d058f55 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/main.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/main.c +@@ -586,7 +586,9 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(normal) + grub_xputs = grub_xputs_saved; + + grub_set_history (0); +- grub_register_variable_hook ("pager", 0, 0); ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("pager", NULL, NULL); ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("color_normal", NULL, NULL); ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("color_highlight", NULL, NULL); + grub_fs_autoload_hook = 0; + grub_unregister_command (cmd_clear); + } +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0050-gettext-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch b/backport-0050-gettext-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7486e6c75bbe9f0698300e61968ed0589042eaa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0050-gettext-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 7580addfc8c94cedb0cdfd7a1fd65b539215e637 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Fri, 1 Nov 2024 23:52:06 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 40/73] gettext: Remove variables hooks on module unload + +The gettext module does not entirely cleanup after itself in +its GRUB_MOD_FINI() leaving a few variables hooks in place. +It is not possible to unload gettext module because normal +module depends on it. Though fix the issues for completeness. + +Fixes: CVE-2025-0622 + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/gettext/gettext.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c +index 7a1c14e4f..e4f4f8ee6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c ++++ b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c +@@ -535,6 +535,10 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (gettext) + + GRUB_MOD_FINI (gettext) + { ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("locale_dir", NULL, NULL); ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("secondary_locale_dir", NULL, NULL); ++ grub_register_variable_hook ("lang", NULL, NULL); ++ + grub_gettext_delete_list (&main_context); + grub_gettext_delete_list (&secondary_context); + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0051-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write-or-.patch b/backport-0051-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write-or-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eb2a881426f859e19449a987b8c5dc2215c15d7f --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0051-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write-or-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +From 09bd6eb58b0f71ec273916070fa1e2de16897a91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:56 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 41/73] gettext: Integer overflow leads to heap OOB write or + read + +Calculation of ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list size in grub_mofile_open() may +overflow leading to subsequent OOB write or read. This patch fixes the +issue by replacing grub_zalloc() and explicit multiplication with +grub_calloc() which does the same thing in safe manner. + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45776 + +Reported-by: Nils Langius +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +Reviewed-by: Alec Brown +--- + grub-core/gettext/gettext.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c +index e4f4f8ee6..63bb1ab73 100644 +--- a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c ++++ b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c +@@ -323,8 +323,8 @@ grub_mofile_open (struct grub_gettext_context *ctx, + for (ctx->grub_gettext_max_log = 0; ctx->grub_gettext_max >> ctx->grub_gettext_max_log; + ctx->grub_gettext_max_log++); + +- ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list = grub_zalloc (ctx->grub_gettext_max +- * sizeof (ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list[0])); ++ ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list = grub_calloc (ctx->grub_gettext_max, ++ sizeof (ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list[0])); + if (!ctx->grub_gettext_msg_list) + { + grub_file_close (fd); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0052-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch b/backport-0052-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..be00ae433e094b2121dea0cbeec74a14a448ab91 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0052-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From b970a5ed967816bbca8225994cd0ee2557bad515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Fri, 22 Nov 2024 06:27:57 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 42/73] gettext: Integer overflow leads to heap OOB write + +The size calculation of the translation buffer in +grub_gettext_getstr_from_position() may overflow +to 0 leading to heap OOB write. This patch fixes +the issue by using grub_add() and checking for +an overflow. + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45777 + +Reported-by: Nils Langius +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +Reviewed-by: Alec Brown +--- + grub-core/gettext/gettext.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c +index 63bb1ab73..9ffc73428 100644 +--- a/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c ++++ b/grub-core/gettext/gettext.c +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -99,6 +100,7 @@ grub_gettext_getstr_from_position (struct grub_gettext_context *ctx, + char *translation; + struct string_descriptor desc; + grub_err_t err; ++ grub_size_t alloc_sz; + + internal_position = (off + position * sizeof (desc)); + +@@ -109,7 +111,10 @@ grub_gettext_getstr_from_position (struct grub_gettext_context *ctx, + length = grub_cpu_to_le32 (desc.length); + offset = grub_cpu_to_le32 (desc.offset); + +- translation = grub_malloc (length + 1); ++ if (grub_add (length, 1, &alloc_sz)) ++ return NULL; ++ ++ translation = grub_malloc (alloc_sz); + if (!translation) + return NULL; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0053-commands-read-Fix-an-integer-overflow-when-supplying.patch b/backport-0053-commands-read-Fix-an-integer-overflow-when-supplying.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b98827bf20de0da7fabd9f8aa5c1e910a43e3e09 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0053-commands-read-Fix-an-integer-overflow-when-supplying.patch @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +From dad8f502974ed9ad0a70ae6820d17b4b142558fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jonathan Bar Or +Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2025 19:17:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 43/73] commands/read: Fix an integer overflow when supplying + more than 2^31 characters + +The grub_getline() function currently has a signed integer variable "i" +that can be overflown when user supplies more than 2^31 characters. +It results in a memory corruption of the allocated line buffer as well +as supplying large negative values to grub_realloc(). + +Fixes: CVE-2025-0690 + +Reported-by: Jonathan Bar Or +Signed-off-by: Jonathan Bar Or +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/commands/read.c | 19 +++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/read.c b/grub-core/commands/read.c +index fe3e88b..f3ff826 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/read.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/read.c +@@ -25,19 +25,21 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + + static char * + grub_getline (void) + { +- int i; ++ grub_size_t i; + char *line; + char *tmp; + char c; ++ grub_size_t alloc_size; + + i = 0; +- line = grub_malloc (1 + i + sizeof('\0')); ++ line = grub_malloc (1 + sizeof('\0')); + if (! line) + return NULL; + +@@ -50,8 +52,17 @@ grub_getline (void) + line[i] = c; + if (grub_isprint (c)) + grub_printf ("%c", c); +- i++; +- tmp = grub_realloc (line, 1 + i + sizeof('\0')); ++ if (grub_add (i, 1, &i)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected")); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ if (grub_add (i, 1 + sizeof('\0'), &alloc_size)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected")); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ tmp = grub_realloc (line, alloc_size); + if (! tmp) + { + grub_free (line); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0054-commands-test-Stack-overflow-due-to-unlimited-recurs.patch b/backport-0054-commands-test-Stack-overflow-due-to-unlimited-recurs.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b3eb503751da9f327e9c1c8d609d403d6f16f153 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0054-commands-test-Stack-overflow-due-to-unlimited-recurs.patch @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +From c68b7d23628a19da67ebe2e06f84165ee04961af Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 20:22:41 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 44/73] commands/test: Stack overflow due to unlimited + recursion depth + +The test_parse() evaluates test expression recursively. Due to lack of +recursion depth check a specially crafted expression may cause a stack +overflow. The recursion is only triggered by the parentheses usage and +it can be unlimited. However, sensible expressions are unlikely to +contain more than a few parentheses. So, this patch limits the recursion +depth to 100, which should be sufficient. + +Reported-by: Nils Langius +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/commands/test.c | 21 ++++++++++++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/test.c b/grub-core/commands/test.c +index 62d3fb398..b585c3d70 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/test.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/test.c +@@ -29,6 +29,9 @@ + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + ++/* Set a limit on recursion to avoid stack overflow. */ ++#define MAX_TEST_RECURSION_DEPTH 100 ++ + /* A simple implementation for signed numbers. */ + static int + grub_strtosl (char *arg, const char ** const end, int base) +@@ -150,7 +153,7 @@ get_fileinfo (char *path, struct test_parse_ctx *ctx) + + /* Parse a test expression starting from *argn. */ + static int +-test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc) ++test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc, int *depth) + { + struct test_parse_ctx ctx = { + .and = 1, +@@ -387,13 +390,24 @@ test_parse (char **args, int *argn, int argc) + if (grub_strcmp (args[*argn], ")") == 0) + { + (*argn)++; ++ if (*depth > 0) ++ (*depth)--; ++ + return ctx.or || ctx.and; + } + /* Recursively invoke if parenthesis. */ + if (grub_strcmp (args[*argn], "(") == 0) + { + (*argn)++; +- update_val (test_parse (args, argn, argc), &ctx); ++ ++ if (++(*depth) > MAX_TEST_RECURSION_DEPTH) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("max recursion depth exceeded")); ++ depth--; ++ return ctx.or || ctx.and; ++ } ++ ++ update_val (test_parse (args, argn, argc, depth), &ctx); + continue; + } + +@@ -428,11 +442,12 @@ grub_cmd_test (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + int argc, char **args) + { + int argn = 0; ++ int depth = 0; + + if (argc >= 1 && grub_strcmp (args[argc - 1], "]") == 0) + argc--; + +- return test_parse (args, &argn, argc) ? GRUB_ERR_NONE ++ return test_parse (args, &argn, argc, &depth) ? GRUB_ERR_NONE + : grub_error (GRUB_ERR_TEST_FAILURE, N_("false")); + } + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0055-commands-minicmd-Block-the-dump-command-in-lockdown-.patch b/backport-0055-commands-minicmd-Block-the-dump-command-in-lockdown-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6c2123528c79e8674e5f55b0b7a35590f6a0f30d --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0055-commands-minicmd-Block-the-dump-command-in-lockdown-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +From 34824806ac6302f91e8cabaa41308eaced25725f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 20:29:39 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 45/73] commands/minicmd: Block the dump command in lockdown + mode + +The dump enables a user to read memory which should not be possible +in lockdown mode. + +Fixes: CVE-2025-1118 + +Reported-by: B Horn +Reported-by: Jonathan Bar Or +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/commands/minicmd.c | 4 ++-- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c +index 286290866..8c5ee3e60 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/minicmd.c +@@ -203,8 +203,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(minicmd) + grub_register_command ("help", grub_mini_cmd_help, + 0, N_("Show this message.")); + cmd_dump = +- grub_register_command ("dump", grub_mini_cmd_dump, +- N_("ADDR [SIZE]"), N_("Show memory contents.")); ++ grub_register_command_lockdown ("dump", grub_mini_cmd_dump, ++ N_("ADDR [SIZE]"), N_("Show memory contents.")); + cmd_rmmod = + grub_register_command ("rmmod", grub_mini_cmd_rmmod, + N_("MODULE"), N_("Remove a module.")); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0056-commands-memrw-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-mo.patch b/backport-0056-commands-memrw-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-mo.