diff --git a/backport-0001-CVE-2020-1971.patch b/backport-0001-CVE-2020-1971.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0dc6a22e78bcadf2f1124f0e548f81f8820d052d..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-0001-CVE-2020-1971.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-From ae1e7c236db52fea0c84cb84ddbfe3d03c55ba4a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 15:19:34 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] DirectoryString is a CHOICE type and therefore uses explicit
- tagging
-
-EDIPartyName has 2 fields that use a DirectoryString. However they were
-marked as implicit tagging - which is not correct for a CHOICE type.
-
-Additionally the partyName field was marked as Optional when, according to
-RFC5280 it is not.
-
-Many thanks to github user @filipnavara for reporting this issue. Also to
-David Benjamin from Google who independently identified and reported it.
-
-Fixes #6859
----
- crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c | 5 +++--
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-@@ -72,8 +72,9 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE(OTHERNAME) = {
- IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OTHERNAME)
- 
- ASN1_SEQUENCE(EDIPARTYNAME) = {
--        ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0),
--        ASN1_IMP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1)
-+        /* DirectoryString is a CHOICE type so use explicit tagging */
-+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(EDIPARTYNAME, nameAssigner, DIRECTORYSTRING, 0),
-+        ASN1_EXP(EDIPARTYNAME, partyName, DIRECTORYSTRING, 1)
- } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EDIPARTYNAME)
- 
- IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(EDIPARTYNAME)
diff --git a/backport-0001-CVE-2022-28737.patch b/backport-0001-CVE-2022-28737.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9c1018219a14b23b12991dad99d11d3c2bcd01a3..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-0001-CVE-2022-28737.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From e99bdbb827a50cde019393d3ca1e89397db221a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
-Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 15:41:00 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pe: Fix a buffer overflow when SizeOfRawData > VirtualSize
-
-During image loading, the size of the destination buffer for the image
-is determined by the SizeOfImage field in the optional header. The start
-and end virtual addresses of each section, as determined by each section's
-VirtualAddress and VirtualSize fields, are bounds checked against the
-allocated buffer. However, the amount of data copied to the destination
-buffer is determined by the section's SizeOfRawData filed. If this is
-larger than the VirtualSize, then the copy can overflow the destination
-buffer.
-
-Fix this by limiting the amount of data to copy to the section's
-VirtualSize. In the case where a section has SizeOfRawData > VirtualSize,
-the excess data is discarded.
-
-This fixes CVE-2022-28737
-
-Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
----
- pe.c | 15 +++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
-index 5d0c6b0..1eb3f59 100644
---- a/pe.c
-+++ b/pe.c
-@@ -1089,6 +1089,7 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 	int i;
- 	EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
- 	char *base, *end;
-+	UINT32 size;
- 	PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT context;
- 	unsigned int alignment, alloc_size;
- 	int found_entry_point = 0;
-@@ -1274,13 +1275,15 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 				return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
- 			}
- 
--			if (Section->SizeOfRawData > 0)
--				CopyMem(base, data + Section->PointerToRawData,
--					Section->SizeOfRawData);
-+			size = Section->Misc.VirtualSize;
-+			if (size > Section->SizeOfRawData)
-+				size = Section->SizeOfRawData;
- 
--			if (Section->SizeOfRawData < Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
--				ZeroMem(base + Section->SizeOfRawData,
--					Section->Misc.VirtualSize - Section->SizeOfRawData);
-+			if (size > 0)
-+				CopyMem(base, data + Section->PointerToRawData, size);
-+
-+			if (size < Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
-+				ZeroMem(base + size, Section->Misc.VirtualSize - size);
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--- 
-2.27.0
-
diff --git a/backport-0002-CVE-2020-1971.patch b/backport-0002-CVE-2020-1971.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9a38e2c838a7a92e8fc9950c51335398dfdd2139..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-0002-CVE-2020-1971.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,94 +0,0 @@
-From 84743d3e7fae623c0a20bd727ec6e8c4031bf42f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 11 Nov 2020 16:12:58 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Correctly compare EdiPartyName in GENERAL_NAME_cmp()
-
-If a GENERAL_NAME field contained EdiPartyName data then it was
-incorrectly being handled as type "other". This could lead to a
-segmentation fault.
-
-Many thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
-
-CVE-2020-1971
----
- crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/v3_genn.c
-@@ -108,6 +108,37 @@ GENERAL_NAME *GENERAL_NAME_dup(GENERAL_N
-                                     (char *)a);
- }
- 
-+static int edipartyname_cmp(const EDIPARTYNAME *a, const EDIPARTYNAME *b)
-+{
-+    int res;
-+
-+    if (a == NULL || b == NULL) {
-+        /*
-+         * Shouldn't be possible in a valid GENERAL_NAME, but we handle it
-+         * anyway. OTHERNAME_cmp treats NULL != NULL so we do the same here
-+         */
-+        return -1;
-+    }
-+    if (a->nameAssigner == NULL && b->nameAssigner != NULL)
-+        return -1;
-+    if (a->nameAssigner != NULL && b->nameAssigner == NULL)
-+        return 1;
-+    /* If we get here then both have nameAssigner set, or both unset */
-+    if (a->nameAssigner != NULL) {
-+        res = ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->nameAssigner, b->nameAssigner);
-+        if (res != 0)
-+            return res;
-+    }
-+    /*
-+     * partyName is required, so these should never be NULL. We treat it in
-+     * the same way as the a == NULL || b == NULL case above
-+     */
-+    if (a->partyName == NULL || b->partyName == NULL)
-+        return -1;
-+
-+    return ASN1_STRING_cmp(a->partyName, b->partyName);
-+}
-+
- /* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */
- int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GENERAL_NAME *b)
- {
-@@ -117,8 +148,11 @@ int GENERAL_NAME_cmp(GENERAL_NAME *a, GE
-         return -1;
-     switch (a->type) {
-     case GEN_X400:
-+        result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.x400Address, b->d.x400Address);
-+        break;
-+
-     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
--        result = ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->d.other, b->d.other);
-+        result = edipartyname_cmp(a->d.ediPartyName, b->d.ediPartyName);
-         break;
- 
-     case GEN_OTHERNAME:
-@@ -165,8 +199,11 @@ void GENERAL_NAME_set0_value(GENERAL_NAM
- {
-     switch (type) {
-     case GEN_X400:
-+        a->d.x400Address = value;
-+        break;
-+
-     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
--        a->d.other = value;
-+        a->d.ediPartyName = value;
-         break;
- 
-     case GEN_OTHERNAME:
-@@ -200,8 +237,10 @@ void *GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(GENERAL_NA
-         *ptype = a->type;
-     switch (a->type) {
-     case GEN_X400:
-+        return a->d.x400Address;
-+
-     case GEN_EDIPARTY:
--        return a->d.other;
-+        return a->d.ediPartyName;
- 
-     case GEN_OTHERNAME:
-         return a->d.otherName;
diff --git a/backport-0002-CVE-2022-28737.patch b/backport-0002-CVE-2022-28737.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a0964e4a8fba2c3a923b0170f3f4d1dc73e688b2..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-0002-CVE-2022-28737.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,78 +0,0 @@
-From 5a82d7973656c68f006aac1ed462e7bb37075d92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
-Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 16:02:19 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] pe: Perform image verification earlier when loading grub
-
-The second stage loader was being verified after loading it into
-memory. As an additional hardening measure to avoid performing risky
-memcpys using header fields from a potentially specially crafted image,
-perform the verification before this so that it can be rejected earlier.
-
-Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
----
- pe.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
-index 1eb3f59..1d120f2 100644
---- a/pe.c
-+++ b/pe.c
-@@ -1106,7 +1106,31 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
--	 * We only need to verify the binary if we're in secure mode
-+	 * Perform the image verification before we start copying data around
-+	 * in order to load it.
-+	 */
-+	if (secure_mode ()) {
-+		efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
-+					   sha1hash);
-+
-+		if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
-+			if (verbose)
-+				console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
-+			else
-+				console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
-+			return efi_status;
-+		} else {
-+			if (verbose)
-+				console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Calculate the hash for the TPM measurement.
-+	 * XXX: We're computing these twice in secure boot mode when the
-+	 *  buffers already contain the previously computed hashes. Also,
-+	 *  this is only useful for the TPM1.2 case. We should try to fix
-+	 *  this in a follow-up.
- 	 */
- 	efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
- 				   sha1hash);
-@@ -1287,22 +1311,6 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	if (secure_mode ()) {
--		efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
--					   sha1hash);
--
--		if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
--			if (verbose)
--				console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
--			else
--				console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
--			return efi_status;
--		} else {
--			if (verbose)
--				console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
--		}
--	}
--
- 	if (context.NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC) {
- 		perror(L"Image has no relocation entry\n");
- 		FreePool(buffer);
--- 
-2.27.0
-
diff --git a/backport-0003-CVE-2020-1971.patch b/backport-0003-CVE-2020-1971.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2dce8108d3ba4f3ed1282ce2d12471e6e6e9763d..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-0003-CVE-2020-1971.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,82 +0,0 @@
-Backport of:
-
-From c521851116486d0cb351c46506d309dce0ae4c56 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 11:58:12 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Check that multi-strings/CHOICE types don't use implicit
- tagging
-
-It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to use implicit
-tagging since the content would be ambiguous. It is an error in the
-template if this ever happens. If we detect it we should stop parsing.
