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CVE-2025-31133
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#ID5ZN6
CVE和安全问题
openeuler-ci-bot
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创建于
2025-11-11 11:12
一、漏洞信息 漏洞编号:[CVE-2025-31133](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31133) 漏洞归属组件:[podman](https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/podman) 漏洞归属的版本:0.10.1,3.4.4,4.5.1,4.9.4 CVSS V3.0分值: BaseScore:N/A None Vector:CVSS:3.0/ 漏洞简述: [ | NOTE: This advisory was sent to <security-announce () opencontainers org> n| on 2025-10-16. If you ship any Open Container Initiative software, we n| highly recommend that you subscribe to our security-announce list in n| order to receive more timely disclosures of future security issues. n| The procedure for subscribing to security-announce is outlined here: n| < , > n nHello, n nThis is a notification to vendors that use or ship runc about THREE (3) nhigh-severity vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-31133, CVE-2025-52565, and nCVE-2025-52881). All three vulnerabilities ultimately allow (through ndifferent methods) for full container breakouts by bypassing runc s nrestrictions for writing to arbitrary /proc files. n nToday we have released the following runc releases which include more nthan 20 patches to resolve this issue: n n * runc v1.4.0-rc.3 < , > n * runc v1.3.3 < , > n * runc v1.2.8 < , > n nWe strongly recommend you update as soon as possible. For your own nreference I have attached a tarball of the patches (which apply cleanly non top of runc v1.2.7, v1.3.2 and v1.4.0-rc.2). n nUnfortunately the patches are are quite large as they required a lot of ndevelopment work in github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin along with nquite deep changes to runc. I would recommend just going with the nreleased versions. n nNote that these patches have not been split into per-CVE patches, as the nresolutions for each issue overlap and so some patches help resolve more nthan one CVE on the list. We strongly recommend simply applying all of nthe provided patches (we have included a squashed single-patch version nfor your convenience -- see v1.[234].patch). n n| **NOTE**: n| Some vendors were given a pre-release version of this release. n| These public releases include two extra patches to fix regressions n| dIscovered very late during the embargo period and were thus not n| included in the pre-release versions. Please update to this version. n| The above tarball includes these extra patches as well. n n/*** Vulnerabilities ***/ n nBelow is a break-down of the key points of each issue. Once this nvulnerability is made public on the embargo date, the linked advisory npages will contain some more information about the issues. n nPlease note that while these issues are generally related, the available nmitigations (if any) vary from issue to issue. However, all of these nattacks rely on starting containers with custom mount configurations -- nif you do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified nsources then these attacks would not be possible to exploit. Note that nDockerfiles support custom mount configurations (with RUN --mount=...) nand so these issues are also exploitable from Dockerfiles. n nAlso please note that the below CVSS scores are based on the threat nmodel from *runc s point of view*. If you were to analyse the same nvulnerability from the perspective of network-enabled systems like nDocker or Kubernetes you would likely end up with a much higher nseverity. n n/* CVE-2025-31133 */ n n container escape via masked path abuse due to mount race conditions n nCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H (7.3) n n< , > n nCVE-2025-31133 exploits an issue with how masked paths are implemented nin runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container s n/dev/null inode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace n/dev/null with a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead nbind-mount the symlink target read-write. This issue affects all known nrunc versions. n nThis stage happens after pivot_root(2) and so cannot be used to nbind-mount host files directly. However, paths like n/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern which can be used to break out of a ncontainer entirely (coredump helpers are spawned as upcalls, which are nnot namespaced and have full host privileges). /proc/sysrq-trigger can nalso be used by an attacker to cause the host system to crash or halt. n(This is Attack 1 .) n nWhile developing a fix for this issue, we also discovered that if the nattacker instead deleted /dev/null, runc would purposefully ignore the nerror and thus make maskedPath a no-op. This is slightly less serious, nbut it would permit some information disclosure through masked files nlike /proc/kcore and /proc/timer_list. (This is Attack 2 .) n nPotential mitigations for this issue include: n n * Using user namespaces, with the host root user not mapped into the n container s namespace. procfs file permissions are managed using Unix n DAC and thus user namespaces stop a container process from being able n to write to them. n n * Not running as a root user in the container (this includes disabling n setuid binaries with noNewPrivileges). As above, procfs file n permissions are managed using Unix DAC and thus non-root users cannot n write to them. n n * Depending on the maskedPath configuration (the default configuration n only masks paths in /proc and /sys), using an AppArmor that blocks n unexpected writes to any maskedPaths (as is the case with the default n profile used by Docker and Podman) will block attempts to exploit n this issue. However, CVE-2025-52881 allows an attacker to bypass LSM n labels, and so this mitigation is not helpful when considered in n combination with CVE-2025-52881. n n * Based on our analysis, SELinux will NOT help mitigate this issue -- n the /dev/null bind-mount used for maskedPaths get re-labeled to the n container context and thus the container will have access to them. n nThanks to Lei Wang (@ssst0n3 from Huawei) for finding and reporting the noriginal vulnerability (Attack 1), and Li Fubang (@lifubang from nacmcoder.com, CIIC) for discovering another attack vector (Attack 2) nbased on @ssst0n3 s initial findings. n n/* CVE-2025-52565 */ n n container escape with malicious config due to /dev/console mount and related races n nCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H (7.3) n n< , > n nCVE-2025-52565 is very similar in concept and application to nCVE-2025-31133, except that it exploits a flaw in /dev/console nbind-mounts. When creating the /dev/console bind-mount (to /dev/pts/$n), nif an attacker replaces /dev/pts/$n with a symlink then runc will nbind-mount the symlink target over /dev/console. This issue affects all nversions of runc >= 1.0.0-rc3. n nAs with CVE-2025-31133, this happens after pivot_root(2) and so cannot nbe used to bind-mount host files directly, but an attacker can trick nrunc into creating a read-write bind-mount of n/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern or /proc/sysrq-trigger, leading to a ncomplete container breakout (as with CVE-2025-31133). n nWhile developing a fix for this issue, we also found some potentially nconcerning issues with os.Create usage (which may have allowed for host nfiles to be truncated by an attacker) -- though we deemed these issues nto not be exploitable, we have provided fixes for them. In addition, nsome previously known issues with /dev/pts/$n race conditions were nre-analysed and we have included mitigations for them too (even though nwe still feel these are mostly hypothetical issues). n nPotential mitigations for this issue include: n n * Using user namespaces, with the host root user not mapped into the n container s namespace. procfs file permissions are managed using Unix n DAC and thus user namespaces stop a container process from being able n to write to them. n n * Not running as a root user in the container (this includes disabling n setuid binaries with noNewPrivileges). As above, procfs file n permissions are managed using Unix DAC and thus non-root users cannot n write to them. n n * The default SELinux policy should mitigate this issue, as the n /dev/console bind-mount does not re-label the mount and so the n container process should not be able to write to unsafe procfs files. n However, CVE-2025-52881 allows an attacker to bypass LSM labels, and n so this mitigation is not helpful when considered in combination with n CVE-2025-52881. n n * The default AppArmor profile used by most runtimes will NOT help n mitigate this issue, as 漏洞公开时间:2025-11-07 03:15:41 漏洞创建时间:2025-11-11 11:12:10 漏洞详情参考链接: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31133 <details> <summary>更多参考(点击展开)</summary> | 参考来源 | 参考链接 | 来源链接 | | ------- | -------- | -------- | | | https://bugs.mageia.org/show_bug.cgi?id=34719 | | | | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:19927 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc | | | | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 | | | | http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/1a30a8f3d921acbbb6a4bb7e99da2c05f8d48522 | | | | https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/8476df83b534a2522b878c0507b3491def48db9f | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/db19bbed5348847da433faa9d69e9f90192bfa64 | | | | https://www.mend.io/vulnerability-database/CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/11/05/3 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm | | | | https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2404705 | | | | https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/5d7b2424072449872d1cd0c937f2ca25f418eb66 | | | | https://linux.oracle.com/cve/CVE-2025-31133.html | | | | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2025-0271.html | | | | https://linux.oracle.com/errata/ELSA-2025-19927.html | | | | https://errata.almalinux.org/9/ALSA-2025-19927.html | | </details> 漏洞分析指导链接: https://gitee.