diff --git a/backport-CVE-2023-6597-gh-91133-tempfile.TemporaryDirectory-fix-symlin.patch b/backport-CVE-2023-6597-gh-91133-tempfile.TemporaryDirectory-fix-symlin.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..d931cac779ce6ca8880c22c5963d1b9bee77ea4a --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2023-6597-gh-91133-tempfile.TemporaryDirectory-fix-symlin.patch @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +From 5585334d772b253a01a6730e8202ffb1607c3d25 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Serhiy Storchaka +Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 18:37:10 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] [3.11] gh-91133: tempfile.TemporaryDirectory: fix symlink bug + in cleanup (GH-99930) (GH-112839) +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +(cherry picked from commit 81c16cd94ec38d61aa478b9a452436dc3b1b524d) + +Co-authored-by: Søren Løvborg +--- + Lib/tempfile.py | 27 +++-- + Lib/test/test_tempfile.py | 111 +++++++++++++++++- + ...2-12-01-16-57-44.gh-issue-91133.LKMVCV.rst | 2 + + 3 files changed, 125 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-12-01-16-57-44.gh-issue-91133.LKMVCV.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/tempfile.py b/Lib/tempfile.py +index aace11fa7b1..f59a63a7b45 100644 +--- a/Lib/tempfile.py ++++ b/Lib/tempfile.py +@@ -270,6 +270,22 @@ def _mkstemp_inner(dir, pre, suf, flags, output_type): + raise FileExistsError(_errno.EEXIST, + "No usable temporary file name found") + ++def _dont_follow_symlinks(func, path, *args): ++ # Pass follow_symlinks=False, unless not supported on this platform. ++ if func in _os.supports_follow_symlinks: ++ func(path, *args, follow_symlinks=False) ++ elif _os.name == 'nt' or not _os.path.islink(path): ++ func(path, *args) ++ ++def _resetperms(path): ++ try: ++ chflags = _os.chflags ++ except AttributeError: ++ pass ++ else: ++ _dont_follow_symlinks(chflags, path, 0) ++ _dont_follow_symlinks(_os.chmod, path, 0o700) ++ + + # User visible interfaces. + +@@ -863,17 +879,10 @@ def __init__(self, suffix=None, prefix=None, dir=None, + def _rmtree(cls, name, ignore_errors=False): + def onerror(func, path, exc_info): + if issubclass(exc_info[0], PermissionError): +- def resetperms(path): +- try: +- _os.chflags(path, 0) +- except AttributeError: +- pass +- _os.chmod(path, 0o700) +- + try: + if path != name: +- resetperms(_os.path.dirname(path)) +- resetperms(path) ++ _resetperms(_os.path.dirname(path)) ++ _resetperms(path) + + try: + _os.unlink(path) +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py +index 1242ec7e3cc..675edc8de9c 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py +@@ -1565,6 +1565,103 @@ def test_cleanup_with_symlink_to_a_directory(self): + "were deleted") + d2.cleanup() + ++ @os_helper.skip_unless_symlink ++ def test_cleanup_with_symlink_modes(self): ++ # cleanup() should not follow symlinks when fixing mode bits (#91133) ++ with self.do_create(recurse=0) as d2: ++ file1 = os.path.join(d2, 'file1') ++ open(file1, 'wb').close() ++ dir1 = os.path.join(d2, 'dir1') ++ os.mkdir(dir1) ++ for mode in range(8): ++ mode <<= 6 ++ with self.subTest(mode=format(mode, '03o')): ++ def test(target, target_is_directory): ++ d1 = self.do_create(recurse=0) ++ symlink = os.path.join(d1.name, 'symlink') ++ os.symlink(target, symlink, ++ target_is_directory=target_is_directory) ++ try: ++ os.chmod(symlink, mode, follow_symlinks=False) ++ except NotImplementedError: ++ pass ++ try: ++ os.chmod(symlink, mode) ++ except FileNotFoundError: ++ pass ++ os.chmod(d1.name, mode) ++ d1.cleanup() ++ self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(d1.name)) ++ ++ with self.subTest('nonexisting file'): ++ test('nonexisting', target_is_directory=False) ++ with self.subTest('nonexisting dir'): ++ test('nonexisting', target_is_directory=True) ++ ++ with self.subTest('existing file'): ++ os.chmod(file1, mode) ++ old_mode = os.stat(file1).st_mode ++ test(file1, target_is_directory=False) ++ new_mode = os.stat(file1).st_mode ++ self.assertEqual(new_mode, old_mode, ++ '%03o != %03o' % (new_mode, old_mode)) ++ ++ with self.subTest('existing dir'): ++ os.chmod(dir1, mode) ++ old_mode = os.stat(dir1).st_mode ++ test(dir1, target_is_directory=True) ++ new_mode = os.stat(dir1).st_mode ++ self.assertEqual(new_mode, old_mode, ++ '%03o != %03o' % (new_mode, old_mode)) ++ ++ @unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os, 'chflags'), 'requires os.chflags') ++ @os_helper.skip_unless_symlink ++ def test_cleanup_with_symlink_flags(self): ++ # cleanup() should not follow symlinks when fixing flags (#91133) ++ flags = stat.UF_IMMUTABLE | stat.UF_NOUNLINK ++ self.check_flags(flags) ++ ++ with self.do_create(recurse=0) as d2: ++ file1 = os.path.join(d2, 'file1') ++ open(file1, 'wb').close() ++ dir1 = os.path.join(d2, 'dir1') ++ os.mkdir(dir1) ++ def test(target, target_is_directory): ++ d1 = self.do_create(recurse=0) ++ symlink = os.path.join(d1.name, 'symlink') ++ os.symlink(target, symlink, ++ target_is_directory=target_is_directory) ++ try: ++ os.chflags(symlink, flags, follow_symlinks=False) ++ except NotImplementedError: ++ pass ++ try: ++ os.chflags(symlink, flags) ++ except FileNotFoundError: ++ pass ++ os.chflags(d1.name, flags) ++ d1.cleanup() ++ self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(d1.name)) ++ ++ with self.subTest('nonexisting file'): ++ test('nonexisting', target_is_directory=False) ++ with