-
-Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
----
- crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c    |  1 +
- crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c    | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
- crypto/err/openssl.txt    |  1 +
- include/openssl/asn1err.h |  1 +
- 4 files changed, 22 insertions(+)
-
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-@@ -202,6 +202,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR), "aux error"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_CLASS), "bad class"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER), "bad object header"},
-+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE), "bad template"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ), "bad password read"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_TAG), "bad tag"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH),
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
-@@ -223,6 +223,15 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE *
-         break;
- 
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
-+        /*
-+         * It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so
-+         * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
-+         */
-+        if (tag != -1) {
-+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-         p = *in;
-         /* Just read in tag and class */
-         ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL,
-@@ -240,6 +249,7 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE *
-             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL);
-             goto err;
-         }
-+
-         /* Check tag matches bit map */
-         if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) {
-             /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */
-@@ -316,6 +326,15 @@ static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE *
-         goto err;
- 
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
-+        /*
-+         * It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so
-+         * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
-+         */
-+        if (tag != -1) {
-+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-+
-         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
-             goto auxerr;
-         if (*pval) {
---- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/asn1.h
-+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/asn1.h
-@@ -1306,6 +1306,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
- # define ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR                                 100
- # define ASN1_R_BAD_CLASS                                 101
- # define ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER                         102
-+# define ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE                              230
- # define ASN1_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ                         103
- # define ASN1_R_BAD_TAG                                   104
- # define ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH                 214
diff --git a/backport-0004-CVE-2020-1971.patch b/backport-0004-CVE-2020-1971.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2914588137389e91900c3ff3469b509542a89a15..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-0004-CVE-2020-1971.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
-Backport of:
-
-From 69f3d3c405991b0d6eea78d554b6aab4daeb4514 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2020 14:55:31 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Complain if we are attempting to encode with an invalid ASN.1
- template
-
-It never makes sense for multi-string or CHOICE types to have implicit
-tagging. If we have a template that uses the in this way then we
-should immediately fail.
-
-Thanks to David Benjamin from Google for reporting this issue.
----
- crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c    |  3 ++-
- crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c    | 16 ++++++++++++++++
- include/openssl/asn1err.h |  7 +++----
- 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[]
-     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP), "ASN1_item_dup"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW), "ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I), "ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I"},
-+    {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D), "ASN1_item_ex_i2d"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_item_i2d_bio"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP), "ASN1_item_i2d_fp"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK), "ASN1_item_pack"},
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/tasn_enc.c
-@@ -150,9 +150,25 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
-         break;
- 
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING:
-+        /*
-+         * It never makes sense for multi-strings to have implicit tagging, so
-+         * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
-+         */
-+        if (tag != -1) {
-+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
-+            return -1;
-+        }
-         return asn1_i2d_ex_primitive(pval, out, it, -1, aclass);
- 
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE:
-+        /*
-+         * It never makes sense for CHOICE types to have implicit tagging, so
-+         * if tag != -1, then this looks like an error in the template.
-+         */
-+        if (tag != -1) {
-+            ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D, ASN1_R_BAD_TEMPLATE);
-+            return -1;
-+        }
-         if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_I2D_PRE, pval, it, NULL))
-             return 0;
-         i = asn1_get_choice_selector(pval, it);
---- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/asn1.h
-+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/asn1.h
-@@ -1210,6 +1210,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP                             191
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW                  121
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I                          120
-+# define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_I2D                          144
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO                         192
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP                          193
- # define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK                            198
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2017-3735.patch b/backport-CVE-2017-3735.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 002a8db20ea09470a27f79c139ad97cc1115b9a9..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2017-3735.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-From 31c8b265591a0aaa462a1f3eb5770661aaac67db Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 22 Aug 2017 11:44:41 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH] Avoid out-of-bounds read
-
-Fixes CVE 2017-3735
-
-Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4276)
-
-(cherry picked from commit b23171744b01e473ebbfd6edad70c1c3825ffbcd)
----
- crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c | 10 ++++++----
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
-index 1290dec9bb8..af080a04f2b 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/v3_addr.c
-@@ -130,10 +130,12 @@ static int length_from_afi(const unsigned afi)
-  */
- unsigned int v3_addr_get_afi(const IPAddressFamily *f)
- {
--    return ((f != NULL &&
--             f->addressFamily != NULL && f->addressFamily->data != NULL)
--            ? ((f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | (f->addressFamily->data[1]))
--            : 0);
-+    if (f == NULL
-+            || f->addressFamily == NULL
-+            || f->addressFamily->data == NULL
-+            || f->addressFamily->length < 2)
-+        return 0;
-+    return (f->addressFamily->data[0] << 8) | f->addressFamily->data[1];
- }
- 
- /*
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2017-3737.patch b/backport-CVE-2017-3737.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ce895ccbb0c9e34f89541bf8e00964ac2573b474..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2017-3737.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 898fb884b706aaeb283de4812340bb0bde8476dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2017 14:04:01 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Don't allow read/write after fatal error
-
-OpenSSL 1.0.2 (starting from version 1.0.2b) introduced an "error state"
-mechanism. The intent was that if a fatal error occurred during a handshake
-then OpenSSL would move into the error state and would immediately fail if
-you attempted to continue the handshake. This works as designed for the
-explicit handshake functions (SSL_do_handshake(), SSL_accept() and
-SSL_connect()), however due to a bug it does not work correctly if
-SSL_read() or SSL_write() is called directly. In that scenario, if the
-handshake fails then a fatal error will be returned in the initial function
-call. If SSL_read()/SSL_write() is subsequently called by the application
-for the same SSL object then it will succeed and the data is passed without
-being decrypted/encrypted directly from the SSL/TLS record layer.
-
-In order to exploit this issue an attacker would have to trick an
-application into behaving incorrectly by issuing an SSL_read()/SSL_write()
-after having already received a fatal error.
-
-Thanks to David Benjamin (Google) for reporting this issue and suggesting
-this fix.
-
-CVE-2017-3737
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- ssl/ssl.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/ssl.h b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/ssl.h
-index 90aeb0ce4e1..3cf96a239ba 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/ssl.h
-+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/ssl.h
-@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ extern "C" {
- # define SSL_ST_BEFORE                   0x4000
- # define SSL_ST_OK                       0x03
- # define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE              (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT)
--# define SSL_ST_ERR                      0x05
-+# define SSL_ST_ERR                      (0x05|SSL_ST_INIT)
- 
- # define SSL_CB_LOOP                     0x01
- # define SSL_CB_EXIT                     0x02
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2018-0732.patch b/backport-CVE-2018-0732.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 570beac3e5fefffbaf76348bd82c75138587a15c..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2018-0732.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,39 +0,0 @@
-From 3984ef0b72831da8b3ece4745cac4f8575b19098 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 11 Jun 2018 19:38:54 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Reject excessively large primes in DH key generation.
-
-CVE-2018-0732
-
-Signed-off-by: Guido Vranken <guidovranken@gmail.com>
-
-(cherry picked from commit 91f7361f47b082ae61ffe1a7b17bb2adf213c7fe)
-
-Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6457)
----
- crypto/dh/dh_key.c | 7 ++++++-
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-index 387558f1467..f235e0d682b 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
-@@ -130,10 +130,15 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
-     int ok = 0;
-     int generate_new_key = 0;
-     unsigned l;
--    BN_CTX *ctx;
-+    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-     BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
-     BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
- 
-+    if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-+        DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-+        return 0;
-+    }
-+
-     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2018-0737.patch b/backport-CVE-2018-0737.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e929ec0e8b77f58955039ddd0e870529fa04e0a4..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2018-0737.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From 349a41da1ad88ad87825414752a8ff5fdd6a6c3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Billy Brumley <bbrumley@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2018 10:10:58 +0300
-Subject: [PATCH] RSA key generation: ensure BN_mod_inverse and BN_mod_exp_mont
- both get called with BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag set.
-
-CVE-2018-0737
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(cherry picked from commit 6939eab03a6e23d2bd2c3f5e34fe1d48e542e787)
----
- crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-index 9ca5dfefb70..42b89a8dfaa 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
-     if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
-+    BN_set_flags(rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+    BN_set_flags(rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-     BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-     /* generate p and q */
-     for (;;) {
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2018-0739.patch b/backport-CVE-2018-0739.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 2e5d29cb1d55a8aab39205378646818f17fcc489..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2018-0739.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,232 +0,0 @@
-From 9310d45087ae546e27e61ddf8f6367f29848220d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2018 10:05:40 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Limit ASN.1 constructed types recursive definition depth
-
-Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in
-PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with
-excessive recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth.
-
-CVE-2018-0739
-
-Credit to OSSFuzz for finding this issue.