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6338f15cdc2d3f615f891014b25501574e1be91d --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0056-commands-memrw-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-mo.patch @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +From 340e4d058f584534f4b90b7dbea2b64a9f8c418c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2024 20:37:10 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 46/73] commands/memrw: Disable memory reading in lockdown mode + +With the rest of module being blocked in lockdown mode it does not make +a lot of sense to leave memory reading enabled. This also goes in par +with disabling the dump command. + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/commands/memrw.c | 21 ++++++++++++--------- + 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/memrw.c b/grub-core/commands/memrw.c +index 39cf3a0..9d8a54a 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/memrw.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/memrw.c +@@ -126,17 +126,20 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memrw) + return; + + cmd_read_byte = +- grub_register_extcmd ("read_byte", grub_cmd_read, 0, +- N_("ADDR"), N_("Read 8-bit value from ADDR."), +- options); ++ grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("read_byte", grub_cmd_read, 0, ++ N_("ADDR"), ++ N_("Read 8-bit value from ADDR."), ++ options); + cmd_read_word = +- grub_register_extcmd ("read_word", grub_cmd_read, 0, +- N_("ADDR"), N_("Read 16-bit value from ADDR."), +- options); ++ grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("read_word", grub_cmd_read, 0, ++ N_("ADDR"), ++ N_("Read 16-bit value from ADDR."), ++ options); + cmd_read_dword = +- grub_register_extcmd ("read_dword", grub_cmd_read, 0, +- N_("ADDR"), N_("Read 32-bit value from ADDR."), +- options); ++ grub_register_extcmd_lockdown ("read_dword", grub_cmd_read, 0, ++ N_("ADDR"), ++ N_("Read 32-bit value from ADDR."), ++ options); + cmd_write_byte = + grub_register_command_lockdown ("write_byte", grub_cmd_write, + N_("ADDR VALUE [MASK]"), +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0057-commands-hexdump-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-.patch b/backport-0057-commands-hexdump-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..28ed66d65fa89a249314d419a3b29e60bf9de4c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0057-commands-hexdump-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From 5f31164aed51f498957cdd6ed733ec71a8592c99 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: B Horn +Date: Fri, 19 Apr 2024 22:31:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH 47/73] commands/hexdump: Disable memory reading in lockdown + mode + +Reported-by: B Horn +Signed-off-by: B Horn +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/commands/hexdump.c | 7 ++++++- + 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/commands/hexdump.c b/grub-core/commands/hexdump.c +index eaa12465b..d6f61d98a 100644 +--- a/grub-core/commands/hexdump.c ++++ b/grub-core/commands/hexdump.c +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -51,7 +52,11 @@ grub_cmd_hexdump (grub_extcmd_context_t ctxt, int argc, char **args) + length = (state[1].set) ? grub_strtoul (state[1].arg, 0, 0) : 256; + + if (!grub_strcmp (args[0], "(mem)")) +- hexdump (skip, (char *) (grub_addr_t) skip, length); ++ { ++ if (grub_is_lockdown() == GRUB_LOCKDOWN_ENABLED) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_ACCESS_DENIED, N_("memory reading is disabled in lockdown mode")); ++ hexdump (skip, (char *) (grub_addr_t) skip, length); ++ } + else if ((args[0][0] == '(') && (args[0][namelen - 1] == ')')) + { + grub_disk_t disk; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0058-fs-bfs-Disable-under-lockdown.patch b/backport-0058-fs-bfs-Disable-under-lockdown.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9be91b8c60f150cfa2e202f424537653a4ff0c0c --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0058-fs-bfs-Disable-under-lockdown.patch @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +From 26db6605036bd9e5b16d9068a8cc75be63b8b630 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2024 15:59:43 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 48/73] fs/bfs: Disable under lockdown + +The BFS is not fuzz-clean. Don't allow it to be loaded under lockdown. +This will also disable the AFS. + +Fixes: CVE-2024-45778 +Fixes: CVE-2024-45779 + +Reported-by: Nils Langius +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/bfs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/bfs.c b/grub-core/fs/bfs.c +index 022f69fe2..78aeb051f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/bfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/bfs.c +@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -1106,8 +1107,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (bfs) + { + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (1 << LOG_EXTENT_SIZE == + sizeof (struct grub_bfs_extent)); +- grub_bfs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_bfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_bfs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_bfs_fs); ++ } + } + + #ifdef MODE_AFS +@@ -1116,5 +1120,6 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI (afs) + GRUB_MOD_FINI (bfs) + #endif + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_bfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_bfs_fs); + } +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0059-fs-Disable-many-filesystems-under-lockdown.patch b/backport-0059-fs-Disable-many-filesystems-under-lockdown.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..22e8c1ecf7b69b1afcddc7537ef842adada4b073 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0059-fs-Disable-many-filesystems-under-lockdown.patch @@ -0,0 +1,394 @@ +From c4bc55da28543d2522a939ba4ee0acde45f2fa74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Axtens +Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2024 16:20:45 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH 49/73] fs: Disable many filesystems under lockdown + +The idea is to permit the following: btrfs, cpio, exfat, ext, f2fs, fat, +hfsplus, iso9660, squash4, tar, xfs and zfs. + +The JFS, ReiserFS, romfs, UDF and UFS security vulnerabilities were +reported by Jonathan Bar Or . + +Fixes: CVE-2025-0677 +Fixes: CVE-2025-0684 +Fixes: CVE-2025-0685 +Fixes: CVE-2025-0686 +Fixes: CVE-2025-0689 + +Suggested-by: Daniel Axtens +Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/affs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/cbfs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/jfs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/minix.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/romfs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/sfs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/udf.c | 11 ++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/ufs.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 11 files changed, 88 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/affs.c b/grub-core/fs/affs.c +index 9b0afb954..520a001c7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/affs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/affs.c +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -703,12 +704,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_affs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(affs) + { +- grub_affs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_affs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_affs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_affs_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(affs) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_affs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_affs_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c b/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c +index 2332745fe..b62c8777c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/cbfs.c +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -390,13 +391,17 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (cbfs) + #if (defined (__i386__) || defined (__x86_64__)) && !defined (GRUB_UTIL) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_XEN) + init_cbfsdisk (); + #endif +- grub_cbfs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_cbfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_cbfs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_cbfs_fs); ++ } + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI (cbfs) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_cbfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_cbfs_fs); + #if (defined (__i386__) || defined (__x86_64__)) && !defined (GRUB_UTIL) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_EMU) && !defined (GRUB_MACHINE_XEN) + fini_cbfsdisk (); + #endif +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +index a82800ac3..03be9ef4c 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/jfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/jfs.c +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -1004,12 +1005,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_jfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(jfs) + { +- grub_jfs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_jfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_jfs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_jfs_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(jfs) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_jfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_jfs_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/minix.c b/grub-core/fs/minix.c +index b7679c3e2..4440fcca8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/minix.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/minix.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -734,8 +735,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(minix) + #endif + #endif + { +- grub_minix_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_minix_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_minix_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_minix_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + +@@ -757,5 +761,6 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(minix) + #endif + #endif + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_minix_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_minix_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c +index 4e1e71738..26e6077ff 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/nilfs2.c +@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -1231,12 +1232,16 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT (nilfs2) + grub_nilfs2_dat_entry)); + COMPILE_TIME_ASSERT (1 << LOG_INODE_SIZE + == sizeof (struct grub_nilfs2_inode)); +- grub_nilfs2_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_nilfs2_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_nilfs2_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_nilfs2_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI (nilfs2) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_nilfs2_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_nilfs2_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index 4e144cc3c..e00349b1d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -1541,12 +1542,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_ntfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (ntfs) + { +- grub_ntfs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_ntfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_ntfs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_ntfs_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI (ntfs) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_ntfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_ntfs_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c +index c3850e013..5d3c85950 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/reiserfs.c +@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -1417,12 +1418,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_reiserfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(reiserfs) + { +- grub_reiserfs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_reiserfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_reiserfs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_reiserfs_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(reiserfs) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_reiserfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_reiserfs_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/romfs.c b/grub-core/fs/romfs.c +index 56b0b2b2f..eafab03b2 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/romfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/romfs.c +@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -475,11 +476,15 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_romfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(romfs) + { +- grub_romfs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_romfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_romfs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_romfs_fs); ++ } + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(romfs) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_romfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_romfs_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c +index f0d7cac43..88705b3a2 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c +@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); +@@ -779,12 +780,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_sfs_fs = + + GRUB_MOD_INIT(sfs) + { +- grub_sfs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_sfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_sfs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_sfs_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI(sfs) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_sfs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_sfs_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/udf.c b/grub-core/fs/udf.c +index 8765c633c..3d5ee5af5 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/udf.