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md 漏洞数据来源: 七彩瞬析开源风险感知平台 漏洞补丁信息: <details> <summary>详情(点击展开)</summary> | 影响的包 | 修复版本 | 修复补丁 | 问题引入补丁 | 来源 | | ------- | -------- | ------- | -------- | --------- | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/1a30a8f3d921acbbb6a4bb7e99da2c05f8d48522 | | github_advisory | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/8476df83b534a2522b878c0507b3491def48db9f | | github_advisory | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/db19bbed5348847da433faa9d69e9f90192bfa64 | | github_advisory | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/5d7b2424072449872d1cd0c937f2ca25f418eb66 | | github_advisory | </details> 二、漏洞分析结构反馈 影响性分析说明: openEuler评分: 受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响): 1.master(4.9.4): 2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(0.10.1): 3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(3.4.4): 4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(3.4.4): 5.openEuler-24.03-LTS(4.9.4): 6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(4.9.4): 7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(4.9.4): 8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(4.9.4): 修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否): 1.master(4.9.4): 2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(0.10.1): 3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(3.4.4): 4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(3.4.4): 5.openEuler-24.03-LTS(4.9.4): 6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(4.9.4): 7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(4.9.4): 8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(4.9.4): 原因说明: 1.master(4.9.4): 2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(0.10.1): 3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(3.4.4): 4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(3.4.4): 5.openEuler-24.03-LTS(4.9.4): 6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(4.9.4): 7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(4.9.4): 8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(4.9.4):
一、漏洞信息 漏洞编号:[CVE-2025-31133](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31133) 漏洞归属组件:[podman](https://gitee.com/src-openeuler/podman) 漏洞归属的版本:0.10.1,3.4.4,4.5.1,4.9.4 CVSS V3.0分值: BaseScore:N/A None Vector:CVSS:3.0/ 漏洞简述: [ | NOTE: This advisory was sent to <security-announce () opencontainers org> n| on 2025-10-16. If you ship any Open Container Initiative software, we n| highly recommend that you subscribe to our security-announce list in n| order to receive more timely disclosures of future security issues. n| The procedure for subscribing to security-announce is outlined here: n| < , > n nHello, n nThis is a notification to vendors that use or ship runc about THREE (3) nhigh-severity vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-31133, CVE-2025-52565, and nCVE-2025-52881). All three vulnerabilities ultimately allow (through ndifferent methods) for full container breakouts by bypassing runc s nrestrictions for writing to arbitrary /proc files. n nToday we have released the following runc releases which include more nthan 20 patches to resolve this issue: n n * runc v1.4.0-rc.3 < , > n * runc v1.3.3 < , > n * runc v1.2.8 < , > n nWe strongly recommend you update as soon as possible. For your own nreference I have attached a tarball of the patches (which apply cleanly non top of runc v1.2.7, v1.3.2 and v1.4.0-rc.2). n nUnfortunately the patches are are quite large as they required a lot of ndevelopment work in github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin along with nquite deep changes to runc. I would recommend just going with the nreleased versions. n nNote that these patches have not been split into per-CVE patches, as the nresolutions for each issue overlap and so some patches help resolve more nthan one CVE on the list. We strongly recommend simply applying all of nthe provided patches (we have included a squashed single-patch version nfor your convenience -- see v1.