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/asn1/asn1.h     |  1 +
- crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c |  3 +-
- crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c | 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
- 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/asn1.h b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/asn1.h
-index 68e791fcdbe..35a2b2aa023 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/asn1.h
-+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/asn1.h
-@@ -1365,6 +1365,7 @@ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
- # define ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL                     139
- # define ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG                         140
- # define ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING                        197
-+# define ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP                           219
- # define ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS                        141
- # define ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT                          190
- # define ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA                           142
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-index fd4ac8d9db8..cfc1512f9d0 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c */
- /* ====================================================================
-- * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[] = {
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL), "mstring not universal"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG), "mstring wrong tag"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING), "nested asn1 string"},
-+    {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP), "nested too deep"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS), "non hex characters"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT), "not ascii format"},
-     {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA), "not enough data"},
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
-index d49a5d5792a..78126e94c37 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c
-@@ -65,6 +65,14 @@
- #include <openssl/buffer.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- 
-+/*
-+ * Constructed types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7)
-+ * could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive
-+ * recursion. Therefore we limit the stack depth. This is the maximum number of
-+ * recursive invocations of asn1_item_embed_d2i().
-+ */
-+#define ASN1_MAX_CONSTRUCTED_NEST 30
-+
- static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len);
- static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf);
- 
-@@ -81,11 +89,11 @@ static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass,
- static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
-                                 const unsigned char **in, long len,
-                                 const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
--                                ASN1_TLC *ctx);
-+                                ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
- static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
-                                    const unsigned char **in, long len,
-                                    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
--                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx);
-+                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth);
- static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
-                                  const unsigned char **in, long len,
-                                  const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-@@ -154,17 +162,16 @@ int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval,
- {
-     ASN1_TLC c;
-     asn1_tlc_clear_nc(&c);
--    return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c);
-+    return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c, 0);
- }
- 
- /*
-  * Decode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging, if any. If 'opt' set and
-  * tag mismatch return -1 to handle OPTIONAL
-  */
--
--int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
--                     const ASN1_ITEM *it,
--                     int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-+static int asn1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in,
-+                            long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass,
-+                            char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
- {
-     const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL;
-     const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf;
-@@ -189,6 +196,11 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
-     else
-         asn1_cb = 0;
- 
-+    if (++depth > ASN1_MAX_CONSTRUCTED_NEST) {
-+        ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NESTED_TOO_DEEP);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-     switch (it->itype) {
-     case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE:
-         if (it->templates) {
-@@ -204,7 +216,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
-                 goto err;
-             }
-             return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len,
--                                        it->templates, opt, ctx);
-+                                        it->templates, opt, ctx, depth);
-         }
-         return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it,
-                                      tag, aclass, opt, ctx);
-@@ -326,7 +338,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
-             /*
-              * We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence can be recognised.
-              */
--            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx);
-+            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx, depth);
-             /* If field not present, try the next one */
-             if (ret == -1)
-                 continue;
-@@ -444,7 +456,8 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
-              * attempt to read in field, allowing each to be OPTIONAL
-              */
- 
--            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx);
-+            ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx,
-+                                       depth);
-             if (!ret) {
-                 errtt = seqtt;
-                 goto err;
-@@ -514,6 +527,13 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
-     return 0;
- }
- 
-+int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
-+                     const ASN1_ITEM *it,
-+                     int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-+{
-+    return asn1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx, 0);
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Templates are handled with two separate functions. One handles any
-  * EXPLICIT tag and the other handles the rest.
-@@ -522,7 +542,7 @@ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len,
- static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
-                                 const unsigned char **in, long inlen,
-                                 const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
--                                ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-+                                ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
- {
-     int flags, aclass;
-     int ret;
-@@ -557,7 +577,7 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
-             return 0;
-         }
-         /* We've found the field so it can't be OPTIONAL now */
--        ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx);
-+        ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx, depth);
-         if (!ret) {
-             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
-             return 0;
-@@ -581,7 +601,7 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
-             }
-         }
-     } else
--        return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx);
-+        return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx, depth);
- 
-     *in = p;
-     return 1;
-@@ -594,7 +614,7 @@ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
- static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
-                                    const unsigned char **in, long len,
-                                    const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt,
--                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx)
-+                                   ASN1_TLC *ctx, int depth)
- {
-     int flags, aclass;
-     int ret;
-@@ -665,8 +685,8 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
-                 break;
-             }
-             skfield = NULL;
--            if (!ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&skfield, &p, len,
--                                  ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx)) {
-+            if (!asn1_item_ex_d2i(&skfield, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-+                                  -1, 0, 0, ctx, depth)) {
-                 ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I,
-                         ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
-                 goto err;
-@@ -684,9 +704,8 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
-         }
-     } else if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) {
-         /* IMPLICIT tagging */
--        ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len,
--                               ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt,
--                               ctx);
-+        ret = asn1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag,
-+                               aclass, opt, ctx, depth);
-         if (!ret) {
-             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
-             goto err;
-@@ -694,8 +713,9 @@ static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val,
-             return -1;
-     } else {
-         /* Nothing special */
--        ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
--                               -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx);
-+        ret = asn1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item),
-+                               -1, tt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_COMBINE, opt, ctx,
-+                               depth);
-         if (!ret) {
-             ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR);
-             goto err;
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2019-1563.patch b/backport-CVE-2019-1563.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a7e706b708179746ca4d5c7def42bc3423efec43..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2019-1563.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-From e21f8cf78a125cd3c8c0d1a1a6c8bb0b901f893f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
-Date: Sun, 1 Sep 2019 00:16:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and
- CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey
-
-An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the
-second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second
-recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct
-encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be
-decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is
-used and the recipient will not notice the attack.
-
-As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted
-key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the
-certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out.
-
-The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the
-CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag.
-
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9777)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 5840ed0cd1e6487d247efbc1a04136a41d7b3a37)
----
- crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c | 12 ++++++++----
- 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-index 6a463680d7e..63bc88269ff 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/pkcs7/pk7_doit.c
-@@ -191,7 +191,8 @@ static int pkcs7_encode_rinfo(PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri,
- }
- 
- static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
--                               PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
-+                               PKCS7_RECIP_INFO *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
-+                               size_t fixlen)
- {
-     EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL;
-     unsigned char *ek = NULL;
-@@ -224,7 +225,9 @@ static int pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(unsigned char **pek, int *peklen,
-     }
- 
-     if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen,
--                         ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0) {
-+                         ri->enc_key->data, ri->enc_key->length) <= 0
-+            || eklen == 0
-+            || (fixlen != 0 && eklen != fixlen)) {
-         ret = 0;
-         PKCS7err(PKCS7_F_PKCS7_DECRYPT_RINFO, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
-         goto err;
-@@ -571,13 +574,14 @@ BIO *PKCS7_dataDecode(PKCS7 *p7, EVP_PKEY *pkey, BIO *in_bio, X509 *pcert)
-             for (i = 0; i < sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_num(rsk); i++) {
-                 ri = sk_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_value(rsk, i);
- 
--                if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
-+                if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey,
-+                        EVP_CIPHER_key_length(evp_cipher)) < 0)
-                     goto err;
-                 ERR_clear_error();
-             }
-         } else {
-             /* Only exit on fatal errors, not decrypt failure */
--            if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey) < 0)
-+            if (pkcs7_decrypt_rinfo(&ek, &eklen, ri, pkey, 0) < 0)
-                 goto err;
-             ERR_clear_error();
-         }
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2021-23840.patch b/backport-CVE-2021-23840.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index bbcadc4dae0185b465ed597e07dc782044fd1b09..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2021-23840.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-Backport of:
-
-From 6a51b9e1d0cf0bf8515f7201b68fb0a3482b3dc1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Tue, 2 Feb 2021 17:17:23 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Don't overflow the output length in EVP_CipherUpdate calls
-
-CVE-2021-23840
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/err/openssl.txt   |  3 ++-
- crypto/evp/evp_enc.c     | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- crypto/evp/evp_err.c     |  4 +++-
- include/openssl/evperr.h |  7 +++----
- 4 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
-@@ -354,6 +354,19 @@ int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ct
-             return 1;
-         } else {
-             j = bl - i;
-+
-+            /*
-+             * Once we've processed the first j bytes from in, the amount of
-+             * data left that is a multiple of the block length is:
-+             * (inl - j) & ~(bl - 1)
-+             * We must ensure that this amount of data, plus the one block that
-+             * we process from ctx->buf does not exceed INT_MAX
-+             */
-+            if (((inl - j) & ~(bl - 1)) > INT_MAX - bl) {
-+                EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE,
-+                       EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW);
-+                return 0;
-+            }
-             memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, j);
-             if (!M_do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl))
-                 return 0;
-@@ -455,6 +468,19 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ct
-     OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final);
- 
-     if (ctx->final_used) {
-+        /*
-+         * final_used is only ever set if buf_len is 0. Therefore the maximum
-+         * length output we will ever see from evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate is
-+         * the maximum multiple of the block length that is <= inl, or just:
-+         * inl & ~(b - 1)
-+         * Since final_used has been set then the final output length is:
-+         * (inl & ~(b - 1)) + b
-+         * This must never exceed INT_MAX
-+         */
-+        if ((inl & ~(b - 1)) > INT_MAX - b) {
-+            EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW);
-+            return 0;
-+        }
-         memcpy(out, ctx->final, b);
-         out += b;
-         fix_len = 1;
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
-@@ -215,6 +215,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[]
-     {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
-      "operation not supported for this keytype"},
-     {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED), "operaton not initialized"},
-+    {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW), "output would overflow"},
-     {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PKCS8_UNKNOWN_BROKEN_TYPE),
-      "pkcs8 unknown broken type"},
-     {ERR_REASON(EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR), "private key decode error"},
---- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/evp.h
-+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/evp.h
-@@ -1509,6 +1509,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
- # define EVP_R_NO_VERIFY_FUNCTION_CONFIGURED              105
- # define EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE   150
- # define EVP_R_OPERATON_NOT_INITIALIZED                   151
-+# define EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW                      184
- # define EVP_R_PKCS8_UNKNOWN_BROKEN_TYPE                  117
- # define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR                   145
- # define EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR                   146
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2021-23841.patch b/backport-CVE-2021-23841.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 773ea493bf24ca3733c5170b829b53dd35853c55..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2021-23841.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-Backport of:
-
-From 122a19ab48091c657f7cb1fb3af9fc07bd557bbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-Date: Wed, 10 Feb 2021 16:10:36 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix Null pointer deref in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash()
-
-The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts
-to create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data
-contained within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly
-handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which
-might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may
-subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a
-potential denial of service attack.