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/udf.c +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + #include + #include + +@@ -1455,12 +1456,16 @@ static struct grub_fs grub_udf_fs = { + + GRUB_MOD_INIT (udf) + { +- grub_udf_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_udf_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_udf_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_udf_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + + GRUB_MOD_FINI (udf) + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_udf_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_udf_fs); + } +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c +index e82d9356d..8b5adbd48 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ufs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ufs.c +@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -899,8 +900,11 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(ufs1) + #endif + #endif + { +- grub_ufs_fs.mod = mod; +- grub_fs_register (&grub_ufs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ { ++ grub_ufs_fs.mod = mod; ++ grub_fs_register (&grub_ufs_fs); ++ } + my_mod = mod; + } + +@@ -914,6 +918,7 @@ GRUB_MOD_FINI(ufs1) + #endif + #endif + { +- grub_fs_unregister (&grub_ufs_fs); ++ if (!grub_is_lockdown ()) ++ grub_fs_unregister (&grub_ufs_fs); + } + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0060-disk-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-ar.patch b/backport-0060-disk-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-ar.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..aa56f3c987f6d90cd939c39dfa619446617c1d69 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0060-disk-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-ar.patch @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +From d8151f98331ee4d15fcca59edffa59246d8fc15f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 02:55:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 51/73] disk: Prevent overflows when allocating memory for + arrays + +Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper +overflow checks are in place. + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 6 ++---- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c +index 1efad0b..830216a 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c +@@ -671,8 +671,7 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + goto lvs_segment_fail; + } + +- seg->nodes = grub_zalloc (sizeof (seg->nodes[0]) +- * seg->node_count); ++ seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, sizeof (seg->nodes[0])); + + p = grub_strstr (p, "mirrors = ["); + if (p == NULL) +@@ -760,8 +759,7 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + } + } + +- seg->nodes = grub_zalloc (sizeof (seg->nodes[0]) +- * seg->node_count); ++ seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, sizeof (seg->nodes[0])); + + p = grub_strstr (p, "raids = ["); + if (p == NULL) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0061-disk-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-.patch b/backport-0061-disk-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..6d016c317685b5dcc4685f87fc174c150d7c2d85 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0061-disk-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,156 @@ +From 33bd6b5ac5c77b346769ab5284262f94e695e464 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 02:55:11 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 52/73] disk: Check if returned pointer for allocated memory is + NULL + +When using grub_malloc(), grub_zalloc() or grub_calloc(), these functions can +fail if we are out of memory. After allocating memory we should check if these +functions returned NULL and handle this error if they did. + +On the occasion make a NULL check in ATA code more obvious. + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/ata.c | 4 ++-- + grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c | 6 ++++++ + grub-core/disk/ldm.c | 6 ++++++ + grub-core/disk/lvm.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ + grub-core/disk/memdisk.c | 2 ++ + 5 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ata.c b/grub-core/disk/ata.c +index 3620a28..8bc3ab7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ata.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ata.c +@@ -112,10 +112,10 @@ grub_ata_identify (struct grub_ata *dev) + return grub_atapi_identify (dev); + + info64 = grub_malloc (GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE); ++ if (info64 == NULL) ++ return grub_errno; + info32 = (grub_uint32_t *) info64; + info16 = (grub_uint16_t *) info64; +- if (! info16) +- return grub_errno; + + grub_memset (&parms, 0, sizeof (parms)); + parms.buffer = info16; +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c +index ec413c3..89c212f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/obdisk.c +@@ -398,6 +398,12 @@ canonicalise_disk (const char *devname) + + grub_strlen (real_unit_address); + + real_canon = grub_malloc (real_unit_str_len); ++ if (real_canon == NULL) ++ { ++ grub_free (parent); ++ grub_print_error (); ++ return NULL; ++ } + + grub_snprintf (real_canon, real_unit_str_len, "%s/disk@%s", + op->name, real_unit_address); +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +index 337abf7..2eb8360 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ldm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ldm.c +@@ -277,6 +277,12 @@ make_vg (grub_disk_t disk, + } + pv->id.uuidlen = *ptr; + pv->id.uuid = grub_malloc (pv->id.uuidlen + 1); ++ if (pv->id.uuid == NULL) ++ { ++ grub_free (pv->internal_id); ++ grub_free (pv); ++ goto fail2; ++ } + grub_memcpy (pv->id.uuid, ptr + 1, pv->id.uuidlen); + pv->id.uuid[pv->id.uuidlen] = 0; + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c +index 830216a..8386bd2 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/lvm.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/lvm.c +@@ -370,6 +370,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + break; + + pv = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*pv)); ++ if (pv == NULL) ++ goto fail4; + q = p; + while (*q != ' ' && q < mda_end) + q++; +@@ -379,6 +381,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + + s = q - p; + pv->name = grub_malloc (s + 1); ++ if (pv->name == NULL) ++ goto pvs_fail_noname; + grub_memcpy (pv->name, p, s); + pv->name[s] = '\0'; + +@@ -451,6 +455,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + break; + + lv = grub_zalloc (sizeof (*lv)); ++ if (lv == NULL) ++ goto fail4; + + q = p; + while (*q != ' ' && q < mda_end) +@@ -545,6 +551,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + goto lvs_fail; + } + lv->segments = grub_calloc (lv->segment_count, sizeof (*seg)); ++ if (lv->segments == NULL) ++ goto lvs_fail; + seg = lv->segments; + + for (i = 0; i < lv->segment_count; i++) +@@ -612,6 +620,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + + seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, + sizeof (*stripe)); ++ if (seg->nodes == NULL) ++ goto lvs_segment_fail; + stripe = seg->nodes; + + p = grub_strstr (p, "stripes = ["); +@@ -672,6 +682,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + } + + seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, sizeof (seg->nodes[0])); ++ if (seg->nodes == NULL) ++ goto lvs_segment_fail; + + p = grub_strstr (p, "mirrors = ["); + if (p == NULL) +@@ -760,6 +772,8 @@ grub_lvm_detect (grub_disk_t disk, + } + + seg->nodes = grub_calloc (seg->node_count, sizeof (seg->nodes[0])); ++ if (seg->nodes == NULL) ++ goto lvs_segment_fail; + + p = grub_strstr (p, "raids = ["); + if (p == NULL) +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c +index 613779c..595de78 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/memdisk.c +@@ -98,6 +98,8 @@ GRUB_MOD_INIT(memdisk) + + memdisk_size = header->size - sizeof (struct grub_module_header); + memdisk_addr = grub_malloc (memdisk_size); ++ if (memdisk_addr == NULL) ++ return; + + grub_dprintf ("memdisk", "Copying memdisk image to dynamic memory\n"); + grub_memmove (memdisk_addr, memdisk_orig_addr, memdisk_size); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0062-disk-ieee1275-ofdisk-Call-grub_ieee1275_close-when-g.patch b/backport-0062-disk-ieee1275-ofdisk-Call-grub_ieee1275_close-when-g.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..92701d2cb0e8f417fc1805318e4b2a759ae72d1a --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0062-disk-ieee1275-ofdisk-Call-grub_ieee1275_close-when-g.patch @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +From fbaddcca541805c333f0fc792b82772594e73753 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 02:55:12 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 53/73] disk/ieee1275/ofdisk: Call grub_ieee1275_close() when + grub_malloc() fails + +In the dev_iterate() function a handle is opened but isn't closed when +grub_malloc() returns NULL. We should fix this by closing it on error. + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c | 5 ++++- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c +index 5534684..f27fdd3 100644 +--- a/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c ++++ b/grub-core/disk/ieee1275/ofdisk.c +@@ -247,7 +247,10 @@ dev_iterate (const struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias) + + buf = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (alias->path) + 32); + if (!buf) +- return; ++ { ++ grub_ieee1275_close (ihandle); ++ return; ++ } + bufptr = grub_stpcpy (buf, alias->path); + + for (i = 0; i < args.nentries; i++) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0063-fs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch b/backport-0063-fs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..cfb34f70ae1f623572d5b18677f61ec63aa23c7d --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0063-fs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +From 60e45174f2783ed21463674b1847a26d38bf7d4c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 19:02:36 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 54/73] fs: Use safe math macros to prevent overflows + +Replace direct arithmetic operations with macros from include/grub/safemath.h +to prevent potential overflow issues when calculating the memory sizes. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/archelp.c | 9 ++++++++- + grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c | 16 ++++++++++++++-- + grub-core/fs/f2fs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c | 9 ++++++++- + grub-core/fs/squash4.c | 12 +++++++++--- + grub-core/fs/xfs.c | 17 +++++++++++++++-- + 7 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/archelp.c b/grub-core/fs/archelp.c +index 0cf544f..6491f74 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/archelp.