[234].patch). n n| **NOTE**: n| Some vendors were given a pre-release version of this release. n| These public releases include two extra patches to fix regressions n| dIscovered very late during the embargo period and were thus not n| included in the pre-release versions. Please update to this version. n| The above tarball includes these extra patches as well. n n/*** Vulnerabilities ***/ n nBelow is a break-down of the key points of each issue. Once this nvulnerability is made public on the embargo date, the linked advisory npages will contain some more information about the issues. n nPlease note that while these issues are generally related, the available nmitigations (if any) vary from issue to issue. However, all of these nattacks rely on starting containers with custom mount configurations -- nif you do not run untrusted container images from unknown or unverified nsources then these attacks would not be possible to exploit. Note that nDockerfiles support custom mount configurations (with RUN --mount=...) nand so these issues are also exploitable from Dockerfiles. n nAlso please note that the below CVSS scores are based on the threat nmodel from *runc s point of view*. If you were to analyse the same nvulnerability from the perspective of network-enabled systems like nDocker or Kubernetes you would likely end up with a much higher nseverity. n n/* CVE-2025-31133 */ n n container escape via masked path abuse due to mount race conditions n nCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H (7.3) n n< , > n nCVE-2025-31133 exploits an issue with how masked paths are implemented nin runc. When masking files, runc will bind-mount the container s n/dev/null inode on top of the file. However, if an attacker can replace n/dev/null with a symlink to some other procfs file, runc will instead nbind-mount the symlink target read-write. This issue affects all known nrunc versions. n nThis stage happens after pivot_root(2) and so cannot be used to nbind-mount host files directly. However, paths like n/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern which can be used to break out of a ncontainer entirely (coredump helpers are spawned as upcalls, which are nnot namespaced and have full host privileges). /proc/sysrq-trigger can nalso be used by an attacker to cause the host system to crash or halt. n(This is Attack 1 .) n nWhile developing a fix for this issue, we also discovered that if the nattacker instead deleted /dev/null, runc would purposefully ignore the nerror and thus make maskedPath a no-op. This is slightly less serious, nbut it would permit some information disclosure through masked files nlike /proc/kcore and /proc/timer_list. (This is Attack 2 .) n nPotential mitigations for this issue include: n n * Using user namespaces, with the host root user not mapped into the n container s namespace. procfs file permissions are managed using Unix n DAC and thus user namespaces stop a container process from being able n to write to them. n n * Not running as a root user in the container (this includes disabling n setuid binaries with noNewPrivileges). As above, procfs file n permissions are managed using Unix DAC and thus non-root users cannot n write to them. n n * Depending on the maskedPath configuration (the default configuration n only masks paths in /proc and /sys), using an AppArmor that blocks n unexpected writes to any maskedPaths (as is the case with the default n profile used by Docker and Podman) will block attempts to exploit n this issue. However, CVE-2025-52881 allows an attacker to bypass LSM n labels, and so this mitigation is not helpful when considered in n combination with CVE-2025-52881. n n * Based on our analysis, SELinux will NOT help mitigate this issue -- n the /dev/null bind-mount used for maskedPaths get re-labeled to the n container context and thus the container will have access to them. n nThanks to Lei Wang (@ssst0n3 from Huawei) for finding and reporting the noriginal vulnerability (Attack 1), and Li Fubang (@lifubang from nacmcoder.com, CIIC) for discovering another attack vector (Attack 2) nbased on @ssst0n3 s initial findings. n n/* CVE-2025-52565 */ n n container escape with malicious config due to /dev/console mount and related races n nCVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H (7.3) n n< , > n nCVE-2025-52565 is very similar in concept and application to nCVE-2025-31133, except that it exploits a flaw in /dev/console nbind-mounts. When creating the /dev/console bind-mount (to /dev/pts/$n), nif an attacker replaces /dev/pts/$n with a symlink then runc will nbind-mount the symlink target over /dev/console. This issue affects all nversions of runc >= 1.0.0-rc3. n nAs with CVE-2025-31133, this happens after pivot_root(2) and so cannot nbe used to bind-mount host files directly, but an attacker can trick nrunc into creating a read-write bind-mount of n/proc/sys/kernel/core_pattern or /proc/sysrq-trigger, leading to a ncomplete container breakout (as with CVE-2025-31133). n nWhile developing a fix for this issue, we also found some potentially nconcerning issues with os.Create usage (which may have allowed for host nfiles to be truncated by an attacker) -- though we deemed these issues nto not be exploitable, we