self.subTest('nonexisting dir'): ++ test('nonexisting', target_is_directory=True) ++ ++ with self.subTest('existing file'): ++ os.chflags(file1, flags) ++ old_flags = os.stat(file1).st_flags ++ test(file1, target_is_directory=False) ++ new_flags = os.stat(file1).st_flags ++ self.assertEqual(new_flags, old_flags) ++ ++ with self.subTest('existing dir'): ++ os.chflags(dir1, flags) ++ old_flags = os.stat(dir1).st_flags ++ test(dir1, target_is_directory=True) ++ new_flags = os.stat(dir1).st_flags ++ self.assertEqual(new_flags, old_flags) ++ + @support.cpython_only + def test_del_on_collection(self): + # A TemporaryDirectory is deleted when garbage collected +@@ -1737,10 +1834,7 @@ def test_modes(self): + d.cleanup() + self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(d.name)) + +- @unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os, 'chflags'), 'requires os.chflags') +- def test_flags(self): +- flags = stat.UF_IMMUTABLE | stat.UF_NOUNLINK +- ++ def check_flags(self, flags): + # skip the test if these flags are not supported (ex: FreeBSD 13) + filename = os_helper.TESTFN + try: +@@ -1749,13 +1843,18 @@ def test_flags(self): + os.chflags(filename, flags) + except OSError as exc: + # "OSError: [Errno 45] Operation not supported" +- self.skipTest(f"chflags() doesn't support " +- f"UF_IMMUTABLE|UF_NOUNLINK: {exc}") ++ self.skipTest(f"chflags() doesn't support flags " ++ f"{flags:#b}: {exc}") + else: + os.chflags(filename, 0) + finally: + os_helper.unlink(filename) + ++ @unittest.skipUnless(hasattr(os, 'chflags'), 'requires os.chflags') ++ def test_flags(self): ++ flags = stat.UF_IMMUTABLE | stat.UF_NOUNLINK ++ self.check_flags(flags) ++ + d = self.do_create(recurse=3, dirs=2, files=2) + with d: + # Change files and directories flags recursively. +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-12-01-16-57-44.gh-issue-91133.LKMVCV.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-12-01-16-57-44.gh-issue-91133.LKMVCV.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..7991048fc48 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2022-12-01-16-57-44.gh-issue-91133.LKMVCV.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++Fix a bug in :class:`tempfile.TemporaryDirectory` cleanup, which now no longer ++dereferences symlinks when working around file system permission errors. +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-3.11-gh-114572-Fix-locking-in-cert_store_stats-and-g.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-0397-gh-114572-Fix-locking-in-cert_store_stats-and-g.patch similarity index 100% rename from backport-3.11-gh-114572-Fix-locking-in-cert_store_stats-and-g.patch rename to backport-CVE-2024-0397-gh-114572-Fix-locking-in-cert_store_stats-and-g.patch diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-0450-gh-109858-Protect-zipfile-from-quoted-overlap-z.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-0450-gh-109858-Protect-zipfile-from-quoted-overlap-z.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..03e5cc10774dff1aaa095b35b2164f3ac6635a91 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-0450-gh-109858-Protect-zipfile-from-quoted-overlap-z.patch @@ -0,0 +1,146 @@ +From a956e510f6336d5ae111ba429a61c3ade30a7549 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Thu, 11 Jan 2024 10:24:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] [3.11] gh-109858: Protect zipfile from "quoted-overlap" + zipbomb (GH-110016) (GH-113913) + +Raise BadZipFile when try to read an entry that overlaps with other entry or +central directory. +(cherry picked from commit 66363b9a7b9fe7c99eba3a185b74c5fdbf842eba) + +Co-authored-by: Serhiy Storchaka +--- + Lib/test/test_zipfile.py | 60 +++++++++++++++++++ + Lib/zipfile.py | 12 ++++ + ...-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst | 3 + + 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py b/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py +index c8e0159765e..9354ab74faa 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_zipfile.py +@@ -2216,6 +2216,66 @@ def test_decompress_without_3rd_party_library(self): + with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_file) as zf: + self.assertRaises(RuntimeError, zf.extract, 'a.txt') + ++ @requires_zlib() ++ def test_full_overlap(self): ++ data = ( ++ b'PK\x03\x04\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0lH\x05\xe2\x1e' ++ b'8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00a\xed' ++ b'\xc0\x81\x08\x00\x00\x00\xc00\xd6\xfbK\\d\x0b`P' ++ b'K\x01\x02\x14\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0lH\x05\xe2' ++ b'\x1e8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00' ++ b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00aPK' ++ b'\x01\x02\x14\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0lH\x05\xe2\x1e' ++ b'8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' ++ b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00bPK\x05' ++ b'\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x02\x00^\x00\x00\x00/\x00\x00' ++ b'\x00\x00\x00' ++ ) ++ with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(data), 'r') as zipf: ++ self.assertEqual(zipf.namelist(), ['a', 'b']) ++ zi = zipf.getinfo('a') ++ self.assertEqual(zi.header_offset, 0) ++ self.assertEqual(zi.compress_size, 16) ++ self.assertEqual(zi.file_size, 1033) ++ zi = zipf.getinfo('b') ++ self.assertEqual(zi.header_offset, 0) ++ self.assertEqual(zi.compress_size, 16) ++ self.assertEqual(zi.file_size, 1033) ++ self.assertEqual(len(zipf.read('a')), 1033) ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex(zipfile.BadZipFile, 'File name.