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/archelp.c +@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -68,6 +69,7 @@ handle_symlink (struct grub_archelp_data *data, + char *rest; + char *linktarget; + grub_size_t linktarget_len; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + *restart = 0; + +@@ -98,7 +100,12 @@ handle_symlink (struct grub_archelp_data *data, + if (linktarget[0] == '\0') + return GRUB_ERR_NONE; + linktarget_len = grub_strlen (linktarget); +- target = grub_malloc (linktarget_len + grub_strlen (*name) + 2); ++ ++ if (grub_add (linktarget_len, grub_strlen (*name), &sz) || ++ grub_add (sz, 2, &sz)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("link target length overflow")); ++ ++ target = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!target) + return grub_errno; + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c +index 4258b83..40e4cbb 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c +@@ -1919,6 +1919,7 @@ find_path (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, + char *path_alloc = NULL; + char *origpath = NULL; + unsigned symlinks_max = 32; ++ grub_size_t sz; + const char *relpath = grub_env_get ("btrfs_relative_path"); + + follow_default = 0; +@@ -2046,9 +2047,15 @@ find_path (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, + struct grub_btrfs_dir_item *cdirel; + if (elemsize > allocated) + { +- allocated = 2 * elemsize; ++ if (grub_mul (2, elemsize, &allocated) || ++ grub_add (allocated, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_free (path_alloc); ++ grub_free (origpath); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("directory item size overflow")); ++ } + grub_free (direl); +- direl = grub_malloc (allocated + 1); ++ direl = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!direl) + { + grub_free (path_alloc); +@@ -2112,8 +2119,16 @@ find_path (struct grub_btrfs_data *data, + grub_free (origpath); + return err; + } +- tmp = grub_malloc (grub_le_to_cpu64 (inode.size) +- + grub_strlen (path) + 1); ++ ++ if (grub_add (grub_le_to_cpu64 (inode.size), grub_strlen (path), &sz) || ++ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_free (direl); ++ grub_free (path_alloc); ++ grub_free (origpath); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("buffer size overflow")); ++ } ++ tmp = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!tmp) + { + grub_free (direl); +@@ -2253,6 +2268,7 @@ grub_btrfs_dir (grub_device_t device, const char *path, + int r = 0; + grub_uint64_t tree; + grub_uint8_t type; ++ grub_size_t sz; + char *new_path = NULL; + + if (!data) +@@ -2303,9 +2319,15 @@ grub_btrfs_dir (grub_device_t device, const char *path, + } + if (elemsize > allocated) + { +- allocated = 2 * elemsize; ++ if (grub_mul (2, elemsize, &allocated) || ++ grub_add (allocated, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("directory element size overflow")); ++ r = -grub_errno; ++ break; ++ } + grub_free (direl); +- direl = grub_malloc (allocated + 1); ++ direl = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!direl) + { + r = -grub_errno; +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c b/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c +index c94e774..e6c51a6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c +@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + struct head hd; + grub_size_t namesize; + grub_uint32_t modeval; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + data->hofs = data->next_hofs; + +@@ -86,7 +88,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + + *mode = modeval; + +- *name = grub_malloc (namesize + 1); ++ if (grub_add (namesize, 1, &sz)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("file name size overflow")); ++ ++ *name = grub_malloc (sz); + if (*name == NULL) + return grub_errno; + +@@ -120,10 +125,17 @@ grub_cpio_get_link_target (struct grub_archelp_data *data) + { + char *ret; + grub_err_t err; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + if (data->size == 0) + return grub_strdup (""); +- ret = grub_malloc (data->size + 1); ++ ++ if (grub_add (data->size, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("target data size overflow")); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ret = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!ret) + return NULL; + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c +index 3d55887..66e408d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/f2fs.c +@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -930,6 +931,7 @@ grub_f2fs_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node) + char *symlink; + struct grub_fshelp_node *diro = node; + grub_uint64_t filesize; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + if (!diro->inode_read) + { +@@ -940,7 +942,12 @@ grub_f2fs_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node) + + filesize = grub_f2fs_file_size(&diro->inode.i); + +- symlink = grub_malloc (filesize + 1); ++ if (grub_add (filesize, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("symlink size overflow")); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ symlink = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!symlink) + return 0; + +@@ -969,6 +976,7 @@ grub_f2fs_check_dentries (struct grub_f2fs_dir_iter_ctx *ctx) + enum FILE_TYPE ftype; + int name_len; + int ret; ++ int sz; + + if (grub_f2fs_test_bit_le (i, ctx->bitmap) == 0) + { +@@ -978,7 +986,12 @@ grub_f2fs_check_dentries (struct grub_f2fs_dir_iter_ctx *ctx) + + ftype = ctx->dentry[i].file_type; + name_len = grub_le_to_cpu16 (ctx->dentry[i].name_len); +- filename = grub_malloc (name_len + 1); ++ if (grub_add (name_len, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("directory entry name length overflow")); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ filename = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!filename) + return 0; + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c +index b1f78e6..8859470 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ ntfscomp (grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs, + { + grub_err_t ret; + grub_disk_addr_t vcn; ++ int log_sz; + + if (ctx->attr->sbuf) + { +@@ -349,7 +351,12 @@ ntfscomp (grub_uint8_t *dest, grub_disk_addr_t ofs, + } + + ctx->comp.comp_head = ctx->comp.comp_tail = 0; +- ctx->comp.cbuf = grub_malloc (1 << (ctx->comp.log_spc + GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR)); ++ if (grub_add (ctx->comp.log_spc, GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR, &log_sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("compression buffer size overflow")); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ctx->comp.cbuf = grub_malloc (1 << log_sz); + if (!ctx->comp.cbuf) + return 0; + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c +index 6a2275a..006f9b7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c +@@ -460,11 +460,11 @@ grub_squash_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node) + { + char *ret; + grub_err_t err; +- grub_size_t sz; ++ grub_uint32_t sz; + + if (grub_add (grub_le_to_cpu32 (node->ino.symlink.namelen), 1, &sz)) + { +- grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow is detected")); ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("symlink name length overflow")); + return NULL; + } + +@@ -580,6 +580,7 @@ grub_squash_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + struct grub_squash_dirent di; + struct grub_squash_inode ino; + grub_size_t sz; ++ grub_uint16_t nlen; + + err = read_chunk (dir->data, &di, sizeof (di), + grub_le_to_cpu64 (dir->data->sb.diroffset) +@@ -595,7 +596,12 @@ grub_squash_iterate_dir (grub_fshelp_node_t dir, + if (err) + return 0; + +- buf = grub_malloc (grub_le_to_cpu16 (di.namelen) + 2); ++ if (grub_add (grub_le_to_cpu16 (di.namelen), 2, &nlen)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("name length overflow")); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ buf = grub_malloc (nlen); + if (!buf) + return 0; + err = read_chunk (dir->data, buf, +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +index 7e1bb33..ee4513e 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/xfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/xfs.c +@@ -679,6 +679,7 @@ static char * + grub_xfs_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node) + { + grub_ssize_t size = grub_be_to_cpu64 (node->inode.size); ++ grub_size_t sz; + + if (size < 0) + { +@@ -700,7 +701,12 @@ grub_xfs_read_symlink (grub_fshelp_node_t node) + if (node->data->hascrc) + off = 56; + +- symlink = grub_malloc (size + 1); ++ if (grub_add (size, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("symlink size overflow")); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ symlink = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!symlink) + return 0; + +@@ -750,8 +756,15 @@ static int iterate_dir_call_hook (grub_uint64_t ino, const char *filename, + { + struct grub_fshelp_node *fdiro; + grub_err_t err; ++ grub_size_t sz; + +- fdiro = grub_malloc (grub_xfs_fshelp_size(ctx->diro->data) + 1); ++ if (grub_add (grub_xfs_fshelp_size(ctx->diro->data), 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("directory data size overflow")); ++ grub_print_error (); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ fdiro = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!fdiro) + { + grub_print_error (); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0064-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arra.patch b/backport-0064-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arra.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19070d57662872bf44090ba7c45d78f755a9bcfe --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0064-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arra.patch @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +From 84bc0a9a68835952ae69165c11709811dae7634e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 19:02:37 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 55/73] fs: Prevent overflows when allocating memory for arrays + +Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper +overflow checks are in place. + +The HFS+ and squash4 security vulnerabilities were reported by +Jonathan Bar Or . + +Fixes: CVE-2025-0678 +Fixes: CVE-2025-1125 + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/btrfs.c | 4 ++-- + grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c | 9 +++++++-- + grub-core/fs/squash4.c | 8 ++++---- + 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c +index 0625b1166..9c1e925c9 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/btrfs.c +@@ -1276,8 +1276,8 @@ grub_btrfs_mount (grub_device_t dev) + } + + data->n_devices_allocated = 16; +- data->devices_attached = grub_malloc (sizeof (data->devices_attached[0]) +- * data->n_devices_allocated); ++ data->devices_attached = grub_calloc (data->n_devices_allocated, ++ sizeof (data->devices_attached[0])); + if (!data->devices_attached) + { + grub_free (data); +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c b/grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c +index 48ae438d8..a80954ee6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/hfspluscomp.c +@@ -244,14 +244,19 @@ hfsplus_open_compressed_real (struct grub_hfsplus_file *node) + return 0; + } + node->compress_index_size = grub_le_to_cpu32 (index_size); +- node->compress_index = grub_malloc (node->compress_index_size +- * sizeof (node->compress_index[0])); ++ node->compress_index = grub_calloc (node->compress_index_size, ++ sizeof (node->compress_index[0])); + if (!node->compress_index) + { + node->compressed = 0; + grub_free (attr_node); + return grub_errno; + } ++ ++ /* ++ * The node->compress_index_size * sizeof (node->compress_index[0]) is safe here ++ * due to relevant checks done in grub_calloc() above. ++ */ + if (grub_hfsplus_read_file (node, 0, 0, + 0x104 + sizeof (index_size), + node->compress_index_size +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c +index f91ff3bfa..cf2bca822 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/squash4.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/squash4.c +@@ -822,10 +822,10 @@ direct_read (struct grub_squash_data *data, + break; + } + total_blocks = ((total_size + data->blksz - 1) >> data->log2_blksz); +- ino->block_sizes = grub_malloc (total_blocks +- * sizeof (ino->block_sizes[0])); +- ino->cumulated_block_sizes = grub_malloc (total_blocks +- * sizeof (ino->cumulated_block_sizes[0])); ++ ino->block_sizes = grub_calloc (total_blocks, ++ sizeof (ino->block_sizes[0])); ++ ino->cumulated_block_sizes = grub_calloc (total_blocks, ++ sizeof (ino->cumulated_block_sizes[0])); + if (!ino->block_sizes || !ino->cumulated_block_sizes) + { + grub_free (ino->block_sizes); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0065-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-assigning-returned-values-.patch b/backport-0065-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-assigning-returned-values-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..581deb96db6b46678fa8fb26df2ff377e89a62a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0065-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-assigning-returned-values-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +From cde9f7f338f8f5771777f0e7dfc423ddf952ad31 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 19:02:38 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 56/73] fs: Prevent overflows when assigning returned values + from read_number() + +The direct assignment of the unsigned long long value returned by +read_number() can potentially lead to an overflow on a 32-bit systems. +The fix replaces the direct assignments with calls to grub_cast() +which detects the overflows and safely assigns the values if no +overflow is detected. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c | 18 ++++++++++++++---- + grub-core/fs/tar.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++------- + 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c b/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c +index 6ba58b354..45ac119a8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/cpio_common.c +@@ -62,11 +62,21 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + #endif + ) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "invalid cpio archive"); +- data->size = read_number (hd.filesize, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.filesize)); ++ ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.filesize, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.filesize)), &data->size)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("data size overflow")); ++ + if (mtime) +- *mtime = read_number (hd.mtime, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.mtime)); +- modeval = read_number (hd.mode, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.mode)); +- namesize = read_number (hd.namesize, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.namesize)); ++ { ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.mtime, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.mtime)), mtime)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("mtime overflow")); ++ } ++ ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.mode, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.mode)), &modeval)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("mode overflow")); ++ ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.namesize, ARRAY_SIZE (hd.namesize)), &namesize)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("namesize overflow")); + + /* Don't allow negative numbers. */ + if (namesize >= 0x80000000) +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/tar.c b/grub-core/fs/tar.c +index fd2ec1f74..1eaa5349f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/tar.