-
-The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by
-OpenSSL itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this
-function directly and they use it on certificates that may have been
-obtained from untrusted sources.
-
-CVE-2021-23841
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-(cherry picked from commit 8130d654d1de922ea224fa18ee3bc7262edc39c0)
----
- crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
-@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_has
- 
-     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
-     f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
-+    if (f == NULL)
-+        goto err;
-     if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
-         goto err;
-     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2021-3712.patch b/backport-CVE-2021-3712.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 37680848121dbab1082076d16b1da996c9366467..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2021-3712.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-Index: openssl-1.0.2p/crypto/asn1/t_x509a.c
-===================================================================
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/t_x509a.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/asn1/t_x509a.c
-@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ int X509_CERT_AUX_print(BIO *out, X509_C
-     } else
-         BIO_printf(out, "%*sNo Rejected Uses.\n", indent, "");
-     if (aux->alias)
--        BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %s\n", indent, "", aux->alias->data);
-+        BIO_printf(out, "%*sAlias: %.*s\n", indent, "", aux->alias->length, aux->alias->data);
-     if (aux->keyid) {
-         BIO_printf(out, "%*sKey Id: ", indent, "");
-         for (i = 0; i < aux->keyid->length; i++)
diff --git a/backport-CVE-2022-0778.patch b/backport-CVE-2022-0778.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index db3376ec4e8f6e56fe1a8cabfcd2e689c3769c57..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-CVE-2022-0778.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-From 3118eb64934499d93db3230748a452351d1d9a65 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
-Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 18:26:21 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix possible infinite loop in BN_mod_sqrt()
-
-The calculation in some cases does not finish for non-prime p.
-
-This fixes CVE-2022-0778.
-
-Based on patch by David Benjamin <davidben@google.com>.
-
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
-index 1723d5ded5a..53b0f559855 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c
-@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
- /*
-  * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks
-  * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number
-- * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime!
-+ * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or
-+ * an incorrect "result" will be returned.
-  */
- {
-     BIGNUM *ret = in;
-@@ -301,18 +302,23 @@ BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
-             goto vrfy;
-         }
- 
--        /* find smallest  i  such that  b^(2^i) = 1 */
--        i = 1;
--        if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
--            goto end;
--        while (!BN_is_one(t)) {
--            i++;
--            if (i == e) {
--                BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
--                goto end;
-+        /* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */
-+        for (i = 1; i < e; i++) {
-+            if (i == 1) {
-+                if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx))
-+                    goto end;
-+
-+            } else {
-+                if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
-+                    goto end;
-             }
--            if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx))
--                goto end;
-+            if (BN_is_one(t))
-+                break;
-+        }
-+        /* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */
-+        if (i >= e) {
-+            BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE);
-+            goto end;
-         }
- 
-         /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */
diff --git a/backport-Fix-an-endless-loop-in-rsa_builtin_keygen.patch b/backport-Fix-an-endless-loop-in-rsa_builtin_keygen.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index af76bc10b6504a8d391bf27e85669a6e9fd7745d..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-Fix-an-endless-loop-in-rsa_builtin_keygen.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,58 +0,0 @@
-From 32492093722636596018a799c438bfc04c343b40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2017 09:54:17 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix an endless loop in rsa_builtin_keygen.
-
-Cherry-picked by Matt Caswell from 69795831.
-
-Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4670)
----
- crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 23 +++++++++++------------
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-index 082c8da2efc..a85493d6097 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-@@ -110,6 +110,16 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
-     int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 
-+    /*
-+     * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
-+     * continually regenerating the same prime values.
-+     */
-+    if (bits < 16) {
-+        ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
-+        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
-+        goto err;
-+    }
-+
-     ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-     if (ctx == NULL)
-         goto err;
-@@ -161,21 +171,10 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
-     if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
-         goto err;
-     for (;;) {
--        /*
--         * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
--         * continually regenerating the same prime values. Check for this and
--         * bail if it happens 3 times.
--         */
--        unsigned int degenerate = 0;
-         do {
-             if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
-                 goto err;
--        } while ((BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0) && (++degenerate < 3));
--        if (degenerate == 3) {
--            ok = 0;             /* we set our own err */
--            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
--            goto err;
--        }
-+        } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
-         if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
-             goto err;
-         if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
diff --git a/backport-Replaced-variable-time-GCD-with-consttime-inversion.patch b/backport-Replaced-variable-time-GCD-with-consttime-inversion.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index c5b3984d7d8cb211f075d936166f4b8e5b76b016..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-Replaced-variable-time-GCD-with-consttime-inversion.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-From 0b199a883e9170cdfe8e61c150bbaf8d8951f3e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Samuel Weiser <samuel.weiser@iaik.tugraz.at>
-Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 15:55:17 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Replaced variable-time GCD with consttime inversion to avoid
- side-channel attacks on RSA key generation
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5170)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 9db724cfede4ba7a3668bff533973ee70145ec07)
----
- crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-index a85493d6097..8553772f062 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
-     BIGNUM *pr0, *d, *p;
-     int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
-     BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+    unsigned long error = 0;
- 
-     /*
-      * When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
-@@ -155,16 +156,25 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
-     if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
-+    BN_set_flags(rsa->e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-     /* generate p and q */
-     for (;;) {
-         if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
-             goto err;
-         if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
-             goto err;
--        if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
--            goto err;
--        if (BN_is_one(r1))
-+        if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
-+            /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
-             break;
-+        }
-+        error = ERR_peek_last_error();
-+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
-+            && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
-+            /* GCD != 1 */
-+            ERR_clear_error();
-+        } else {
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-         if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
-             goto err;
-     }
-@@ -177,10 +187,18 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
-         } while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
-         if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
-             goto err;
--        if (!BN_gcd(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx))
--            goto err;
--        if (BN_is_one(r1))
-+        if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
-+            /* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
-             break;
-+        }
-+        error = ERR_peek_last_error();
-+        if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
-+            && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
-+            /* GCD != 1 */
-+            ERR_clear_error();
-+        } else {
-+            goto err;
-+        }
-         if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
-             goto err;
-     }
diff --git a/backport-arm-aa64-fix-the-size-of-.rela-sections.patch b/backport-arm-aa64-fix-the-size-of-.rela-sections.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 584fc27cb135afb359eb8b1bc7c7a20832795603..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-arm-aa64-fix-the-size-of-.rela-sections.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-From 34e3ef205c5d65139eacba8891fa773c03174679 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 16 Jun 2021 16:13:32 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] arm/aa64: fix the size of .rela* sections
-
-The previous commit(*) merged .rel* and .dyn* into .rodata, and this
-made ld to generate the wrong size for .rela* sections that covered
-other unrelated sections. When the EFI image was loaded, _relocate()
-went through the unexpected data and may cause unexpected crash.
-This commit moves .rel* and .dyn* out of .rodata in the ld script but
-also moves the related variables, such as _evrodata, _rodata_size,
-and _rodata_vsize, to the end of the new .dyn section, so that the
-crafted pe-coff section header for .rodata still covers our new
-.rela and .dyn sections.
-
-(*) 212ba30544f ("arm/aa64 targets: put .rel* and .dyn* in .rodata")
-
-Fix issue: https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/371
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- Makefile            |  4 ++--
- elf_aarch64_efi.lds | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
- elf_arm_efi.lds     | 24 ++++++++++++++++--------
- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile
-index 050c921..45db2b5 100644
---- a/Makefile
-+++ b/Makefile
-@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ ifneq ($(OBJCOPY_GTE224),1)
- endif
- 	$(OBJCOPY) -D -j .text -j .sdata -j .data -j .data.ident \
- 		-j .dynamic -j .rodata -j .rel* \
--		-j .rela* -j .reloc -j .eh_frame \
-+		-j .rela* -j .dyn -j .reloc -j .eh_frame \
- 		-j .vendor_cert -j .sbat \
- 		$(FORMAT) $< $@
- 	# I am tired of wasting my time fighting binutils timestamp code.