have provided fixes for them. In addition, nsome previously known issues with /dev/pts/$n race conditions were nre-analysed and we have included mitigations for them too (even though nwe still feel these are mostly hypothetical issues). n nPotential mitigations for this issue include: n n * Using user namespaces, with the host root user not mapped into the n container s namespace. procfs file permissions are managed using Unix n DAC and thus user namespaces stop a container process from being able n to write to them. n n * Not running as a root user in the container (this includes disabling n setuid binaries with noNewPrivileges). As above, procfs file n permissions are managed using Unix DAC and thus non-root users cannot n write to them. n n * The default SELinux policy should mitigate this issue, as the n /dev/console bind-mount does not re-label the mount and so the n container process should not be able to write to unsafe procfs files. n However, CVE-2025-52881 allows an attacker to bypass LSM labels, and n so this mitigation is not helpful when considered in combination with n CVE-2025-52881. n n * The default AppArmor profile used by most runtimes will NOT help n mitigate this issue, as 漏洞公开时间:2025-11-07 03:15:41 漏洞创建时间:2025-11-11 11:12:10 漏洞详情参考链接: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31133 <details> <summary>更多参考(点击展开)</summary> | 参考来源 | 参考链接 | 来源链接 | | ------- | -------- | -------- | | | https://bugs.mageia.org/show_bug.cgi?id=34719 | | | | https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2025:19927 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc | | | | https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 | | | | http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/1a30a8f3d921acbbb6a4bb7e99da2c05f8d48522 | | | | https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/8476df83b534a2522b878c0507b3491def48db9f | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-9493-h29p-rfm2 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/db19bbed5348847da433faa9d69e9f90192bfa64 | | | | https://www.mend.io/vulnerability-database/CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2025/11/05/3 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/security/advisories/GHSA-cgrx-mc8f-2prm | | | | https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2404705 | | | | https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/5d7b2424072449872d1cd0c937f2ca25f418eb66 | | | | https://linux.oracle.com/cve/CVE-2025-31133.html | | | | https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-31133 | | | | https://advisories.mageia.org/MGASA-2025-0271.html | | | | https://linux.oracle.com/errata/ELSA-2025-19927.html | | | | https://errata.almalinux.org/9/ALSA-2025-19927.html | | </details> 漏洞分析指导链接: https://gitee.com/openeuler/cve-manager/blob/master/cve-vulner-manager/doc/md/manual.md 漏洞数据来源: 七彩瞬析开源风险感知平台 漏洞补丁信息: <details> <summary>详情(点击展开)</summary> | 影响的包 | 修复版本 | 修复补丁 | 问题引入补丁 | 来源 | | ------- | -------- | ------- | -------- | --------- | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/1a30a8f3d921acbbb6a4bb7e99da2c05f8d48522 | | github_advisory | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/8476df83b534a2522b878c0507b3491def48db9f | | github_advisory | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/db19bbed5348847da433faa9d69e9f90192bfa64 | | github_advisory | | | | https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/5d7b2424072449872d1cd0c937f2ca25f418eb66 | | github_advisory | </details> 二、漏洞分析结构反馈 影响性分析说明: openEuler评分: 受影响版本排查(受影响/不受影响): 1.master(4.9.4): 2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(0.10.1): 3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(3.4.4): 4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(3.4.4): 5.openEuler-24.03-LTS(4.9.4): 6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(4.9.4): 7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(4.9.4): 8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(4.9.4): 修复是否涉及abi变化(是/否): 1.master(4.9.4): 2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(0.10.1): 3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(3.4.4): 4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(3.4.4): 5.openEuler-24.03-LTS(4.9.4): 6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(4.9.4): 7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(4.9.4): 8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(4.9.4): 原因说明: 1.master(4.9.4): 2.openEuler-20.03-LTS-SP4(0.10.1): 3.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP3(3.4.4): 4.openEuler-22.03-LTS-SP4(3.4.4): 5.openEuler-24.03-LTS(4.9.4): 6.openEuler-24.03-LTS-Next(4.9.4): 7.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP1(4.9.4): 8.openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP2(4.9.4):
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