*differ'): ++ zipf.read('b') ++ ++ @requires_zlib() ++ def test_quoted_overlap(self): ++ data = ( ++ b'PK\x03\x04\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0lH\x05Y\xfc' ++ b'8\x044\x00\x00\x00(\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00a\x00' ++ b'\x1f\x00\xe0\xffPK\x03\x04\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0l' ++ b'H\x05\xe2\x1e8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00' ++ b'\x00\x00b\xed\xc0\x81\x08\x00\x00\x00\xc00\xd6\xfbK\\' ++ b'd\x0b`PK\x01\x02\x14\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0' ++ b'lH\x05Y\xfc8\x044\x00\x00\x00(\x04\x00\x00\x01' ++ b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' ++ b'\x00aPK\x01\x02\x14\x00\x14\x00\x00\x00\x08\x00\xa0l' ++ b'H\x05\xe2\x1e8\xbb\x10\x00\x00\x00\t\x04\x00\x00\x01\x00' ++ b'\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00$\x00\x00\x00' ++ b'bPK\x05\x06\x00\x00\x00\x00\x02\x00\x02\x00^\x00\x00' ++ b'\x00S\x00\x00\x00\x00\x00' ++ ) ++ with zipfile.ZipFile(io.BytesIO(data), 'r') as zipf: ++ self.assertEqual(zipf.namelist(), ['a', 'b']) ++ zi = zipf.getinfo('a') ++ self.assertEqual(zi.header_offset, 0) ++ self.assertEqual(zi.compress_size, 52) ++ self.assertEqual(zi.file_size, 1064) ++ zi = zipf.getinfo('b') ++ self.assertEqual(zi.header_offset, 36) ++ self.assertEqual(zi.compress_size, 16) ++ self.assertEqual(zi.file_size, 1033) ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex(zipfile.BadZipFile, 'Overlapped entries'): ++ zipf.read('a') ++ self.assertEqual(len(zipf.read('b')), 1033) ++ + def tearDown(self): + unlink(TESTFN) + unlink(TESTFN2) +diff --git a/Lib/zipfile.py b/Lib/zipfile.py +index 6189db5e3e4..058d7163ea1 100644 +--- a/Lib/zipfile.py ++++ b/Lib/zipfile.py +@@ -367,6 +367,7 @@ class ZipInfo (object): + 'compress_size', + 'file_size', + '_raw_time', ++ '_end_offset', + ) + + def __init__(self, filename="NoName", date_time=(1980,1,1,0,0,0)): +@@ -408,6 +409,7 @@ def __init__(self, filename="NoName", date_time=(1980,1,1,0,0,0)): + self.external_attr = 0 # External file attributes + self.compress_size = 0 # Size of the compressed file + self.file_size = 0 # Size of the uncompressed file ++ self._end_offset = None # Start of the next local header or central directory + # Other attributes are set by class ZipFile: + # header_offset Byte offset to the file header + # CRC CRC-32 of the uncompressed file +@@ -1437,6 +1439,12 @@ def _RealGetContents(self): + if self.debug > 2: + print("total", total) + ++ end_offset = self.start_dir ++ for zinfo in sorted(self.filelist, ++ key=lambda zinfo: zinfo.header_offset, ++ reverse=True): ++ zinfo._end_offset = end_offset ++ end_offset = zinfo.header_offset + + def namelist(self): + """Return a list of file names in the archive.""" +@@ -1590,6 +1598,10 @@ def open(self, name, mode="r", pwd=None, *, force_zip64=False): + 'File name in directory %r and header %r differ.' + % (zinfo.orig_filename, fname)) + ++ if (zinfo._end_offset is not None and ++ zef_file.tell() + zinfo.compress_size > zinfo._end_offset): ++ raise BadZipFile(f"Overlapped entries: {zinfo.orig_filename!r} (possible zip bomb)") ++ + # check for encrypted flag & handle password + is_encrypted = zinfo.flag_bits & _MASK_ENCRYPTED + if is_encrypted: +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..be279caffc4 +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Library/2023-09-28-13-15-51.gh-issue-109858.43e2dg.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ ++Protect :mod:`zipfile` from "quoted-overlap" zipbomb. It now raises ++BadZipFile when try to read an entry that overlaps with other entry or ++central directory. +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-3219-1-gh-122133-Authenticate-socket-connection-for-so.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-3219-1-gh-122133-Authenticate-socket-connection-for-so.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..2911f7bdd9f1430ce8a95f0509485f82cd0ed7ed --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-3219-1-gh-122133-Authenticate-socket-connection-for-so.patch @@ -0,0 +1,218 @@ +From 5f90abaa786f994db3907fc31e2ee00ea2cf0929 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2024 14:43:45 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] [3.11] gh-122133: Authenticate socket connection for + `socket.socketpair()` fallback (GH-122134) (#122426) + +Authenticate socket connection for `socket.socketpair()` fallback when the platform does not have a native `socketpair` C API. We authenticate in-process using `getsocketname` and `getpeername` (thanks to Nathaniel J Smith for that suggestion). + +(cherry picked from commit 78df1043dbdce5c989600616f9f87b4ee72944e5) + +Co-authored-by: Seth Michael Larson +Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith +--- + Lib/socket.py | 17 +++ + Lib/test/test_socket.py | 128 +++++++++++++++++- + ...-07-22-13-11-28.gh-issue-122133.0mPeta.rst | 5 + + 3 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-22-13-11-28.gh-issue-122133.0mPeta.