-@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ ifneq ($(OBJCOPY_GTE224),1)
- endif
- 	$(OBJCOPY) -D -j .text -j .sdata -j .data \
- 		-j .dynamic -j .rodata -j .rel* \
--		-j .rela* -j .reloc -j .eh_frame -j .sbat \
-+		-j .rela* -j .dyn -j .reloc -j .eh_frame -j .sbat \
- 		-j .debug_info -j .debug_abbrev -j .debug_aranges \
- 		-j .debug_line -j .debug_str -j .debug_ranges \
- 		-j .note.gnu.build-id \
-diff --git a/elf_aarch64_efi.lds b/elf_aarch64_efi.lds
-index 353b24a..42825fd 100644
---- a/elf_aarch64_efi.lds
-+++ b/elf_aarch64_efi.lds
-@@ -70,21 +70,29 @@ SECTIONS
-   .rodata :
-   {
-     _rodata = .;
--    *(.rela.dyn)
--    *(.rela.plt)
--    *(.rela.got)
--    *(.rela.data)
--    *(.rela.data*)
--
-     *(.rodata*)
-     *(.srodata)
--    *(.dynsym)
--    *(.dynstr)
-     . = ALIGN(16);
-     *(.note.gnu.build-id)
-     . = ALIGN(4096);
-     *(.vendor_cert)
-     *(.data.ident)
-+    . = ALIGN(4096);
-+  }
-+  . = ALIGN(4096);
-+  .rela :
-+  {
-+    *(.rela.dyn)
-+    *(.rela.plt)
-+    *(.rela.got)
-+    *(.rela.data)
-+    *(.rela.data*)
-+  }
-+  . = ALIGN(4096);
-+  .dyn :
-+  {
-+    *(.dynsym)
-+    *(.dynstr)
-     _evrodata = .;
-     . = ALIGN(4096);
-   }
-diff --git a/elf_arm_efi.lds b/elf_arm_efi.lds
-index e4e29bd..5334621 100644
---- a/elf_arm_efi.lds
-+++ b/elf_arm_efi.lds
-@@ -70,21 +70,29 @@ SECTIONS
-   .rodata :
-   {
-     _rodata = .;
--    *(.rel.dyn)
--    *(.rel.plt)
--    *(.rel.got)
--    *(.rel.data)
--    *(.rel.data*)
--
-     *(.rodata*)
-     *(.srodata)
--    *(.dynsym)
--    *(.dynstr)
-     . = ALIGN(16);
-     *(.note.gnu.build-id)
-     . = ALIGN(4096);
-     *(.vendor_cert)
-     *(.data.ident)
-+    . = ALIGN(4096);
-+  }
-+  . = ALIGN(4096);
-+  .rela :
-+  {
-+    *(.rela.dyn)
-+    *(.rela.plt)
-+    *(.rela.got)
-+    *(.rela.data)
-+    *(.rela.data*)
-+  }
-+  . = ALIGN(4096);
-+  .dyn :
-+  {
-+    *(.dynsym)
-+    *(.dynstr)
-     _evrodata = .;
-     . = ALIGN(4096);
-   }
--- 
-2.27.0
-
diff --git a/backport-consttime-flag-changed.patch b/backport-consttime-flag-changed.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b74c567dcd70617fdef00e89e1c01e2665e3e23..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-consttime-flag-changed.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From 0d6710289307d277ebc3354105c965b6e8ba8eb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Samuel Weiser <samuel.weiser@iaik.tugraz.at>
-Date: Fri, 9 Feb 2018 14:11:47 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] consttime flag changed
-
-Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
-Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
-Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5170)
-
-(cherry picked from commit 7150a4720af7913cae16f2e4eaf768b578c0b298)
----
- crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-index 610d82db665..9ca5dfefb70 100644
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_gen.c
-@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
-     if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
-         goto err;
- 
--    BN_set_flags(rsa->e, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-+    BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-     /* generate p and q */
-     for (;;) {
-         if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
diff --git a/backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE.patch b/backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 65c941d90e4f0a7d6e414977eae71ac0286705ff..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-Backport of:
-
-From 4bd0db1feaaf97fbc2bd31f54f1fbdeab80b2b1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
-Date: Sun, 9 Dec 2018 14:20:30 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] make update
-
-Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
-Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
-(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7852)
-
-(cherry picked from commit f2f734d4f9e34643a1d3e5b79d2447cd643519f8)
----
- crypto/err/openssl.txt   | 1 +
- crypto/evp/evp_err.c     | 2 ++
- include/openssl/evperr.h | 1 +
- 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
-
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
-@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_DecryptFinal_ex"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_DecryptUpdate"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
-+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE), "evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_EncryptUpdate"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
---- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/evp.h
-+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/evp.h
-@@ -1398,6 +1398,7 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
- # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX                        101
- # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE                          166
- # define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX                          128
-+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE                   219
- # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
- # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          167
- # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
diff --git a/backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE.patch b/backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 85ea54085572d8591ad3ec1e9e36ac82ddfc4cdc..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-Partial backport of:
-
-From 83151b73a4736bca1797f8edc2b0ad4cf7ac9146 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org>
-Date: Mon, 25 Jul 2016 15:02:26 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] evp/evp_enc.c: make assert error message more readable and
- add EVPerr(PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPED)
-
-Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
----
- crypto/evp/evp_enc.c  | 28 +++++++++++++++++++---------
- crypto/evp/evp_err.c  |  3 +++
- include/openssl/evp.h |  3 +++
- 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
-
---- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
-+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/evp_err.c
-@@ -92,8 +92,10 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[]
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH),
-      "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_DecryptFinal_ex"},
-+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_DecryptUpdate"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX), "EVP_DigestInit_ex"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX), "EVP_EncryptFinal_ex"},
-+    {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE), "EVP_EncryptUpdate"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE), "EVP_MD_size"},
-     {ERR_FUNC(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT), "EVP_OpenInit"},
---- a/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/evp.h
-+++ b/Cryptlib/Include/openssl/evp.h
-@@ -1396,8 +1396,10 @@ void ERR_load_EVP_strings(void);
- # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL                        124
- # define EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH              122
- # define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX                        101
-+# define EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE                          166
- # define EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX                          128
- # define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX                        127
-+# define EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE                          167
- # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX                         110
- # define EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE                                162
- # define EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT                               102
diff --git a/backport-mok-delete-the-existing-RT-variables-only-when-only_.patch b/backport-mok-delete-the-existing-RT-variables-only-when-only_.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5e531d70f47ac60bc4104e6b21714eb540476dcf..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-mok-delete-the-existing-RT-variables-only-when-only_.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From b1fead0f7c9a09634057317a7bd2a5c94258e5df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 30 Jun 2021 16:34:51 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] mok: delete the existing RT variables only when
- only_first=TRUE
-
-For the firmware without the variable writing issues, MOK variables are
-mirrored when only_first=TRUE. However, LibDeleteVariable() was called
-in maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable() when only_first=FALSE, and this
-could delete MOK variables that were just mirrored in the first round.
-
-This bug was hidden since LibDeleteVariable() deletes BS+RT+NV variables
-while we mirror MOK variables as BS+RT, and the firmware refused to
-delete the mirrored MOK variable due to mismatching attributes. However,
-some firmwares, such as VMWare, didn't enforce the attribute check and
-just deleted the variables with matched name and GUID. In such system,
-MokListRT was always removed before it reached OS.
-
-Fixes: https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/386
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- mok.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/mok.c b/mok.c
-index 454672b..84e51f3 100644
---- a/mok.c
-+++ b/mok.c
-@@ -868,7 +868,7 @@ maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v,
- 	BOOLEAN present = FALSE;
- 
- 	if (v->rtname) {
--		if (!only_first && (v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST)) {
-+		if (only_first && (v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST)) {
- 			dprint(L"deleting \"%s\"\n", v->rtname);
- 			efi_status = LibDeleteVariable(v->rtname, v->guid);
- 			dprint(L"LibDeleteVariable(\"%s\",...) => %r\n", v->rtname, efi_status);
--- 
-2.27.0
-
diff --git a/backport-mok-relax-the-maximum-variable-size-check.patch b/backport-mok-relax-the-maximum-variable-size-check.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5f6cbecbe73c5386653b3715463e875310dcf848..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-mok-relax-the-maximum-variable-size-check.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-From 3f327f546c219634b24cfd9abe9ec987bbb6ad14 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
-Date: Wed, 5 May 2021 11:25:07 +0800
-Subject: [PATCH] mok: relax the maximum variable size check
-
-Some UEFI environment such as u-boot doesn't implement
-QueryVariableInfo(), so we couldn't rely on the function to estimate the
-available space for RT variables. All we can do is to call SetVariable()
-directly and check the return value of SetVariable().
