diff --git a/CVE-2021-23214.patch b/CVE-2021-23214.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..9b6f6068e822826898b73ceee5fd696005884cf3 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2021-23214.patch @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +From 9ae0f1112954989e955b4b29e4580216eccfcee4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tom Lane +Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:01:43 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] Reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption handshake. + +The server collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data +from the client socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested +during startup, any additional data received with the initial +request message remained in the buffer, and would be treated as +already-decrypted data once the encryption handshake completed. +Thus, a man-in-the-middle with the ability to inject data into the +TCP connection could stuff some cleartext data into the start of +a supposedly encryption-protected database session. + +This could be abused to send faked SQL commands to the server, +although that would only work if the server did not demand any +authentication data. (However, a server relying on SSL certificate +authentication might well not do so.) + +To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer +is not empty after the encryption handshake. + +Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. + +Security: CVE-2021-23214 +--- + src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c | 12 ++++++++++++ + src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + src/include/libpq/libpq.h | 1 + + 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c +index 4452ea4228cb..31bedac24912 100644 +--- a/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c ++++ b/src/backend/libpq/pqcomm.c +@@ -1199,6 +1199,18 @@ pq_getstring(StringInfo s) + } + } + ++/* -------------------------------- ++ * pq_buffer_has_data - is any buffered data available to read? ++ * ++ * This will *not* attempt to read more data. ++ * -------------------------------- ++ */ ++bool ++pq_buffer_has_data(void) ++{ ++ return (PqRecvPointer < PqRecvLength); ++} ++ + + /* -------------------------------- + * pq_startmsgread - begin reading a message from the client. +diff --git a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c +index 586d6a7d3b96..661b2d037f2a 100644 +--- a/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c ++++ b/src/backend/postmaster/postmaster.c +@@ -2061,6 +2061,19 @@ ProcessStartupPacket(Port *port, bool SSLdone) + if (SSLok == 'S' && secure_open_server(port) == -1) + return STATUS_ERROR; + #endif ++ ++ /* ++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. If we do, ++ * it was received before we performed the SSL handshake, so it wasn't ++ * encrypted and indeed may have been injected by a man-in-the-middle. ++ * We report this case to the client. ++ */ ++ if (pq_buffer_has_data()) ++ ereport(FATAL, ++ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION), ++ errmsg("received unencrypted data after SSL request"), ++ errdetail("This could be either a client-software bug or evidence of an attempted man-in-the-middle attack."))); ++ + /* regular startup packet, cancel, etc packet should follow... */ + /* but not another SSL negotiation request */ + return ProcessStartupPacket(port, true); +diff --git a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h +index fd2dd5853ccf..d3cf746de39f 100644 +--- a/src/include/libpq/libpq.h ++++ b/src/include/libpq/libpq.h +@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ extern int pq_getmessage(StringInfo s, int maxlen); + extern int pq_getbyte(void); + extern int pq_peekbyte(void); + extern int pq_getbyte_if_available(unsigned char *c); ++extern bool pq_buffer_has_data(void); + extern int pq_putbytes(const char *s, size_t len); + + /* diff --git a/CVE-2021-23222.patch b/CVE-2021-23222.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3d3210824406bdaee38fead59ef85d39d12ba456 --- /dev/null +++ b/CVE-2021-23222.patch @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From e65d9c8cd15a86207f1da387a9c917c93c14ea11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tom Lane +Date: Mon, 8 Nov 2021 11:14:56 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] libpq: reject extraneous data after SSL or GSS encryption + handshake. + +libpq collects up to a bufferload of data whenever it reads data from +the socket. When SSL or GSS encryption is requested during startup, +any additional data received with the server's yes-or-no reply +remained in the buffer, and would be treated as already-decrypted data +once the encryption handshake completed. Thus, a man-in-the-middle +with the ability to inject data into the TCP connection could stuff +some cleartext data into the start of a supposedly encryption-protected +database session. + +This could probably be abused to inject faked responses to the +client's first few queries, although other details of libpq's behavior +make that harder than it sounds. A different line of attack is to +exfiltrate the client's password, or other sensitive data that might +be sent early in the session. That has been shown to be possible with +a server vulnerable to CVE-2021-23214. + +To fix, throw a protocol-violation error if the internal buffer +is not empty after the encryption handshake. + +Our thanks to Jacob Champion for reporting this problem. + +Security: CVE-2021-23222 +--- + doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml | 14 ++++++++++++++ + src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c | 13 +++++++++++++ + 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml +index 3a269640fcd6..6a2d4a14fce5 100644 +--- a/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml ++++ b/doc/src/sgml/protocol.sgml +@@ -1348,6 +1348,20 @@ + and proceed without requesting SSL. + + ++ ++ When SSL encryption can be performed, the server ++ is expected to send only the single S byte and then ++ wait for the frontend to initiate an SSL handshake. ++ If additional bytes are available to read at this point, it likely ++ means that a man-in-the-middle is attempting to perform a ++ buffer-stuffing attack ++ (CVE-2021-23222). ++ Frontends should be coded either to read exactly one byte from the ++ socket before turning the socket over to their SSL library, or to ++ treat it as a protocol violation if they find they have read additional ++ bytes. ++ ++ + + An initial SSLRequest can also be used in a connection that is being + opened to send a CancelRequest message. +diff --git a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c +index 18c09472bed4..03b7cd60d391 100644 +--- a/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c ++++ b/src/interfaces/libpq/fe-connect.c +@@ -2719,6 +2719,19 @@ PQconnectPoll(PGconn *conn) + pollres = pqsecure_open_client(conn); + if (pollres == PGRES_POLLING_OK) + { ++ /* ++ * At this point we should have no data already buffered. ++ * If we do, it was received before we performed the SSL ++ * handshake, so it wasn't encrypted and indeed may have ++ * been injected by a man-in-the-middle. ++ */ ++ if (conn->inCursor != conn->inEnd) ++ { ++ appendPQExpBufferStr(&conn->errorMessage, ++ libpq_gettext("received unencrypted data after SSL response\n")); ++ goto error_return; ++ } ++ + /* SSL handshake done, ready to send startup packet */ + conn->status = CONNECTION_MADE; + return PGRES_POLLING_WRITING; diff --git a/postgresql.spec b/postgresql.spec index 909052880f05d3b0545358dc75eeb18414d88219..1878793f828e2340036bf750276d10eebf2e05be 100644 --- a/postgresql.spec +++ b/postgresql.spec @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Name: postgresql Version: 10.5 -Release: 22 +Release: 23 Summary: PostgreSQL client programs License: PostgreSQL URL: http://www.postgresql.org/ @@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ Patch6012: CVE-2020-25695.patch Patch6013: CVE-2020-25696.patch Patch6014: CVE-2021-20229.patch Patch6018: CVE-2021-32028.patch +Patch6019: CVE-2021-23214.patch +Patch6020: CVE-2021-23222.patch BuildRequires: gcc perl(ExtUtils::MakeMaker) glibc-devel bison flex gawk perl(ExtUtils::Embed) BuildRequires: perl-devel perl-generators readline-devel zlib-devel systemd systemd-devel @@ -436,6 +438,9 @@ find_lang_bins pltcl.lst pltcl %attr(-,postgres,postgres) %{_libdir}/pgsql/test %changelog +* Fri Mar 11 2022 wangkai - 10.5-23 +- Fix CVE-2021-23214 CVE-2021-23222 + * Wed Oct 20 2021 bzhaoop - 10.5.22 - Fix CVE-2021-32028