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/socket.py b/Lib/socket.py +index a0567b76bcf..591d4739a64 100644 +--- a/Lib/socket.py ++++ b/Lib/socket.py +@@ -648,6 +648,23 @@ def socketpair(family=AF_INET, type=SOCK_STREAM, proto=0): + raise + finally: + lsock.close() ++ ++ # Authenticating avoids using a connection from something else ++ # able to connect to {host}:{port} instead of us. ++ # We expect only AF_INET and AF_INET6 families. ++ try: ++ if ( ++ ssock.getsockname() != csock.getpeername() ++ or csock.getsockname() != ssock.getpeername() ++ ): ++ raise ConnectionError("Unexpected peer connection") ++ except: ++ # getsockname() and getpeername() can fail ++ # if either socket isn't connected. ++ ssock.close() ++ csock.close() ++ raise ++ + return (ssock, csock) + __all__.append("socketpair") + +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_socket.py b/Lib/test/test_socket.py +index 42adc573ecc..a60eb436c7b 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_socket.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_socket.py +@@ -542,19 +542,27 @@ class SocketPairTest(unittest.TestCase, ThreadableTest): + def __init__(self, methodName='runTest'): + unittest.TestCase.__init__(self, methodName=methodName) + ThreadableTest.__init__(self) ++ self.cli = None ++ self.serv = None ++ ++ def socketpair(self): ++ # To be overridden by some child classes. ++ return socket.socketpair() + + def setUp(self): +- self.serv, self.cli = socket.socketpair() ++ self.serv, self.cli = self.socketpair() + + def tearDown(self): +- self.serv.close() ++ if self.serv: ++ self.serv.close() + self.serv = None + + def clientSetUp(self): + pass + + def clientTearDown(self): +- self.cli.close() ++ if self.cli: ++ self.cli.close() + self.cli = None + ThreadableTest.clientTearDown(self) + +@@ -4667,6 +4675,120 @@ def _testSend(self): + self.assertEqual(msg, MSG) + + ++class PurePythonSocketPairTest(SocketPairTest): ++ ++ # Explicitly use socketpair AF_INET or AF_INET6 to ensure that is the ++ # code path we're using regardless platform is the pure python one where ++ # `_socket.socketpair` does not exist. (AF_INET does not work with ++ # _socket.socketpair on many platforms). ++ def socketpair(self): ++ # called by super().setUp(). ++ try: ++ return socket.socketpair(socket.AF_INET6) ++ except OSError: ++ return socket.socketpair(socket.AF_INET) ++ ++ # Local imports in this class make for easy security fix backporting. ++ ++ def setUp(self): ++ import _socket ++ self._orig_sp = getattr(_socket, 'socketpair', None) ++ if self._orig_sp is not None: ++ # This forces the version using the non-OS provided socketpair ++ # emulation via an AF_INET socket in Lib/socket.py. ++ del _socket.socketpair ++ import importlib ++ global socket ++ socket = importlib.reload(socket) ++ else: ++ pass # This platform already uses the non-OS provided version. ++ super().setUp() ++ ++ def tearDown(self): ++ super().tearDown() ++ import _socket ++ if self._orig_sp is not None: ++ # Restore the default socket.socketpair definition. ++ _socket.socketpair = self._orig_sp ++ import importlib ++ global socket ++ socket = importlib.reload(socket) ++ ++ def test_recv(self): ++ msg = self.serv.recv(1024) ++ self.assertEqual(msg, MSG) ++ ++ def _test_recv(self): ++ self.cli.send(MSG) ++ ++ def test_send(self): ++ self.serv.send(MSG) ++ ++ def _test_send(self): ++ msg = self.cli.recv(1024) ++ self.assertEqual(msg, MSG) ++ ++ def test_ipv4(self): ++ cli, srv = socket.socketpair(socket.AF_INET) ++ cli.close() ++ srv.close() ++ ++ def _test_ipv4(self): ++ pass ++ ++ @unittest.skipIf(not hasattr(_socket, 'IPPROTO_IPV6') or ++ not hasattr(_socket, 'IPV6_V6ONLY'), ++ "IPV6_V6ONLY option not supported") ++ @unittest.skipUnless(socket_helper.IPV6_ENABLED, 'IPv6 required for this test') ++ def test_ipv6(self): ++ cli, srv = socket.socketpair(socket.AF_INET6) ++ cli.close() ++ srv.close() ++ ++ def _test_ipv6(self): ++ pass ++ ++ def test_injected_authentication_failure(self): ++ orig_getsockname = socket.socket.getsockname ++ inject_sock = None ++ ++ def inject_getsocketname(self): ++ nonlocal inject_sock ++ sockname = orig_getsockname(self) ++ # Connect to the listening socket ahead of the ++ # client socket. ++ if inject_sock is None: ++ inject_sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) ++ inject_sock.setblocking(False) ++ try: ++ inject_sock.connect(sockname[:2]) ++ except (BlockingIOError, InterruptedError): ++ pass ++ inject_sock.setblocking(True) ++ return sockname ++ ++ sock1 = sock2 = None ++ try: ++ socket.socket.getsockname = inject_getsocketname ++ with self.assertRaises(OSError): ++ sock1, sock2 = socket.socketpair() ++ finally: ++ socket.socket.getsockname = orig_getsockname ++ if inject_sock: ++ inject_sock.close() ++ if sock1: # This cleanup isn't needed on a successful test. ++ sock1.close() ++ if sock2: ++ sock2.close() ++ ++ def _test_injected_authentication_failure(self): ++ # No-op. Exists for base class threading infrastructure to call. ++ # We could refactor this test into its own lesser class along with the ++ # setUp and tearDown code to construct an ideal; it is simpler to keep ++ # it here and live with extra overhead one this _one_ failure test. ++ pass ++ ++ + class NonBlockingTCPTests(ThreadedTCPSocketTest): + + def __init__(self, methodName='runTest'): +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-22-13-11-28.gh-issue-122133.0mPeta.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-22-13-11-28.gh-issue-122133.0mPeta.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..3544eb3824d +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-22-13-11-28.gh-issue-122133.0mPeta.