-
-Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
----
- mok.c | 9 +++++++--
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/mok.c b/mok.c
-index db18093..454672b 100644
---- a/mok.c
-+++ b/mok.c
-@@ -364,13 +364,18 @@ mirror_mok_db(CHAR16 *name, CHAR8 *name8, EFI_GUID *guid, UINT32 attrs,
- 	SIZE_T max_var_sz;
- 
- 	efi_status = get_max_var_sz(attrs, &max_var_sz);
--	if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
-+	if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && efi_status != EFI_UNSUPPORTED) {
- 		LogError(L"Could not get maximum variable size: %r",
- 			 efi_status);
- 		return efi_status;
- 	}
- 
--	if (FullDataSize <= max_var_sz) {
-+	/* Some UEFI environment such as u-boot doesn't implement
-+	 * QueryVariableInfo() and we will only get EFI_UNSUPPORTED when
-+	 * querying the available space. In this case, we just mirror
-+	 * the variable directly. */
-+	if (FullDataSize <= max_var_sz || efi_status == EFI_UNSUPPORTED) {
-+		efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
- 		if (only_first)
- 			efi_status = SetVariable(name, guid, attrs,
- 						 FullDataSize, FullData);
--- 
-2.27.0
-
diff --git a/backport-shim-another-attempt-to-fix-load-options-handling.patch b/backport-shim-another-attempt-to-fix-load-options-handling.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ba154b829fac064a70bc6c6eaa5bc505387bdca7..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-shim-another-attempt-to-fix-load-options-handling.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,402 +0,0 @@
-From 4d64389c6c941d21548b06423b8131c872e3c3c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 Jun 2021 16:34:18 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] shim: another attempt to fix load options handling
-
-The load options handling is quite complicated and tries to accomodate
-several scenarios, but there are currently multiple issues:
-
-- If the supplied LoadOptions is an EFI_LOAD_OPTION structure,
-second_stage gets initialized to the entire contents of the OptionalData
-field and load_options is initialized to NULL, which means it isn't
-possible to pass additional options to the second stage loader (and it
-looks like the intention is for this to be supported).
-
-- If the supplied LoadOptions contains 2 or more strings, the code seems
-to assume that shim was executed from the UEFI shell and that the first
-argument is the path of the shim executable, so it's ignored. But this
-breaks the ability to pass additional options to the second stage loader
-from BDS on firmware implementations that initialize LoadOptions to just
-the OptionalData field of the EFI_LOAD_OPTION, which is what EDK2 seems
-to do.
-
-This is moot anyway because this case (strings == 2) doesn't actually seem
-to work, as nothing sets loader_len and therefore second_stage is not set
-to the custom loader path.
-
-- If the supplied LoadOptions contains a single string that isn't shim's
-path, nothing sets loader_len and therefore second_stage isn't set at the
-end of set_second_stage.
-
-- set_second_stage replaces L' ' characters with L'\0' - whilst this is
-useful to NULL terminate the path for the second stage, it doesn't seem
-quite right to do this for the remaining LoadOptions data. Grub's
-chainloader command supplies additional arguments as a NULL-terminated
-space-delimited string via LoadOptions. Making it NULL-delimited seems to
-be incompatible with the kernel's commandline handling, which wouldn't
-work for scenarios where you might want to direct-boot a kernel image
-(wrapped in systemd's EFI stub) from shim.
-
-- handle_image passes the original LoadOptions to the second stage if
-load_options is NULL, which means that the second stage currently always
-gets shim's load options.
-
-I've made an attempt to try to fix things. After the initial
-checks in set_second_stage, it now does this:
-
-- Tries to parse LoadOptions as an EFI_LOAD_OPTION in order to extract
-the OptionalData if it is.
-- If it's not an EFI_LOAD_OPTION, check if the first string is the
-current shim path and ignore it if it is (the UEFI shell case).
-- Split LoadOptions in to a single NULL terminated string (used to
-initialize second_stage) and the unmodified remaining data (used to
-initialize load_options and load_options_size).
-
-I've also modified handle_image to always set LoadOptions and
-LoadOptionsSize. If shim is executed with no options, or is only
-executed with a single option to override the second stage loader
-path, the second stage is executed with LoadOptions = NULL and
-LoadOptionsSize = 0 now.
-
-I've tested this on EDK2 and I can load a custom loader with extra
-options from both BDS and the UEFI shell:
-
-FS0:\> shimx64.efi test.efi
-LoadOptionsSize: 0
-LoadOptions: (null)
-FS0:\> shimx64.efi       test.efi
-LoadOptionsSize: 0
-LoadOptions: (null)
-FS0:\> shimx64.efi test.efi foo bar
-LoadOptionsSize: 16
-LoadOptions: foo bar
----
- include/ucs2.h |  27 -------
- pe.c           |   6 +-
- shim.c         | 200 ++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------------
- 3 files changed, 92 insertions(+), 141 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/ucs2.h b/include/ucs2.h
-index e43c341..ee038ce 100644
---- a/include/ucs2.h
-+++ b/include/ucs2.h
-@@ -81,31 +81,4 @@ is_all_nuls(UINT8 *data, UINTN data_size)
- 	return true;
- }
- 
--static inline UINTN
--__attribute__((__unused__))
--count_ucs2_strings(UINT8 *data, UINTN data_size)
--{
--	UINTN pos = 0;
--	UINTN last_nul_pos = 0;
--	UINTN num_nuls = 0;
--	UINTN i;
--
--	if (data_size % 2 != 0)
--		return 0;
--
--	for (i = pos; i < data_size; i++) {
--		if (i % 2 != 0) {
--			if (data[i] != 0)
--				return 0;
--		} else if (data[i] == 0) {
--			last_nul_pos = i;
--			num_nuls++;
--		}
--		pos = i;
--	}
--	if (num_nuls > 0 && last_nul_pos != pos - 1)
--		return 0;
--	return num_nuls;
--}
--
- #endif /* SHIM_UCS2_H */
-diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
-index 365e32a..13bc397 100644
---- a/pe.c
-+++ b/pe.c
-@@ -1144,10 +1144,8 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 	li->ImageSize = context.ImageSize;
- 
- 	/* Pass the load options to the second stage loader */
--	if ( load_options ) {
--		li->LoadOptions = load_options;
--		li->LoadOptionsSize = load_options_size;
--	}
-+	li->LoadOptions = load_options;
-+	li->LoadOptionsSize = load_options_size;
- 
- 	if (!found_entry_point) {
- 		perror(L"Entry point is not within sections\n");
-diff --git a/shim.c b/shim.c
-index 40e4894..ecf6ee5 100644
---- a/shim.c
-+++ b/shim.c
-@@ -1241,9 +1241,13 @@ EFI_STATUS init_grub(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
- 	return efi_status;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Extract the OptionalData and OptionalData fields from an
-+ * EFI_LOAD_OPTION.
-+ */
- static inline EFI_STATUS
--get_load_option_optional_data(UINT8 *data, UINTN data_size,
--			      UINT8 **od, UINTN *ods)
-+get_load_option_optional_data(VOID *data, UINT32 data_size,
-+			      VOID **od, UINT32 *ods)
- {
- 	/*
- 	 * If it's not at least Attributes + FilePathListLength +
-@@ -1253,7 +1257,8 @@ get_load_option_optional_data(UINT8 *data, UINTN data_size,
- 	if (data_size < (sizeof(UINT32) + sizeof(UINT16) + 2 + 4))
- 		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- 
--	UINT8 *cur = data + sizeof(UINT32);
-+	UINT8 *start = (UINT8 *)data;
-+	UINT8 *cur = start + sizeof(UINT32);
- 	UINT16 fplistlen = *(UINT16 *)cur;
- 	/*
- 	 * If there's not enough space for the file path list and the
-@@ -1263,8 +1268,8 @@ get_load_option_optional_data(UINT8 *data, UINTN data_size,
- 		return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- 
- 	cur += sizeof(UINT16);
--	UINTN limit = data_size - (cur - data) - fplistlen;
--	UINTN i;
-+	UINT32 limit = data_size - (cur - start) - fplistlen;
-+	UINT32 i;
- 	for (i = 0; i < limit ; i++) {
- 		/* If the description isn't valid UCS2-LE, it's not valid. */
- 		if (i % 2 != 0) {
-@@ -1380,6 +1385,57 @@ done:
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Split the supplied load options in to a NULL terminated
-+ * string representing the path of the second stage loader,
-+ * and return a pointer to the remaining load options data
-+ * and its remaining size.
-+ *
-+ * This expects the supplied load options to begin with a
-+ * string that is either NULL terminated or terminated with
-+ * a space and some optional data. It will return NULL if
-+ * the supplied load options contains no spaces or NULL
-+ * terminators.
-+ */
-+static CHAR16 *
-+split_load_options(VOID *in, UINT32 in_size,
-+		   VOID **remaining,
-+		   UINT32 *remaining_size) {
-+	UINTN i;
-+	CHAR16 *arg0 = NULL;
-+	CHAR16 *start = (CHAR16 *)in;
-+
-+	/* Skip spaces */
-+	for (i = 0; i < in_size / sizeof(CHAR16); i++) {
-+		if (*start != L' ')
-+			break;
-+
-+		start++;
-+	}
-+
-+	in_size -= ((VOID *)start - in);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Ensure that the first argument is NULL terminated by
-+	 * replacing L' ' with L'\0'.
