diff --git a/CVE-2023-0056.patch b/CVE-2023-0056.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..83d49812ee0817e352ed63de0c36005097c95aca --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2023-0056.patch @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +From 827a6299e6995c5c3ba620d8b7cbacdaef67f2c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christopher Faulet +Date: Thu, 22 Dec 2022 09:47:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] BUG/MEDIUM: mux-h2: Refuse interim responses with end-stream + flag set + +As state in RFC9113#8.1, HEADERS frame with the ES flag set that carries an +informational status code is malformed. However, there is no test on this +condition. + +On 2.4 and higher, it is hard to predict consequences of this bug because +end of the message is only reported with a flag. But on 2.2 and lower, it +leads to a crash because there is an unexpected extra EOM block at the end +of an interim response. + +Now, when a ES flag is detected on a HEADERS frame for an interim message, a +stream error is sent (RST_STREAM/PROTOCOL_ERROR). + +This patch should solve the issue #1972. It should be backported as far as +2.0. +--- + src/mux_h2.c | 5 +++++ + 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/mux_h2.c b/src/mux_h2.c +index ac7afcd2a6bc..22b1f1e79a65 100644 +--- a/src/mux_h2.c ++++ b/src/mux_h2.c +@@ -4782,6 +4782,11 @@ static int h2c_decode_headers(struct h2c *h2c, struct buffer *rxbuf, uint32_t *f + *flags |= H2_SF_HEADERS_RCVD; + + if (h2c->dff & H2_F_HEADERS_END_STREAM) { ++ if (msgf & H2_MSGF_RSP_1XX) { ++ /* RFC9113#8.1 : HEADERS frame with the ES flag set that carries an informational status code is malformed */ ++ TRACE_STATE("invalid interim response with ES flag!", H2_EV_RX_FRAME|H2_EV_RX_HDR|H2_EV_H2C_ERR|H2_EV_PROTO_ERR, h2c->conn); ++ goto fail; ++ } + /* no more data are expected for this message */ + htx->flags |= HTX_FL_EOM; + } diff --git a/CVE-2023-25725.patch b/CVE-2023-25725.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..1fb81bbf16f43c8655b03ca9341cca88247aa452 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2023-25725.patch @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +From a8598a2eb11b6c989e81f0dbf10be361782e8d32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Willy Tarreau +Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 21:36:54 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] BUG/CRITICAL: http: properly reject empty http header field + names + +The HTTP header parsers surprizingly accepts empty header field names, +and this is a leftover from the original code that was agnostic to this. + +When muxes were introduced, for H2 first, the HPACK decompressor needed +to feed headers lists, and since empty header names were strictly +forbidden by the protocol, the lists of headers were purposely designed +to be terminated by an empty header field name (a principle that is +similar to H1's empty line termination). This principle was preserved +and generalized to other protocols migrated to muxes (H1/FCGI/H3 etc) +without anyone ever noticing that the H1 parser was still able to deliver +empty header field names to this list. In addition to this it turns out +that the HPACK decompressor, despite a comment in the code, may +successfully decompress an empty header field name, and this mistake +was propagated to the QPACK decompressor as well. + +The impact is that an empty header field name may be used to truncate +the list of headers and thus make some headers disappear. While for +H2/H3 the impact is limited as haproxy sees a request with missing +headers, and headers are not used to delimit messages, in the case of +HTTP/1, the impact is significant because the presence (and sometimes +contents) of certain sensitive headers is detected during the parsing. +Thus, some of these headers may be seen, marked as present, their value +extracted, but never delivered to upper layers and obviously not +forwarded to the other side either. This can have for consequence that +certain important header fields such as Connection, Upgrade, Host, +Content-length, Transfer-Encoding etc are possibly seen as different +between what haproxy uses to parse/forward/route and what is observed +in http-request rules and of course, forwarded. One direct consequence +is that it is possible to exploit this property in HTTP/1 to make +affected versions of haproxy forward more data than is advertised on +the other side, and bypass some access controls or routing rules by +crafting extraneous requests. Note, however, that responses to such +requests will normally not be passed back to the client, but this can +still cause some harm. + +This specific risk can be mostly worked around in configuration using +the following rule that will rely on the bug's impact to precisely +detect the inconsistency between the known body size and the one +expected to be advertised to the server (the rule works from 2.0 to +2.8-dev): + + http-request deny if { fc_http_major 1 } !{ req.body_size 0 } !{ req.hdr(content-length) -m found } !{ req.hdr(transfer-encoding) -m found } !