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ ++Authenticate the socket connection for the ``socket.socketpair()`` fallback ++on platforms where ``AF_UNIX`` is not available like Windows. ++ ++Patch by Gregory P. Smith and Seth Larson . Reported by Ellie ++ +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-3219-2-gh-122133-Rework-pure-Python-socketpair-tests-t.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-3219-2-gh-122133-Rework-pure-Python-socketpair-tests-t.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..3c696cdb41fc264e2212eeb94cfcbb97ce4e8cff --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-3219-2-gh-122133-Rework-pure-Python-socketpair-tests-t.patch @@ -0,0 +1,207 @@ +From c5655aa6ad120d2ed7f255bebd6e8b71a9c07dde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Miss Islington (bot)" + <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com> +Date: Fri, 2 Aug 2024 15:09:45 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] [3.11] gh-122133: Rework pure Python socketpair tests to + avoid use of importlib.reload. (GH-122493) (GH-122506) + +(cherry picked from commit f071f01b7b7e19d7d6b3a4b0ec62f820ecb14660) + +Co-authored-by: Russell Keith-Magee +Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith +--- + Lib/socket.py | 121 +++++++++++++++++++--------------------- + Lib/test/test_socket.py | 20 ++----- + 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Lib/socket.py b/Lib/socket.py +index 591d4739a64..f386241abfb 100644 +--- a/Lib/socket.py ++++ b/Lib/socket.py +@@ -590,16 +590,65 @@ def fromshare(info): + return socket(0, 0, 0, info) + __all__.append("fromshare") + +-if hasattr(_socket, "socketpair"): ++# Origin: https://gist.github.com/4325783, by Geert Jansen. Public domain. ++# This is used if _socket doesn't natively provide socketpair. It's ++# always defined so that it can be patched in for testing purposes. ++def _fallback_socketpair(family=AF_INET, type=SOCK_STREAM, proto=0): ++ if family == AF_INET: ++ host = _LOCALHOST ++ elif family == AF_INET6: ++ host = _LOCALHOST_V6 ++ else: ++ raise ValueError("Only AF_INET and AF_INET6 socket address families " ++ "are supported") ++ if type != SOCK_STREAM: ++ raise ValueError("Only SOCK_STREAM socket type is supported") ++ if proto != 0: ++ raise ValueError("Only protocol zero is supported") ++ ++ # We create a connected TCP socket. Note the trick with ++ # setblocking(False) that prevents us from having to create a thread. ++ lsock = socket(family, type, proto) ++ try: ++ lsock.bind((host, 0)) ++ lsock.listen() ++ # On IPv6, ignore flow_info and scope_id ++ addr, port = lsock.getsockname()[:2] ++ csock = socket(family, type, proto) ++ try: ++ csock.setblocking(False) ++ try: ++ csock.connect((addr, port)) ++ except (BlockingIOError, InterruptedError): ++ pass ++ csock.setblocking(True) ++ ssock, _ = lsock.accept() ++ except: ++ csock.close() ++ raise ++ finally: ++ lsock.close() + +- def socketpair(family=None, type=SOCK_STREAM, proto=0): +- """socketpair([family[, type[, proto]]]) -> (socket object, socket object) ++ # Authenticating avoids using a connection from something else ++ # able to connect to {host}:{port} instead of us. ++ # We expect only AF_INET and AF_INET6 families. ++ try: ++ if ( ++ ssock.getsockname() != csock.getpeername() ++ or csock.getsockname() != ssock.getpeername() ++ ): ++ raise ConnectionError("Unexpected peer connection") ++ except: ++ # getsockname() and getpeername() can fail ++ # if either socket isn't connected. ++ ssock.close() ++ csock.close() ++ raise + +- Create a pair of socket objects from the sockets returned by the platform +- socketpair() function. +- The arguments are the same as for socket() except the default family is +- AF_UNIX if defined on the platform; otherwise, the default is AF_INET. +- """ ++ return (ssock, csock) ++ ++if hasattr(_socket, "socketpair"): ++ def socketpair(family=None, type=SOCK_STREAM, proto=0): + if family is None: + try: + family = AF_UNIX +@@ -611,61 +660,7 @@ def socketpair(family=None, type=SOCK_STREAM, proto=0): + return a, b + + else: +- +- # Origin: https://gist.github.com/4325783, by Geert Jansen. Public domain. +- def socketpair(family=AF_INET, type=SOCK_STREAM, proto=0): +- if family == AF_INET: +- host = _LOCALHOST +- elif family == AF_INET6: +- host = _LOCALHOST_V6 +- else: +- raise ValueError("Only AF_INET and AF_INET6 socket address families " +- "are supported") +- if type != SOCK_STREAM: +- raise ValueError("Only SOCK_STREAM socket type is supported") +- if proto != 0: +- raise ValueError("Only protocol zero is supported") +- +- # We create a connected TCP socket. Note the trick with +- # setblocking(False) that prevents us from having to create a thread. +- lsock = socket(family, type, proto) +- try: +- lsock.bind((host, 0)) +- lsock.listen() +- # On IPv6, ignore flow_info and scope_id +- addr, port = lsock.getsockname()[:2] +- csock = socket(family, type, proto) +- try: +- csock.setblocking(False) +- try: +- csock.connect((addr, port)) +- except (BlockingIOError, InterruptedError): +- pass +- csock.setblocking(True) +- ssock, _ = lsock.accept() +- except: +- csock.close() +- raise +- finally: +- lsock.close() +- +- # Authenticating avoids using a connection from something else +- # able to connect to {host}:{port} instead of us. +- # We expect only AF_INET and AF_INET6 families. +- try: +- if ( +- ssock.getsockname() != csock.getpeername() +- or csock.getsockname() != ssock.getpeername() +- ): +- raise ConnectionError("Unexpected peer connection") +- except: +- # getsockname() and getpeername() can fail +- # if either socket isn't connected. +- ssock.close() +- csock.close() +- raise +- +- return (ssock, csock) ++ socketpair = _fallback_socketpair + __all__.append("socketpair") + + socketpair.