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/tar.c +@@ -99,9 +99,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + if (hd.typeflag == 'L') + { + grub_err_t err; +- grub_size_t namesize = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)); ++ grub_size_t namesize; + +- if (grub_add (namesize, 1, &sz)) ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)), &namesize) || ++ grub_add (namesize, 1, &sz)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("name size overflow")); + + *name = grub_malloc (sz); +@@ -123,9 +124,10 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + if (hd.typeflag == 'K') + { + grub_err_t err; +- grub_size_t linksize = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)); ++ grub_size_t linksize; + +- if (grub_add (linksize, 1, &sz)) ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)), &linksize) || ++ grub_add (linksize, 1, &sz)) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("link size overflow")); + + if (data->linkname_alloc < sz) +@@ -174,15 +176,22 @@ grub_cpio_find_file (struct grub_archelp_data *data, char **name, + (*name)[extra_size + sizeof (hd.name)] = 0; + } + +- data->size = read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)); ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.size, sizeof (hd.size)), &data->size)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("data size overflow")); ++ + data->dofs = data->hofs + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE; + data->next_hofs = data->dofs + ((data->size + GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - 1) & + ~(GRUB_DISK_SECTOR_SIZE - 1)); + if (mtime) +- *mtime = read_number (hd.mtime, sizeof (hd.mtime)); ++ { ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.mtime, sizeof (hd.mtime)), mtime)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("mtime overflow")); ++ } + if (mode) + { +- *mode = read_number (hd.mode, sizeof (hd.mode)); ++ if (grub_cast (read_number (hd.mode, sizeof (hd.mode)), mode)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, N_("mode overflow")); ++ + switch (hd.typeflag) + { + /* Hardlink. */ +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0066-fs-zfs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch b/backport-0066-fs-zfs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0990dcb9d319bec9631904146cd8f39bdeb70dd0 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0066-fs-zfs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +From 88e491a0f744c6b19b6d4caa300a576ba56db7c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 07:17:02 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 57/73] fs/zfs: Use safe math macros to prevent overflows + +Replace direct arithmetic operations with macros from include/grub/safemath.h +to prevent potential overflow issues when calculating the memory sizes. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ + 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index cbbd867..72ebf53 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -2383,6 +2383,7 @@ fzap_iterate (dnode_end_t * zap_dnode, zap_phys_t * zap, + zap_dnode->endian) << DNODE_SHIFT); + grub_err_t err; + grub_zfs_endian_t endian; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + if (zap_verify (zap, zap_dnode->endian)) + return 0; +@@ -2444,8 +2445,14 @@ fzap_iterate (dnode_end_t * zap_dnode, zap_phys_t * zap, + if (le->le_type != ZAP_CHUNK_ENTRY) + continue; + +- buf = grub_malloc (grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_name_length, endian) +- * name_elem_length + 1); ++ if (grub_mul (grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_name_length, endian), name_elem_length, &sz) || ++ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("buffer size overflow")); ++ grub_free (l); ++ return grub_errno; ++ } ++ buf = grub_malloc (sz); + if (zap_leaf_array_get (l, endian, blksft, + grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_name_chunk, + endian), +@@ -2866,6 +2873,7 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + && ((grub_zfs_to_cpu64(((znode_phys_t *) DN_BONUS (&dnode_path->dn.dn))->zp_mode, dnode_path->dn.endian) >> 12) & 0xf) == 0xa) + { + char *sym_value; ++ grub_size_t sz; + grub_size_t sym_sz; + int free_symval = 0; + char *oldpath = path, *oldpathbuf = path_buf; +@@ -2916,8 +2924,19 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + if (err) + break; + free_symval = 1; +- } +- path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sym_sz + grub_strlen (oldpath) + 1); ++ } ++ ++ if (grub_add (sym_sz, grub_strlen (oldpath), &sz) || ++ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("path buffer size overflow")); ++ grub_free (oldpathbuf); ++ if (free_symval) ++ grub_free (sym_value); ++ err = grub_errno; ++ break; ++ } ++ path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!path_buf) + { + grub_free (oldpathbuf); +@@ -2951,6 +2970,7 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + { + void *sahdrp; + int hdrsize; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + if (dnode_path->dn.dn.dn_bonuslen != 0) + { +@@ -2984,7 +3004,15 @@ dnode_get_path (struct subvolume *subvol, const char *path_in, dnode_end_t *dn, + + SA_SIZE_OFFSET), + dnode_path->dn.endian); + char *oldpath = path, *oldpathbuf = path_buf; +- path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sym_sz + grub_strlen (oldpath) + 1); ++ if (grub_add (sym_sz, grub_strlen (oldpath), &sz) || ++ grub_add (sz, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("path buffer size overflow")); ++ grub_free (oldpathbuf); ++ err = grub_errno; ++ break; ++ } ++ path = path_buf = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!path_buf) + { + grub_free (oldpathbuf); +@@ -3553,6 +3581,7 @@ grub_zfs_nvlist_lookup_nvlist_array (const char *nvlist, const char *name, + unsigned i; + grub_size_t nelm; + int elemsize = 0; ++ int sz; + + found = nvlist_find_value (nvlist, name, DATA_TYPE_NVLIST_ARRAY, &nvpair, + &size, &nelm); +@@ -3587,7 +3616,12 @@ grub_zfs_nvlist_lookup_nvlist_array (const char *nvlist, const char *name, + return 0; + } + +- ret = grub_zalloc (elemsize + sizeof (grub_uint32_t)); ++ if (grub_add (elemsize, sizeof (grub_uint32_t), &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("elemsize overflow")); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ret = grub_zalloc (sz); + if (!ret) + return 0; + grub_memcpy (ret, nvlist, sizeof (grub_uint32_t)); +@@ -4166,6 +4200,7 @@ iterate_zap_snap (const char *name, grub_uint64_t val, + struct grub_dirhook_info info; + char *name2; + int ret; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + dnode_end_t mdn; + +@@ -4186,7 +4221,10 @@ iterate_zap_snap (const char *name, grub_uint64_t val, + return 0; + } + +- name2 = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (name) + 2); ++ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (name), 2, &sz)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("name length overflow")); ++ ++ name2 = grub_malloc (sz); + name2[0] = '@'; + grub_memcpy (name2 + 1, name, grub_strlen (name) + 1); + ret = ctx->hook (name2, &info, ctx->hook_data); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0067-fs-zfs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-.patch b/backport-0067-fs-zfs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..24a2d3d0b30f6046ef828012e7a1cd7bc983ed1a --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0067-fs-zfs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 7f38e32c7ebeaebb79e2c71e3c7d5ea367d3a39c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 07:17:03 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 58/73] fs/zfs: Prevent overflows when allocating memory for + arrays + +Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper +overflow checks are in place. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index 3dc69fc..eb44ebe 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -721,8 +721,8 @@ fill_vdev_info_real (struct grub_zfs_data *data, + { + fill->n_children = nelm; + +- fill->children = grub_zalloc (fill->n_children +- * sizeof (fill->children[0])); ++ fill->children = grub_calloc (fill->n_children, ++ sizeof (fill->children[0])); + } + + for (i = 0; i < nelm; i++) +@@ -3699,8 +3699,8 @@ zfs_mount (grub_device_t dev) + #endif + + data->n_devices_allocated = 16; +- data->devices_attached = grub_malloc (sizeof (data->devices_attached[0]) +- * data->n_devices_allocated); ++ data->devices_attached = grub_calloc (data->n_devices_allocated, ++ sizeof (data->devices_attached[0])); + data->n_devices_attached = 0; + err = scan_disk (dev, data, 1, &inserted); + if (err) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0068-fs-zfs-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memor.patch b/backport-0068-fs-zfs-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memor.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1048c2247045150db3387cf13ddab98eab8c19d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0068-fs-zfs-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memor.patch @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +From 13065f69dae0eeb60813809026de5bd021051892 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 07:17:01 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 59/73] fs/zfs: Check if returned pointer for allocated memory + is NULL + +When using grub_malloc() or grub_zalloc(), these functions can fail if +we are out of memory. After allocating memory we should check if these +functions returned NULL and handle this error if they did. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index eb44ebe..27e63ef 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -612,6 +612,8 @@ zfs_fetch_nvlist (struct grub_zfs_device_desc *diskdesc, char **nvlist) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BUG, "member drive unknown"); + + *nvlist = grub_malloc (VDEV_PHYS_SIZE); ++ if (!*nvlist) ++ return grub_errno; + + /* Read in the vdev name-value pair list (112K). */ + err = grub_disk_read (diskdesc->dev->disk, diskdesc->vdev_phys_sector, 0, +@@ -723,6 +725,11 @@ fill_vdev_info_real (struct grub_zfs_data *data, + + fill->children = grub_calloc (fill->n_children, + sizeof (fill->children[0])); ++ if (!fill->children) ++ { ++ grub_free (type); ++ return grub_errno; ++ } + } + + for (i = 0; i < nelm; i++) +@@ -2453,6 +2460,11 @@ fzap_iterate (dnode_end_t * zap_dnode, zap_phys_t * zap, + return grub_errno; + } + buf = grub_malloc (sz); ++ if (!buf) ++ { ++ grub_free (l); ++ return grub_errno; ++ } + if (zap_leaf_array_get (l, endian, blksft, + grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_name_chunk, + endian), +@@ -2468,6 +2480,12 @@ fzap_iterate (dnode_end_t * zap_dnode, zap_phys_t * zap, + val_length = ((int) le->le_value_length + * (int) le->le_int_size); + val = grub_malloc (grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (val_length, endian)); ++ if (!val) ++ { ++ grub_free (l); ++ grub_free (buf); ++ return grub_errno; ++ } + if (zap_leaf_array_get (l, endian, blksft, + grub_zfs_to_cpu16 (le->le_value_chunk, + endian), +@@ -3701,6 +3719,11 @@ zfs_mount (grub_device_t dev) + data->n_devices_allocated = 16; + data->devices_attached = grub_calloc (data->n_devices_allocated, + sizeof (data->devices_attached[0])); ++ if (!data->devices_attached) ++ { ++ grub_free (data); ++ return NULL; ++ } + data->n_devices_attached = 0; + err = scan_disk (dev, data, 1, &inserted); + if (err) +@@ -4227,6 +4250,9 @@ iterate_zap_snap (const char *name, grub_uint64_t val, + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("name length overflow")); + + name2 = grub_malloc (sz); ++ if (!name2) ++ return grub_errno; ++ + name2[0] = '@'; + grub_memcpy (name2 + 1, name, grub_strlen (name) + 1); + ret = ctx->hook (name2, &info, ctx->hook_data); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0069-fs-zfs-Add-missing-NULL-check-after-grub_strdup-call.patch b/backport-0069-fs-zfs-Add-missing-NULL-check-after-grub_strdup-call.