From 166b1f8b84ef7ed507561abfc4c7ff6c4ef1c3aa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: fly_fzc <2385803914@qq.com> Date: Tue, 11 Feb 2025 10:37:06 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2024-13176 (cherry picked from commit 20e81d82ddb8ffdeb0b56419907abc1f19560d14) --- ...E-2024-13176-Fix-timing-side-channel.patch | 124 ++++++++++++++++++ openssl.spec | 6 +- 2 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2024-13176-Fix-timing-side-channel.patch diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-13176-Fix-timing-side-channel.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-13176-Fix-timing-side-channel.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..330a8f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-13176-Fix-timing-side-channel.patch @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +From 2af62e74fb59bc469506bc37eb2990ea408d9467 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz +Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 18:27:02 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix timing side-channel in ECDSA signature computation + +There is a timing signal of around 300 nanoseconds when the top word of +the inverted ECDSA nonce value is zero. This can happen with significant +probability only for some of the supported elliptic curves. In particular +the NIST P-521 curve is affected. To be able to measure this leak, the +attacker process must either be located in the same physical computer or +must have a very fast network connection with low latency. + +Attacks on ECDSA nonce are also known as Minerva attack. + +Fixes CVE-2024-13176 + +Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson +Reviewed-by: Neil Horman +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/26429) + +(cherry picked from commit 63c40a66c5dc287485705d06122d3a6e74a6a203) +--- + crypto/bn/bn_exp.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------ + crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 7 ++++--- + include/crypto/bn.h | 3 +++ + 3 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +index 8700a25a14..9466e53bef 100644 +--- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c ++++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp.c +@@ -606,7 +606,7 @@ static int MOD_EXP_CTIME_COPY_FROM_PREBUF(BIGNUM *b, int top, + * out by Colin Percival, + * http://www.daemonology.net/hyperthreading-considered-harmful/) + */ +-int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, ++int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, + BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) + { +@@ -623,10 +623,6 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + unsigned int t4 = 0; + #endif + +- bn_check_top(a); +- bn_check_top(p); +- bn_check_top(m); +- + if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_BN, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); + return 0; +@@ -1146,7 +1142,7 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + goto err; + } else + #endif +- if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx)) ++ if (!bn_from_mont_fixed_top(rr, &tmp, mont, ctx)) + goto err; + ret = 1; + err: +@@ -1160,6 +1156,19 @@ int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, + return ret; + } + ++int BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, ++ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, ++ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) ++{ ++ bn_check_top(a); ++ bn_check_top(p); ++ bn_check_top(m); ++ if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(rr, a, p, m, ctx, in_mont)) ++ return 0; ++ bn_correct_top(rr); ++ return 1; ++} ++ + int BN_mod_exp_mont_word(BIGNUM *rr, BN_ULONG a, const BIGNUM *p, + const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) + { +diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c +index a84e088c19..eda5c83e55 100644 +--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c ++++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c +@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ + #include + #include + #include "crypto/ec.h" ++#include "crypto/bn.h" + #include "internal/nelem.h" + #include "ec_local.h" + +@@ -1262,10 +1263,10 @@ static int ec_field_inverse_mod_ord(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r, + if (!BN_sub(e, group->order, e)) + goto err; + /*- +- * Exponent e is public. +- * No need for scatter-gather or BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. ++ * Although the exponent is public we want the result to be ++ * fixed top. + */ +- if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data)) ++ if (!bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(r, x, e, group->order, ctx, group->mont_data)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; +diff --git a/include/crypto/bn.h b/include/crypto/bn.h +index f8855d8463..34244bdf1a 100644 +--- a/include/crypto/bn.h ++++ b/include/crypto/bn.h +@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ int bn_set_words(BIGNUM *a, const BN_ULONG *words, int num_words); + */ + int bn_mul_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, + BN_MONT_CTX *mont, BN_CTX *ctx); ++int bn_mod_exp_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, ++ const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, ++ BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont); + int bn_to_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, + BN_CTX *ctx); + int bn_from_mont_fixed_top(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, BN_MONT_CTX *mont, +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/openssl.spec b/openssl.spec index 5ebb70d..aa2ea1b 100644 --- a/openssl.spec +++ b/openssl.spec @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Name: openssl Epoch: 1 Version: 3.0.12 -Release: 15 +Release: 16 Summary: Cryptography and SSL/TLS Toolkit License: OpenSSL and SSLeay URL: https://www.openssl.org/ @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ Patch62: backport-Refactor-a-separate-func-for-provider-activation-fro.patch Patch63: backport-Refactor-OSSL_LIB_CTX-to-avoid-using-CRYPTO_EX_DATA.patch Patch64: backport-Release-the-drbg-in-the-global-default-context-befor.patch Patch65: backport-params-provide-a-faster-TRIE-based-param-lookup.patch +Patch66: backport-CVE-2024-13176-Fix-timing-side-channel.patch Patch9000: add-FIPS_mode_set-support.patch Patch9001: backport-CVE-2024-9143-Harden-BN_GF2m_poly2arr-against-misuse.patch @@ -279,6 +280,9 @@ make test || : %ldconfig_scriptlets libs %changelog +* Sat Feb 8 2025 jinlun - 1:3.0.12-16 +- fix CVE-2024-13176 + * Wed Nov 27 2024 peng.zou - 1:3.0.12-15 - Fix build error for ppc64le -- Gitee