__doc__ = """socketpair([family[, type[, proto]]]) -> (socket object, socket object) +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_socket.py b/Lib/test/test_socket.py +index a60eb436c7b..cc803d8753b 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_socket.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_socket.py +@@ -4676,7 +4676,6 @@ def _testSend(self): + + + class PurePythonSocketPairTest(SocketPairTest): +- + # Explicitly use socketpair AF_INET or AF_INET6 to ensure that is the + # code path we're using regardless platform is the pure python one where + # `_socket.socketpair` does not exist. (AF_INET does not work with +@@ -4691,28 +4690,21 @@ def socketpair(self): + # Local imports in this class make for easy security fix backporting. + + def setUp(self): +- import _socket +- self._orig_sp = getattr(_socket, 'socketpair', None) +- if self._orig_sp is not None: ++ if hasattr(_socket, "socketpair"): ++ self._orig_sp = socket.socketpair + # This forces the version using the non-OS provided socketpair + # emulation via an AF_INET socket in Lib/socket.py. +- del _socket.socketpair +- import importlib +- global socket +- socket = importlib.reload(socket) ++ socket.socketpair = socket._fallback_socketpair + else: +- pass # This platform already uses the non-OS provided version. ++ # This platform already uses the non-OS provided version. ++ self._orig_sp = None + super().setUp() + + def tearDown(self): + super().tearDown() +- import _socket + if self._orig_sp is not None: + # Restore the default socket.socketpair definition. +- _socket.socketpair = self._orig_sp +- import importlib +- global socket +- socket = importlib.reload(socket) ++ socket.socketpair = self._orig_sp + + def test_recv(self): + msg = self.serv.recv(1024) +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-3.11-gh-113171-gh-65056-Fix-private-non-global-IP-ad.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-4032-gh-113171-gh-65056-Fix-private-non-global-IP-ad.patch similarity index 100% rename from backport-3.11-gh-113171-gh-65056-Fix-private-non-global-IP-ad.patch rename to backport-CVE-2024-4032-gh-113171-gh-65056-Fix-private-non-global-IP-ad.patch diff --git a/backport-CVE-2024-6232-gh-121285-Remove-backtracking-when-parsing-tarf.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-6232-gh-121285-Remove-backtracking-when-parsing-tarf.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..0e3db4eacdf89a5c64f62dc5ac9bcfc7105c11ad --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2024-6232-gh-121285-Remove-backtracking-when-parsing-tarf.patch @@ -0,0 +1,247 @@ +From d449caf8a179e3b954268b3a88eb9170be3c8fbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Seth Michael Larson +Date: Tue, 3 Sep 2024 10:07:13 -0500 +Subject: [PATCH] [3.11] gh-121285: Remove backtracking when parsing tarfile + headers (GH-121286) (#123639) + +* Remove backtracking when parsing tarfile headers +* Rewrite PAX header parsing to be stricter +* Optimize parsing of GNU extended sparse headers v0.0 + +(cherry picked from commit 34ddb64d088dd7ccc321f6103d23153256caa5d4) + +Co-authored-by: Kirill Podoprigora +Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith +--- + Lib/tarfile.py | 105 +++++++++++------- + Lib/test/test_tarfile.py | 42 +++++++ + ...-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst | 2 + + 3 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) + create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst + +diff --git a/Lib/tarfile.py b/Lib/tarfile.py +index 612217b1ad0..0d6b925533b 100755 +--- a/Lib/tarfile.py ++++ b/Lib/tarfile.py +@@ -842,6 +842,9 @@ def data_filter(member, dest_path): + # Sentinel for replace() defaults, meaning "don't change the attribute" + _KEEP = object() + ++# Header length is digits followed by a space. ++_header_length_prefix_re = re.compile(br"([0-9]{1,20}) ") ++ + class TarInfo(object): + """Informational class which holds the details about an + archive member given by a tar header block. +@@ -1411,41 +1414,59 @@ def _proc_pax(self, tarfile): + else: + pax_headers = tarfile.pax_headers.copy() + +- # Check if the pax header contains a hdrcharset field. This tells us +- # the encoding of the path, linkpath, uname and gname fields. Normally, +- # these fields are UTF-8 encoded but since POSIX.1-2008 tar +- # implementations are allowed to store them as raw binary strings if +- # the translation to UTF-8 fails. +- match = re.search(br"\d+ hdrcharset=([^\n]+)\n", buf) +- if match is not None: +- pax_headers["hdrcharset"] = match.group(1).decode("utf-8") +- +- # For the time being, we don't care about anything other than "BINARY". +- # The only other value that is currently allowed by the standard is +- # "ISO-IR 10646 2000 UTF-8" in other words UTF-8. +- hdrcharset = pax_headers.get("hdrcharset") +- if hdrcharset == "BINARY": +- encoding = tarfile.encoding +- else: +- encoding = "utf-8" +- + # Parse pax header information. A record looks like that: + # "%d %s=%s\n" % (length, keyword, value). length is the size + # of the complete record including the length field itself and +- # the newline. keyword