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..00834d5864adfd008f8d43bd92ca48885dc0de03 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0069-fs-zfs-Add-missing-NULL-check-after-grub_strdup-call.patch @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +From dd6a4c8d10e02ca5056681e75795041a343636e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 07:17:04 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 60/73] fs/zfs: Add missing NULL check after grub_strdup() call + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c | 2 ++ + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +index 6a964974f..376042631 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/zfs/zfs.c +@@ -3349,6 +3349,8 @@ dnode_get_fullpath (const char *fullpath, struct subvolume *subvol, + filename = 0; + snapname = 0; + fsname = grub_strdup (fullpath); ++ if (!fsname) ++ return grub_errno; + } + else + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0070-net-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch b/backport-0070-net-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..07f1a2822383afa87cc7a98995832dc4790361b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0070-net-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch @@ -0,0 +1,242 @@ +From c0efc60fd470068fb2849adcab9db6719e4ab5c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 18:04:42 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 61/73] net: Use safe math macros to prevent overflows + +Replace direct arithmetic operations with macros from include/grub/safemath.h +to prevent potential overflow issues when calculating the memory sizes. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/bootp.c | 16 ++++++++-- + grub-core/net/dns.c | 9 +++++- + grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c | 20 ++++++++++-- + grub-core/net/net.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++----- + 4 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/bootp.c b/grub-core/net/bootp.c +index 6b07a4a..4f4cb79 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/bootp.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/bootp.c +@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + static int + dissect_url (const char *url, char **proto, char **host, char **path) +@@ -1479,6 +1480,7 @@ grub_cmd_dhcpopt (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + unsigned num; + const grub_uint8_t *ptr; + grub_uint8_t taglength; ++ grub_uint8_t len; + + if (argc < 4) + return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT, +@@ -1520,7 +1522,12 @@ grub_cmd_dhcpopt (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + if (grub_strcmp (args[3], "string") == 0) + { + grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE; +- char *val = grub_malloc (taglength + 1); ++ char *val; ++ ++ if (grub_add (taglength, 1, &len)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("tag length overflow")); ++ ++ val = grub_malloc (len); + if (!val) + return grub_errno; + grub_memcpy (val, ptr, taglength); +@@ -1553,7 +1560,12 @@ grub_cmd_dhcpopt (struct grub_command *cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + if (grub_strcmp (args[3], "hex") == 0) + { + grub_err_t err = GRUB_ERR_NONE; +- char *val = grub_malloc (2 * taglength + 1); ++ char *val; ++ ++ if (grub_mul (taglength, 2, &len) || grub_add (len, 1, &len)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("tag length overflow")); ++ ++ val = grub_malloc (len); + int i; + if (!val) + return grub_errno; +diff --git a/grub-core/net/dns.c b/grub-core/net/dns.c +index 006fbf4..6af3d67 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/dns.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/dns.c +@@ -224,10 +224,17 @@ get_name (const grub_uint8_t *name_at, const grub_uint8_t *head, + { + int length; + char *ret; ++ int len; + + if (!check_name_real (name_at, head, tail, NULL, &length, NULL)) + return NULL; +- ret = grub_malloc (length + 1); ++ ++ if (grub_add (length, 1, &len)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("name length overflow")); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ret = grub_malloc (len); + if (!ret) + return NULL; + if (!check_name_real (name_at, head, tail, NULL, NULL, ret)) +diff --git a/grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c b/grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c +index bcb3f9e..6501148 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/drivers/ieee1275/ofnet.c +@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -404,6 +405,7 @@ search_net_devices (struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias) + grub_uint8_t *pprop; + char *shortname; + char need_suffix = 1; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + if (grub_strcmp (alias->type, "network") != 0) + return 0; +@@ -461,9 +463,23 @@ search_net_devices (struct grub_ieee1275_devalias *alias) + } + + if (need_suffix) +- ofdata->path = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (alias->path) + sizeof (SUFFIX)); ++ { ++ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (alias->path), sizeof (SUFFIX), &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obatining size of ofdata path")); ++ grub_print_error (); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } + else +- ofdata->path = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (alias->path) + 1); ++ { ++ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (alias->path), 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obatining size of ofdata path")); ++ grub_print_error (); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } + if (!ofdata->path) + { + grub_print_error (); +diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c +index 0cf37f4..9abe2a7 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/net.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c +@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ + #ifdef GRUB_MACHINE_EFI + #include + #endif ++#include + + GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+"); + +@@ -211,6 +212,7 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_slaac (struct grub_net_card *card, + { + struct grub_net_slaac_mac_list *slaac; + char *ptr; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + for (slaac = card->slaac_list; slaac; slaac = slaac->next) + if (grub_net_hwaddr_cmp (&slaac->address, hwaddr) == 0) +@@ -220,9 +222,16 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_slaac (struct grub_net_card *card, + if (!slaac) + return NULL; + +- slaac->name = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (card->name) +- + GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN +- + sizeof (":slaac")); ++ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (card->name), ++ (GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN + sizeof (":slaac")), &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_free (slaac); ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "overflow detected while obtaining size of slaac name"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ ++ slaac->name = grub_malloc (sz); + ptr = grub_stpcpy (slaac->name, card->name); + if (grub_net_hwaddr_cmp (&card->default_address, hwaddr) != 0) + { +@@ -293,6 +302,7 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_link_local (struct grub_net_card *card, + char *name; + char *ptr; + grub_net_network_level_address_t addr; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + addr.type = GRUB_NET_NETWORK_LEVEL_PROTOCOL_IPV6; + addr.ipv6[0] = grub_cpu_to_be64_compile_time (0xfe80ULL << 48); +@@ -307,9 +317,14 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_link_local (struct grub_net_card *card, + return inf; + } + +- name = grub_malloc (grub_strlen (card->name) +- + GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN +- + sizeof (":link")); ++ if (grub_add (grub_strlen (card->name), ++ (GRUB_NET_MAX_STR_HWADDR_LEN + sizeof (":link")), &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, ++ "overflow detected while obtaining size of link name"); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ name = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!name) + return NULL; + +@@ -1462,8 +1477,14 @@ grub_net_open_real (const char *name) + if (grub_strchr (port_start + 1, ':')) + { + int iplen = grub_strlen (server); ++ grub_size_t sz; + /* bracket bare ipv6 addrs */ +- host = grub_malloc (iplen + 3); ++ if (grub_add (iplen, 3, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, N_("overflow detected while obtaining length of host")); ++ return NULL; ++ } ++ host = grub_malloc (sz); + if(!host) + { + return NULL; +@@ -1723,6 +1744,7 @@ grub_env_set_net_property (const char *intername, const char *suffix, + { + char *varname, *varvalue; + char *ptr; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + varname = grub_xasprintf ("net_%s_%s", intername, suffix); + if (!varname) +@@ -1730,7 +1752,12 @@ grub_env_set_net_property (const char *intername, const char *suffix, + for (ptr = varname; *ptr; ptr++) + if (*ptr == ':') + *ptr = '_'; +- varvalue = grub_malloc (len + 1); ++ if (grub_add (len, 1, &sz)) ++ { ++ grub_free (varname); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "overflow detected while obtaining the size of an env variable"); ++ } ++ varvalue = grub_malloc (sz); + if (!varvalue) + { + grub_free (varname); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0071-net-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arr.patch b/backport-0071-net-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arr.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..08d095d7f883ee1394384f6f28a17259f8e8434a --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0071-net-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arr.patch @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +From dee2c14fd66bc497cdc74c69fde8c9b84637c8eb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 18:04:43 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 62/73] net: Prevent overflows when allocating memory for + arrays + +Use grub_calloc() when allocating memory for arrays to ensure proper +overflow checks are in place. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/dns.c | 4 ++-- + grub-core/net/net.c | 4 ++-- + 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/dns.c b/grub-core/net/dns.c +index 39b0c46cf..f20cd6f83 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/dns.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/dns.c +@@ -470,8 +470,8 @@ grub_net_dns_lookup (const char *name, + && grub_get_time_ms () < dns_cache[h].limit_time) + { + grub_dprintf ("dns", "retrieved from cache\n"); +- *addresses = grub_malloc (dns_cache[h].naddresses +- * sizeof ((*addresses)[0])); ++ *addresses = grub_calloc (dns_cache[h].naddresses, ++ sizeof ((*addresses)[0])); + if (!*addresses) + return grub_errno; + *naddresses = dns_cache[h].naddresses; +diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c +index 3ca7e0796..1abdc097f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/net.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c +@@ -88,8 +88,8 @@ grub_net_link_layer_add_address (struct grub_net_card *card, + /* Add sender to cache table. */ + if (card->link_layer_table == NULL) + { +- card->link_layer_table = grub_zalloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE +- * sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0])); ++ card->link_layer_table = grub_calloc (LINK_LAYER_CACHE_SIZE, ++ sizeof (card->link_layer_table[0])); + if (card->link_layer_table == NULL) + return; + } +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0072-net-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-i.patch b/backport-0072-net-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-i.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1f0bff73a477db9aa7b96210ee7a884a17545202 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0072-net-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-i.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From 1c06ec900591d1fab6fbacf80dc010541d0a5ec8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2025 18:04:44 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 63/73] net: Check if returned pointer for allocated memory is + NULL + +When using grub_malloc(), the function can fail if we are out of memory. +After allocating memory we should check if this function returned NULL +and handle this error if it did. + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/net/net.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/net/net.c b/grub-core/net/net.c +index 1abdc097f..6ea33d1cd 100644 +--- a/grub-core/net/net.c ++++ b/grub-core/net/net.c +@@ -227,6 +227,11 @@ grub_net_ipv6_get_slaac (struct grub_net_card *card, + } + + slaac->name = grub_malloc (sz); ++ if (slaac->name == NULL) ++ { ++ grub_free (slaac); ++ return NULL; ++ } + ptr = grub_stpcpy (slaac->name, card->name); + if (grub_net_hwaddr_cmp (&card->default_address, hwaddr) != 0) + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0073-fs-sfs-Check-if-allocated-memory-is-NULL.patch b/backport-0073-fs-sfs-Check-if-allocated-memory-is-NULL.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..19ef6f709bef6329271bbe47ba1954de592117e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0073-fs-sfs-Check-if-allocated-memory-is-NULL.patch @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +From e3c578a56f9294e286b6028ca7c1def997a17b15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Tue, 28 Jan 2025 05:15:50 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 64/73] fs/sfs: Check if allocated memory is NULL + +When using grub_zalloc(), if we are out of memory, this function can fail. +After allocating memory, we should check if grub_zalloc() returns NULL. +If so, we should handle this error. + +Fixes: CID 473856 + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/sfs.