diff --git a/backport-CVE-2023-0465.patch b/backport-CVE-2023-0465.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..7479015d9c0a3cce6ca3b049c582a165e90caa9a --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2023-0465.patch @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell +Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in +leaf + certs + +Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we +later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf +cert was bad. + +Fixes: CVE-2023-0465 + +Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588) + +Reference:https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 +Conflict: Context conflict +--- + Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +index 96f306b..a6878fe 100644 +--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c ++++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +@@ -1768,16 +1768,23 @@ static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) + * Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. + */ + X509 *x; +- int i; +- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { ++ int i, cbcalled = 0; ++ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); + if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) + continue; ++ cbcalled = 1; + ctx->current_cert = x; + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION; + if (!ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx)) + return 0; + } ++ if (!cbcalled) { ++ /* Should not be able to get here */ ++ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */ + return 1; + } + if (ret == -2) { +-- +2.33.0 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2023-2650.patch b/backport-CVE-2023-2650.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..37798cd27f626a69494e47dfbfc8215afca15203 --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2023-2650.patch @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +From 423a2bc737a908ad0c77bda470b2b59dc879936b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Richard Levitte +Date: Fri, 12 May 2023 10:00:13 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] Restrict the size of OBJECT IDENTIFIERs that OBJ_obj2txt will + translate + +Reference:https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=423a2bc737a908ad0c77bda470b2b59dc879936b +Conflict:NA + +OBJ_obj2txt() would translate any size OBJECT IDENTIFIER to canonical +numeric text form. For gigantic sub-identifiers, this would take a very +long time, the time complexity being O(n^2) where n is the size of that +sub-identifier. + +To mitigate this, a restriction on the size that OBJ_obj2txt() will +translate to canonical numeric text form is added, based on RFC 2578 +(STD 58), which says this: + +> 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values +> +> An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative numbers. +> For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a sub-identifier, +> there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, and each sub-identifier +> has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 decimal). + +Fixes otc/security#96 +Fixes CVE-2023-2650 + +Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz +--- + crypto/objects/obj_dat.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ + 1 files changed, 50 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c +index 01cde00e98..c0e55197a0 100644 +--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c ++++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c +@@ -443,6 +443,25 @@ int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) + first = 1; + bl = NULL; + ++ /* ++ * RFC 2578 (STD 58) says this about OBJECT IDENTIFIERs: ++ * ++ * > 3.5. OBJECT IDENTIFIER values ++ * > ++ * > An OBJECT IDENTIFIER value is an ordered list of non-negative ++ * > numbers. For the SMIv2, each number in the list is referred to as a ++ * > sub-identifier, there are at most 128 sub-identifiers in a value, ++ * > and each sub-identifier has a maximum value of 2^32-1 (4294967295 ++ * > decimal). ++ * ++ * So a legitimate OID according to this RFC is at most (32 * 128 / 7), ++ * i.e. 586 bytes long. ++ * ++ * Ref: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2578#section-3.5 ++ */ ++ if (len > 586) ++ goto err; ++ + while (len > 0) { + l = 0; + use_bn = 0; +-- +2.34.1 + diff --git a/backport-CVE-2023-3446.patch b/backport-CVE-2023-3446.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..4aca482ec2616914865b43c22b671a30d3fb3b8b --- /dev/null +++ b/backport-CVE-2023-3446.patch @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +From 8780a896543a654e757db1b9396383f9d8095528 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell +Date: Thu, 6 Jul 2023 16:36:35 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix DH_check() excessive time with over sized modulus + +The DH_check() function checks numerous aspects of the key or parameters +that have been supplied. Some of those checks use the supplied modulus +value even if it is excessively large. + +There is already a maximum DH modulus size (10,000 bits) over which +OpenSSL will not generate or derive keys. DH_check() will however still +perform various tests for validity on such a large modulus. We introduce +a +new maximum (32,768) over which DH_check() will just fail. + +An application that calls DH_check() and supplies a key or parameters +obtained from an untrusted source could be vulnerable to a Denial of +Service attack. + +The function DH_check() is itself called by a number of other OpenSSL +functions. An application calling any of those other functions may +similarly be affected. The other functions affected by this are +DH_check_ex() and EVP_PKEY_param_check(). + +CVE-2023-3446 + +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale +Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove +Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/21452) +--- + Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h | 5 +++++ + Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c | 4 ++++ + 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h +index 6488879..06142df 100644 +--- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h ++++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/dh.h +@@ -77,6 +77,10 @@ + # define OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 + # endif + ++# ifndef OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS ++# define OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 32768 ++# endif ++ + # define DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P 0x01 + + /* +@@ -356,6 +360,7 @@ void ERR_load_DH_strings(void); + # define DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY 102 + # define DH_F_DHPARAMS_PRINT_FP 101 + # define DH_F_DH_BUILTIN_GENPARAMS 106 ++# define DH_F_DH_CHECK 126 + # define DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT 117 + # define DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY 118 + # define DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO 119 +diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c +index 9f3b174..9c62da4 100644 +--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c ++++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_check.c +@@ -78,6 +78,10 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret) + BN_ULONG l; + BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL; + ++ /* Don't do any check at all with an excessively large modulus */ ++ if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_CHECK_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) { ++ return 0; ++ } + *ret = 0; + ctx = BN_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) +-- +2.27.0 + diff --git a/shim.spec b/shim.spec index 2ff71a084aed0d0f7fdf0484aa2e851962d8a3bc..8967806265ac0e5791935d17725080cdebe75d7b 100644 --- a/shim.spec +++ b/shim.spec @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Name: shim Version: 15 -Release: 34 +Release: 35 Summary: First-stage UEFI bootloader ExclusiveArch: x86_64 aarch64 License: BSD @@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ Patch23: backport-CVE-2023-0464.patch Patch24: backport-CVE-2023-3817.patch Patch25: backport-CVE-2023-40551-pe-relocate-Fix-bounds-check-for-MZ-b.patch Patch26: backport-CVE-2023-40547-avoid-incorrectly-trusting-HTTP-heade.patch +Patch27: backport-CVE-2023-3446.patch +Patch28: backport-CVE-2023-0465.patch +Patch29: backport-CVE-2023-2650.patch # Feature Patch9000: Feature-add-tpcm-support-with-ipmi-channel.patch @@ -162,6 +165,9 @@ cd .. /usr/src/debug/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}/* %changelog +* Wed Feb 28 2024 zhengxiaoxiao - 15-35 +- fix CVE-2023-3446 CVE-2023-0465 CVE-2023-2650 + * Tue Jan 30 2024 jinlun - 15-34 - fix CVE-2023-40547 CVE-2023-40551