and value are both UTF-8 encoded strings. +- regex = re.compile(br"(\d+) ([^=]+)=") ++ # the newline. + pos = 0 +- while True: +- match = regex.match(buf, pos) +- if not match: +- break ++ encoding = None ++ raw_headers = [] ++ while len(buf) > pos and buf[pos] != 0x00: ++ if not (match := _header_length_prefix_re.match(buf, pos)): ++ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header") ++ try: ++ length = int(match.group(1)) ++ except ValueError: ++ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header") ++ # Headers must be at least 5 bytes, shortest being '5 x=\n'. ++ # Value is allowed to be empty. ++ if length < 5: ++ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header") ++ if pos + length > len(buf): ++ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header") + +- length, keyword = match.groups() +- length = int(length) +- if length == 0: ++ header_value_end_offset = match.start(1) + length - 1 # Last byte of the header ++ keyword_and_value = buf[match.end(1) + 1:header_value_end_offset] ++ raw_keyword, equals, raw_value = keyword_and_value.partition(b"=") ++ ++ # Check the framing of the header. The last character must be '\n' (0x0A) ++ if not raw_keyword or equals != b"=" or buf[header_value_end_offset] != 0x0A: + raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header") +- value = buf[match.end(2) + 1:match.start(1) + length - 1] ++ raw_headers.append((length, raw_keyword, raw_value)) ++ ++ # Check if the pax header contains a hdrcharset field. This tells us ++ # the encoding of the path, linkpath, uname and gname fields. Normally, ++ # these fields are UTF-8 encoded but since POSIX.1-2008 tar ++ # implementations are allowed to store them as raw binary strings if ++ # the translation to UTF-8 fails. For the time being, we don't care about ++ # anything other than "BINARY". The only other value that is currently ++ # allowed by the standard is "ISO-IR 10646 2000 UTF-8" in other words UTF-8. ++ # Note that we only follow the initial 'hdrcharset' setting to preserve ++ # the initial behavior of the 'tarfile' module. ++ if raw_keyword == b"hdrcharset" and encoding is None: ++ if raw_value == b"BINARY": ++ encoding = tarfile.encoding ++ else: # This branch ensures only the first 'hdrcharset' header is used. ++ encoding = "utf-8" ++ ++ pos += length + ++ # If no explicit hdrcharset is set, we use UTF-8 as a default. ++ if encoding is None: ++ encoding = "utf-8" ++ ++ # After parsing the raw headers we can decode them to text. ++ for length, raw_keyword, raw_value in raw_headers: + # Normally, we could just use "utf-8" as the encoding and "strict" + # as the error handler, but we better not take the risk. For + # example, GNU tar <= 1.23 is known to store filenames it cannot +@@ -1453,17 +1474,16 @@ def _proc_pax(self, tarfile): + # hdrcharset=BINARY header). + # We first try the strict standard encoding, and if that fails we + # fall back on the user's encoding and error handler. +- keyword = self._decode_pax_field(keyword, "utf-8", "utf-8", ++ keyword = self._decode_pax_field(raw_keyword, "utf-8", "utf-8", + tarfile.errors) + if keyword in PAX_NAME_FIELDS: +- value = self._decode_pax_field(value, encoding, tarfile.encoding, ++ value = self._decode_pax_field(raw_value, encoding, tarfile.encoding, + tarfile.errors) + else: +- value = self._decode_pax_field(value, "utf-8", "utf-8", ++ value = self._decode_pax_field(raw_value, "utf-8", "utf-8", + tarfile.errors) + + pax_headers[keyword] = value +- pos += length + + # Fetch the next header. + try: +@@ -1478,7 +1498,7 @@ def _proc_pax(self, tarfile): + + elif "GNU.sparse.size" in pax_headers: + # GNU extended sparse format version 0.0. +- self._proc_gnusparse_00(next, pax_headers, buf) ++ self._proc_gnusparse_00(next, raw_headers) + + elif pax_headers.get("GNU.sparse.major") == "1" and pax_headers.get("GNU.sparse.minor") == "0": + # GNU extended sparse format version 1.0. +@@ -1500,15 +1520,24 @@ def _proc_pax(self, tarfile): + + return next + +- def _proc_gnusparse_00(self, next, pax_headers, buf): ++ def _proc_gnusparse_00(self, next, raw_headers): + """Process a GNU tar extended sparse header, version 0.0. + """ + offsets = [] +- for match in re.finditer(br"\d+ GNU.sparse.offset=(\d+)\n", buf): +- offsets.append(int(match.group(1))) + numbytes = [] +- for match in re.finditer(br"\d+ GNU.sparse.numbytes=(\d+)\n", buf): +- numbytes.append(int(match.group(1))) ++ for _, keyword, value in raw_headers: ++ if keyword == b"GNU.sparse.offset": ++ try: ++ offsets.append(int(value.decode())) ++ except ValueError: ++ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header") ++ ++ elif keyword == b"GNU.sparse.numbytes": ++ try: ++ numbytes.append(int(value.decode())) ++ except ValueError: ++ raise InvalidHeaderError("invalid header") ++ + next.sparse = list(zip(offsets, numbytes)) + + def _proc_gnusparse_01(self, next, pax_headers): +diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py +index 389da7be3a3..c99c88ce93a 100644 +--- a/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py ++++ b/Lib/test/test_tarfile.py +@@ -1208,6 +1208,48 @@ def test_pax_number_fields(self): + finally: + tar.close() + ++ def test_pax_header_bad_formats(self): ++ # The fields from the pax header have priority over the ++ # TarInfo. ++ pax_header_replacements = ( ++ b" foo=bar\n", ++ b"0 \n", ++ b"1 \n", ++ b"2 \n", ++ b"3 =\n", ++ b"4 =a\n", ++ b"1000000 foo=bar\n", ++ b"0 foo=bar\n", ++ b"-12 foo=bar\n", ++ b"000000000000000000000000036 foo=bar\n", ++ ) ++ pax_headers = {"foo": "bar"} ++ ++ for replacement in pax_header_replacements: ++ with self.subTest(header=replacement): ++ tar = tarfile.open(tmpname, "w", format=tarfile.PAX_FORMAT, ++ encoding="iso8859-1") ++ try: ++ t = tarfile.TarInfo() ++ t.name = "pax" # non-ASCII ++ t.uid = 1 ++ t.pax_headers = pax_headers ++ tar.addfile(t) ++ finally: ++ tar.close() ++ ++ with open(tmpname, "rb") as f: ++ data = f.read() ++ self.assertIn(b"11 foo=bar\n", data) ++ data = data.replace(b"11 foo=bar\n", replacement) ++ ++ with open(tmpname, "wb") as f: ++ f.truncate() ++ f.write(data) ++ ++ with self.assertRaisesRegex(tarfile.ReadError, r"method tar: ReadError\('invalid header'\)"): ++ tarfile.open(tmpname, encoding="iso8859-1") ++ + + class WriteTestBase(TarTest): + # Put all write tests in here that are supposed to be tested +diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst +new file mode 100644 +index 00000000000..81f918bfe2b +--- /dev/null ++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-07-02-13-39-20.gh-issue-121285.hrl-yI.rst +@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ ++Remove backtracking from tarfile header parsing for ``hdrcharset``, PAX, and ++GNU sparse headers. +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-gh-121650-Encode-newlines-in-headers-and-verify-head.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-6923-gh-121650-Encode-newlines-in-headers-and-verify-head.patch similarity index 100% rename from backport-gh-121650-Encode-newlines-in-headers-and-verify-head.patch rename to backport-CVE-2024-6923-gh-121650-Encode-newlines-in-headers-and-verify-head.patch diff --git a/backport-gh-123067-Fix-quadratic-complexity-in-parsing-quoted.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-7592-gh-123067-Fix-quadratic-complexity-in-parsing-quoted.patch similarity index 100% rename from backport-gh-123067-Fix-quadratic-complexity-in-parsing-quoted.patch rename to backport-CVE-2024-7592-gh-123067-Fix-quadratic-complexity-in-parsing-quoted.patch diff --git a/backport-gh-123270-Replaced-SanitizedNames-with-a-more-surgic.patch b/backport-CVE-2024-8088-gh-123270-Replaced-SanitizedNames-with-a-more-surgic.patch similarity index 100% rename from backport-gh-123270-Replaced-SanitizedNames-with-a-more-surgic.patch rename to backport-CVE-2024-8088-gh-123270-Replaced-SanitizedNames-with-a-more-surgic.patch diff --git a/python3.spec b/python3.spec index 4c1852c09eb29c69ea087092be5f5afe4002e74f..9a5ab8508b0e04fbb82ea0c04ada6a9cac63c95c 100644 --- a/python3.spec +++ b/python3.spec @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ Summary: Interpreter of the Python3 programming language URL: https://www.python.org/ Version: 3.11.6 -Release: 5 +Release: 6 License: Python-2.0 %global branchversion 3.11 @@ -92,12 +92,17 @@ Source1: pyconfig.h Patch1: 00001-rpath.patch Patch251: 00251-change-user-install-location.patch -Patch6000: backport-3.11-gh-114572-Fix-locking-in-cert_store_stats-and-g.patch -Patch6001: backport-3.11-gh-113171-gh-65056-Fix-private-non-global-IP-ad.patch +Patch6000: backport-CVE-2024-0397-gh-114572-Fix-locking-in-cert_store_stats-and-g.patch +Patch6001: backport-CVE-2024-4032-gh-113171-gh-65056-Fix-private-non-global-IP-ad.patch Patch6002: backport-3.11-gh-115133-Fix-tests-for-XMLPullParser-with-Expa.patch -Patch6003: backport-gh-121650-Encode-newlines-in-headers-and-verify-head.patch -Patch6004: backport-gh-123067-Fix-quadratic-complexity-in-parsing-quoted.patch -Patch6005: backport-gh-123270-Replaced-SanitizedNames-with-a-more-surgic.patch +Patch6003: backport-CVE-2024-6923-gh-121650-Encode-newlines-in-headers-and-verify-head.patch +Patch6004: backport-CVE-2024-7592-gh-123067-Fix-quadratic-complexity-in-parsing-quoted.patch +Patch6005: backport-CVE-2024-8088-gh-123270-Replaced-SanitizedNames-with-a-more-surgic.patch +Patch6006: backport-CVE-2024-6232-gh-121285-Remove-backtracking-when-parsing-tarf.patch +Patch6007: backport-CVE-2024-3219-1-gh-122133-Authenticate-socket-connection-for-so.patch +Patch6008: backport-CVE-2024-3219-2-gh-122133-Rework-pure-Python-socketpair-tests-t.patch +Patch6009: backport-CVE-2023-6597-gh-91133-tempfile.TemporaryDirectory-fix-symlin.patch +Patch6010: backport-CVE-2024-0450-gh-109858-Protect-zipfile-from-quoted-overlap-z.patch Patch9000: add-the-sm3-method-for-obtaining-the-salt-value.patch Patch9001: 0001-add-loongarch64-support-for-python.patch @@ -203,6 +208,11 @@ rm configure pyconfig.h.in %patch6003 -p1 %patch6004 -p1 %patch6005 -p1 +%patch6006 -p1 +%patch6007 -p1 +%patch6008 -p1 +%patch6009 -p1 +%patch6010 -p1 %patch9000 -p1 %patch9001 -p1 @@ -868,6 +878,18 @@ export BEP_GTDLIST="$BEP_GTDLIST_TMP" %{_mandir}/*/* %changelog +* Tue Sep 24 2024 xinsheng - 3.11.6-6 +- Type:CVE +- CVE:CVE-2024-6232,CVE-2024-3219,CVE-2024-0450,CVE-2023-6597 +- SUG:NA +- DESC:fix CVE-2024-6232,CVE-2024-3219,CVE-2024-0450,CVE-2023-6597 + - rename all CVE patch name + - CVE-2024-6232: Remove backtracking when parsing tarfile headers + - CVE-2024-3219: patch1 Authenticate socket connection for `socket.socketpair()` fallback + - CVE-2024-3219: patch2 Rework pure Python socketpair tests to avoid use of importlib.reload. + - CVE-2024-0450: Protect zipfile from "quoted-overlap" zipbomb + - CVE-2023-6597: tempfile.TemporaryDirectory: fix symlink bug in cleanup + * Tue Sep 03 2024 xinsheng - 3.11.6-5 - Type:CVE - CVE:NA