From 643ca8840f0ba904b48c05496797669be8c98e4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: shixuantong Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2022 11:14:15 +0800 Subject: [PATCH] fix CVE-2021-28861 (cherry picked from commit 796770d20d97afa2c12cd5eeeb11cf09478269a1) --- backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch | 131 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ python3.spec | 10 ++- 2 files changed, 140 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch diff --git a/backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch b/backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c683f28 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +From 5715382d3a89ca118ce2e224d8c69550d21fe51b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 14:36:55 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] gh-87389: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in + http.server. (GH-93879) + +Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when +an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header +with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix +proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan). + +Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google]. +(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e) + +Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith +--- + Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++ + Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++- + .../2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++ + 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py +index e985dfd..78748c6 100644 +--- a/Lib/http/server.py ++++ b/Lib/http/server.py +@@ -332,6 +332,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler): + return False + self.command, self.path = command, path + ++ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect ++ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts ++ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI ++ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path. ++ if self.path.startswith('//'): ++ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single / ++ + # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive. + try: + self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile, +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +index 1cc020f..8fdbab4 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py +@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + pass + + def setUp(self): +- BaseTestCase.setUp(self) ++ super().setUp() + self.cwd = os.getcwd() + basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir() + os.chdir(basetempdir) +@@ -361,7 +361,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + except: + pass + finally: +- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self) ++ super().tearDown() + + def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None): + def close_conn(): +@@ -417,6 +417,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase): + self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK, + data=os_helper.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE) + ++ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self): ++ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location. ++ ++ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host. ++ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389 ++ ++ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot ++ resolve into a redirect to another server. ++ """ ++ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory')) ++ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory' ++ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash ++ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does ++ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic. ++ response = self.request(url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!') ++ ++ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack_url = f'/{url}' ++ response = self.request(attack_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location) ++ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, ++ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and ' ++ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.') ++ ++ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash ++ attack3_url = f'//{url}' ++ response = self.request(attack3_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location) ++ ++ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http ++ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed ++ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head ++ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen. ++ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}' ++ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/' ++ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url) ++ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY) ++ location = response.getheader('Location') ++ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if ++ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that ++ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header. ++ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location) ++ + def test_get(self): + #constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer + response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test') +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 0000000..029d437 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server ++when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial ++fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan. +-- +1.8.3.1 + diff --git a/python3.spec b/python3.spec index 457ec50..eba21a2 100644 --- a/python3.spec +++ b/python3.spec @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Summary: Interpreter of the Python3 programming language URL: https://www.python.org/ Version: 3.10.2 -Release: 7 +Release: 8 License: Python-2.0 %global branchversion 3.10 @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ Patch1: 00001-rpath.patch Patch251: 00251-change-user-install-location.patch Patch6000: backport-bpo-46811-Make-test-suite-support-Expat-2.4.5.patch Patch6001: backport-CVE-2015-20107.patch +Patch6002: backport-CVE-2021-28861.patch Patch9000: add-the-sm3-method-for-obtaining-the-salt-value.patch @@ -186,6 +187,7 @@ rm configure pyconfig.h.in %patch251 -p1 %patch6000 -p1 %patch6001 -p1 +%patch6002 -p1 %patch9000 -p1 @@ -803,6 +805,12 @@ export BEP_GTDLIST="$BEP_GTDLIST_TMP" %{_mandir}/*/* %changelog +* Thu Aug 25 2022 shixuantong - 3.10.2-8 +- Type:CVE +- CVE:CVE-2021-28861 +- SUG:NA +- DESC:fix CVE-2021-28861 + * Fri Aug 12 2022 shixuantong - 3.10.2-7 - Type:enhancement - CVE:NA -- Gitee