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c +index 88705b3a2..bad4ae8d1 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/sfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/sfs.c +@@ -429,6 +429,9 @@ grub_sfs_mount (grub_disk_t disk) + - 24 /* offsetof (struct grub_sfs_objc, objects) */ + - 25); /* offsetof (struct grub_sfs_obj, filename) */ + data->label = grub_zalloc (max_len + 1); ++ if (data->label == NULL) ++ goto fail; ++ + grub_strncpy (data->label, (char *) rootobjc->objects[0].filename, max_len); + + grub_free (rootobjc_data); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0074-script-execute-Fix-potential-underflow-and-NULL-dere.patch b/backport-0074-script-execute-Fix-potential-underflow-and-NULL-dere.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..add26f7d63547c6a06c30b17dbbfec4ab8f3e3c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0074-script-execute-Fix-potential-underflow-and-NULL-dere.patch @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +From d13b6e8ebd10b4eb16698a002aa40258cf6e6f0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 06:48:37 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 65/73] script/execute: Fix potential underflow and NULL + dereference + +The result is initialized to 0 in grub_script_arglist_to_argv(). +If the for loop condition is not met both result.args and result.argc +remain 0 causing result.argc - 1 to underflow and/or result.args NULL +dereference. Fix the issues by adding relevant checks. + +Fixes: CID 473880 + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/script/execute.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/script/execute.c b/grub-core/script/execute.c +index e1450f45d..a86e0051f 100644 +--- a/grub-core/script/execute.c ++++ b/grub-core/script/execute.c +@@ -760,6 +760,9 @@ cleanup: + } + } + ++ if (result.args == NULL || result.argc == 0) ++ goto fail; ++ + if (! result.args[result.argc - 1]) + result.argc--; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0075-osdep-unix-getroot-Fix-potential-underflow.patch b/backport-0075-osdep-unix-getroot-Fix-potential-underflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..984978a338a69f252152cbb0d46b991997cfc303 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0075-osdep-unix-getroot-Fix-potential-underflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +From 66733f7c7dae889861ea3ef3ec0710811486019e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2025 06:48:38 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 66/73] osdep/unix/getroot: Fix potential underflow + +The entry_len is initialized in grub_find_root_devices_from_mountinfo() +to 0 before the while loop iterates through /proc/self/mountinfo. If the +file is empty or contains only invalid entries entry_len remains +0 causing entry_len - 1 in the subsequent for loop initialization +to underflow. To prevent this add a check to ensure entry_len > 0 before +entering the for loop. + +Fixes: CID 473877 + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +Reviewed-by: Ross Philipson +--- + grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c | 3 +++ + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c b/grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c +index 7dd775d2a..527d4f0c5 100644 +--- a/grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c ++++ b/grub-core/osdep/linux/getroot.c +@@ -484,6 +484,9 @@ again: + } + } + ++ if (!entry_len) ++ goto out; ++ + /* Now scan visible mounts for the ones we're interested in. */ + for (i = entry_len - 1; i >= 0; i--) + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0076-misc-Ensure-consistent-overflow-error-messages.patch b/backport-0076-misc-Ensure-consistent-overflow-error-messages.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7cc0ae7a8227d8199d66bf4c2197a090f2445793 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0076-misc-Ensure-consistent-overflow-error-messages.patch @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From f8795cde217e21539c2f236bcbb1a4bf521086b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2025 19:02:39 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 67/73] misc: Ensure consistent overflow error messages + +Update the overflow error messages to make them consistent +across the GRUB code. + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 2 +- + grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c | 2 +- + grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 2 +- + 3 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +index e00349b1d..960833a34 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c +@@ -574,7 +574,7 @@ retry: + goto retry; + } + } +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "run list overflown"); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "run list overflow"); + } + ctx->curr_vcn = ctx->next_vcn; + ctx->next_vcn += read_run_data (run, c1, 0); /* length of current VCN */ +diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c +index f168a318e..b68bf5e40 100644 +--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c ++++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfscomp.c +@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static grub_err_t + decomp_nextvcn (struct grub_ntfs_comp *cc) + { + if (cc->comp_head >= cc->comp_tail) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "compression block overflown"); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "compression block overflow"); + if (grub_disk_read + (cc->disk, + (cc->comp_table[cc->comp_head].next_lcn - +diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +index 3163e97bf..aa7524b7d 100644 +--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c ++++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c +@@ -626,7 +626,7 @@ static grub_err_t + grub_png_output_byte (struct grub_png_data *data, grub_uint8_t n) + { + if (--data->raw_bytes < 0) +- return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "image size overflown"); ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE, "image size overflow"); + + if (data->cur_column == 0) + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0077-bus-usb-ehci-Define-GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE-as-grub_uint32_.patch b/backport-0077-bus-usb-ehci-Define-GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE-as-grub_uint32_.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9c801fa7a2adc68518185b31d7e5082dbdb9c41e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0077-bus-usb-ehci-Define-GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE-as-grub_uint32_.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 9907d9c2723304b42cf6da74f1cc6c4601391956 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2025 15:11:10 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 68/73] bus/usb/ehci: Define GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE as grub_uint32_t + +The Coverity indicates that GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE is an int that contains +a negative value and we are using it for the variable token which is +grub_uint32_t. To remedy this we can cast the definition to grub_uint32_t. + +Fixes: CID 473851 + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c b/grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c +index 9abebc6bd..2db07c7c0 100644 +--- a/grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c ++++ b/grub-core/bus/usb/ehci.c +@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ enum + + #define GRUB_EHCI_TERMINATE (1<<0) + +-#define GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE (1<<31) ++#define GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE ((grub_uint32_t) 1<<31) + + enum + { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0078-normal-menu-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-an-integer-overfl.patch b/backport-0078-normal-menu-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-an-integer-overfl.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..a692ce98ab191178a2ad7b79a51fb59ebe957a2b --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0078-normal-menu-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-an-integer-overfl.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From 6feae07f953bee6ce82efda19a695d187a32f987 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2025 15:11:11 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 69/73] normal/menu: Use safe math to avoid an integer overflow + +The Coverity indicates that the variable current_entry might overflow. +To prevent this use safe math when adding GRUB_MENU_PAGE_SIZE to current_entry. + +On the occasion fix limiting condition which was broken. + +Fixes: CID 473853 + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/normal/menu.c | 5 ++--- + 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/normal/menu.c b/grub-core/normal/menu.c +index ec0c92b..3fdb8f6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/normal/menu.c ++++ b/grub-core/normal/menu.c +@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include ++#include + + /* Time to delay after displaying an error message about a default/fallback + entry failing to boot. */ +@@ -781,9 +782,7 @@ run_menu (grub_menu_t menu, int nested, int *auto_boot) + + case GRUB_TERM_CTRL | 'c': + case GRUB_TERM_KEY_NPAGE: +- if (current_entry + GRUB_MENU_PAGE_SIZE < menu->size) +- current_entry += GRUB_MENU_PAGE_SIZE; +- else ++ if (grub_add (current_entry, GRUB_MENU_PAGE_SIZE, ¤t_entry) || current_entry >= menu->size) + current_entry = menu->size - 1; + menu_set_chosen_entry (current_entry); + break; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0079-kern-partition-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-c.patch b/backport-0079-kern-partition-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-c.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..54336a0a8512390122b9928452ce05974e68346e --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0079-kern-partition-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-c.patch @@ -0,0 +1,50 @@ +From 8e6e87e7923ca2ae880021cb42a35cc9bb4c8fe2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 18:16:56 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 70/73] kern/partition: Add sanity check after grub_strtoul() + call + +The current code incorrectly assumes that both the input and the values +returned by grub_strtoul() are always valid which can lead to potential +errors. This fix ensures proper validation to prevent any unintended issues. + +Fixes: CID 473843 + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/kern/partition.c | 12 ++++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/partition.c b/grub-core/kern/partition.c +index f3f125e..144a7b6 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/partition.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/partition.c +@@ -125,14 +125,22 @@ grub_partition_probe (struct grub_disk *disk, const char *str) + for (ptr = str; *ptr;) + { + grub_partition_map_t partmap; +- int num; ++ unsigned long num; + const char *partname, *partname_end; + + partname = ptr; + while (*ptr && grub_isalpha (*ptr)) + ptr++; + partname_end = ptr; +- num = grub_strtoul (ptr, &ptr, 0) - 1; ++ ++ num = grub_strtoul (ptr, &ptr, 0); ++ if (*ptr != '\0' || num == 0 || num > GRUB_INT_MAX) ++ { ++ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_NUMBER, N_("invalid partition number")); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ ++ num -= 1; + + curpart = 0; + /* Use the first partition map type found. */ +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0080-kern-misc-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-call.patch b/backport-0080-kern-misc-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-call.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..b4375070adb1afc108c95f5202a4fd05668675e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0080-kern-misc-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-call.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From a8d6b06331a75d75b46f3dd6cc6fcd40dcf604b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Lidong Chen +Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2025 18:16:57 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 71/73] kern/misc: Add sanity check after grub_strtoul() call + +When the format string, fmt0, includes a positional argument +grub_strtoul() or grub_strtoull() is called to extract the argument +position. However, the returned argument position isn't fully validated. +If the format is something like "%0$x" then these functions return +0 which leads to an underflow in the calculation of the args index, curn. +The fix is to add a check to ensure the extracted argument position is +greater than 0 before computing curn. Additionally, replace one +grub_strtoull() with grub_strtoul() and change curn type to make code +more correct. + +Fixes: CID 473841 + +Signed-off-by: Lidong Chen +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/kern/misc.c | 9 +++++++-- + 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/kern/misc.c b/grub-core/kern/misc.c +index 7cee5d75c..2b7922393 100644 +--- a/grub-core/kern/misc.c ++++ b/grub-core/kern/misc.c +@@ -830,7 +830,7 @@ parse_printf_arg_fmt (const char *fmt0, struct printf_args *args, + while ((c = *fmt++) != 0) + { + int longfmt = 0; +- grub_size_t curn; ++ unsigned long curn; + const char *p; + + if (c != '%') +@@ -848,7 +848,10 @@ parse_printf_arg_fmt (const char *fmt0, struct printf_args *args, + + if (*fmt == '$') + { +- curn = grub_strtoull (p, 0, 10) - 1; ++ curn = grub_strtoul (p, 0, 10); ++ if (curn == 0) ++ continue; ++ curn--; + fmt++; + } + +@@ -1034,6 +1037,8 @@ grub_vsnprintf_real (char *str, grub_size_t max_len, const char *fmt0, + + if (*fmt == '$') + { ++ if (format1 == 0) ++ continue; + curn = format1 - 1; + fmt++; + format1 = 0; +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0081-loader-i386-linux-Cast-left-shift-to-grub_uint32_t.patch b/backport-0081-loader-i386-linux-Cast-left-shift-to-grub_uint32_t.