-+	 */
-+	for (i = 0; i < in_size / sizeof(CHAR16); i++) {
-+		if (start[i] == L' ' || start[i] == L'\0') {
-+			start[i] = L'\0';
-+			arg0 = (CHAR16 *)start;
-+			break;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	if (arg0) {
-+		UINTN skip = i + 1;
-+		*remaining_size = in_size - (skip * sizeof(CHAR16));
-+		*remaining = *remaining_size > 0 ? start + skip : NULL;
-+	}
-+
-+	return arg0;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Check the load options to specify the second stage loader
-  */
-@@ -1387,20 +1443,11 @@ EFI_STATUS set_second_stage (EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
- {
- 	EFI_STATUS efi_status;
- 	EFI_LOADED_IMAGE *li = NULL;
--	CHAR16 *start = NULL;
--	UINTN remaining_size = 0;
-+	VOID *remaining = NULL;
-+	UINT32 remaining_size;
- 	CHAR16 *loader_str = NULL;
--	UINTN loader_len = 0;
--	unsigned int i;
--	UINTN second_stage_len;
- 
--	second_stage_len = (StrLen(DEFAULT_LOADER) + 1) * sizeof(CHAR16);
--	second_stage = AllocatePool(second_stage_len);
--	if (!second_stage) {
--		perror(L"Could not allocate %lu bytes\n", second_stage_len);
--		return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
--	}
--	StrCpy(second_stage, DEFAULT_LOADER);
-+	second_stage = DEFAULT_LOADER;
- 	load_options = NULL;
- 	load_options_size = 0;
- 
-@@ -1499,105 +1546,44 @@ EFI_STATUS set_second_stage (EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
- 		return EFI_SUCCESS;
- 
- 	/*
--	 * Check and see if this is just a list of strings.  If it's an
--	 * EFI_LOAD_OPTION, it'll be 0, since we know EndEntire device path
--	 * won't pass muster as UCS2-LE.
--	 *
--	 * If there are 3 strings, we're launched from the shell most likely,
--	 * But we actually only care about the second one.
-+	 * See if this is an EFI_LOAD_OPTION and extract the optional
-+	 * data if it is. This will return an error if it is not a valid
-+	 * EFI_LOAD_OPTION.
- 	 */
--	UINTN strings = count_ucs2_strings(li->LoadOptions,
--					   li->LoadOptionsSize);
--
--	/*
--	 * In some cases we get strings == 1 because BDS is using L' ' as the
--	 * delimeter:
--	 * 0000:74 00 65 00 73 00 74 00 2E 00 65 00 66 00 69 00 t.e.s.t...e.f.i.
--	 * 0016:20 00 6F 00 6E 00 65 00 20 00 74 00 77 00 6F 00 ..o.n.e...t.w.o.
--	 * 0032:20 00 74 00 68 00 72 00 65 00 65 00 00 00       ..t.h.r.e.e...
--	 *
--	 * If so replace it with NULs since the code already handles that
--	 * case.
--	 */
--	if (strings == 1) {
--		UINT16 *cur = start = li->LoadOptions;
--
--		/* replace L' ' with L'\0' if we find any */
--		for (i = 0; i < li->LoadOptionsSize / 2; i++) {
--			if (cur[i] == L' ')
--				cur[i] = L'\0';
--		}
--
--		/* redo the string count */
--		strings = count_ucs2_strings(li->LoadOptions,
--					     li->LoadOptionsSize);
--	}
--
--	/*
--	 * If it's not string data, try it as an EFI_LOAD_OPTION.
--	 */
--	if (strings == 0) {
--		/*
--		 * We at least didn't find /enough/ strings.  See if it works
--		 * as an EFI_LOAD_OPTION.
--		 */
--		efi_status = get_load_option_optional_data(li->LoadOptions,
--							   li->LoadOptionsSize,
--							   (UINT8 **)&start,
--							   &loader_len);
--		if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
--			return EFI_SUCCESS;
--
--		remaining_size = 0;
--	} else if (strings >= 2) {
-+	efi_status = get_load_option_optional_data(li->LoadOptions,
-+						   li->LoadOptionsSize,
-+						   &li->LoadOptions,
-+						   &li->LoadOptionsSize);
-+	if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- 		/*
-+		 * it's not an EFI_LOAD_OPTION, so it's probably just a string
-+		 * or list of strings.
-+		 *
- 		 * UEFI shell copies the whole line of the command into
--		 * LoadOptions.  We ignore the string before the first L'\0',
--		 * i.e. the name of this program.
-+		 * LoadOptions. We ignore the first string, i.e. the name of this
-+		 * program in this case.
- 		 */
--		UINT16 *cur = li->LoadOptions;
--		for (i = 1; i < li->LoadOptionsSize / 2; i++) {
--			if (cur[i - 1] == L'\0') {
--				start = &cur[i];
--				remaining_size = li->LoadOptionsSize - (i * 2);
--				break;
--			}
-+		CHAR16 *loader_str = split_load_options(li->LoadOptions,
-+							li->LoadOptionsSize,
-+							&remaining,
-+							&remaining_size);
-+
-+		if (loader_str && is_our_path(li, loader_str)) {
-+			li->LoadOptions = remaining;
-+			li->LoadOptionsSize = remaining_size;
- 		}
--
--		remaining_size -= i * 2 + 2;
--	} else if (strings == 1 && is_our_path(li, start)) {
--		/*
--		 * And then I found a version of BDS that gives us our own path
--		 * in LoadOptions:
--
--77162C58                           5c 00 45 00 46 00 49 00          |\.E.F.I.|
--77162C60  5c 00 42 00 4f 00 4f 00  54 00 5c 00 42 00 4f 00  |\.B.O.O.T.\.B.O.|
--77162C70  4f 00 54 00 58 00 36 00  34 00 2e 00 45 00 46 00  |O.T.X.6.4...E.F.|
--77162C80  49 00 00 00                                       |I...|
--
--		* which is just cruel... So yeah, just don't use it.
--		*/
--		return EFI_SUCCESS;
- 	}
- 
-+	loader_str = split_load_options(li->LoadOptions, li->LoadOptionsSize,
-+					&remaining, &remaining_size);
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Set up the name of the alternative loader and the LoadOptions for
- 	 * the loader
- 	 */
--	if (loader_len > 0) {
--		/* we might not always have a NULL at the end */
--		loader_str = AllocatePool(loader_len + 2);
--		if (!loader_str) {
--			perror(L"Failed to allocate loader string\n");
--			return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
--		}
--
--		for (i = 0; i < loader_len / 2; i++)
--			loader_str[i] = start[i];
--		loader_str[loader_len/2] = L'\0';
--
-+	if (loader_str) {
- 		second_stage = loader_str;
--		load_options = remaining_size ? start + (loader_len/2) : NULL;
-+		load_options = remaining;
- 		load_options_size = remaining_size;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -1777,12 +1763,6 @@ shim_fini(void)
- 
- 	unhook_exit();
- 
--	/*
--	 * Free the space allocated for the alternative 2nd stage loader
--	 */
--	if (load_options_size > 0 && second_stage)
--		FreePool(second_stage);
--
- 	console_fini();
- }
- 
--- 
-2.27.0
-
diff --git a/backport-shim-implement-SBAT-verification-for-the-shim_lock-p.patch b/backport-shim-implement-SBAT-verification-for-the-shim_lock-p.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 31ba7cf73b98f06e0c6f6f8cad470b91d501f50f..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
--- a/backport-shim-implement-SBAT-verification-for-the-shim_lock-p.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,225 +0,0 @@
-From a2da05fcb8972628bec08e4adfc13abbafc319ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Feb 2022 21:29:16 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] shim: implement SBAT verification for the shim_lock protocol
-
-This implements SBAT verification via the shim_lock protocol
-by moving verification inside the existing verify_buffer()
-function that is shared by both shim_verify() and handle_image().
-
-The .sbat section is optional for code verified via the shim_lock
-protocol, unlike for code that is verified and executed directly
-by shim. For executables that don't have a .sbat section,
-verification is skipped when using the protocol.
-
-A vendor can enforce SBAT verification for code verified via the
-shim_lock protocol by revoking all pre-SBAT binaries via a dbx
-update or by using vendor_dbx and then only signing binaries that
-have a .sbat section from that point.
-
-Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
----
- include/pe.h |  2 +-
- pe.c         | 46 +++++++--------------------------
- shim.c       | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
- 3 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/include/pe.h b/include/pe.h
-index 43727f5..b86e1b3 100644
---- a/include/pe.h
-+++ b/include/pe.h
-@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ read_header(void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 	    PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context);
- 
- EFI_STATUS
--handle_sbat(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize);
-+verify_sbat_section(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize);
- 
- EFI_STATUS
- handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
-diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
-index 92c2804..554e77c 100644
---- a/pe.c
-+++ b/pe.c
-@@ -820,7 +820,7 @@ read_header(void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- }
- 
- EFI_STATUS
--handle_sbat(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize)
-+verify_sbat_section(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize)
- {
- 	unsigned int i;
- 	EFI_STATUS efi_status;
-@@ -834,7 +834,12 @@ handle_sbat(char *SBATBase, size_t SBATSize)
- 
- 	if (SBATBase == NULL || SBATSize == 0) {
- 		dprint(L"No .sbat section data\n");
--		return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
-+		/*
-+		 * SBAT is mandatory for binaries loaded by shim, but optional
-+		 * for binaries loaded outside of shim but verified via the
-+		 * protocol.