{ method CONNECT } + +This will exclusively block such carefully crafted requests delivered +over HTTP/1. HTTP/2 and HTTP/3 do not need content-length, and a body +that arrives without being announced with a content-length will be +forwarded using transfer-encoding, hence will not cause discrepancies. +In HAProxy 2.0 in legacy mode ("no option http-use-htx"), this rule will +simply have no effect but will not cause trouble either. + +A clean solution would consist in modifying the loops iterating over +these headers lists to check the header name's pointer instead of its +length (since both are zero at the end of the list), but this requires +to touch tens of places and it's very easy to miss one. Functions such +as htx_add_header(), htx_add_trailer(), htx_add_all_headers() would be +good starting points for such a possible future change. + +Instead the current fix focuses on blocking empty headers where they +are first inserted, hence in the H1/HPACK/QPACK decoders. One benefit +of the current solution (for H1) is that it allows "show errors" to +report a precise diagnostic when facing such invalid HTTP/1 requests, +with the exact location of the problem and the originating address: + + $ printf "GET / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: localhost\r\n:empty header\r\n\r\n" | nc 0 8001 + HTTP/1.1 400 Bad request + Content-length: 90 + Cache-Control: no-cache + Connection: close + Content-Type: text/html + +

400 Bad request

+ Your browser sent an invalid request. + + + $ socat /var/run/haproxy.stat <<< "show errors" + Total events captured on [10/Feb/2023:16:29:37.530] : 1 + + [10/Feb/2023:16:29:34.155] frontend decrypt (#2): invalid request + backend (#-1), server (#-1), event #0, src 127.0.0.1:31092 + buffer starts at 0 (including 0 out), 16334 free, + len 50, wraps at 16336, error at position 33 + H1 connection flags 0x00000000, H1 stream flags 0x00000810 + H1 msg state MSG_HDR_NAME(17), H1 msg flags 0x00001410 + H1 chunk len 0 bytes, H1 body len 0 bytes : + + 00000 GET / HTTP/1.1\r\n + 00016 Host: localhost\r\n + 00033 :empty header\r\n + 00048 \r\n + +I want to address sincere and warm thanks for their great work to the +team composed of the following security researchers who found the issue +together and reported it: Bahruz Jabiyev, Anthony Gavazzi, and Engin +Kirda from Northeastern University, Kaan Onarlioglu from Akamai +Technologies, Adi Peleg and Harvey Tuch from Google. And kudos to Amaury +Denoyelle from HAProxy Technologies for spotting that the HPACK and +QPACK decoders would let this pass despite the comment explicitly +saying otherwise. + +This fix must be backported as far as 2.0. The QPACK changes can be +dropped before 2.6. In 2.0 there is also the equivalent code for legacy +mode, which doesn't suffer from the list truncation, but it would better +be fixed regardless. + +CVE-2023-25725 was assigned to this issue. +--- + src/h1.c | 4 ++++ + src/hpack-dec.c | 9 +++++++++ + src/qpack-dec.c | 9 +++++++++ + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/h1.c b/src/h1.c +index 3330a5fcb68b..88a54c4a593d 100644 +--- a/src/h1.c ++++ b/src/h1.c +@@ -834,6 +834,10 @@ int h1_headers_to_hdr_list(char *start, const char *stop, + + if (likely(*ptr == ':')) { + col = ptr - start; ++ if (col <= sol) { ++ state = H1_MSG_HDR_NAME; ++ goto http_msg_invalid; ++ } + EAT_AND_JUMP_OR_RETURN(ptr, end, http_msg_hdr_l1_sp, http_msg_ood, state, H1_MSG_HDR_L1_SP); + } + +diff --git a/src/hpack-dec.c b/src/hpack-dec.c +index 147021cc36e9..052a7c3da8f6 100644 +--- a/src/hpack-dec.c ++++ b/src/hpack-dec.c +@@ -420,6 +420,15 @@ int hpack_decode_frame(struct hpack_dht *dht, const uint8_t *raw, uint32_t len, + /* and are correctly filled here */ + } + ++ /* We must not accept empty header names (forbidden by the spec and used ++ * as a list termination). ++ */ ++ if (!name.len) { ++ hpack_debug_printf("##ERR@%d##\n", __LINE__); ++ ret = -HPACK_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ++ goto leave; ++ } ++ + /* here's what we have here : + * - name.len > 0 + * - value is filled with either const data or data allocated from tmp +diff --git a/src/qpack-dec.c b/src/qpack-dec.c +index 0da6cf89a727..2d811564538a 100644 +--- a/src/qpack-dec.c ++++ b/src/qpack-dec.c +@@ -531,6 +531,15 @@ int qpack_decode_fs(const unsigned char *raw, uint64_t len, struct buffer *tmp, + len -= value_len; + } + ++ /* We must not accept empty header names (forbidden by the spec and used ++ * as a list termination). ++ */ ++ if (!name.len) { ++ qpack_debug_printf(stderr, "##ERR@%d\n", __LINE__); ++ ret = -QPACK_DECOMPRESSION_FAILED; ++ goto out; ++ } ++ + list[hdr_idx].n = name; + list[hdr_idx].v = value; + ++hdr_idx; diff --git a/haproxy.spec b/haproxy.spec index 87c00cf572f34939dd371ddc28cb7de01b70ce97..5700e4499bc2d7da6fc4875d8e879afcfe57cc04 100644 --- a/haproxy.spec +++ b/haproxy.spec @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Name: haproxy Version: 2.6.6 -Release: 1 +Release: 2 Summary: The Reliable, High Performance TCP/HTTP Load Balancer License: GPLv2+ @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ Source2: %{name}.cfg Source3: %{name}.logrotate Source4: %{name}.sysconfig +Patch0: CVE-2023-25725.patch +Patch1: CVE-2023-0056.patch BuildRequires: gcc lua-devel pcre2-devel openssl-devel systemd-devel systemd libatomic Requires(pre): shadow-utils @@ -117,6 +119,9 @@ exit 0 %{_mandir}/man1/* %changelog +* Sat Feb 25 2023 yaoxin - 2.6.6-2 +- Fix CVE-2023-25725 and CVE-2023-0056 + * Sat Oct 22 2022 xinghe - 2.6.6-1 - Type:enhancement - ID:NA