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3d514830685c47c0f124c4929fa8a19a1c63816a --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0081-loader-i386-linux-Cast-left-shift-to-grub_uint32_t.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +From 490a6ab71cebd96fae7a1ceb9067484f5ccbec2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2025 01:47:57 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 72/73] loader/i386/linux: Cast left shift to grub_uint32_t + +The Coverity complains that we might overflow into a negative value when +setting linux_params.kernel_alignment to (1 << align). We can remedy +this by casting it to grub_uint32_t. + +Fixes: CID 473876 + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c | 2 +- + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c +index 977757f2c..b051600c8 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/linux.c +@@ -806,7 +806,7 @@ grub_cmd_linux (grub_command_t cmd __attribute__ ((unused)), + } + + linux_params.code32_start = prot_mode_target + lh.code32_start - GRUB_LINUX_BZIMAGE_ADDR; +- linux_params.kernel_alignment = (1 << align); ++ linux_params.kernel_alignment = ((grub_uint32_t) 1 << align); + linux_params.ps_mouse = linux_params.padding11 = 0; + linux_params.type_of_loader = GRUB_LINUX_BOOT_LOADER_TYPE; + +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-0082-loader-i386-bsd-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-underflow.patch b/backport-0082-loader-i386-bsd-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-underflow.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..eba9f11fbc00956cacbf004014f1d505a7beec1c --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-0082-loader-i386-bsd-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-underflow.patch @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +From 4dc6166571645780c459dde2cdc1b001a5ec844c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Alec Brown +Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2025 22:04:08 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH 73/73] loader/i386/bsd: Use safe math to avoid underflow + +The operation kern_end - kern_start may underflow when we input it into +grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr() call. To avoid this we can use safe +math for this subtraction. + +Fixes: CID 73845 + +Signed-off-by: Alec Brown +Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper +--- + grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c | 14 ++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c +index 1f9128f6f..578433402 100644 +--- a/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c ++++ b/grub-core/loader/i386/bsd.c +@@ -1340,6 +1340,7 @@ static grub_err_t + grub_bsd_load_elf (grub_elf_t elf, const char *filename) + { + grub_err_t err; ++ grub_size_t sz; + + kern_end = 0; + kern_start = ~0; +@@ -1370,8 +1371,11 @@ grub_bsd_load_elf (grub_elf_t elf, const char *filename) + + if (grub_errno) + return grub_errno; +- err = grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr (relocator, &ch, +- kern_start, kern_end - kern_start); ++ ++ if (grub_sub (kern_end, kern_start, &sz)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "underflow detected while determining size of kernel for relocator"); ++ ++ err = grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr (relocator, &ch, kern_start, sz); + if (err) + return err; + +@@ -1431,8 +1435,10 @@ grub_bsd_load_elf (grub_elf_t elf, const char *filename) + { + grub_relocator_chunk_t ch; + +- err = grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr (relocator, &ch, kern_start, +- kern_end - kern_start); ++ if (grub_sub (kern_end, kern_start, &sz)) ++ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_OUT_OF_RANGE, "underflow detected while determining size of kernel for relocator"); ++ ++ err = grub_relocator_alloc_chunk_addr (relocator, &ch, kern_start, sz); + if (err) + return err; + kern_chunk_src = get_virtual_current_address (ch); +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/grub.patches b/grub.patches index 546cddfd8a559bdf6964a915dd898d7ec4dd3b4c..21ff49a62aba07bf3d79a9c92285a8d0138d2414 100644 --- a/grub.patches +++ b/grub.patches @@ -357,3 +357,85 @@ Patch0357: backport-osdep-linux-hostdisk-Use-stat-instead-of-udevadm.patch Patch0358: backport-commands-legacycfg-Avoid-closing-file-twice.patch Patch0359: backport-disk-lvm-GRUB-fails-to-detect-LVM-volumes-due-to-an-.patch Patch0360: bugfix-fix-not-verifying-grub-cfg-when-loading-it.patch +Patch0361: backport-0001-misc-Implement-grub_strlcpy.patch +Patch0362: backport-0002-fs-ufs-Fix-a-heap-OOB-write.patch +Patch0363: backport-0003-fs-hfs-Fix-stack-OOB-write-with-grub_strcpy.patch +Patch0364: backport-0004-fs-tar-Initialize-name-in-grub_cpio_find_file.patch +Patch0365: backport-0005-fs-tar-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch +Patch0366: backport-0006-fs-f2fs-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch +Patch0367: backport-0007-fs-hfsplus-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch +Patch0368: backport-0008-fs-iso9660-Set-a-grub_errno-if-mount-fails.patch +Patch0369: backport-0009-fs-iso9660-Fix-invalid-free.patch +Patch0370: backport-0010-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-in-jfs_getent.patch +Patch0371: backport-0011-fs-jfs-Fix-OOB-read-caused-by-invalid-dir-slot-index.patch +Patch0372: backport-0012-fs-jfs-Use-full-40-bits-offset-and-address-for-a-dat.patch +Patch0373: backport-0013-fs-jfs-Inconsistent-signed-unsigned-types-usage-in-r.patch +Patch0374: backport-0014-fs-ext2-Fix-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-extents.patch +Patch0375: backport-0015-fs-ntfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch +Patch0376: backport-0016-fs-ntfs-Track-the-end-of-the-MFT-attribute-buffer.patch +Patch0377: backport-0017-fs-ntfs-Use-a-helper-function-to-access-attributes.patch +Patch0378: backport-0018-fs-ntfs-Implement-attribute-verification.patch +Patch0379: backport-0019-fs-xfs-Fix-issues-found-while-fuzzing-the-XFS-filesy.patch +Patch0380: backport-0020-fs-xfs-Fix-out-of-bounds-read.patch +Patch0381: backport-0021-fs-xfs-Ensuring-failing-to-mount-sets-a-grub_errno.patch +Patch0382: backport-0022-kern-file-Ensure-file-data-is-set.patch +Patch0383: backport-0023-kern-file-Implement-filesystem-reference-counting.patch +Patch0384: backport-0024-cryptodisk-Refactor-to-discard-have_it-global.patch +Patch0385: backport-0025-cryptodisk-Return-failure-in-cryptomount-when-no-cry.patch +Patch0386: backport-0026-cryptodisk-Improve-error-messaging-in-cryptomount-in.patch +Patch0387: backport-0027-cryptodisk-Improve-cryptomount-u-error-message.patch +Patch0388: backport-0028-cryptodisk-Add-infrastructure-to-pass-data-from-cryp.patch +Patch0389: backport-0029-cryptodisk-Refactor-password-input-out-of-crypto-dev.patch +Patch0390: backport-0030-cryptodisk-Move-global-variables-into-grub_cryptomou.patch +Patch0391: backport-0031-cryptodisk-Improve-handling-of-partition-name-in-cry.patch +Patch0392: backport-0032-cryptodisk-Fix-Coverity-use-after-free-bug.patch +Patch0393: backport-0033-disk-cryptodisk-Require-authentication-after-TPM-unl.patch +Patch0394: backport-0034-disk-loopback-Reference-tracking-for-the-loopback.patch +Patch0395: backport-0035-kern-disk-Limit-recursion-depth.patch +Patch0396: backport-0036-kern-partition-Limit-recursion-in-part_iterate.patch +Patch0397: backport-0037-script-execute-Limit-the-recursion-depth.patch +Patch0398: backport-0038-net-Unregister-net_default_ip-and-net_default_mac-va.patch +Patch0399: backport-0039-net-Remove-variables-hooks-when-interface-is-unregis.patch +Patch0400: backport-0040-net-Fix-OOB-write-in-grub_net_search_config_file.patch +Patch0401: backport-0041-net-tftp-Fix-stack-buffer-overflow-in-tftp_open.patch +Patch0402: backport-0042-video-readers-jpeg-Do-not-permit-duplicate-SOF0-mark.patch +Patch0403: backport-0043-kern-dl-Fix-for-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_dl_ref.patch +Patch0404: backport-0044-fs-ext2-Rework-out-of-bounds-read-for-inline-and-external.patch +Patch0405: backport-0045-kern-dl-Check-for-the-SHF_INFO_LINK-flag-in-grub_dl_.patch +Patch0406: backport-0046-commands-extcmd-Missing-check-for-failed-allocation.patch +Patch0407: backport-0047-commands-ls-Fix-NULL-dereference.patch +Patch0408: backport-0048-commands-pgp-Unregister-the-check_signatures-hooks-o.patch +Patch0409: backport-0049-normal-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch +Patch0410: backport-0050-gettext-Remove-variables-hooks-on-module-unload.patch +Patch0411: backport-0051-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write-or-.patch +Patch0412: backport-0052-gettext-Integer-overflow-leads-to-heap-OOB-write.patch +Patch0413: backport-0053-commands-read-Fix-an-integer-overflow-when-supplying.patch +Patch0414: backport-0054-commands-test-Stack-overflow-due-to-unlimited-recurs.patch +Patch0415: backport-0055-commands-minicmd-Block-the-dump-command-in-lockdown-.patch +Patch0416: backport-0056-commands-memrw-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-mo.patch +Patch0417: backport-0057-commands-hexdump-Disable-memory-reading-in-lockdown-.patch +Patch0418: backport-0058-fs-bfs-Disable-under-lockdown.patch +Patch0419: backport-0059-fs-Disable-many-filesystems-under-lockdown.patch +Patch0420: backport-0060-disk-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-ar.patch +Patch0421: backport-0061-disk-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-.patch +Patch0422: backport-0062-disk-ieee1275-ofdisk-Call-grub_ieee1275_close-when-g.patch +Patch0423: backport-0063-fs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch +Patch0424: backport-0064-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arra.patch +Patch0425: backport-0065-fs-Prevent-overflows-when-assigning-returned-values-.patch +Patch0426: backport-0066-fs-zfs-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch +Patch0427: backport-0067-fs-zfs-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-.patch +Patch0428: backport-0068-fs-zfs-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memor.patch +Patch0429: backport-0069-fs-zfs-Add-missing-NULL-check-after-grub_strdup-call.patch +Patch0430: backport-0070-net-Use-safe-math-macros-to-prevent-overflows.patch +Patch0431: backport-0071-net-Prevent-overflows-when-allocating-memory-for-arr.patch +Patch0432: backport-0072-net-Check-if-returned-pointer-for-allocated-memory-i.patch +Patch0433: backport-0073-fs-sfs-Check-if-allocated-memory-is-NULL.patch +Patch0434: backport-0074-script-execute-Fix-potential-underflow-and-NULL-dere.patch +Patch0435: backport-0075-osdep-unix-getroot-Fix-potential-underflow.patch +Patch0436: backport-0076-misc-Ensure-consistent-overflow-error-messages.patch +Patch0437: backport-0077-bus-usb-ehci-Define-GRUB_EHCI_TOGGLE-as-grub_uint32_.patch +Patch0438: backport-0078-normal-menu-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-an-integer-overfl.patch +Patch0439: backport-0079-kern-partition-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-c.patch +Patch0440: backport-0080-kern-misc-Add-sanity-check-after-grub_strtoul-call.patch +Patch0441: backport-0081-loader-i386-linux-Cast-left-shift-to-grub_uint32_t.patch +Patch0442: backport-0082-loader-i386-bsd-Use-safe-math-to-avoid-underflow.patch diff --git a/grub2.spec b/grub2.spec index f9fde11c3cb10d8d2de1ef2c77d91e57170989c5..5f0aab52653b503c48d3462ff04b437f42a3560d 100644 --- a/grub2.spec +++ b/grub2.spec @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ Name: grub2 Epoch: 1 Version: 2.06 -Release: 46 +Release: 47 Summary: Bootloader with support for Linux, Multiboot and more License: GPLv3+ URL: http://www.gnu.org/software/grub/ @@ -440,6 +440,15 @@ fi %{_datadir}/man/man* %changelog +* Tue Mar 4 2025 zhangqiumiao - 1:2.06-47 +- Type:CVE +- CVE:CVE-2024-45781,CVE-2024-45782,CVE-2024-56737,CVE-2024-45780,CVE-2024-45783,CVE-2024-49504,CVE-2025-0624,CVE-20 +24-45774,CVE-2024-45775,CVE-2025-0622,CVE-2025-0622,CVE-2025-0622,CVE-2024-45776,CVE-2024-45777,CVE-2025-0690,CVE-20 +25-1118,CVE-2024-45778,CVE-2024-45779,CVE-2025-0677,CVE-2025-0684,CVE-2025-0685,CVE-2025-0686,CVE-2025-0689,CVE-2025 +-0678,CVE-2025-1125 +- SUG:NA +- DESC:fix the vulnerabilities announced on February 18th, 2025 + * Tue Dec 24 2024 zhangqiumiao - 1:2.06-46 - Type:bugfix - CVE:NA