-+		 */
-+		return in_protocol ? EFI_SUCCESS : EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- 	}
- 
- 	sbat_size = SBATSize + 1;
-@@ -980,9 +985,6 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 
- 	EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *RelocSection = NULL;
- 
--	char *SBATBase = NULL;
--	size_t SBATSize = 0;
--
- 	/*
- 	 * Copy the executable's sections to their desired offsets
- 	 */
-@@ -1027,33 +1029,6 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 					RelocBaseEnd == end) {
- 				RelocSection = Section;
- 			}
--		} else if (CompareMem(Section->Name, ".sbat\0\0\0", 8) == 0) {
--			if (SBATBase || SBATSize) {
--				perror(L"Image has multiple SBAT sections\n");
--				return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
--			}
--
--			if (Section->NumberOfRelocations != 0 ||
--			    Section->PointerToRelocations != 0) {
--				perror(L"SBAT section has relocations\n");
--				return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
--			}
--
--			/* The virtual size corresponds to the size of the SBAT
--			 * metadata and isn't necessarily a multiple of the file
--			 * alignment. The on-disk size is a multiple of the file
--			 * alignment and is zero padded. Make sure that the
--			 * on-disk size is at least as large as virtual size,
--			 * and ignore the section if it isn't. */
--			if (Section->SizeOfRawData &&
--			    Section->SizeOfRawData >= Section->Misc.VirtualSize &&
--			    base && end) {
--				SBATBase = base;
--				/* +1 because of size vs last byte location */
--				SBATSize = end - base + 1;
--				dprint(L"sbat section base:0x%lx size:0x%lx\n",
--				       SBATBase, SBATSize);
--			}
- 		}
- 
- 		if (Section->Characteristics & EFI_IMAGE_SCN_MEM_DISCARDABLE) {
-@@ -1095,11 +1070,8 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
- 	}
- 
- 	if (secure_mode ()) {
--		efi_status = handle_sbat(SBATBase, SBATSize);
--
--		if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
--			efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize,
--						   &context, sha256hash, sha1hash);
-+		efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
-+					   sha1hash);
- 
- 		if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- 			if (verbose)
-diff --git a/shim.c b/shim.c
-index 604c0db..6d6b1e5 100644
---- a/shim.c
-+++ b/shim.c
-@@ -559,9 +559,9 @@ verify_one_signature(WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS *sig,
-  * Check that the signature is valid and matches the binary
-  */
- EFI_STATUS
--verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
--	       PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context,
--	       UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
-+verify_buffer_authenticode (char *data, int datasize,
-+			    PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context,
-+			    UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
- {
- 	EFI_STATUS ret_efi_status;
- 	size_t size = datasize;
-@@ -695,6 +695,71 @@ verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
- 	return ret_efi_status;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Check that the binary is permitted to load by SBAT.
-+ */
-+EFI_STATUS
-+verify_buffer_sbat (char *data, int datasize,
-+		    PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context)
-+{
-+	int i;
-+	EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
-+	char *SBATBase = NULL;
-+	size_t SBATSize = 0;
-+
-+	Section = context->FirstSection;
-+	for (i = 0; i < context->NumberOfSections; i++, Section++) {
-+		if (CompareMem(Section->Name, ".sbat\0\0\0", 8) != 0)
-+			continue;
-+
-+		if (SBATBase || SBATSize) {
-+			perror(L"Image has multiple SBAT sections\n");
-+			return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
-+		}
-+
-+		if (Section->NumberOfRelocations != 0 ||
-+		    Section->PointerToRelocations != 0) {
-+			perror(L"SBAT section has relocations\n");
-+			return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
-+		}
-+
-+		/* The virtual size corresponds to the size of the SBAT
-+		 * metadata and isn't necessarily a multiple of the file
-+		 * alignment. The on-disk size is a multiple of the file
-+		 * alignment and is zero padded. Make sure that the
-+		 * on-disk size is at least as large as virtual size,
-+		 * and ignore the section if it isn't. */
-+		if (Section->SizeOfRawData &&
-+		    Section->SizeOfRawData >= Section->Misc.VirtualSize) {
-+			SBATBase = ImageAddress(data, datasize,
-+						Section->PointerToRawData);
-+			SBATSize = Section->SizeOfRawData;
-+			dprint(L"sbat section base:0x%lx size:0x%lx\n",
-+			       SBATBase, SBATSize);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return verify_sbat_section(SBATBase, SBATSize);
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Check that the signature is valid and matches the binary and that
-+ * the binary is permitted to load by SBAT.
-+ */
-+EFI_STATUS
-+verify_buffer (char *data, int datasize,
-+	       PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context,
-+	       UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
-+{
-+	EFI_STATUS efi_status;
-+
-+	efi_status = verify_buffer_sbat(data, datasize, context);
-+	if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
-+		return efi_status;
-+
-+	return verify_buffer_authenticode(data, datasize, context, sha256hash, sha1hash);
-+}
-+
- static int
- should_use_fallback(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
- {
-@@ -1542,7 +1607,7 @@ efi_main (EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab)
- 			goto die;
- 		}
- 
--		efi_status = handle_sbat(sbat_start, sbat_end - sbat_start - 1);
-+		efi_status = verify_sbat_section(sbat_start, sbat_end - sbat_start - 1);
- 		if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- 			perror(L"Verifiying shim SBAT data failed: %r\n",
- 			       efi_status);
--- 
-2.27.0
-
diff --git a/shim-15.4.tar.bz2 b/shim-15.4.tar.bz2
deleted file mode 100644
index 503b4ece5d6928a385d52f3ec87f85309a149d36..0000000000000000000000000000000000000000
Binary files a/shim-15.4.tar.bz2 and /dev/null differ
diff --git a/shim-15.6.tar.bz2 b/shim-15.6.tar.bz2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000..c88d790071b21728470d721c2c97c331d1eb2271
Binary files /dev/null and b/shim-15.6.tar.bz2 differ
diff --git a/shim.spec b/shim.spec
index 5e23d028454692b09707c505ca6cfc4b60a8fd7a..cd6bdbf795e1137017fa640411d4bdd07c9dfa26 100644
--- a/shim.spec
+++ b/shim.spec
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
 %global shimBOOT  /boot/efi/EFI/BOOT/
 
 Name:	   	   shim
-Version:	   15.4
-Release:	   5
+Version:	   15.6
+Release:	   1
 Summary:	   First-stage UEFI bootloader
 ExclusiveArch:     x86_64 aarch64
 License:	   BSD
@@ -31,33 +31,6 @@ Source0:	   https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/%{version}/shim-%{v
 Source1:	   BOOTAA64.CSV
 Source2:	   BOOTX64.CSV
 
-Patch0: backport-shim-another-attempt-to-fix-load-options-handling.patch
-Patch1: backport-arm-aa64-fix-the-size-of-.rela-sections.patch
-Patch2: backport-mok-relax-the-maximum-variable-size-check.patch
-Patch3: backport-mok-delete-the-existing-RT-variables-only-when-only_.patch
-Patch4: backport-shim-implement-SBAT-verification-for-the-shim_lock-p.patch
-Patch5: backport-0001-CVE-2022-28737.patch
-Patch6: backport-0002-CVE-2022-28737.patch
-Patch7: backport-CVE-2017-3735.patch
-Patch8: backport-CVE-2017-3737.patch
-Patch9: backport-CVE-2018-0732.patch
-Patch10: backport-Fix-an-endless-loop-in-rsa_builtin_keygen.patch
-Patch11: backport-Replaced-variable-time-GCD-with-consttime-inversion.patch
-Patch12: backport-consttime-flag-changed.patch
-Patch13: backport-CVE-2018-0737.patch
-Patch14: backport-CVE-2018-0739.patch
-Patch15: backport-CVE-2019-1563.patch
-Patch16: backport-0001-CVE-2020-1971.patch
-Patch17: backport-0002-CVE-2020-1971.patch
-Patch18: backport-0003-CVE-2020-1971.patch
-Patch19: backport-0004-CVE-2020-1971.patch
-Patch20: backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE.patch
-Patch21: backport-make-update-EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE.patch
-Patch22: backport-CVE-2021-23840.patch
-Patch23: backport-CVE-2021-23841.patch
-Patch24: backport-CVE-2022-0778.patch
-Patch25: backport-CVE-2021-3712.patch
-
 BuildRequires: elfutils-libelf-devel openssl-devel openssl git pesign gnu-efi gnu-efi-devel gcc
 Requires:      dbxtool efi-filesystem mokutil
 Provides:	   bundled(openssl) = 1.0.2j
@@ -153,9 +126,7 @@ cd ..
 %files debuginfo
 %defattr(-,root,root,-)
 /usr/lib/debug/*
-%ifarch x86_64
 %exclude /usr/lib/debug/.build-id
-%endif
 
 %files debugsource
 %defattr(-,root,root,-)
@@ -163,6 +134,9 @@ cd ..
 /usr/src/debug/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}/*
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Oct 31 2022 jinlun <jinlun@huawei.com> - 15.6-1
+- update version to 15.6
+
 * Tue Sep 20 2022 jinlun <jinlun@huawei.com> - 15.4-5
 - fix CVE-2017-3735 CVE-2017-3737 CVE-2018-0732 CVE-2018-0737
   CVE-2018-0739 CVE-2019-1563 CVE-2020-1971 CVE-2021-23840